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Abstract
This dissertation considers the theological suitability of Charles S. Peirce’s philosophy of
signs (semeiotic) for use in theories respecting the great Christian tradition. As a case-study, this
dissertation examines panentheism as a problem for a Christian approach to natural theology utilizing semeiotic, as proposed by Alister McGrath. Leading interpreters of Peirce’s philosophy of
religion, Michael Raposa and Robert Corrington, hold that Peirce’s semeiotic entails a panentheist ontology. If that is the case, then a fully developed use of semeiotic by McGrath may inadvertently risk the coherence of his theory. The present study takes a systematic theology approach combined with an empirical method inspired by Peirce’s distinct form of pragmatism.
Chapter one introduces the problematic, the methodology, and the plan for the work of this dissertation. Chapter two defines three characteristic discrepancies that any authentic form of
panentheism will have vis-à-vis a traditional Christian theology of the Creator-creature relation.
Chapter three explores the relationship of Peirce’s thought to panentheist ontology as defined in
chapter two. It finds that Peirce’s semeiotic is not inherently panentheist but that some of its aspects understandably lend themselves to panentheist perspectives in the thought of some interpreters of Peirce. Chapter four tests for the persistence of this relation of Peirce’s semeiotic to
panentheism by constructing a robustly semeiotic form of McGrath’s theory (via Raposa’s theosemiotic), identifying Robert Neville as an exemplar of such a Christian theosemiotic, and sampling Neville’s work for evidence of panentheism. This dissertation concludes that Neville’s
prior ontological commitments, rather than semeiotic, are the primary factors in his positive relation to panentheism. Therefore, semeiotic appears to be susceptible to panentheist perspectives
held by interpreters, but semeiotic itself does not seem to entail panentheism. Consequently,
there is reason to expect that a robust semeiotic theory applied to the task of Christian natural
iv

theology will not stumble over panentheism as long as it holds to a traditional Christian ontology. This result bears positive implications for the use of semeiotic in theological endeavors in
many other forms of cultural engagement beyond the religion and science dialogue that situates
McGrath’s proposal.
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One: Introduction
Natural theology is experiencing a rebirth. Karl Barth effectively silenced theologians
pursuing natural theology in the twentieth century.1 It has been primarily scientists exploring a
“new natural theology” within the religion and science field.2 They are motivated at once by both
the wonders of some natural phenomena and a desire to avoid a God-of-the-gaps appeal. Nor is
this a “revival” of natural theology in its classical philosophical mode of working out various
proofs of God’s existence. Rather, the new natural theology argues for theism as the best explanation for “the way the world is.”3 John Polkinghorne has studied the phenomenon of this shift
toward natural theology in religion and science circles and is among its chief proponents. in his
estimation, “we are living in a third period of intense activity in natural theology.”4
Several of the most important voices from the last one hundred years of contemporary
theology contribute to this renaissance of natural theology: Teilhard de Chardin, John MacQuarrie, Jürgen Moltmann, T. F. Torrance, Wolfhart Pannenberg, and Alister McGrath.5 As a product
of late twentieth and early twenty-first century culture, often the new natural theology is marked
by core values of the day, including relationality/relativity and the incomplete process of

Cf., Andrew Moore, “Theological Critiques of Natural Theology,” in The Oxford Handbook of Natural
Theology, ed. Russell Re Manning (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
1

John C. Polkinghorne, “Where is Natural Theology Today?,” Science and Christian Belief 18, no. 2
(2006): 171; Peter Barrett, “The New Natural Theology: A Bridging and Integrating Mode of Inquiry,” Scriptura 89
(2005): 495-99.
2

3

Polkinghorne, “Natural Theology Today,” 172.

4

Ibid., 170-71. The other two periods culminated in Anselm and then in William Paley.

5

Cf., Alister E. McGrath, Science and Religion A New Introduction (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons,
2013), cf., Part IV “Case Studies in Science and Religion”; Michael W. Brierley, “Naming a Quiet Revolution: The
Panentheistic Turn in Modern Theology,” in In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being: Panentheistic
Reflections on God’s Presence in a Scientific World, ed. Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
William B. Eerdmans, 2004), 3.
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becoming.6 Accordingly, some of the most prolific proponents of the new natural theology also
lend their voices to panentheism as the best way forward in the dialogic relationship between
theology and science; namely, Ian Barbour, John MacQuarrie, Jürgen Moltmann, Arthur Peacocke, and Philip Clayton.7
For those concerned to maintain traditional forms of Christian faith, panentheism presents
a problem for natural theology, “new” or otherwise.8 Through most of the twentieth century
“panentheism” was synonymous with process theism in the Whiteheadian tradition of Charles
Hartshorne. 9 Evangelical philosophers and theologians subjected process panentheism to rigorous critique.10 Disciples of Hartshorne endeavored to improve upon his ideas.11 Some more recent proponents of panentheism have shied away from Hartshorne’s full-throated panentheism,
wishing to benefit from its coherence with modern naturalistic science while also holding on to
certain beliefs of classical theism that Hartshorne rejects.12 However, it is doubtful that such a
balance has yet been achieved. In a recent essay, evangelical theologian Roger Olson has engaged the present generation of panentheism. He grants that today’s panentheism is not

6
John C. Polkinghorne, “Christianity and Science,” in Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, ed.
Philip Clayton (New York: Oxford Univ Press, 2006), 64-68.

Brierley, “Naming,” 3. The generic gloss for “panentheism” is that the world is in God, while God is more
than the world. Normally, the “in” is understood in some sort of ontological sense. See chapter two of this
dissertation and Appendix A.
7

8

“Traditional” is used here in the sense of the great Christian tradition; on which, see below.

9

E.g., Charles Hartshorne, A Natural Theology for Our Time (La Salle, Il.: Open Court, 1967).

10
E.g., W. David Beck, “Schubert Ogden on the Relationship between Theology and Philosophy” (Ph.D.
diss., Boston University, 1980); R.G. Gruenler, The Inexhaustible God: Biblical Faith and the Challenge of Process
Theism (Baker Book House, 1983); Norman L. Geisler, Christian Apologetics, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, Mich: Baker
Academic, 2013), 177-194.
11
John B. Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, Based on the Thought of Alfred North Whitehead
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965); David Ray Griffin, Reenchantment Without Supernaturalism: A Process
Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2001).

Owen C. Thomas, “Problems in Panentheism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, ed.
Philip Clayton (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 654. Some identifying as panentheists wish to maintain
classical theistic beliefs such as divine omniscience, creaturely contingency, and creation ex nihilo; ibid., 655.
12

3
necessarily subject to the devastating critiques applied to process panentheism. It is possible, argues Olson, that a Christian form of panentheism could balance tradition and science. Such a
panentheism must guard Christian faith by maintaining God’s strict ontological independence
from the world that is God’s creation.13 As discussion later in this dissertation will show, maintaining a God-world ontological duality disqualifies a view’s claim to panentheism in the estimation of some of its leading advocates. The problem of panentheism for the new natural theology,
then, is that panentheism as such still must deny one of the defining tenets of a traditional Christian doctrine of God.
Into this fray, like twenty-first century prophets to a post-secular, but also post-Christian,
culture, two voices have cried out to religion and science researchers, urging the new natural theology to maintain its traditional Christian moorings. 14 At the turn of this century, theologian
Stanley Hauerwas delivered the Gifford Lectures. Hauerwas surveyed twentieth-century developments in natural theology. He argued for a twenty-first century practice of natural theology as
a form of witness to the great tradition of the Christian faith.15 At this same time, Alister
McGrath was working out his three-volume contribution to religion and science, A Scientific
Theology. In that work he drew inspiration from T. F. Torrance and Emil Brunner who advocated
that Christian theology can be both faithful to tradition and scientifically coherent.16 Rather than

Roger E. Olson, “A Postconservative Evangelical Response to Panentheism,” The Evangelical Quarterly
85, no. 4 (2013): 331-32, 336-37.
13

14
On the cultural description “post-secular,” cf., Jürgen Habermas, An Awareness of What is Missing:
Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular Age (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), 18.

Stanley Hauerwas, With the Grain of the Universe: the Church’s Witness and Natural Theology: Being
the Gifford Lectures Delivered at the University of St. Andrews in 2001 (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic,
2013).
15

16

Alister E. McGrath, A Scientific Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans Pub., 2001-2003). On
the background figures T. F. Torrance and Emil Brunner, cf., also, Alister E. McGrath, T. F. Torrance: An
Intellectual Biography (Bloomsbury Academic, 2006); Alister E. McGrath, Emil Brunner: A Reappraisal (Malden,
MA: Wiley, 2013).
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a culmination of his work in natural theology, that series marked only the beginning of what has
become years of work to cast a vision for a “renewal” of natural theology. More specifically,
since 2008, McGrath has been working out a vision for a “Christian natural theology” that bears
witness to the truth of Christian faith in the abductive (best explanation) manner of the new natural theology.17
In his recent book, Re-Imagining Nature, McGrath’s epistemology of the Christian natural theology he envisions may inadvertently plant a seed leading to incoherence. Any natural theology must account for how it is that one expects natural phenomena to communicate information about God. He proposes that the sign theory (semeiotic) of nineteenth century philosopher and scientist Charles S. Peirce provides a crucial element Christian natural theology.18 To
McGrath, Peirce’s sign theory explains how human minds make theological sense of natural objects and informs the strategic cultivation of a Christian perspective on the natural world.19 Since
Charles Hartshorne decades ago, Peirce scholars have held that Peirce’s philosophy indicates a
panentheist account of the God-world relation. For example, Michael Raposa, whose Peirce’s
Philosophy of Religion provides the only monograph explicating Peirce’s philosophy of religion,
writes, “…Peirce, while definitely not a pantheist, might be properly labeled a panentheist, that
is, one who views the world as being included in but not exhaustive of the divine reality.”20 It

17

Alister E. McGrath, The Open Secret: A New Vision for Natural Theology, Kindle ed. (Malden, MA:
Blackwell Publishing, 2008); Alister E. McGrath, A Fine-Tuned Universe: The Quest for God in Science and
Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009); Alister E. McGrath, Darwinism and the Divine:
Evolutionary Thought and Natural Theology (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013); Alister E. McGrath, ReImagining Nature: The Promise of a Christian Natural Theology (Malden, MA: Wiley, 2016).
18

For an informative introduction to Charles Peirce, cf., Douglas R. Anderson and Charles S. Peirce,
Strands of System: the Philosophy of Charles Peirce, Purdue University Press Series in the History of Philosophy
(West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1995).
19

McGrath, Re-Imagining Nature, 69-73; 96-98.

C.f., Michael L. Raposa, Peirce’s Philosophy of Religion (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
1989), 51; Michael L. Raposa, “The ‘Never Ending Poem’: Some Remarks on Dombrowski’s Divine Beauty,”
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy 31, no. 3 (2010): 220-21. For Hartshorne’s view, cf., Charles
20

5
may be the case that Peirce’s philosophy of signs entails the sort of panentheism that contradicts
the Christian faith McGrath’s project aims to uphold.
This dissertation engages the possibility of this problem of panentheism due to the influence of Peirce’s thought upon McGrath’s theory of Christian natural theology. It applies a pragmatic method of inquiry in combination with the theological values and structures of systematic
Christian theology. It carefully defines “panentheism” and why it presents a problem for theology in the mainstream of the great Christian tradition. It also establishes the manner in which
Peirce’s sign theory relates to panentheism. Then this dissertation discovers the theological effects a full version of Peirce’s sign theory would have if incorporated into Christian natural theology.21 As a result, this study finds that a robust appropriation of Peirce’s semeiotic would

Hartshorne and William L. Reese, Philosophers speak of God (Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books, 2000; repr., 1953),
258-69. Cf., also, Robert S. Corrington, Introduction to C. S. Peirce: Philosopher, Semiotician, and Ecstatic
Naturalist (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1993), 202-03; John W. Cooper, Panentheism—The Other God of the
Philosophers: From Plato to the Present (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2013), 139; Leon J. Niemoczynski,
“The Sacred Depths of Nature: An Ontology of the Possible in the Philosophy of Peirce and Heidegger” (Ph.D.
diss., Southern Illinois University Carbondale, 2009), 112, 114. In a similar way, Donna Orange’s own descriptions
of Peirce’s conception of God seem to indicate panentheism, though she did not use that term. She holds that for
Peirce God is not simply identified with the “sum of all items in the universe…Rather, the divine is the tendency,
manifested in natural processes, of growth toward reasonableness.” But this immanence is balanced by the
transcendence of Peirce’s God as also the ideal of these processes. Cf. Donna M. Orange, Peirce’s Conception of
God: A Developmental Study (Lubbock, Tex., USA: Institute for Studies in Pragmaticism, 1984), 91-92. Cf. also
Benjamin J. Chicka, “God the Created: Philosophy, Science, and Pragmatic Constructive Realism” (Ph.D. The
Claremont Graduate University, 2017), 71. Others include John R Shook, “Panentheism and Peirce's God: Theology
Guided by Philosophy and Cosmology,” Philosophy, Theology and the Sciences 3, no. 1 (2016): 29; David Matthew
Mills, “The Drama of Creation: Charles Sanders Peirce on the Universe as God’s Work of Art” (Ph.D. diss.,
Pennsylvania State University, 2000), 122; Charles Gerald Conway, “A study in the metaphysics of metaphorical
theology: C. S. Peirce's conception of the ‘continuum’ as a model for the ‘spiritual presence’ of Paul Tillich” (Ph.D.
diss., Graduate Theological Union, 2005), 179; Søren Brier, “Can Peircean Pragmaticism Help Theology to
Understand the World?,” Chinese Semiotic Studies 12, no. 3 (2016): 477. Cf. also, Søren Brier, “Pragmaticism,
Science, and Theology or How to Answer the Riddle of the Sphinx?,” The American Journal of Semiotics 34, no. 12 (2018): 142, 145-47, 150-56.
Peirce scholarship increasingly recognizes the coherence of Peirce’s philosophical theories as a system.
Therefore, abstracting elements of Peirce’s system for use in other systems may not be valid, depending on the
compatibility of the other system with that of Peirce. Indeed, Peirce seems to have claimed as much regarding the
use of his philosophy for theology. Regarding the use of his categories to argue for the divine Trinity, Peirce writes
that the user must also accept the philosophical system within which the categories function as theorized. Cf., Roger
A. Ward, Peirce and Religion: Knowledge, Transformation, and the Reality of God, American Philosophy Series
(London; Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2018), 32.
21

6
influence McGrath’s project to share Peirce’s relation to panentheism; that is, to share Peirce’s
bias toward—and thus a susceptibility to—a panentheist ontology.
Review of Literature
A review of the relevant literature shows that some who address the question of the compatibility of Peirce’s semeiotic metaphysics with a broadly Christian theology do not find apparent panentheist implications problematic. Philosopher Michael Raposa holds they do not contradict one another.22 He writes that panentheism “neither undermines the doctrine of creation nor
collapses the distinction between God and the universe,” (PPR 51). Charles Conway writes in his
theology dissertation that “panentheism does not preclude trinitarianism, if one properly conceives the work and ‘place’ of the Spirit.”23 Like Raposa, Conway presses beyond mere non-contradiction. He claims also that, at least in some respects, Peirce’s philosophy is consistent with
trinitarian theology. Conway’s entire project focuses on the correlation of the Holy Spirit and the
metaphysical continuum grounding all signs, in light of Paul Tillich’s pneumatology.24 So, in the

Raposa, “Never Ending Poem,” 208; 220-21. Further, it seems valid to infer from Raposa that Peirce’s
panentheist system is consistent with classical theism. In his seminal monograph on Peirce, Raposa contends with
Charles Hartshorne’s claims that “elements” of classical theism in Peirce’s thought “are inconsistent with elements
in Peirce’s system,” (PPR 160-61n22). Elsewhere, Raposa holds that Peirce’s version of the universe as a body of
signs is, like the traditional view of “‘the book of nature,’” “entirely consistent with the basic features of a classical
theism.” Cf., Michael L. Raposa, “In the Presence of the Universe: Peirce, Royce, and Theology as Theosemiotic,”
The Harvard Theological Review 103, no. 2 (2010): 215.
22

While Raposa pays attention to classical theism, it should be noted, that “classical theism” is not
necessarily identical to trinitarian Christian theism. This is not a critique of classical theism, but a contextual
distinction. Classical theism pertains to philosophical theology rather than confessional approaches to theology such
as McGrath’s proposed Christian natural theology. Thomas Williams locates the nexus of classical theism in an
affinity for adopting Platonic and/or Aristotelian philosophy of religion. Therefore, he names Jewish and Muslim
theologies among those associated with classical theism. Thomas Williams, “Introduction to Classical Theism,” in
Models of God and Alternative Ultimate Realities, ed. Jeanine Diller and Asa Kasher (Dordrecht: Springer
Netherlands, 2013), 95. Therefore, the Christian tradition of the triune Godhead is not an aspect of classical theism
as such.
23

Conway, “Metaphorical Theology,” 165.

Cf., esp., Conway, “Metaphorical Theology,” vii. 3, 116-18, 158, 165. Niemoczynski also finds a
correlation of Peirce’s theory of the semiotic ground with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit; cf. Niemoczynski, “The
Sacred Depths of Nature,” 45-46.
24
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cases of Raposa and Conway, one finds affirmations that Peirce’s panentheism is consistent with
some form of Christian theism.
Stronger than claims of not contradicting Christian theism, other writers hold that
Peirce’s philosophy of religion is consistent with certain elements of Christian theology, even
“fruitful” for traditional forms of Christian thought.25 Hermann Deuser has worked for decades
to apply semeiotic to theology for the German Protestant community. For Deuser, Peirce’s
thought supplies an abundant spring of resources to correct persistent problems in theology.26 For
example, Deuser finds that Peirce’s categories equip theologians with a semiotics of symbols that
readily applies to the relations ascribed to the divine Trinity while avoiding subordinationism,
modalism, and polytheism.27 Another problem for which Deuser finds help from Peirce is with
“das Zahlendilemma,” the problem of number for the Trinity. Peirce’s triadic metaphysics appears to be able to coherently negotiate the tension between the unity and trinity of the Godhead.28 Additionally, Deuser appropriates Peirce’s metaphysics and semeiotic to interpret the triune God as a symbol of the dynamic, creative processes of the natural world.29 Deuser finds

Robinson and Southgate write of the “potential fruitfulness of [Peirce’s] metaphysical framework,” in
Andrew Robinson and Christopher Southgate, “Semiotics As a Metaphysical Framework for Christian Theology,”
Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 45, no. 3 (2010): 707. Similarly, Amos Yong writes that Peirce’s triadic
metaphysical categories yield “fruitful insights,” especially regarding issues in Trinitarian theology, cf. Amos Yong,
Dialogical Spirit: Christian Reason and Theological Method in the Third Millennium (Cambridge, United Kingdom:
James Clarke & Co., 2015), 38.
25

Hermann Deuser, Gott: Geist und Natur: theologische Konsequenzen aus Charles S. Peirce’
Religionsphilosophie (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1993), vii. There he writes, „Grundbegriffe und Problemstellungen der
Theologie durch Peirce‘ kategoriale Semiotik in uberzeugenderer Weise formuliert werden konnen; erst dann sind
sie wirklich geeignet, als Losungspotentiale in Theorie und Praxis unserer Lebenswelt eingesetzt zu werden.“
26

Ibid., 109, 164. On Peirce’s triadic categories and semeiotic as resources for theorizing the triunity of the
Godhead, cf. also Yong, Dialogical Spirit, 38.
27

28

Hermann Deuser, Gottesinstinkt: semiotische Religionstheorie und Pragmatismus (Tübingen: Mohr
Siebeck, 2004), 54.
29
E.g., Deuser writes that God is a fitting symbol of the tripartite nature of the human experience of reality,
„Gerade das christliche, personale Symbol “Gott” vermag diese Dreiheit vollständig darzustellen, weil in ihr
Erstheits – und Existenzrelation ebenso gelten wie die Vermittlung des Geistes,“ Deuser, Gottesinsinkt, 16. So,
Deuser calls attention to ways that Peirce’s categorial semiotic explains dynamic world processes that are also
represented by the Trinitarian God as a metaphor of the world. Deuser, Gott: Geist und Natur, 166-67. Raposa and
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those resources helpful also to describe the Father-Son relation, though, again, apparently as
symbolic of dynamic forces in the world as related to things constituting that world.30 However,
Deuser does not raise the question of panentheism. Finally, Deuser finds Peirce helpful in resolving problems regarding the coherence of the doctrine of the Incarnation and regarding divine action in the sacraments of the church.31
Andrew Robinson, though not addressing the question of panentheism, grants a great degree of consistency between Peirce’s metaphysics and Trinitarian theology.32 For example, Robinson writes that the triadic metaphysical categories of Peirce’s system describe a natural semiotic process that “models the ‘perichoresis’ of the Trinitarian persons.” Therefore, he holds that
Peirce’s categories, and the dynamic of signs they inform, are “‘vestiges of the Trinity in creation’.”33 In view of these and other parallels between Peirce’s categories and the persons of the
Trinity, Robinson argues for a Christian metaphysics informed by Peirce’s categories and theory

others also recognize the potential of Peirce’s categorial metaphysics for explicating the God-world relation; cf.
Raposa, Peirce's Philosophy of Religion, 51; Mills, “Drama of Creation,” 113; Yong, Dialogical Spirit, 38. As
discussed above, Raposa and Mills find Peirce to manifest a panentheist model of this relation. Yong, like Deuser,
finds Peirce’s semeiotic helpful to explicate Trinitarian doctrine, including God’s “economic” relationship to the
natural world, though neither comments specifically regarding panentheism.
30

Deuser, Gottesinstinkt, 106-07.

31

Hermann Deuser, Religion: Kosmologie und Evolution: sieben religionsphilosophische Essays
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 69-70; Deuser, Gott: Geist und Natur, 174-75.
32
Robinson and Southgate, “Metaphysical Framework,” 694. One may infer indirect attention to the
panentheist entailments of Peirce’s system in Robinson’s monograph. In one place he passingly mentions
panentheism as among “the various alternatives to creation ex nihilo” put forth out of concern about an
overemphasis on the contingency of creation leading to a Deistic sort of transcendence of God. The context is a
discussion of Colin Gunton’s contribution to trinitarian doctrine of creation and not particular concerns of
panentheism implied by Peirce’s theories. Andrew Robinson, God and the World of Signs Trinity, Evolution, and the
Metaphysical Semiotics of C. S. Peirce (Boston: Brill, 2010), 253.

Robinson, God and the World of Signs, 99, 1. Cf., also, Robinson and Southgate, “Metaphysical
Framework,”690, 693. On the parallel between triadic semiosis and Trinitarian perichoresis, cf. also Crystal
Downing, Changing Signs of Truth: A Christian Introduction to the Semiotics of Communication (Downers Grove,
Ill.: IVP Academic, 2012), 230. Robinson is not alone in recognizing the general correlation of the Trinitarian
persons with Peirce’s formulation of the triadic metaphysical categories. E.g., cf. also Gérard Deledalle, Charles S.
Peirce’s Philosophy of Signs: Essays in Comparative Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 173;
Shook, “Panentheism,” 11n3; Brier, “Peircean Pragmaticism,” 476.
33

9
of signs.34 Consequently, Robinson finds Peirce helpful for resolving problems in Trinitarian theology. He writes, “I suggest a way of approaching, clarifying and developing Trinitarian thought
in the light of Peirce’s metaphysics and semiotics.”35 In particular, Robinson finds Peirce’s categories and semeiotic fruitful for explicating the Trinity in such a way as to avoid polytheism
(“tri-theism”), subordinationism, and modalism.36 A related issue is how “to understand the dynamic mutual indwelling (perichoresis) of the three persons of the Trinity.” Robinson again finds
Peirce’s semeiotic able to explain that problem coherently.37 Peirce’s metaphysical categories not
only help with the basic structure and relations of the triune God. Robinson also finds Peirce’s
thought fruitful in explicating the question of begetting in the Godhead.38 Another theological
issue on which Peirce supplies helpful resources for Robinson is the doctrine of the Incarnation.
In particular, Robinson draws upon Peirce’s taxonomy of signs and their categorial dynamics to
explicate the unity of the divine and human natures of Jesus.39
Pentecostal Christian theologian Amos Yong manifests the range of assessments of
Peirce’s value for theology surveyed here. Like Raposa and Conway, Yong finds Peirce’s views
not to contradict traditional theism. Though not addressing the question of panentheism, Yong

34
Cf., e.g., Robinson and Southgate, “Metaphysical Framework,” 707. What is summarized there is set
forth in detail in Robinson’s monograph; cf. Robinson, God and the World of Signs, 223.
35

Robinson, God and the World of Signs, 9.

36

Robinson and Southgate, “Metaphysical Framework,” 694-95.

Ibid., 695. Crystal Downing, too, finds Peirce helpful to explicate “the coinherence of the Trinity”; cf.
Downing, Changing Signs of Truth, 234.
37

Robinson, God and the World of Signs, 80-81. Cf. also Robinson and Southgate, “Metaphysical
Framework,” 694. On the related issue of the question of God’s existence, Cyril Orji affirms Deledalle’s positive
assessment of the cogency of Peirce’s categorial explication of the being of God as real, transcending the creaturely
world of mere existence. Cf. Cyril Orji, A Science-Theology Rapprochement: Pannenberg, Peirce, and Lonergan in
Conversation (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2018), 112; Deledalle, Philosophy of Signs, 173. “Real” and
“existent” as used by Orji reflects Peirce’s use of these terms within Peirce’s Scholastic Realism. On which, cf.
chapter three below.
38

39

Cf., e.g., Robinson and Southgate, “Metaphysical Framework,” 699.
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affirms that Peirce’s philosophy is “compatible with, or at least not essentially opposed to, evangelical beliefs and sensibilities.” Yong credits Peirce’s vagueness for allowing “a place for the
conservatism of tradition” within Peirce’s widely relevant views.40 Like Robinson and Deuser,
Yong finds various correlations of Peirce’s thought not only consistent with Christian theology
but also fruitful for constructive and systematic work in theology. In one place, he observes, “because Peirce was not primarily a theologian, nor was he interested principally in theological reflection, his should not be mistaken for a theological trinitarianism. At the same time, the suggestiveness of Peirce’s triadic epistemology and metaphysics for religious studies, theology, and
theological method are far from exhausted.”41 Inspired by Donald Gelpi’s work, Yong has produced a monograph on pneumatological theological method drawing expressly upon Peirce’s triadic categories and semeiotic.42 Additionally, Yong points to Peirce as a resource regarding the
understanding of one’s experience of God and the understanding of God as person.43
Alister McGrath and Cyril Orji, in different ways, hold Peirce as crucial to a faithful
Christian theological engagement with science. As noted earlier, McGrath recently describes semeiotic as helpful for structuring a theory of Christian culture toward training the Christian community in viewing the world through the sign of the cross.44 Historically, McGrath’s engagement
with Peirce’s thought regards the value of Peirce’s theory of abductive reasoning applied to

40

Yong, Dialogical Spirit, 20, 38, 41.

41

Amos Yong, Spirit-Word-Community: Theological Hermeneutics in Trinitarian Perspective (Wipf and
Stock Publishers, 2006; repr., Ashgate 2002), 91.
Ibid., 95. Since the 1980s, Donald Gelpi, SJ, has developed and utilized a “foundational pneumatology”
drawing significantly upon Peirce’s core concepts regarding the triadic metaphysical categories. Cf., e.g., Donald L.
Gelpi, Experiencing God: A Theology of Human Emergence (University Press of America, 1987); Donald L. Gelpi,
“The Authentication of Doctrines: Hints from C. S. Peirce,” Theological studies. 60, no. 2 (1999): 276-93.
42

43

Cf., Yong, Dialogical Spirit, 38.

44

McGrath, Re-Imagining Nature, 96.
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Christian apologetics in the field of theology and science.45 Orji holds Peirce’s metaphysics as
especially helpful in explaining “emergence systems” in nature according to the doctrine of continuing creation. Namely, Peirce’s metaphysical principle of “evolutionary love” is seen to be
helpful here.46
To summarize, among those writers engaging the value of Peirce for theology, some find
him at least not in contradiction with traditional Christian thought—even when granting panentheism as an implication of his thought. Importantly, however, one of these, Raposa, is a philosopher considering classical theism rather than orthodox trinitarian theology of the mainstream tradition. The second, Conway, works as a theologian but limits the scope of his considerations to
apparent correlations between Peirce’s concept of metaphysical continuity and Paul Tillich’s
pneumatology. Conway holds this as sufficient to ward off panentheism as theologically problematic. Deuser, Robinson, and Yong are willing to take the slightly stronger position that
Peirce’s metaphysics and semeiotic are in fact consistent with Christian theology, and therefore
theologically productive (though panentheism does not factor in their analyses). They base “consistency” on the fact of several apparent correlations between Peirce’s views and, especially, the

This is an element in McGrath’s very recent works; cf., McGrath, Open Secret, loc. 5760; McGrath, A
Fine-tuned Universe, 42-45, 83-84; McGrath, Darwinism and the Divine, 198-99; Alister E. McGrath, “The
Rationality of Faith: How Does Christianity Make Sense of Things?,” Philosophia Christi 18, no. 2 (2016): 401-02;
McGrath, Re-Imagining Nature, 178; Alister E. McGrath, The Territories of Human Reason: Science and Theology
in an Age of Multiple Rationalities (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2018), 175-81. This theme appears only
briefly in McGrath’s scientific theology project prior to 2008; cf., Alister E. McGrath, Reality, vol. 2, A Scientific
Theology (New York: T & T Clark, 2006), 158.
45

Though not within the context of theology and science, Anette Ejsing, like McGrath, has recently focused
attention on the theological usefulness of Peirce’s theory of abduction. Specifically, Ejsing finds this element of
Peirce’s philosophy useful for constructing a theology of hope. She employs Peirce’s thought to build upon helpful
insights from Wolfhart Pannenberg. Anette Ejsing, Theology of Anticipation: A Constructive Study of C. S. Peirce,
Princeton Theological Monograph Series (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2007), 8. Ben Quash also draws
upon Peirce’s theory of abduction, and applies it to a semeiotic pneumatology of history, drawing upon Peter Ochs,
David Ford, and Dan Hardy; cf. Ben Quash, Found Theology: History, Imagination and the Holy Spirit (A&C
Black, 2013), 215-21, 231-32.
46

Orji, Science-Theology Rapprochement, 76.

12
doctrine of the Trinity. However, might they overstate the importance of these correlations?
There is really no question that Peirce conscientiously appropriated the Trinitarian schema as he
moved into the latter stages of his philosophical development. He observed that both his metaphysical categories and their application in his theory of signs agreed at some level with the traditional formulation of the relations of the Trinity.47 The unresolved—indeed, not yet asked—
question is whether Christian theology can appropriate a full-fledged, Peircean semeiotic without
also corrupting in a panentheist manner the traditional metaphysics of Christian theology of creation.
Method
These introductory considerations have observed two methods on the question of Peirce’s
theism and of whether Christian theism truly accords with Peirce’s philosophical system. On the
one hand, Michael Raposa works according to the discipline of philosophy of religion. According to philosophy of religion methodology, the primary concerns are to understand Peirce’s
thinking and to improve the coherence of his philosophical insights through corrections as
needed. Such evaluations and corrections rest upon standards pertaining to philosophical reasoning.48 On the other hand, Conway, Deuser, Robinson, and Yong employ constructive theology
method, by which categories in systematic theology are adjusted for coherence with other
spheres of knowledge.49 Regarding Peirce and theology, their starting point is supplied by

47

Deledalle, Philosophy of Signs, 170, 173.

48

On this basic methodology, cf., Paul Draper, ed. Current Controversies in Philosophy of Religion (New
York: Routledge, 2019), 1-3. Of course, there are many variations on this theme, including the work of Christian
philosophers, such as J. P. Moreland and William L. Craig, among many others.
49

E.g., Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen writes that theology in a constructive mode seeks coherence both with
“biblical tradition” and with knowledge according to “cultural, religious, sociological, and other resources,” VeliMatti Kärkkäinen, Christ and Reconciliation, vol. 1, A Constructive Christian Theology for the Pluralistic World
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2013), 18-19.
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evident points of contact, such as a triadic semeiotic and the perichoresis of the Trinity. From
there, theological questions are engaged drawing upon theoretical resources supplied by the correlated elements of Peirce’s system. The resulting fruitfulness of Peirce’s theory to explicate
problematic Christian doctrines may be considered a pragmatic proof implicitly validating
Peirce’s thought for Christian theology. So, in this case, Peirce’s philosophy is taken as given
and applied to theological problems. On this method, Peirce’s insights are validated theologically
by their ability to supply cogent and coherent clarifications to long-standing debates in Christian
theology. Both methods make valuable contributions to Peirce’s legacy of truth-seeking inquiry.
Both methods also have their respective ways of relativizing the truth claims of the great Christian tradition. Philosophy of religion brackets any claims to authority in religion that derive from
special revelation.50 Constructive theology opens the normative claims of Christian tradition to
correction by non-Christian others.51 What is needed is engagement with semeiotic and its philosophical context in Peirce’s thought according to a third method, systematic theology (defined
below).
This dissertation seeks to discover whether, and if so why, the appropriation of Peirce’s
semeiotic, according to its philosophical context in Peirce’s thought, would incorporate panentheism into a traditional Christian theology of nature. Therefore, this project engages a systematic theological critique of Peirce’s semeiotic metaphysics with special attention to elements contributing to its apparent panentheism. The approach taken here blends systematic theology with

50
Draper, Current Controversies, 2, “Ideally, philosophy of religion does not treat sacred texts or tradition
as normative, while theology does.”

Kärkkäinen, e.g., stands with Philip Clayton’s view that “[t]heologians cannot simply presuppose the
truth of the Chrisitian tradition but must be concerned in an ongoing way with the question of the truth of their
central assertions,” Kärkkäinen, Christ and Reconciliation, 17.
51
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an empirical methodology informed by Peirce’s pragmatism. These methodological concepts receive further clarification in remaining sections of this chapter.
Systematic Theology
“Systematic” indicates that the theologian endeavors to work carefully and in an orderly
way. In that sense, then, the term systematic applies equally well to a broad array of theological
methods. Indeed, it is surely the case that every theologian approaches the task systematically. In
such a broad sense, then, the term communicates nothing distinctive; it is vaguer than the methods themselves, such as biblical, philosophical, and constructive.52 The present inquiry employs
“systematic theology” in the sense of that distinct method within the theological encyclopedia.
Therefore, the term is used vis-à-vis biblical studies, biblical theology, historical theology, and
practical theology.53 Systematic theology in this sense draws upon resources provided by the first
three to work out contemporary expressions of the spectrum of Christian doctrines (e.g., doctrines of Scripture, God, angels, man, sin, Christ, Holy Spirit, church, last things).54 This basic

52

Similarly, cf. John M. Frame, The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God, vol. 1, A Theology of Lordship
(Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Publishing, 1987), 213. Frame also finds that “systematic” is too ambiguous to “make any
positive use of the term,” yet affirms the general definition of explicitly asking application questions to synthesize
biblical teachings.
53

Cf., e.g., John Frame’s discussion of these disciplines as “traditional forms of theology,” ibid., 206.

54
On the reliance of systematic theology upon resources supplied by exegetical, biblical, and historical
theology, cf., Millard J. Erickson, Christian theology (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1998), 53; Frame,
Knowledge of God, 212-13; Colin E. Gunton, “Historical and Systematic Theology,” in The Cambridge Companion
to Christian Doctrine, ed. Colin E. Gunton, Cambridge Companions to Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997), 4.

On the basic task of systematic theology as working out contemporary interpretations of Scripture, cf., esp.,
Erickson, Systematic Theology, 8. There he writes, “So we propose a more complete definition of theology: the
discipline that strives to give a coherent statement of the doctrines of the Christian faith, based primarily on the
Scriptures, placed in the context of culture in general, worded in a contemporary idiom, and related to issues of
life,” (original italics). Similarly, cf. Frame, Knowledge of God, 213. Also, Kevin Vanhoozer uses metaphors from
the realm of theater to convey theology as an enterprise interpreting the Bible in a contemporary way. He writes,
“The soft systematics advocated here seeks a fit between the church’s present speech and action, on the one hand,
and the canonically specified Christo-drama, on the other,” Kevin J. Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine: A
Canonical Linguistic Approach to Christian Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2005), 258n53.
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task entails engagement with relevant truth-claims current in other fields of study, including, especially, philosophy, physical sciences, and social sciences.55 While systematic theology informs
the method used here, this project does not aim to attain to a complete systematic theology. Work
is limited to one doctrine, creation, though other doctrines will factor as they are relevant to that
one (e.g., incarnation). Systematic theological work on the doctrine of creation is further limited
by the primary concern regarding panentheism motivating this inquiry. Therefore, this project
does not attempt a systematic theology of creation per se. Rather, systematic theological method
indicates the resources and logic for inquiry into the problem of panentheism associated with
Peirce’s semeiotic. Accordingly, the doctrine of creation, systematically situated, provides this
dissertation’s theological approach to Peirce’s semeiotic as a theory explaining religious experience and knowledge. Traditional theological resources factor primarily in setting up the panentheism problematic (see chapter two).
Traditional Christian Orthodoxy
At various points, this introduction has referenced the concept of a mainstream Christian
tradition. This needs to be defined further because there are various possible ways of doing so.
Indeed, especially under Bultmann’s influence, contemporary Christian theology is not in agreement on whether there is such a thing as a definable mainstream Christianity. Rather, it is held
that the history of followers of Christ is one of “Christianities” rather than just one faith tradition.
The concept of traditional Christian orthodoxy for this inquiry follows the lead of Alister
McGrath and Kevin Vanhoozer. Vanhoozer holds that theology should attain to a “Catholic-
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Cf., e.g., David K. Clark, To Know and Love God: Method for Theology, Foundations of Evangelical
Theology (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway Books, 2003), 33; Stanley J. Grenz, “Articulating the Christian Belief-Mosaic,”
in Evangelical Futures: A Conversation on Theological Method, ed. John G. Stackhouse (Grand Rapids: Baker,
2000), 124.
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Evangelical Orthodoxy,” meaning that theology should have a catholic scope including “the
whole people of God, spread out over space, across cultures, and through time”; also that this
broad scope is evangelical, being oriented to the specific message of the gospel of Jesus Christ
given in the Bible.56 Vanhoozer defines “orthodoxy” as a “nonreductive” canonicity. The range
of biblical possibilities is respected without trying to reduce orthodoxy to a single one of those.
For example, a recent trend suggesting that narrative theology supplies the essence of Christian
theology is a reductive effort contrary to the sort of catholic-evangelical orthodoxy Vanhoozer
has in mind.57 In other words, the approach taken here aims for consistency with what is sometimes called the great Christian tradition (GCT). Alister McGrath supplies a helpful definition of
the concept of “the great tradition” for this project, as follows:
The magisterial Reformation thus offers an approach to engaging with the “great tradition” that has immense potential for their evangelical progeny today. Theology is not
simply about giving priority to the Bible; it is about valuing and engaging with those in
the past who gave priority to the Bible, and valuing and interacting with the ideas they
derived from that engagement. Quite simply, the mainline reformers believed the Bible
had been honored, interpreted, and applied faithfully in the past and that they were under
an obligation to take past reflections into account as they developed their own.58
Accordingly, the systematic theology in this project respects GCT in the broadly evangelical
sense described by Vanhoozer and McGrath.
This is not to limit the project to any particular denominational system. Rather, it is to
emphasize that the method followed here grants normative status to the Bible.59 The Bible is the
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Vanhoozer, Drama of Doctrine, 27. Stanley Grenz also uses “catholic” in this sense, that present-day
theologians must read the Bible “conscious that we are members of a community of faith that spans the centuries,”
Grenz, “Articulating,” 126-27.
57

Vanhoozer, Drama of Doctrine, 27.
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McGrath, “Engaging,” 144.
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On priority granted to propositions given in the Bible as an essential characteristic of theology that is
“evangelical,” cf. Vanhoozer, Drama of Doctrine, 26; Alister E. McGrath, “Engaging the Great Tradition:
Evangelical Theology and the Role of Tradition,” in Evangelical Futures: A Conversation on Theological Method,
ed. John G. Stackhouse (Grand Rapids, Mich., Leicester, UK, and Vancouver, BC: Baker Books, Inter-Varsity
Press, and Regent College Publishing, 2000), 139; John G. Stackhouse, “Evangelical Theology Should Be
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primary source for systematic theology here, in that claims given through various literary means
in the Bible (e.g., narrative, poetry, paraenesis) provide the starting point for theological work,
such as on the doctrine of creation. The Bible is the primary source also in the sense that insights
from other sources (such as tradition, experience, and contemporary culture) are to be read in its
light.60 This is in contrast to systematic theologies that grant tradition (e.g., Catholic theology) or
experience (e.g., some Pentecostal theology) parallel status to the Bible as theological sources.61
Therefore, the topic of the doctrine of creation, this inquiry seeks the general tenets salient among those past Christian thinkers who seem to have aimed for a catholic-evangelical orthodoxy. No two authors write in precisely the same way, however, so there is no suggestion
here of defining a GCT doctrine of creation with great specificity. Rather, the hope is to define
general types of claims that are made in catholic-evangelical orthodox treatments of creation

Evangelical,” in Evangelical Futures: A Conversation on Theological Method, ed. John G. Stackhouse (Grand
Rapids: Baker, 2000), 41-42.
The definitive role played by the Bible for Christian theology is a major theme of Kevin Vanhoozer’s
“canonical-linguistic theology,” described in terms of a theater company creatively acting according to a given
script; cf., esp., Vanhoozer, Drama of Doctrine, 16, 247-52. Similarly, Stanley Grenz writes, “The ultimate authority
in the church is the Spirit speaking through Scripture…it always comes to its hearers within a specific historicalcultural context…This hermeneutical process occurs in part as contemporary ‘knowledge’—the discoveries and
insights of the various disciplines of human learning—informs our theological construction,” Grenz, “Articulating,”
127.
60
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Regarding the role of the Bible relative to the role of tradition in Catholic theology, this claim is not to
imply that Catholics hold tradition as equal to the Bible in every respect as divine revelation. The Bible is
distinguished as the ultimate authority regarding divine revelation, but Catholic theologians also hold that Church
tradition supplies the authoritative—indeed, divinely revealed—means for interpreting the Bible faithfully.
Describing neo-Scholastic theology, Avery Dulles writes, “revelation is contained in two sources, namely the Bible
and apostolic tradition—both of which are to be esteemed, in the phrase of the Council of Trent, ‘with the same
sense of devotion and reverence.’ Tradition is held to supplement and clarify the truths contained in the Bible,”
Avery Dulles, Models of revelation (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1983), 45.
On the high degree of authority granted to experience by some Pentecostal theologians, cf., e.g., Kenneth J.
Archer, A Pentecostal Hermeneutic for the Twenty First Century: Spirit, Scripture and Community, vol. 28, Journal
of Pentecostal Theology Supplement Series (New York: T&T Clark International, 2004); Kenneth J. Archer,
“Pentecostal Hermeneutics: Retrospect and Prospect,” Journal of Pentecostal Theology 4, no. 8 (1996): 65, 75; Sang
Min Han, “Constructing a New Approach for Contemporary Pentecostal Theology: A Study of Ecstasy and Spiritual
Presence as a Divine–Human Encounter” (Ph.D. diss., Drew University, 2011); Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, 208;
Terry L. Cross, “The Divine-Human Encounter Towards a Pentecostal Theology of Experience,” Pneuma 31, no. 1
(2009): 3-34; Paul W Lewis, “Towards a Pentecostal Epistemology: The Role of Experience in Pentecostal
Hermeneutics,” The Spirit & Church 2, no. 1 (2000): 95-125.
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theology. For example, there is an evident tradition holding to creatio ex nihilo. However, within
that doctrinal category there are various possibilities for defining the constituent terms and for
interpreting how this category relates to biblical texts. The Christian perspective to be defined in
chapter two below is an evident tradition of thought, particular instances of which bear a general
consistency, or a rough parity, with one another, and appear to be governed by a respect for the
Bible as theologically normative.
Pragmaticism
Additionally, this project takes a pragmatic approach to the work of answering the question of a panentheist influence inherent in semeiotic as such. However, this is not according to
the well-known pragmatism in the tradition of William James, John Dewey, and Richard Rorty.
Rather, it is in the related yet distinctive sense of pragmatism that Peirce had in mind when he
coined the term.62 Chapter three below, discusses in some detail Peirce’s pragmatic ideal, which
he later renamed pragmaticism. It will suffice, for now, to note that a pragmatism in Peirce’s
sense as pragmaticism is a distinctive way to engage empirical inquiry. That is, the truth of
things is evident in the habits and practices to which they would give rise in the event that their
full truth was realized in some behavior. From an a priori point of view, pragmaticism holds that
one’s understanding of a concept—one’s belief about what that concept means—is discovered by
imagining what one thinks would be the case if one were to live consistently according to that

Cf., CP 6.481, 482, 490, for an example Peirce’s way of distancing himself from James and others whose
divergence from Peirce’s idea Peirce credits to a persistent nominalism in their thinking. For this reason, Peirce
coined a new term, naming his pragmatism pragmaticism. So, the pragmatic approach engaged here is not subject to
Geisler’s critique of “pragmatism”; Geisler, Christian Apologetics, chapter six, “Pragmatism.”
62

The recent dissertation by Andrew Hollingsworth also explores the value of Peirce’s pragmaticism for
theological method. Whereas the present study remains close to Peirce’s own views, Hollingsworth treats Peirce as
interpreted in the works of Umberto Eco. Cf., Andrew Hollingsworth, “‘Ecos’ in the Labyrinth: Systematic
Theology as Semiotic Phenomenon” (Ph.D. diss., New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, 2018).
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idea. Importantly, Peirce would not claim that what one imagines is the truth of that concept,
only that what one imagines truly represents what one believes to be true about that concept.
From an a posteriori point of view, pragmaticism holds that the truth of any matter is manifest to
some degree in whatever habits of practice result from it, as the fruit of anything represents the
truth of its roots.63 Accordingly, the present inquiry tests its hypothesis by looking for evidence
in experience that the practice of a robustly semeiotic Christian natural theology relates to a
panentheist metaphysics in a manner parallel to Peirce’s relation to panentheism.
Two strategies facilitate this pragmatic approach to a systematic theological engagement
with semeiotic and panentheism. First, this inquiry constructs various models to represent what is
most typical of theories under consideration. There is danger, of course, in abstracting some perspective such as panentheism. One risks setting up a straw man, easily disposed of but meaningless after all is said and done. The empirical sensibility of Peirce’s pragmaticism mitigates that
risk by working with those who are well established and experienced in their respective fields.
When modeling “Christian Theism” in chapter two, for example, several historical theological
studies in the doctrine of creation provide a diachronic assessment of beliefs consistently held
among landmark figures of GCT. To be sure, this remains an abstraction, but one that mitigates
arbitrariness and that derives from substantial accounts of representative views. The resulting
model is sufficiently vague for comparison with panentheism. It is also sufficiently defined to
maintain a distinct, consistent identity.64
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Peirce’s notion of pragmaticism was inspired by Jesus’ teaching, “you shall know them by their fruits,”
(Matt 7:19). See discussion in chapter three below.

This modeling strategy is similar to representing distinct schools of thought according to their “core
beliefs” as practiced within the “research program” framework theorized by Imre Lakatos. Cf., Imre Lakatos,
“Falsification and Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,” in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge,
ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
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The second strategy is case-study experimentation. This works in the other direction from
the modeling strategy. For example, in chapter four, a model of a semeiotic form of Christian
natural theology qualifies Robert Neville as an exemplar. In that way Neville can be treated as a
case of that sort of natural theology. This is a form of experimentation, because it treats representative writings of Neville as empirical evidence of the practice of a semeiotic Christian natural theology. His works are observed for the three criteria identifying a theology as panentheist
defined in chapter two. A strength of this strategy is its empirical objectivity. The experiment in
chapter four discovers Neville according to qualifying criteria established independently of considerations of Neville’s work. The subsequent discovery of elements of panentheism in Neville’s
thought therefore correlates panentheism in some way with the Peircean concepts to which chapter four attends.65
The pragmaticist aspect of the present project is consistent with tacit assumptions at work
in standard critical procedures in systematic theology. For example, consider Wayne Grudem’s
systematic theological approach to a critique of theistic evolution.66 Grudem’s manner of argument is to call attention to a number of ways claims made by proponents of theistic evolution
contradict claims made by the text of the Bible and in the theological tradition of the Christian
church. Its form could be represented as, “Theistic evolutionist A makes claim x, which directly
contradicts traditional Christian teaching z.” However, a pragmaticist dimension to the logic of
this critique manifests in several places where Grudem uses the language of “would be” in structuring his criticism of certain tenets of theistic evolution. After listing twelve points on which
65
Peirce’s philosophy informs a case study approach in biblical interpretation in Susannah Ticciati,
“Anachronism or Illumination? Genesis 1 and Creation ex nihilo,” Anglican Theological Review 99, no. 4 (2017):
694.

Wayne Grudem, “Biblical and Theological Introduction: The Incompatibility of Theistic Evolution with
the Biblical Account of Creation and with Important Christian Doctrines,” in Theistic Evolution: A Scientific,
Philosophical, and Theological Critique, ed. J. P. Moreland et al. (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 2017).
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exemplars of theistic evolution contradict a plain sense reading of Genesis 1-3 as historical narrative, Grudem writes, “no one would derive such a reading of the narrative from simply reading
the biblical text alone.” Similarly, he imagines that for theistic evolutionists “to remove the contradiction between [their view and scripture] would require denying the historicity of nearly all
of the text in Genesis 1-3.” Finally, Grudem claims that such a denial as he just described “would
undermine a number of core Christian doctrines.”67 These statements can be taken as evidence of
a tacit question in the logic of his critique: “If one were to really believe theistic evolution, what
would the traditional doctrine z look like as a result?” Transposed into a pragmaticist register,
Grudem’s critical inquiry would begin with that question, reformed into a hypothesis that belief
in theistic evolution would result in a contradiction of doctrine z. Perhaps some clarification of
theistic evolutionary theory would be necessary. Then, Grudem would deduce doctrinal implications of theistic evolution relevant to the doctrine in question, say, the historical Adam and Eve.
This would provide some definition to the manner of contradiction involved. Then, Grudem
would look to what practicing theistic evolutionists have said on the matter to see if his deductions were correct. Evidence from their work confirming his deductions would consequently support his initial hypothesis.
One might object that the pragmatic method just described is much more complicated
than Grudem’s simple observation of contrasts. In his essay, Grudem observes what key theistic
evolutionists appear to agree on in their writings on issues such as the historical Adam and Eve.
Then he holds that up against traditional Christian teaching on the matter, clearly demonstrating
the contradiction. However, the simplicity of this approach is misleading. There are a number of

Grudem, “Biblical and Theological Introduction,” 73. Emphasis added on occurrences of “would.”
Grudem’s full argument includes his later chapter in the same book; cf., Wayne Grudem, “Theistic Evolution
Undermines Twelve Creation Events and Several Crucial Christian Doctrines,” in Theistic Evolution: A Scientific,
Philosophical, and Theological Critique, ed. J. P. Moreland et al. (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 2017).
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tacit mental steps taken in the process, just as there are some number of tacit logical steps between “theistic evolution” and statement x that clearly contradicts doctrine z. How is one to know
that the contradictory claims are truly due to what is essential to theistic evolutionary theory?
Might it be the case that other beliefs and theories factor into such contradictory statements?
Along that line, also, is it not important to identify why theistic evolutionists seem to draw conclusions similarly contradicting long-held doctrines of the Christian faith?
This is why this dissertation adopts a pragmaticist approach for its systematic theological
critique of the possible panentheist entailments of semeiotic. The value and power of such a
pragmaticist approach to theological inquiry consists, in part, in reifying beliefs and ideas serving as root causes producing certain theological claims. It is not sufficient simply to observe evident correlations between Peirce’s views and tenets of panentheism. For example, proponents of
the view that Peirce’s metaphysics is panentheistic, almost in every case, establish their claim in
connection to Peirce’s metaphysical doctrine of continuity.68 Indeed, the similarity is compelling.
However, according to this inquiry’s analysis, Peirce’s philosophy does not entail a clearly defined panentheism. Furthermore, the course of this pragmaticist inquiry shows that, when put
into natural theological practice, a robust account of Peirce’s semeiotic still does not produce
conclusions attaining to criteria identifying the influence of panentheism. That is, this dissertation finds that an actual practitioner of a robustly semeiotic Christian natural theology, Robert
Neville, does manifest beliefs consistent with panentheism, but that these panentheist beliefs result from Neville’s prior ontological commitments rather than to Peirce’s semeiotic philosophy.
Grudem’s much simpler tack would certainly show that a Peircean theologian holds strongly
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Cf. the leading studies on this question by Raposa, Peirce's Philosophy of Religion, 51; Corrington,
Introduction, 202-03; Cooper, Panentheism, 139. In Cooper, continuity is implied by Peirce’s concept of “Absolute
First” and “Absolute Second,” which are mediated by the cosmos as a “Third.” These allude to Peirce’s
phnomenological categories, on which, cf. chapter three below.
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panentheist beliefs, but it could not truly claim to have shown how those beliefs relate to Peirce’s
semeiotic.
Other Terms and Delimitations
By now it is evident that this dissertation uses an unusual form of the word for theories
about signs. Charles Peirce used several variations of semeiotic when referring to his philosophy
of signs. Max Fisch, among the founders of Peirce scholarship, writes, “For…the art or science
or doctrine or general theory of semiosis [Peirce] uses semeiotic; much less often, semeiotics or
semiotic; very rarely, semeotic; never semiotics.” Fisch argues that semeiotic is the proper term
by which to reference Peirce’s theory of signs. Peirce derived the term from the Greek when
naming his distinctive philosophy of signs. Further, “To tell us how to pronounce his preferred
form, he marks it sēmeioʹtic (MS 318:52).” Fisch notes that it is pronounced with a long o.69 This
dissertation follows that tradition of Peirce scholarship respecting this as the proper form by
which to designate the Peircean sign theory, rather than the more familiar form semiotics. T. L.
Short expresses this sentiment well when he writes, “I use ‘semeiotic’, in Peirce’s occasional
spelling, for his theory or theories of signs, and the more usual ‘semiotic’ for that movement
which originated in Europe…independently of Peirce and that later appropriated him, with confusion all around.”70
As an engagement with the theological entailments of panentheist ontology, this dissertation pays great attention to the question of the God-world relation. In contrast to semeiotic as the

Max H. Fisch, “Peirce's General Theory of Signs,” in Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, ed. Kenneth
Laine Ketner and Christian J. W. Kloesel (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986), 322.
69

T. L. Short, Peirce’s Theory of Signs (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), ix.
Cf., also, Kenneth Laine Ketner, “Semeiotic,” in Das Bild zwischen Kognition und Kreativität: Interdisziplinäre
Zugänge zum bildhaften Denken, ed. Elize Bisanz (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2011). I am grateful to Dr. Ketner
for providing a copy of this essay during a visit to the Institute for Studies of Pragmaticism, which he founded, and
for which he served as Director.
70

24
term for Peirce’s theory of signs vis-à-vis other sign theories, this dissertation does not use world
as a specific philosophical term. Throughout the dissertation, world, cosmos, and universe serve
as synonyms for the idea of the totality of whatever is commonly referred to as natural. Therefore, to whatever extent faculties of consciousness and mind are part of the order of nature, these
are included within the scope of these synonyms. Theologically, these synonyms refer to all that
is commonly conceived as the creation.
Additionally, this dissertation limits its scope in two important ways. In engaging and defining panentheism, the most relevant literature is from the past two decades. Prior to that, scholars identified panentheism with process theism and the metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead.71 However, currently the panentheism field wishes to include Hartshorne’s dipolar model
as one type of panentheism rather than the definitive one. Consequently, much of the past generation of theological engagements with panentheism speak only to what panentheists consider
now a minority view. On the other hand, admittedly, past detailed critiques of panentheism in its
process form would make relevant points one could apply to panentheism more broadly. That
would easily supply a researcher abundant material to consider for a book-length project in its
own right.
This dissertation engages Peirce’s thought in the opposite temporal orientation. That is,
this research is interested in Peirce’s own ideas about signs, God, and metaphysics. Much has
been done since Peirce to correct and develop his profound thinking on many matters.72 Present
Peirce scholarship surely understands Peirce better than he understood himself in many ways.

71
E.g., Norman L. Geisler and William D. Watkins, Worlds Apart: A Handbook on World Views, second
ed. (Eugene, Or: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2003), 107-08; their exemplars of panentheism are Whitehead,
Hartshorne, and Ogden.

E.g., cf., Short, Peirce’s Theory of Signs; Peter Ochs, Peirce, Pragmatism, and the Logic of Scripture
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Michael L. Raposa, Theosemiotic: Religion, Reading, and the Gift
of Meaning (New York: Fordham University Press, 2020).
72
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However, there is always a risk of misrepresenting Peirce, or even refashioning Peirce in the image of later generations who are interested in appropriating his ideas. Inevitably, interpreting
Peirce’s ideas incorporates values and beliefs of the time of the one writing. The question motivating this dissertation responds to claims by Peirce scholars that Peirce’s ideas as he conceived
them indicate or even entail a panentheist ontology. Therefore, it will not do to test these claims
according to contemporary interpretations of Peirce’s thought. If panentheism pertains to the present zeitgeist as some have indicated, then these interpretations naturally will tend to read panentheism into Peirce’s thought.73 Consequently, this dissertation engages Peirce’s ideas directly, in
their primary sources in his writings. Where secondary sources are used, this project makes every
effort to discern where descriptive commentary ends and constructive development begins. Not
long ago this would not have been a feasible approach for any project for which engagement
with Peirce’s thought constitutes only a part. Now there is a growing body of reference material
facilitating the study of topics Peirce’s comments on which are scattered throughout Peirce’s
writings. Also, the Peirce Edition Project and the Institute for the Study of Pragmaticism continue to produce critical editions of Peirce’s writings so that nonexperts can engage Peirce and
his ideas.74

Arthur Peacocke, “Introduction: ‘In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being?’,” in In Whom We
Live and Move and Have Our Being: Panentheistic Reflections on God's Presence in a Scientific World, ed. Philip
Clayton and Arthur Peacocke (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 2004), xix-xxi. Robert Corrington
admits that he interprets Peirce in terms of panentheism, because Peirce’s own ideas leave the God-world relation
quite vague; cf., Corrington, Introduction, 202-04.
73
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Most notably, The Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, published by the Peirce
Edition Project, has published its seventh volume. With that series to date, critical editions of Peirce’s writings
through 1892 are now available.
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Overview
The chapters that follow pursue a pragmatic inquiry into the ways in which Peirce’s semeiotic relates to a panentheist metaphysics that would, according to a systematic theology of
creation, render Christian natural theology incoherent. Chapter two takes the first steps in this inquiry by defining the respective GCT and present day panentheist models for the God-cosmos
relation. This work models Christian theism according to a set of seven distinguishing beliefs. It
models panentheism according to a set of six distinguishing beliefs. A comparison of these views
defines the problem of panentheism according to Christian systematic theological standards.
There are three characteristic ways that panentheism talks about the God-cosmos relation that
traditional Christian theists cannot affirm. These provide criteria for recognizing the presence of
panentheism in the experimental portion of chapter four.
Chapter three offers an account of Peirce’s semeiotic set within Peirce’s philosophical
system. The work of this chapter observes how Peirce’s semeiotic epistemology and metaphysics
contribute to his ideas about God, especially how God relates to the cosmos. In short, Peirce conceived of God’s relation to the world in terms of an artisan to the artisan’s works. Peirce uses the
imagery of authorship, as in the world as God’s great poem. These observations consistently
show that Peirce held the God-world relation to be semeiotic in nature. Accordingly, Peirce’s
theology and metaphysics do not meet the panentheist standard discovered in chapter two. However, neither are Peirce’s views wholly unlike a panentheist model. Therefore, chapter three concludes that Peirce’s semeiotic metaphysics is not yet panentheism; that there seems to be a bias
toward panentheism in Peirce but not panentheism as such.
Finally, chapter four experimentally tests the hypothesis of this project that a Christian
natural theology incorporation of a robust semeiotic will also incorporate Peirce’s relationship to
panentheism. In light of the results of chapter three, this hypothesis becomes, a robust
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incorporation of Peirce’s semeiotic by Christian natural theology will also incorporate the
panentheist bias inherent in Peirce’s thought. The work of this chapter sets up the experiment by
drawing upon the theosemiotic of Michael Raposa to guide a Peircean take on McGrath’s project. This produces an outline of ideas describing a Christian theosemiotic, for which Robert Neville serves as an exemplar. The experiment looks at Neville’s experience, as a theologian working with Peirce’s semeiotic, to see if there is evidence of a panentheist metaphysics—or a bias in
that direction—in his conclusions. The inquiry finds that Neville’s work does demonstrate a
panentheist ontology, but that this does not seem to have come from the influence of semeiotic.
Rather, it seems that Neville’s panentheism is, in a sense, in spite of his use of Peirce’s ideas.
That is, Neville adapts Peirce’s theory to Neville’s ontology of the world as the creation of a “divine” eternal ontological creative act. Moreover, this dissertation finds that Neville’s ontological
commitments produce ideas that go beyond panentheist forms of religious naturalism. Therefore,
a Christian natural theology informed by a robust semeiotic theory would not be panentheist as
long as its ontology remains determined by GCT orthodoxy.

28
Two: Modeling the God-World Relation
This dissertation engages alleged panentheist tendencies in C. S. Peirce’s metaphysics as
a potential problem for the use of Peirce’s semeiotic by renewed attempts at natural theology
such as that of Alister McGrath. This requires the careful definition of the elements of that problematic. One needs to have a clear sense for what “panentheism” is. One then needs also to understand just how panentheism is a problem for orthodox Christian theological projects such as
McGrath’s Christian Natural Theology (CNT). Both of these objectives require the definition of
a basic, GCT conception of God’s relation to the cosmos. Defining these three elements of the
problematic is the objective of the present chapter.
A premise of the problematic is that panentheism is incompatible with GCT theology
pursued in this project. Not everyone would agree that such is the case. Some of the major proponents of panentheism consider themselves faithful to the mainstream of Christian tradition.1
However, an ongoing problem among panentheists just is how to define their theistic model to
include the gamut of variations claiming “panentheist” for their own view. This problem of definition is accompanied by the problem of demarcation: How does panentheism distinguish itself
from other theistic models? These remain open questions in the panentheism literature, so it is
necessary to spend time working through them below.

E.g., Arthur Peacocke, “A Naturalistic Christian Faith for the Twenty-First Century: An Essay in
Interpretation,” in All That Is: A Naturalistic Faith for the Twenty-First Century, ed. Philip Clayton (Minneapolis:
Fortress, 2007), 10. Peacocke describes his substantial introductory essay, writing, “In what follows, an attempt will
be made to develop features of a more specifically Christian faith that are consistent with…a naturalistic
perspective…I attribute ontological status to theological terms [viz., “God”] through the warrant of a critical
realism….” Philip Clayton counts himself among Christian panentheists; cf., Clayton, “Panentheism,” 700. VeliMatti Kärkkäinen’s recent systematic theology adopts a view he calls “Classical Panentheism”; cf., ch. 10,
“Classical Panentheism” in Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, Trinity and Revelation, vol. 2, A Constructive Christian
Theology for the Pluralistic World (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2014). Cf., also, Anna Case-Winters,
Reconstructing a Christian Theology of Nature: Down to Earth, Ashgate Science and Religion Series (New York:
Routledge, 2016); Jan‐Olav Henriksen, “The Experience of God and the World: Christianity’s Reasons for
Considering Panentheism a Viable Option,” Zygon 52, no. 4 (2017): 1086-96.
1
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Whatever one’s definition of panentheism, it is also necessary to say clearly why it seems
to be problematic. What is the theistic God-cosmos relation model promoted by this project, such
that panentheism constitutes a problem to overcome? In the literature on demarcation, panentheism is usually contrasted with classical theism and pantheism. Classical theism refers to the
broad tradition, primarily in Western thought, that there is a God somehow responsible for,
wholly other than, and related to the experienced universe. It is rooted in Greek philosophy that
has influenced aspects of Christian thought.2 In contrast, pantheism is a model in which God and
the world are identical and coextensive, such that “all is God.”3
However, the theistic model of God’s relation to the cosmos for this project needs to be
defined by GCT rather than by Western thought more generally. The ways panentheism may or
may not be problematic for classical theism are not the same as how they may or may not be
problematic for traditional Christian theology. For example, some versions of classical theism
hold that God is absolutely unchanging.4 Therefore, the claim by panentheists that God is constantly changing (except in God’s world-transcending essence) is a direct contradiction. A model
informed by GCT, however, can also affirm that with respect to God’s essential character and his
own being God is unchanging (Ps 102:26, 27), but with respect to God’s relations to the cosmos
and creatures within it there is a sense in which God is changing (Gen 6:6; 1 Sam 15:11).5

Williams, “Introduction to Classical Theism,” 95, identifies Classical Theism as primarily characterized
by a number of perfections ascribed to God. The Classical theist God acts upon others but is not acted upon by
others.
2

3

Ted Peters, “Models of God,” Philosophia 35, no. 3 (2007): 281-82.

E.g., Geisler, Christian Apologetics, 233, writes, “a necessary Being has no possibility of change
whatsoever.”
4

5
To be clear, such changes are neither fickle nor arbitrary. God’s covenant decisions are unchanging, but
God’s covenant allows for repentance and redemption from the consequences of sin. For example, God promises
Judah’s destruction and that he will not change his mind on this; however, God also offers to change his mind if they
repent (Jer 4:28; 26:13). Similarly, the unchanging nature of God’s covenant is in view in Malachi 3:6; Hebrews
6:18; 13:8; James 1:17. This is a complex issue, and there are diverse options available within GCT. For example,
there are proponents for a determinist view and for an open theist view. For the purposes of this inquiry, it suffices
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Therefore, classical theism will be considered when demarcating panentheism as a model of the
God-cosmos relation. However, this chapter will need to define a Christian theism model of the
God-cosmos relation according to the sources particular to GCT.6
This chapter first defines a Christian theism model of the God-cosmos relation (CT). That
inquiry finds that the doctrine of the incarnation informs seven ontological principles structured
by an overarching metaphor of the craftsman. The resulting model emphasizes the stark ontological distinction between Creator and creature inherent to the doctrine of creation from nothing. It
also emphasizes the personal, redemptive, and loving actions of the Creator toward and with the
creation. Then CT is shown to be consistent with the theological structure of Alister McGrath’s
vision for CNT. After that, the chapter pursues a definition of a panentheist model of the Godcosmos relation (PEM). Though the definition and demarcation problems remain unsettled, this
work finds sufficient agreement in key sources to construct a model. The chapter concludes by
identifying ways in which PEM entails problems according to CT. These considerations will,
first, enable the work of chapter three to decide how Peirce’s metaphysics relates to PEM. They
will also enable chapter four to determine whether a semeiotic CNT might suffer in the ways
PEM is problematic vis-à-vis CT.

to note the availability of the middle ground described here. For a discussion of these questions within the tensions
of beliefs rooted in the Bible, cf., Jay Wesley Richards, The Untamed God: A Philosophical Exploration of Divine
Perfection, Immutability, and Simplicity (Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity Press, 2003). For recent defenses of
determinism, cf., Guillame Bignon and Paul Helm, Excusing Sinners and Blaming God: A Calvinist Assessment of
Determinism, Moral Responsibility, and Divine Involvement in Evil (Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick Publications, 2018);
Peter Furlong, The Challenges of Divine Determinism: A Philosophical Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2019). For a salient example of open theism, cf., Clark H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s
Openness (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Paternoster Press, 2001). It has recently been argued that the controversy in this
debate might be due, at least in part, to a misunderstanding of Aquinas’ views; cf., Michael J. Dodds, The
Unchanging God of Love: Thomas Aquinas and Contemporary Theology on Divine Immutability, Second ed.
(Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 2008).
6
Admittedly, clarifying a Christian theist model as distinct from classical theism compares to the work of
defining a species within a genus of theistic models.
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Christian Theism (CT)
Orthodox Christian discourse speaks of the God-world relation as being between Creator
and creature.7 In speaking here of a Creator-creature model of the God-world relation, the ancient Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo nuances the term “creation.”8 So, while there is a
sense in which the Creator's work continues in the forms of providence typically described in
systematic theology, it remains grounded in the definitive act of origination, in which God made
to exist the very material that God subsequently formed and is forming in various ways.9 Accordingly, then, the metaphor of the artisan, of the craftsman frames the model describing Christian
theistic ontology.10 Seven ontological principles comprise the Christian theist model (CT) for
this project.11 First, the principle of the Redemption Economy is that redemption is at the heart of

The aim here is a bird’s-eye view on the basic features of a catholic-evangelical way of speaking of the
God-world relation. This intends to be normative to the extent that parameters of a mainstream view are evident in
the tradition. Emphasis lies on observations in historical theology. See note 11 below.
7

8

On the relation of the concept of creatio ex nihilo to biblical roots and to developments in Christian
doctrine, cf., Gerhard May, Creatio Ex Nihilo: The Doctrine of “Creation Out of Nothing” in Early Christian
Thought (New York;: T & T Clark International, 2004); Gary A. Anderson, Creation Ex Nihilo: Origins,
Development, Contemporary Challenges (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2018); Paul Copan
and William Lane Craig, Creation Out of Nothing: A Biblical, Philosophical, and Scientific Exploration (Baker
Publishing Group, 2004).
9
The term “creation” and its cognates have become associated with the concept of “continuing creation,”
which holds a different sense of the term “creation” than the traditional Christian view. E.g., Ted Peters, God—The
World’s Future: Systematic Theology for a New Era (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2015), 252, “God creates
continually and will not finish this creative work until the creation is consummated in the eschaton.” This is stated in
contrast to the notion that “creation” pertains primarily to a past action, which is the sense advocated by CT. Further,
ibid., 257, “God as constantly engaged in drawing the world out of nonbeing and into existence with the aim of
consummating this creative work in the future,” clarifies Peters’ sense of “creation.” The process of becoming
existent from nonexistence is ongoing until the end.
10

While the artisan metaphor (so, also, the second CT principle, the Maker Analogy) provides a robust
structure by which to explain the traditional ontology of God's relation to the cosmos, the underlying doctrines are
not derived analytically from the biblical metaphor. That is, orthodox Christian teaching on the relation of God to
the world did not result from extensive reflection on the divine artisan symbolism evident in scripture. Rather, the
doctrines follow logically as implications of the incarnation of the Son as Jesus Christ as will be noted throughout
the explanation of the principles below.
11

For these seven principles, I am especially indebted to excellent historical surveys in Colin E. Gunton,
The Triune Creator: A Historical and Systematic Study (Alban Books Limited, 1998); Paul M. Blowers, Drama of
the Divine Economy: Creator and Creation in Early Christian Theology and Piety (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2012); I.A. McFarland, From Nothing: A Theology of Creation (Westminster John Knox Press, 2014).
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God’s purpose for creation. Second, the principle of the Maker Analogy states that the artisan
metaphor, though imperfect, fittingly represents the Creator-creature relation. Third, the principle
of the Freedom of Divine Action speaks to the utter transcendence of God in being and power.
Fourth, the principle of Absolute Ontological Distinction expresses an important implication of
creation ex nihilo. Fifth, the principle of Two Orders of Being follows as a corollary of Absolute
Ontological Distinction to emphasize the separate ontological integrity of God and of what God
has made. Sixth, the principle of the Divine Ground of Being guards against Deism by highlighting the creation’s constant existential dependence upon the Creator. Seventh, the principle of the
Relation of Others returns to the basic theme of Redemption Economy, now informed by the
strict ontological otherness of creation from Creator, yet as other held in constant redemptive relation to and by the Creator.
The principle of the Redemption Economy (RE) is that God created the cosmos as the object of his love to be perfected through the work of redemption.12 That is, God’s plan in creating
the heavens and the earth was always already to redeem it through the course of an historical
project centered in the incarnate Son, Jesus Christ (Eph. 1:10). It is therefore the light of the life
of Christ Jesus that manifests this purpose of God's entire project of creation. Specifically, the
incarnation provides “the model” of the Creator-creature relation.13 The paradigmatic

On God’s redemptive purpose for creating the cosmos, cf., e.g., J. J. Johnson Leese, Christ, Creation,
and the Cosmic Goal of Redemption: A Study of Pauline Creation Theology as Read by Irenaeus and Applied to
Ecotheology, vol. 580, Library of New Testament Studies (New York, NY: T & T Clark, 2018); John G. Gibbs,
Creation and Redemption: A Study in Pauline Theology, vol. 26, Novum Testamentum Supplements (Leiden: Brill,
1971); Jonathan R. Wilson, God’s Good World: Reclaiming the Doctrine of Creation (Grand Rapids: Baker
Academic, 2013); Kimlyn J. Bender, “Christ, Creation and the Drama of Redemption: ‘The Play's the Thing . . .’,”
Scottish Journal of Theology 62, no. 2 (2009): 156-59.
12

Gunton, Triune Creator, 183, “The incarnation—the act of free divine interrelation with the created
world—provides the model of mediation that we need. Christology … the Son of God in free personal relation to the
world, indeed identification with part of that world, is the basis for an understanding of God the Father’s relations
with his creation.”
13
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significance of the incarnation taught patristic theologians to read Genesis in light of gospel
sources, such as the Gospel of John (John 1:1-3). It also taught them to recognize that the divine
act of origination accomplished in creating everything ex nihilo was done with the intention of
redeeming that very creation.14 Indeed, God’s act of creation in the beginning initiated a “project” to perfect the creation that requires overcoming sin and its evil produce.15 As Irenaeus affirmed, the incarnation manifests the “recapitulation” by which God is redeeming and so perfecting the created order.16 Also, the plan of recapitulation revealed in the incarnation entails that
God’s good work of origination in the beginning (Gen 1:31) was nevertheless incomplete. Its intended purpose was to be fulfilled through the direct, internal involvement of Christ (Eph 1:4; 1
Pe 1:20).17 Recapitulation in christology holds that evil in the very nature of the order of creation
requires “that creation’s purpose can be achieved only by its redirection from within by the creator himself.”18 Therefore, God did not create initially without already having in view the need to
overcome sin in order to bring the fullness of his creation plan to completion.
In light of the Spirit’s role in the resurrection of Jesus (Rom 1:4; Eph 1:19-20; 1 Pe 3:18),
one understands that it is through the ongoing work of the Spirit that God administers the project

14

Blowers, Drama, 136, 140.

Gunton, Triune Creator, 86. Similarly, Blowers, Drama, 292, “for early Christian
interpreters…[c]reating was an overarching and open-ended project of the divine economy that included nurturing,
shaping, renewing, actualizing hidden potentialities, transforming, finishing.”
15

16
Blowers, Drama, 17, 373, 174; Gunton, Triune Creator, 169, writes that Irenaeus’ understanding of
christological “recapitulation” rests upon Ephesians 1:10 and places the cross at the center of the redemption
economy.
17

Cf., Gunton, Triune Creator, 202.

Ibid., 11. Colin Gunton explains the principle of recapitulation: “Divine providential action takes place in
a world which can be perfected only through the death of the mediator of creation on the cross of Calvary. In sum,
the death and resurrection of Jesus is the model for all providential action, as those acts which enable the world to
become itself by action within, and over against, its fallen structures,” ibid., 190. So, the logic of recapitulation is
that “the creation is renewed from within,” ibid., 24.
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by which that purpose is accomplished. Hence, a redemption economy.19 It was by the enabling,
empowering work and presence of the Spirit that the incarnation was realized and continued in
the person of Jesus (Lk 1:35).20 In other words, the Spirit’s work of perfecting the creation and of
completing the work of redemption is historical, being carried out within the structure of time.21
In the incarnation, God’s free and redemptive involvement with the created order is made
clear. The Spirit’s role in raising Jesus from the dead provides insight into the historical manner
in which God is working with the creation. In turn, the redemptive purpose of the cross and of
the incarnation itself provides insight into the purpose in the Creator’s creating in the beginning.
This is, as it were, an inside job, in that the creator becomes part of the creation to “redirect the

The word “economy” represents the apostle Paul’s use of οἰκονμία when writing about God’s “plan for
the fullness of time,” (Eph 1:10) and God’s “plan of the mystery hidden for ages,” (Eph 3:9). Karl Rahner famously
applied this word in his seminal treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity, Karl Rahner, The Trinity, trans. Joseph
Donceel (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2001; repr., 1970). Rahner’s analysis of the immanent trinity and the
economic trinity greatly influenced twentieth century trinitarian theology. Cf., Paul D. Molnar, Faith, Freedom, and
the Spirit: The Economic Trinity in Barth, Torrance and Contemporary Theology (Downers Grove, Illinois: IVP
Academic, 2015); Stanley J. Grenz, Rediscovering the Triune God: The Trinity in Contemporary Theology
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2004). On avoiding some of the landmines associated with this complicated doctrine,
cf., Kevin Giles, Jesus and the Father: Modern Evangelicals Reinvent the Doctrine of the Trinity (Grand Rapids,
Mich: Zondervan, 2006).
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Gunton, Triune Creator, 184; also, ibid., 23-24, holds the incarnation to be an instance of new creation,
since Jesus had to be created within Mary’s womb. The role of the Spirit in the life of the incarnate Son, Jesus, is not
meant to diminish the status of the Son, the Word, as the divine person enfleshed as Jesus (John 1:14). The intention
is only to give proper place to the witness of Scripture as to the presence and involvement of the Spirit in the life of
Jesus, without adopting the controversial position of a Spirit christology (e.g., Luke 4:18, 21; Matt 4:1; 12:28).
Regarding efforts to work out an orthodox Spirit christology, cf., Myk Habets, The Anointed Son: A Trinitarian
Spirit Christology, vol. 129, Princeton Theological Monograph Series (Eugene, Or: Pickwick Publications, 2010);
Roger Haight, “The Case for Spirit Christology,” Theological Studies 53, no. 2 (1992): 257-87; Greg Liston, “A
‘Chalcedonian’ Spirit Christology,” Irish Theological Quarterly 81, no. 1 (2016): 74-93; Ralph Del Colle, Christ
and the Spirit: Spirit Christology in Trinitarian Perspective (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
On the relevant history of doctrine, cf., Hershel Odell Bryant, “Spirit Christology in the Christian Tradition: From
the Patristic Period to the Rise of Pentecostalism in the Twentieth-Century” (Ph.D. diss., Bangor University, 2013).
The question of Spirit christology relates to the question of this dissertation in another respect. Joseph Bracken, a
recent proponent of panentheism, sees in Spirit christology a justification for panentheist metaphysics; cf., Joseph A.
Bracken, “Trinitarian Spirit Christology: In Need of a New Metaphysics?,” Theological Studies 72, no. 4 (2011):
750-67.

Gunton, Triune Creator, 170, writes that the resurrection is “the eschatological action par excellence,” a
work of the Spirit of God nevertheless very much within the temporal order. Cf., also, Sinclair B. Ferguson, The
Holy Spirit (Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity Press, 1996); Michael Scott Horton, Rediscovering the Holy Spirit:
God’s Perfecting Presence in Creation, Redemption, and Everyday Life (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan,
2017).
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creation to its eschatological destiny.”22 So, the RE principle teaches that God created the heavens and the earth in such a way that, at just the right moment, the Son could be born of woman
(Gal 4:4-5) and redeem all creation from the inside out (Rom 8:19-21).
Second, the principle of the Maker Analogy (MA) makes the artisan metaphor transparent and expresses God’s work of creation as both like and unlike human craftsmanship. Church
tradition made this form of the metaphor expressly a part of the Christian faith. As the Nicene
Creed confesses, “We believe in one God, the Father almighty, Maker of heaven and earth, and
of all things visible and invisible....” The ancient creed was, of course, echoing eminent imagery
used in Hebrew and Christian scripture when depicting God’s relation to the cosmos.23 In the
scriptural witness one finds that there are ways in which the Creator’s work of making is similar
to that of human makers. Genesis 1 claims that God is the maker of the heavens and the earth and
all that is in them.24 This claim from the beginning of sacred scripture is repeated throughout the
holy writings (e.g., Ex. 20:11, Neh. 9:6, Psa. 146:6, Jer. 32:17, Ac. 17:24, Col. 1:16, Rev. 14:7).
It is fitting, then, that the imagery of the potter is used to represent God’s work of making what
he creates (Job 10:8-9, Jer. 18:3, Rom. 9:20-21).25 So, God’s work of making is like that of a human craftsman in that God makes something according to his good intention, which produces
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So, the repetition of the key word bara and its cognate asah throughout the passage (Gen 1:1, 7, 16, 21,
25, 26, 27, 31. While not technical terms nuancing ex nihilo, asah is used of the work of making in general, and
scripture’s use of bara is limited to a special sort of making ascribed only to God (e.g., Isa. 41:20). Cf., Bill T.
Arnold, Genesis, New Cambridge Bible Commentary (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 36; Othmar
Keel, Silvia Schroer, and Peter T. Daniels, Creation: Biblical Theologies in the Context of the Ancient Near East
(Winona Lake, Indiana: Eisenbrauns, 2015), 97; John H. Walton, Genesis 1 as Ancient Cosmology (Winona Lake,
Ind: Eisenbrauns, 2011), 133; Gerhard von Rad, Genesis: A Commentary, Revised ed. (Philadelphia: Westminster
Press, 1973), 48-49; and David W. Cotter, Genesis, Berit Olam: Studies in Hebrew Narrative & Poetry
(Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 2003), 4. On the “ambiguous” presence of the doctrine of creation from
nothing in the Bible, cf., Blowers, Drama, 186.
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On the use of the image of the potter in scripture for God’s creative activity, cf., Keel & Schroer,
Creation, 96-97.
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something good and valuable (Gen. 1:31).26 On the other hand, God is very much unlike a human
craftsman in that God does not merely refashion preexisting matter or substance of any kind.
God breaks the “maker” mold, and it fell to postapostolic theologians to make this clear. For example, Theophilus of Antioch understood, “For man, being below, begins to build from the
earth, and cannot in order make the roof, unless he has first laid the foundation. But the power of
God is shown in this, that, first of all, He creates out of nothing, according to His will, the things
that are made.”27 This brings this inquiry to the third ontological principle of CT which highlights the doctrine of creation ex nihilo.
Third, the principle of the Freedom of Divine Action (FDA) holds that the Creator’s
power is neither limited by nor dependent upon anything that is not God. Theological challenges
encountered in non-Christian neighbors motivated early Christian thinkers to reflect on implications of the incarnation for creation theology.28 The incarnation, demonstrating the infinite God’s
power to unite himself to the finite being of the human Jesus, suggests that God’s power and being utterly transcend the created order.

Colin Gunton writes, “The incarnation implies a

certain freedom in the relations between God and the world, and so is the basis of the doctrine
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Murray Rae, “Jesus Christ, the Order of Creation,” in Christ and the Created Order, ed. Andrew B.
Torrance and Thomas H. McCall, Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, and Science (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Zondervan, 2018), 24, “a cosmos rather than a chaos,” (e.g., Isa 45:18); Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, Creation and
Humanity, vol. 3, A Constructive Christian Theology for the Pluralistic World (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2015), 74.

Theophilus of Antioch, 2.10. Describing Theophilus’ view, McFarland From Nothing, 21, writes,
“creation cannot be thought of as God reshaping some preexisting material in the manner of a human artisan who, in
making a pot from clay or bread from flour, creates from something else. Instead, God brings into being the very
stuff of which the universe is made. In short, God creates from nothing.” Similarly, cf. also Blowers, Drama, 167.
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The Platonic claim of the eternal nature of matter was recognized as especially threatening to the
sovereignty of God as Creator, motivating the development of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo in its classical sense.
Cf., Blowers, Drama, 28, 170; also Gunton, Triune Creator, 3. McFarland, From Nothing, 36, adds that God’s
sovereignty carried important implications about God's power to save and to redeem; also, early theologians wished
to guard God’s “ability to engage directly with the world of change” without granting the Platonic principle of
divine inclusion in the being of the world. Moreover, Gunton, Triune Creator, 54, calls attention to the “two hands”
doctrine as entailing that God is directly involved with what he creates, rather than, as the Gnostics speculated,
dependent upon intermediary beings.
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that God creates ‘out of nothing’.”29 That is, God’s sovereignty over the created order is understood as being absolutely independent of that order (e.g., Isa 51:6; Rom 9:21; 2 Pe 3:10).30 Simon Oliver also points out that God's freedom transcends not only the properties pertaining to
the material stuff of creation but also to whatever principles and processes pertain to the cosmos
as such.31 So, the classic doctrine of creation ex nihilo implies the CT principle of Freedom of
Divine Action. This doctrine resulted from reflection upon theological implications of the incarnation to distinguish the Christian conception of “creation” from the conceptions of neighbor
cultures. It strongly implies that God as Creator is limited by nothing in his power to effect his
will in creation, nor does God rely upon anything that is not God to create everything that is not
God. God is sovereign to create as he wills.
Fourth, the principle of Absolute Ontological Distinction (AOD) maintains a strong Creator-creature distinction by denying any degree of ontological continuity between God and creation. This principle, too, is primarily determined in Christian thought by christology. For the
same reason that the incarnation manifests the freedom of God’s sovereign power over the creation, expressed in terms of creatio ex nihilo, the incarnation also implies “an absolute ontological
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Gunton, Triune Creator, 67-68. Even though this doctrine is not unambiguously taught in scripture,
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distinction between creator and creation.”32 That is, christology confesses the union of two natures that do not mix and that remain consubstantial with others of like nature.33 Therefore, AOD
is evident in Christ himself. As the one by and through whom the creation is made and sustained,
“the Son is the…principle of distinction” between God and the world. That is, in that the Son upholds the creation as such (Col 1:17; see below on TOB), he distinguishes it from divine being.34
Like a craftsman who is neither identical to nor continuous with what he makes, neither is God
ontologically continuous with anything God has made. McFarland writes that the common denominator among non-Christian “cosmogonies [is] the presupposition of a fundamental ontological continuity between Creator and creature.” 35 The early Christian theologians realized that any
such continuity, however, implies some degree of divinity in the created order of being, which is
the claim of all forms of pantheism.36 So, AOD underscores creation from nothing, affirms its
christological roots, and avoids the idolatry of viewing the creation as having an ontological status equal to the Creator.37

Gunton, Triune Creator, 67. So, also, McFarland, From Nothing, 13, writes of the “radical ontological
discontinuity between Creator and creature encapsulated in the doctrine of creation from nothing.” Blowers, Drama,
1, 164, observes that this element of creation doctrine in the patristic era manifests as the idea of an “ontological
chasm (διάστημα) that separates [the triune Creator (and the) time-bound creation].”
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For an updated treatment of this topic, cf., Aaron Riches, Ecce Homo: on the Divine Unity of Christ,
Interventions (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 2016).
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Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1994),
31. Affirming Pannenberg’s basic claim that the Son’s distinction from the Father as begotten grounds creaturely
distinction from God, cf., Triune Creator, 159, 142-43, 21-22; also, Karkkainen, Creation and Humanity, 60.

Consider, further, this distinction as implied in the word as means of divine creation. The divine word is not
what is created, but the creation is an effect wrought by that word. So, speech-act theory appears to offer fruitful
insights for Christian metaphysics. Cf., eg., Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology: Divine Action, Passion,
and Authorship, vol. 18, Cambridge Studies in Christian Doctrine (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
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Fifth, the principle of Two Orders of Being (TOB) affirms only two realities; one is God,
the other is everything that is not God.38 This principle of orthodox doctrine maintains the integrity of both the Creator and the creation.39 The integrity of the Creator as such requires that the
Creator is not part of a larger whole. So, TOB entails divine transcendence as existence in a
unique order of being from that of the creation. That is, as Trinity, God is self-sufficient being
and therefore in need of nothing else. Creation is an absolutely free act of God’s will according
to his love.40 In contrast, creatures are contingent. The creation may not have been created at all,
or it may have been created other than it was created. In addition to the categories of necessary
and contingent, TOB is evident in the contrast between divine eternity and created temporality.
Gunton points out that space and time are properties belonging to the created order. Time and
space are therefore not continuous with the being of God.41
Further, there is a kind of difference pertaining to the way the Creator differs from all
creation, and there is a kind of difference pertaining to the way creatures differ among themselves.42 The first kind of difference, observed just now, regards the integrity of the Creator’s
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(Dordrecht: Springer, 2001).
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order of being. The second kind of difference has to do with the integrity of the creaturely order
of being. That is, in giving creation being, patristic thinkers understood God to have “empowered
it with a graceful integrity of its own.”43 By “integrity,” then, TOB refers to the need to protect
creaturely being from being subsumed within the being of God, making the creation part of the
life of God rather than having a creaturely life of its own.44 Basil of Ceasarea therefore wrote of
“the ontological homogeneity of the creation.” That is, everything that is not God “has the same
ontological status before God.”45 There is a creaturely order of being ontologically distinct from
the divine order of being. So, the Creator differs from the entire created order in a way that is different from the way creatures differ among others within that order.
Orthodox Christian ontology maintains a strict distinction between the two orders and all
that pertains to them. Nevertheless, the Absolute Ontological Distinction of the Two Orders of
Being must, within properly Christian thought, be recognized as so “only in relation to the God
who continues to uphold it by his ‘two hands,’” as Irenaeus famously wrote regarding the roles
of the Son and the Spirit in creating and sustaining the created order.46 That is, Christian ontology, holding to the Creator-creature model, understands that the distinct reality of the created order is such precisely because of its ongoing dependence upon God for its being. This brings this
inquiry to the next ontological principle of the CT model.

Blowers, Drama, 186. Similarly, Gunton writes “that the world is given value as a realm of being in its
own right.” It is, after all “the created order,” which God deemed “very good.” Gunton, Triune Creator, 10.
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Sixth, the principle of the Divine Ground of Being (DGB) underscores God’s ontological
transcendence in that God upholds and sustains the being of all things by granting their participation in being.47 The contingency of the creaturely order is in the sense that it does not necessarily
exist, nor does it necessarily exist as it does. The creation is also contingent in that it depends
upon God at every moment for its very being (Heb 1:3). Therefore, the confession of the orthodox Christian tradition is that God as such is “the sole ground of being” for himself and for everything that is not God.48 According to James Smith, proponents of Radical Orthodoxy (a recent
effort to retrieve traditional theological perspectives to meet the challenges of the present postsecular, postmodern culture) hold that this must be understood according to the analogy of being,
a concept which complements TOB. That is, being as such for creatures is by analogy to the divine being, not as an extension of God’s own being.49 The creation has being “only to the extent
that it receives the gift of being from the Creator,” in other words, to the extent “that the creature
participates in” the ontological order granted by the Creator.50

The phrase “ground of being” is a way of speaking of God’s transcendence famously expressed by Paul
Tillich. The phrase here as in Tillich intends to hold together this divine transcendence vis-à-vis the created order
and that order’s constant existential reliance upon God’s present sustaining power. The present study therein affirms
Tillich’s effort to resist the pull of naturalism. However, the use of the “ground of being” phrase here resists
Tillich’s implicit panentheism. Tillich explains his “ground of being” conception in terms of “self-transcendence.”
He appears to bring human experience of the world and human experience of God into such intimacy as to suggest a
panentheist ontology. Cf., Paul Tillich, Existence and the Christ, vol. 2, Systematic Theology (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1957), 7-9.
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participating in God’s essence.” However, CT is careful to note the TOB principle, which calls for a concept of
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Theophilus of Antioch provides another way to conceive of DGB. With regard to creation
ex nihilo, Theophilus wrote that the transcendence of God indicated by this doctrine “points to
the fact that ‘the heights of heaven, the depths of hell, and the ends of the earth are in [God’s]
hand.’”51 Clearly, that everything is figuratively in God’s “hand” is meant to express the conviction that all of the created order of being depends absolutely upon God for its ongoing existence.52 Irenaeus strengthened this insight by conceiving God’s relation to the cosmos in terms of
God’s “two hands,” Christ and the Holy Spirit.53 The work of one “hand,” of Christ, according to
Colossians 1:16-17 and Hebrews 1:2-3, consists in “both origination and continuing interaction
and upholding” all that God has made. God’s second “hand,” the Spirit, is “the presence of one
enabling the world to be and become truly itself.”54
What is emphatic in all of this is the great grace of God in so granting creaturely existence to share in being, albeit perhaps tangentially rather than in continuity with the divine essence. As Oliver affirms, “It is God who, at every moment, holds creation as other than himself.”
But this otherness in creaturely existence is itself God’s first and constant gift to creatures.55 Importantly, it is a gift constantly and personally delivered through the empowering presence of the
Spirit. Through him, God not only grants being to the creation, but also guides the creation in
love to the attainment of God’s redemptive purpose.
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Gunton, Triune Creator, 143, “the one by whose mediation the Son became incarnate and is made the
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Oliver, “Every Good and Perfect Gift,” 35, writes that the “fundamental ontology of creation [ex nihilo,
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Seventh, the principle of the Relation of Others (RO) observes that it is the nature of the
triune love of God to bring the created other into relation with God according to the redeeming
and perfecting purposes of God. Orthodox Christian thought confesses the triune being of the
Creator (e.g., Matt 28:19; 2 Cor 13:14; 1 Pe 1:2). This indicates the unity of action, bound by
love, as Creator of all things. That is, God as Trinity creates and sustains creation. So, Levering
writes of the “inseparable operation of the persons ad extra…in which the Father works through
the Son and in the Spirit.”56 So, recall Irenaeus’ notion that the work of creation is “attributed to
the Father…realized through the work of his two hands, the Son and the Spirit.”57 As the one
through whom all things are created and sustained as the creation, Christ, the Son, is the “link between God and the created world.”58 This is manifest above all in the incarnation of the Son, because, “In the unity of Christ’s person, he is fully human and fully divine, fully creator and fully
creation. This means not that the divine and the created are confused within the person of Christ,
but that they are inseparable.”59 This relation is accomplished by the Spirit, just as the Spirit
unites the divine and created orders in Jesus.60 Likewise, as redemption per se is accomplished in
the moment of the cross (Rom 5:10; Eph 2:14-16), the redemption economy motivated by the
love of God is evident in the work of the Spirit (Rom 8:20-25; Phil 1:6).61 The Spirit brings the
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loving presence of the Creator to creatures to “enable” them to attain their divine purpose (Phil
2:12, 13).62 So, writes Blowers, “in patristic theology and piety, the creative mission of the Holy
Spirit in concert with the Father and the Son revolved around four cognate activities consistently…associated with the Spirit: animating, sanctifying, beautifying, perfecting.”63 Therefore,
RO holds that God embraces the creation – the ontological other, and that God’s Spirit lovingly
guides the creation to its redemptive purpose.
Table 1 The CT Model

1. Redemption Economy (RE)
2. Maker Analogy (MA)
3. Freedom of Divine Action (FDA)
4. Absolute Ontological Distinction (AOD)
5. Two Orders of Being (TOB)
6. Divine Ground of Being (DGB)
7. Relation of Others (RO)
A summary of these principles of CT shows how MA, the second ontological principle of
CT, provides the basic framework within which the other principles of the CT model must be understood, ensuring their GCT flavor. According to RE, the finished work of the creation is continuously worked on as the Maker actively brings the purposed project to perfection. The skilled
craftsman has the freedom to make whatever he wants from the material he uses (FDA). Further,
neither the material nor the completed work are identical to the craftsman even as there are manifest ways in which the maker's personality has imprinted itself upon the work (AOD, TOB). The
completed work forever owes its existence to its maker, and in the God-world relation this is intensified such that the creation continues its existence only by the gracious will of the Maker

Gunton, Triune Creator, 161, “The world does indeed cohere in the Son, but is diversified and
particularized as the second hand of the Father enables things to be what they are created to be in the Son.”
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Blowers, Drama, 292.

45
(DGB). Finally, RO reiterates that the created other is the object of the Creator’s love. The Creator’s continuous work on the project entails the Creator’s immanence, becoming united with the
project to guide it from within.
CNT & CT
It is important to highlight briefly the continuity between McGrath’s Christian Natural
Theology proposal (CNT) and the CT model of the God-cosmos relation. This is necessary to establish the relevance of the CT-panentheism relationship discussed in this chapter to the experiment with a semeiotic CNT in chapter four. Specifically, chapter four constructs an experimental
form of CNT according to Peirce’s semeiotic philosophy. That experimental version is then evaluated according to the ways panentheism is problematic for CT, as will be defined in the section
“The Problem of Panentheism” below. Comparing that constructed version of CNT to CT to discern a panentheist influence in semeiotic requires that CNT sans semeiotic is theologically on
par with the CT standard. The next two paragraphs demonstrate the positive correlation of the
two theological schemas.
McGrath identifies five beliefs comprising the core of CNT’s theological structure: the
Self-Revealing God, the Analogia Entis, the Imago Dei, the Economy of Salvation, and the Incarnation.64 Self-Revealing God is “the idea of a transcendent God who chooses to self-disclose
in history and nature,” (OS 4423; FT 71). Analogia Entis holds forth the Augustinian doctrine
“that there exists, on the one hand, a perceptible correspondence and, on the other, an ontological
difference, between the creator and the creation,” (OS 4551). This follows from creatio ex nihilo
in that creation remains dependent upon the power of its creator (FT 73-74). Therefore, also, “the

64
Cf., Appendix B for a comprehensive discussion of McGrath’s account of these beliefs and for a
consideration of their relation to CT.
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created order is capable of rendering the character of God, especially God’s wisdom, goodness,
and beauty,” (FT 74). The CNT belief Imago Dei grounds the human faculty of making theological sense of natural phenomena in the “rationality of God” who created “both the fundamental
ordering of nature and the human observer of nature,” (FT 77). Part of God’s ordering of the observer’s mind is to grant the human mind its own agency, comparable to God’s creative agency,
to construct imaginatively and rationally its perception of significance in nature (OS 4683). The
Economy of Salvation refers to the narrative schema in which the natural world is currently subject to the “fall,” but its restoration anticipated according to God’s plan: the narrative structure of
“creation, fall, redemption, and consummation,” (OS 4423, 4772). Finally, the CNT belief in the
Incarnation holds “that God entered into the natural order in Christ, in order to transform and redeem it,” (OS 4423). McGrath writes that this belief is definitive for all the others (RI 98-100;
OS 4443).
Table 2 CNT & CT Parity

CNT

CT

1. Self-Revealing God

(RO)

2. Analogia Entis

DGB, FDA, AOD, TOB

3. Imago Dei

MA, (RE)

4. Economy of Salvation

RE

5. Incarnation

FDA, TOB

Theological parity between CT and CNT is evident in that four of the five theological beliefs of CNT relate closely to CT (Table 2). Only the first theological belief of CNT, the Self-Revealing God, stands outside of CT's expressed claims. Even in that case, there is an indirect relationship to CT’s principle of the Relation of Others. The second and third CNT theological beliefs also relate imprecisely to CT principles, but there are genuine points of contact nevertheless.
CT and CNT both highlight the way the doctrine of the Analogia Entis holds forth the
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ontological otherness of Creator and creature. CNT goes the additional step to argue that the doctrine also affirms the suitability of the creaturely being to represent the self-revealing God. The
third CNT doctrine, the Imago Dei, relates implicitly to CT’s principle of the Maker Analogy.
Additionally, on the common ground of the problem of sin, this CNT core belief also relates implicitly to Redemption Economy among the CT principles. The fourth and fifth CNT core theological beliefs agree quite closely with claims of the CT model. The parallel relationship of CT
and CNT manifests in synonymous relation of the Redemption Economy principle in CT and the
Economy of Salvation belief in CNT. Finally, both theories agree that the Incarnation serves as
the defining principle for the other beliefs. However, CT focuses on the ontological implications
of the Incarnation, and CNT focuses on the epistemological ones. There is, therefore, close theological agreement between CNT and CT. This overview has shown a “before” snapshot of CNT
theologically. In chapter four, this will be compared to an “after” snapshot of the theological effects of semeiotic upon CNT.
Panentheism (PEM)
This section has two objectives. The first is to describe the array of variations on the
panentheism theme according to recent scholarship.65 The second is to abstract from these what
seem to be the essential characteristics qualifying a view as panentheist. That is, this section
seeks to model panentheism per se according to the common factors across the known types of
panentheism. However, very little distinguishes panentheism as a God-world model compared to

E.g., cf. the analysis of the wide variety of panentheist perspectives by Philip Clayton, “Panentheism
Today: A Constructive and Systematic Evaluation,” in In Whom We Live and Have Our Being: Panentheistic
Reflections on God’s Presence in a Scientific World, ed. Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
William B. Eerdmans, 2004). Clayton uses this language of “variations on a single theme” in discussing correlations
among the essays of the volume; ibid., 250. Also, see the detailed review of that volume with this theme of
panentheistic pluralism in view, in Edgar A. Towne, “The Variety of Panentheisms,” Zygon 40, no. 3 (2005): 78081.
65
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other models. That is, there are almost no theological claims made by panentheism that are not
found within proponents of classical theisms or pantheism. Yet, there is certainly a panentheism
movement of considerable scope and duration.66
The field of writers expressly ascribing to panentheism is quite broad. Many authors have
some degree of a sympathetic relationship to Christianity, for example, Schubert Ogden, Jürgen
Moltmann, Philip Clayton, Arthur Peacocke, and David Pailin.67 Process philosophers are an important subset of panentheists.68 However, when process theists describe divine attributes and actions, their views are markedly different than those who attempt to remain basically under the
tent of Christianity.69 Another subset takes a rather mystical approach. For example, Philip Clayton describes the mystical panentheism of Catherine Keller as one whose theology “is spoken in
the liminal language of postmodernism and poststructuralism...a speaking that is at the same time
an unsaying. Her language is invariably translucent and evocative; it never allows one to grasp a
proposition, to pin down a truth.”70 All so far at least have in common a minimal sort of theism.

Brierley, “Naming,” 3-5. Brierley surveys the contemporary range of conceptions of panentheism as a
twentieth century phenomenon in theology and philosophy of religion. For studies demonstrating panentheism as a
persistent model with a long history, cf., Hartshorne and Reese, Philosophers Speak of God; Cooper, Panentheism.
66

67

Brierley, “Naming,” 3.

68

In fact, process philosopher Charles Hartshorne is credited with sparking the contemporary panentheist
movement; cf. Brierley, “Naming,” 3. The seminal works in this regard are Charles Hartshorne, The Divine
Relativity: A Social Conception of God (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1964; repr., 1948);
Hartshorne and Reese, Philosophers Speak of God. Influential disciples of Hartshorne include, Cobb, A Christian
Natural Theology, Based on the Thought of Alfred North Whitehead; Griffin, Reenchantment.
69

So, most panentheists distance themselves to some extent from a process form of panentheism, according
to Thomas, “Problems in Panentheism,” 655. Cf., also, the discussion of Niels Gregersen’s conception of “Qualified
(Christian) Panentheism (QP),” in Ronnie P. Campbell, “Mere Christian Theism and the Problem of Evil: Toward A
Trinitarian Perichoretic Theodicy” (Ph.D. diss., Liberty University, 2015), 99-100, 102-03. There, Campbell
discusses Niels Henrik Gregersen, “Three Varieties of Panentheism,” in In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our
Being: Panentheistic Reflections on God’s Presence in a Scientific World, ed. Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 2004), 22-24. Campbell’s dissertation is now published as Ronnie P.
Campbell, Worldviews and the Problem of Evil: A Comparative Approach (Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press, 2019).
70
Philip Clayton, “How Radically Can God be Reconceived Before Ceasing to Be God? The Four Faces of
Panentheism,” Zygon 52, no. 4 (2017): 1051.
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That is, they would affirm even a most generic sense of “there is a God.” Yet, the panentheist
“family” has recently been shown also to include non-theists, such as adherents of Buddhism,
and atheists.71
Not only is the field of explicit panentheists broad enough to suggest contradictions.
There are others who are counted as “implicit” panentheists. Their views are considered to manifest the basic panentheist claim, even if only implied—and even if expressly denied, as in the
cases of John Polkinghorne and Wolfhart Pannenberg. In fact, the entire history of panentheism
prior to the nineteenth century consists of implicit panentheists, because the term was not coined
until then, and it was not developed and promoted as a theological model until Hartshorne’s
work in the middle third of the twentieth century.72
This broad diversity raises the problem of definition: Is the term “panentheism” meaningful if both Christian theologians and non-theist Buddhist philosophers affirm it? The problem of
coherence is also raised: Can Panentheism remain consistent across this diversity, or does it have
different senses in different contexts? Do these senses harmonize or conflict? Panentheism proponents recognize one another and claim some who do not profess to be panentheist.73 How is
this possible? These questions are well beyond the scope of this project. Yet, what matters here is
whether there is sufficient consistency in the panentheist field to define a basic model of what
unifies them as a community called “Panentheist.”
The panentheism literature generally concurs with the definition of panentheism standardized by the Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, “‘The belief that the Being of God

Cooper, Panentheism, 18-19. Cf. also Michael Murphy, “The Emergence of Evolutionary Panentheism,”
in Panentheism Across the World's Traditions, ed. Loriliai Biernacki and Philip Clayton (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2013).
71

72

Cooper, Panentheism, 26-28.

73

Ibid., 27-28; Brierley, “Naming,” 3-4.
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includes and penetrates the whole universe, so that every part of it exists in Him, but (as against
Pantheism) that His Being is more than, and is not exhausted by, the universe.’”74 This is indeed
the heart of panentheism, as the discussion below shows.75 However, proponents of panentheism
also point out that important terms in that definition remain too vague. For example, the preposition “in” receives much attention in the literature for two reasons. First, it is the salient element
of the term panentheism (literally, “all-in-god”).76 Second, this preposition has a wide range of
possible senses.77 So, in his review essay summarizing the work accomplished by the contributors to In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being, Philip Clayton notes that as many
senses of “in” are represented as there are authors of the essays.78 Therefore, the challenge for

S. v. “Panentheism,” Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church (ed. F. L. Cross and E. A. Livingstone,
2 ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 1027; quoted in Peacocke, “Introduction: ‘In Whom We Live and
Move and Have Our Being?’,”.
74

nd

Joanna Leidenhag, “Deploying Panpsychism for the Demarcation of Panentheism,” in Panentheism and
Panpsychism: Philosophy of Religion Meets Philosophy of Mind, ed. Godehard Brüntrup, Benedikt Paul Göcke, and
Ludwig Jaskolla, Innsbruck Studies in Philosophy of Religion (Boston, MA: mentis Verlag, 2020), 65, identifies
panentheism’s “central claims” as the “panentheistic slogans” that “‘the world is the body of God’” and “‘the world
is in God.’”
75

Philip Clayton, “Panentheism,” in The Routledge Companion to Modern Christian Thought, ed. Chad
Meister and James K. Beilby (New York: Routledge, 2013), 692-93; Georg Gasser, “God’s Omnipresence in the
World: On Possible Meanings of ‘En’ in Panentheism,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 85, no. 1
(2019): 44.
76

Gregory R. Peterson, “Whither Panentheism?,” Zygon 36, no. 3 (2001): 396, called for work defining the
“en” in panentheism as a priority for resolving panentheism’s internal “tensions.” Several researchers took on such a
task. For example, see Benedikt Paul Göcke, “There is No Panentheistic Paradigm,” The Heythrop Journal (2015):
4-5. He writes, “The key notion ‘in’ is the most troublesome of the notions the panentheist has to clarify…the
panentheist has to decide on a particular interpretation of what it is supposed to mean that everything is in God. The
problem is that there are countless interpretations of the preposition ‘in’ to be found in the debate…‘in’ is just a
placeholder for whatever one wishes to assert about the relationship between God and the world,” ibid., 4.
77

78
Clayton, “Panentheism Today: A Constructive and Systematic Evaluation,” 253, provides a list of
thirteen senses of “in” represented among the various essays. There are seventeen essays explicating panentheism
according to various perspectives. As recently as 2019, Philip Clayton admits that there is still much work to be
done to define panentheism as such vis-à-vis other views; Philip Clayton, “Prospects for Panentheism as Research
Program,” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11, no. 1 (2019): 4. His own conclusion for now is that
panentheism is recognized according to various “family resemblances,” though he remains hopeful that further
“constructive work” will clarify panentheism’s distinct identity; ibid., 16. Hence, his advocacy of identifying
panentheism as a “research program” rather than as a distinct theological model. Similarly, cf., Gasser, “God’s
omnipresence,” 43-44.
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this effort to model basic “Panentheism” is to define a distinctly panentheist sense of how the
world is “in” God.
Table 3 The Brierley Model (BM)

1. The cosmos is God’s body
2. Language of “in and through”
3. Cosmos as sacrament
4. Inextricable intertwining
5. God’s dependence upon the cosmos
6. Intrinsic positive value of the cosmos
7. Passibility
8. Degree Christology
Michael Brierley’s essay, “Naming a Quiet Revolution: the Panentheist Turn in Modern
Theology” is especially helpful. Brierley’s doctoral research focused on the rise of panentheism
as a theological model in the twentieth century.79 Based on that research, Brierley offers that the
field is indeed quite diverse, nevertheless it is possible to set down several hypotheses that generally describe panentheism across the board. His own approach to that descriptive task is to focus
attention on the work of seven “key panentheists.” They are so named because they are the ones
Brierley finds to offer sustained engagement with the definitive problem of panentheism: What
does it mean to say that all is “in” God.80 Consequently, the Brierley Model (BM) lists the eight
“themes” answering the question of “in” (see Table 3).81

79

Brierley, “Naming,” 1.

80
Ibid., 5. He identifies Philip Clayton, David Griffin, Charles Hartshorne, John Macquarrie, Jay
McDaniel, David Pailin, and Arthur Peacocke. Of these, according to Brierley, all but Clayton, Macquarrie, and
Peacocke are process panentheists; ibid., 3.
81

Ibid., 7-12.
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The content of each of these themes can be quickly summarized. That the cosmos is
God’s body is a standard metaphor in panentheist literature.82 Though often cast as an analogy
with the human mind-body (or, psychosomatic) anthropology, Brierley prefers “person-body.”
That is, God’s relation to the universe is like the relation of a human person to their body.83
Therefore, to touch some part of the universe is to touch God, though God’s essential self is distinct from the universe. As the person is more than just a body, so is God. Most important, the
person depends upon the body and the body depends upon the person, though in different ways.
The remaining seven themes follow from the first. Panentheists use “in and through” language to
speak of God’s active relation to the universe. It is the instrument through which God acts and
lives.84 Also, God’s relation is to all of the universe, present in such a way as to act through it as
a person acts through their body. Therefore, the universe has a sacramental aspect, being the
means of God’s presence to his creatures.85 More than that, God and the universe are inextricably
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E.g., cf., Clayton, “Panentheism,” 695.
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Brierley, “Naming,” 6.
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Ibid., 7.

Ibid., 8-9. Brierley reflects a common Christian view of “sacrament” as “a physical thing ‘under,’ ‘in,’ or
‘through’ which God comes.” Put this way, it is not clear how this is something belonging to panentheism more than
to classical theism, or even CT. Such a view is easily construed in terms of the gracious gift of being discussed in
CT’s core belief, Divine Ground of Being. According to CT, in God’s freedom and love, God is able to be present in
and active through what is yet ontologically other than himself. Veli-Mati Kärkkäinen also associates
sacramentalism with the doctrine of God’s omnipresence and active preservation of all being, Kärkkäinen, Trinity
and Revelation, 56. According to Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy, 142-48, the Radical Orthodoxy project
develops a Christian ontology of “participation. According to this view, creaturely being is graciously “suspended”
by the transcendent being of the Creator immanent to the creaturely being. This theory is guarded from panentheism
by insisting on the themes of gift and difference in the God-world relation.
85

Of course, it is possible, as Brierley shows, to construe sacramentalism according to a panentheist ontology,
such that the sacramental aspect is a function of the interdependence of the being of God and the being of creation.
For example, Henriksen, “The Experience of God and the World,” 1080-83, argues that a “sacramental
panentheism” motivates the adoption of panentheism by Christians. A salient claim of that argument is that there is
ontological interdependence in the God-world relationship, because God needs the world as the medium of
interrelation with and revelation to creatures. On the other hand, Henriksen also relies upon the semiotic nature of
the sacramentality of creation. One might argue that the “sacramental panentheism” view stops short of a
demarcated panentheism, such as this chapter finds below. It is the semeiotic aspect of Peirce’s ontology that
appears to guard his metaphysics from panentheism; see chapter three below.
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intertwined, which is to say that there is a “mutual coinherence” intrinsic to the being of both
God and the universe.86 These things, furthermore, entail a real sense in which God needs the
universe. Though God’s transcendence according to panentheism entails God’s ontological priority to the universe, nevertheless God depends on the universe for God’s experience of life. Of
course, there is a considerably stronger sense of dependence in the universe’s relation to God.
The very existence of the universe depends upon God. Therefore, the universe participates in divine qualities such as God’s goodness. Not every divine attribute or quality extends to the universe. God’s being is eternal in God’s essence, while the universe is strictly temporal. So, goodness extends to the universe because God creates it (continuous creation is a view often held by
panentheists) and acts through it as God’s instrument. Being so intertwined and ontologically interdependent with the universe, panentheists hold that God is passible. God empathizes with everything. More than that, Brierley writes that the experiences of the universe just are God’s own
experiences. Finally, degree Christology is the view that the Incarnation of the Son in the person
of Jesus was a marked case of what is generally true of God’s relation to the cosmos.87 That is to
say that the mind-body analogy is descriptive of the panentheist view, and not merely metaphorical. Brierley holds that these eight themes constitute not only a definition of the term “panentheism,” but also a standard – a “yardstick” – by which to qualify any view as an instance of bona
fide panentheism.88 Therefore, these themes explicate the simple panentheist definition: the cosmos is in God but God is more than the cosmos.
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Brierley uses this phrase in a later essay; Michael W. Brierley, “The Potential of Panentheism for
Dialogue Between Science and Religion,” in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, ed. Philip Clayton
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 637.
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Brierley, “Naming,” 12. However, Brierley notes that this view is not as widespread among panentheists.

That definitive model of panentheism according to Brierley is, “Panentheism can be defined as the
doctrine of the cosmos being the good…‘body’…, or ‘sacrament,’ needed by God… with which God is inextricably
88
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However, the question of demarcating a panentheism model among other theistic models
has not yet been settled. That is, it is not sufficient to describe the basic claims made by panentheists in setting forth their versions of panentheism. Since panentheism is a recent theistic
model, it is necessary also to show how the set of basic beliefs of panentheism distinguish themselves from other types of theism.89 This is called the “demarcation problem.”90 Three recent
studies engage this problem in some detail. The studies compare beliefs held by panentheists
with sets of beliefs generally recognized as pertaining to classical theism and pantheism. In each
case, the authors show the lack of any clear demarcation between panentheism and the other
models.91 That is, the set of beliefs associated with panentheism suggests it is a form of classical
theism repulsed by a strong sense of transcendence perceived as definitive of classical theism
and attracted to a strong immanence found in pantheism but unwilling to go that far (viz., a Godworld identity).92 Still, the great degree of general agreement across demarcation analyses

intertwined and ‘in and through’ which God works and suffers. The doctrine involves a degree Christology,”
Brierley, “Naming,” 12-13.
89
The identity of “panentheism” as a theological model is recent. Cf., Brierley, “Naming,” 2,
“‘Panentheism’…was coined by Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781-1832), the German idealist philosopher and
a contemporary of Hegel.” Also, cf., Philip Clayton, The Problem of God in Modern Thought (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
William B. Eerdmans, 2000), 56, 66; Gregory Peterson, Minding God: Theology and the Cognitive Sciences
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), 198. Historical studies of panentheism across millennia are necessarily a posteriori
identifications of cases of panentheism; e.g., Hartshorne & Reese, Philosophers Speak of God; Cooper,
Panentheism.

The modern panentheist movement has been motivated by dissatisfaction with classical theist and pantheist
alternatives; cf., Michael Levine, “Non-Theistic Conceptions of God,” in Routledge Companion to Philosophy of
Religion, ed. Chad Meister and Paul Copan (Routledge, 2012), 237-38.
Cf., Clayton, “Prospects,” 3; Göcke, “There is No Panentheistic Paradigm,” 2; R. T. Mullins, “The
Difficulty with Demarcating Panentheism,” Sophia 55, no. 3 (2016): 325-46. Also, Leidenhag, “Deploying,” 66,
writes that demarcation is necessary to prevent panentheism from becoming “a somewhat suspect ‘fudge’ word.”
90

Cf. the Appendix for details. Brierley, “Potential,” 638, distinguishes a “‘basic’ panentheism,” that
includes Christian sympathizers such as Arthur Peacocke, from “‘advanced’ panentheism,” which is best represented
among process thinkers; Mullins, “Difficulty,” 334-36, 338-41; Mikael Stenmark, “Panentheism and Its Neighbors,”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 85, no. 1 (2019): 41. Mullins offers a brief sketch of a hypothesis
of two ways that could be developed toward demarcating panentheism. Similarly, Stenmark finds panentheist
nuances to beliefs that have a version in other models, which beliefs he calls “extensions.”
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92

Cf., the second paragraph in note 94 below. Notwithstanding the expressed desire of prominent
panentheists to avoid pantheism, some have argued forcefully that panentheism logically entails pantheism. Cf.,
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suggests the possibility of integrating their findings into a panentheism “meta-model.” The
Panentheism Meta-Model (PEM) synthesizes these three studies to highlight the correlations
among their findings. The result is an evident, demarcated order among classical theism, panentheism, and pantheism.93 In this way the Meta-Model shows which beliefs held among panentheism’s proponents serve to define panentheism’s distinctive sense in which the world is “in”
God.94 Table 4 reduces the Meta-Model to represent panentheism in terms of its definitive beliefs.

John C. Polkinghorne, Science and Providence: God’s Interaction with the World, Templeton Foundation Press ed.
(Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press, 2005), 20; William Lane Craig, “Pantheists in Spite of Themselves:
God and Infinity in Contemporary Theology,” in For Faith and Clarity: Philosophical Contributions to Christian
Theology, ed. James K. Beilby (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006); Uwe Meixner, “Orthodox Panentheism:
Sergius Bulgakov's Sophiology,” in Panentheism and Panpsychism: Philosophy of Religion Meets Philosophy of
Mind, ed. Ludwig Jaskolla, Benedikt Paul Göcke, and Godehard Brüntrup (Boston, MA: mentis Verlag, 2020), 206.
Cf., also, William Rowe, “Does Panentheism Reduce to Pantheism? A Response to Craig,” International Journal for
Philosophy of Religion 61, no. 2 (2007): 65-67.
93

Cf. Table 7 The Panentheism Meta-Model (PEM) Detail in Appendix A.
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If resolving the demarcation problem requires that PEM includes beliefs unavailable to other models,
then there is no PEM paradigm or research program. This is the conclusion of Mullins, “Demarcating Panentheism,”
342; and, in another sense, of Göcke, “Panentheistic Paradigm,” 1, 6. However, note that Göcke takes an analytical
approach rather than a demarcation approach. Rather than comparing panentheism to other models, he considers
analytical possibilities of the salient terms of panentheism (everything, is, in, God). He finds that the possible
variations are immense, and there is not yet a consensus view, a bona fide panentheism paradigm. This is consistent
with the demarcation findings discussed here. To outsiders, panentheism presents as logically a variation on classical
philosophical theism more than a distinctive model in its own right. Yet, a panentheism core is still evident, as will
be shown.
If Mullins and Göcke are correct in this, then it would follow that panentheism is a form of classical
philosophical theism that favors pantheism in limited respects. Such a conclusion finds perhaps unwitting support
even in panentheism literature. It is common in the literature for the panentheism movement to be described as
working out as strong a notion of divine immanence as possible (against a vicious divine impassibility alleged as a
core belief of classical philosophical theism) without sliding into pantheism’s God-world identification. E.g., cf.,
Peacocke, “Introduction,” xviii, xxi; Brierley, “Naming,” 3-5; Cooper, Panentheism, 322.
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Table 4 The Panentheism Meta-Model (PEM)

Belief

Variants

1

Empathy

(S10) Divine Sensibility; (B5) God is affected by the
cosmos

2

Ontological Inclusion

(S6) Ontological Inclusion; (M) All-in-God; (B4) God
contains the universe

3

Mind-Body Analogy

(M) Mind-Body analogy; (B10) The cosmos is God's
body; (B11) God includes the cosmos, as whole includes part

4

Mutual Co-Inherence

(M) Relational; (B12) God and cosmos inextricably intertwined; (B) Mutual Co-Inherence

5

Dynamic Dipolarity

(M) Dynamic; (B14) God is dipolar

6

Symmetrical Ontological Dependence

(S7) Symmetrical Ontological Dependence; [(M) God
needs the world ontologically]; (B13) God is dependent on the cosmos (B)

Notes
Correlates with denial of
Classical Philosophical
Theism (CPT) belief in impassibility.
Correlates with denial of
CPT belief in ontological
distinction.

Correlates with denial of
Pantheism (P) belief in
God-world identity.

The middle column details correlations among the demarcation studies: Stenmark (S), Mullins (M), and Brierley
(B). A number with the initial indicates a numbered item given in the respective study. Brackets indicate a view
as possible but not at panentheism’s core according to that study.

The Meta-Model order reflects a preference for Stenmark’s ordering, because of his organized approach. However, now that the ideas from the several studies are correlated, the deeper
logic of PEM is clarified by discussing PEM in light of BM. That is, BM is not concerned with
demarcation but with the explication of what is basic to the broad base of panentheists. BM
shows that the mind-body analogy supplies the logical structure within which the other tenets of
Penentheism work as a coherent theory. Therefore, with BM, the following discussion of PEM
begins with Mind-Body Analogy. It then follows the embodiment logic to discuss Ontological
Inclusion, Dynamic Dipolarity, Mutual Co-Inherence, Symmetrical Ontological Dependence,
and Empathy. Though the correlation of PEM and BM is not precise, the degree of agreement
seems sufficient to corroborate PEM, since most doctrines are held in common and in similar
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senses according to the logic of divine embodiment. Therefore, a revised PEM is shown in Table
5.
Table 5 PEM According to the Logic of BM

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Mind-Body Analogy
Ontological Inclusion
Dynamic Dipolarity
Mutual Co-Inherence
Symmetrical Ontological
Dependence (SOD)
6. Empathy
The first tenet of PEM is the Mind-Body Analogy. This point is deceptively simple. On
the one hand, it is the straightforward claim that God’s relation to the universe is in some way
like the relation of human minds to their bodies. Philip Clayton, a prolific proponent of Panentheism, writes that God’s relation to the universe is “somehow analogous” to the way the mind
“indwells” the body.95 The qualification “in some way like” is important, because this is claimed
only as an analogy. As such, there are certain ways the analogy works to clarify the relation.
There are other ways in which the analogy does not work.96 Clearly, the analogy is proposed
only to the extent that it provides positive support.97 The positive implication of the analogy is in
that one is generally conscious that one’s mind somehow effects bodily events; one’s mind perceives by way of bodily senses; further, one’s mind causes effects beyond one’s body by acting
through one’s body.98 Recall item two from BM above, “the language of in and through.” So,

Clayton, “Panentheism,” 695. Further, this analogy is central enough to warrant Clayton to promote it as
“the panentheistic analogy,” in Philip Clayton, “Panentheism in Metaphysical and Scientific Perspective,” in In
Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being: Panentheistic Reflections on God's Presence in a Scientific World,
ed. Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 2004), 83. Mullins,
“Difficulty,” 335, describes this analogy as a panentheist way of speaking of divine omnipresence.
95
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Peterson, “Whither Panentheism?,” 402.

97

Brierley, “Naming,” 7.

98
Mullins, “Difficulty,” 336. By “body,” Mullins finds that panentheists mean that the God-world relation
satisfies two criteria. First, that “the mind can move the body through a basic action. A basic action is when an agent
can perform an act without having to perform some other action in order to accomplish the first act. For instance, I
move my arm by a basic act. I do not move the cup of water on my desk by a basic act.” Second, that “the mind can
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bodily events and actions are expressions of the will of one’s mind. This is held by most panentheists as a basic sense of God’s relation to the world.99 On PEM, then, events in the world are
embodied self-expressions of the will of God. This appears to be in view when Brierley comments upon the process theism view that “cosmic events are divine actions per se.”100 For example, Philip Clayton writes, “panentheists understand the regularities of the natural world as themselves expressions of the regularities of God’s nature, somewhat like the autonomic functioning
of the human body. Special divine action then represents God’s intentional actions – roughly
analogous to individual conscious actions by human agents.”101
On the other hand, there are already signs of a much greater complexity to this analogy.
What does it mean to claim that God acts via the world like a mind acts via its body, for example? The additional points of PEM serve to flesh out this definitive, if vague, metaphor for PEM.
That the universe is the bodily means by which God experiences or does anything lends to an adjacent item in Brierley’s fifteen-fold list of senses of “in”: “God includes the cosmos, as a whole
includes a part.”102 When explaining the mind-body analogy for the formulation of BM, Brierley

look out from the world from where the body is. The body is the mind’s locus of perception of the world. The mind
acquires perceptual knowledge as mediated through the body.”
99
However, Brierley prefers analogy of pregnant mother rather than the typical panentheist analogy of the
cosmos as God’s body; the cosmos is in God like a fetus is in the mother. Cf., Brierley, “Potential,” 638.

Ibid., 639. Note, further, that Brierley holds process theism as the exemplar of “advanced” panentheism,
which embraces #11-#14 of his list (see Appendix A). Clayton’s explanation of this analogy includes the notion that
God acts in and through the universe as Brierley’s note about cosmic events indicates above. Clayton,
“Metaphysical and Scientific Perspective,” 83-84, writes, “The power of this analogy lies in the fact that mental
causation, as every human agent knows it, is more than physical causation and yet still a part of the natural world.
Apparently, no natural law is broken when you form the (mental) intention to raise your hand and then you cause
that particular physical object in the world, your hand, to rise. The PA [panentheistic analogy] therefore offers the
possibility of conceiving divine actions that express divine intentions and agency without breaking natural law. On
the PA there would be no qualitative difference between the regularity of natural law conceived as expressing the
regular or repetitive operation of divine agency and the intentionality of special divine actions.”
100

Clayton, “Panentheism,” 700. Gasser, “God’s omnipresence,” 58, advocates for a different way in
which divine action might define panentheism. He describes a view of divine omnipresence according to the logical
necessity that God is present wherever God acts upon anything.
101

Brierley, “Potential,” 637. This notion of a “locative” sense of “in” for defining and demarcating
panentheism has received emphasis recently in Karl Pfeifer, “Naïve Panentheism,” in Panentheism and
102
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writes, “part of God can be seen and touched…, while part nevertheless exists ‘beyond.’”103 So,
the second item in PEM is “Ontological Inclusion.”
Stenmark summarizes the panentheist doctrine of “ontological inclusion” as “the world is
a part of God but not identical to God.”104 This is explained by way of a strong take on the mindbody analogy, as follows:
Panentheists, like deists and traditional theists, believe in a personal or personal-like God,
but reject the idea that God is ontologically distinct from the world. Rather, the world is
God’s body, through which God lives his or her life, as we live our lives through our bodies. God, like a human person, is physically embodied in a body and is growing older
through time, and changes as the world changes. Since the world constitutes a part of
God, God is ontologically affected by changes in the world. God is within, but not totally
confined by, the temporal order and nothing comes into being except through God. But
God nevertheless needs a body (a world) for God’s existence. God could not exist without that part of Godself.105
This is the panentheist way of expressing God’s transcendence, according to Stenmark.106 However, this is clearly something else from the traditional theist conception of transcendence. Notice at the beginning of the above quote that the doctrine of ontological inclusion is grounded in
panentheism’s denial of the traditional view of God’s ontological distinction from the universe.
Therefore, ontologically, panentheists hold that God and the world are somehow of similar

Panspsychism: Philosophy of Religion Meets Philosophy of Mind, ed. Godehard Brüntrup, Benedikt Paul Göcke,
and Ludwig Jaskolla, Innsbruck Studies in Philosophy of Religion (Boston, MA: mentis Verlag, 2020), 126.
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Brierley, “Naming,” 6.

Stenmark, “Panentheism and Its Neighbors,” 26. The present discussion relies upon Stenmark’s
treatment of this concept here, since his is the clearest. Brierley’s 4th of 15 possible senses of “in” is that “God
contains the universe.” By itself, this is really just a logical corollary of everything is in God. The significance for
this sense of “in” is that it is the starting point for the panentheism spectrum in Brierley’s list (Brierley, “Potential,”
638). However, Brierley makes it clear that “contains” ultimately is problematic for panentheism, and works better
with traditional theism, because it implies an external relation between God and the world. In contrast, therefore, if
panentheism affirms “contains” it must be carefully nuanced to entail an internal relation. This is why, according to
Brierley, panentheists quite often follow the assertion all is in God with “God is in all,” (ibid., 637). Therefore, this
might be explained by Stenmark’s discussion of the doctrine of ontological inclusion. If God “contains” the world it
is analogous to the way human minds might be said to contain their bodies. Ultimately, it is a way of expressing
God’s transcendence while maintaining an intimate, ontological relation.
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Stenmark, “Panentheism and Its Neighbors,” 26-27.
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Ibid., 27.
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being. Keep in mind, on the other hand, that panentheism also rejects the God-world identity promoted in pantheism. Therefore, there is somehow not an ontological distinction between God
and the universe, but neither is there ontological identity. Hence, once again, the usefulness of
the panentheist analogy.107 Common sense seems to hold that human experience of the mindbody relation does not identify human minds as ontologically the same as their bodies. Given
that dualism is false, one’s mind cannot be something entirely ontologically other than one’s
body.108
Stenmark’s strong form of the mind-body analogy in describing Ontological Inclusion
shows that, for panentheists, the universe is necessary to God’s existence and thus also for all of
God’s experience. As with one’s body, so with the cosmos: God lives through the cosmos, according to panentheism. Therefore, it is also the case that as it is human minds that are conscious
of living through their bodies, God is the self-consciousness of the universe.109 Not surprisingly,
then, Stenmark writes that Ontological Inclusion also entails panpsychism. This is the belief—
especially prominent in process theism—that conscious experience in some form is common
throughout the universe.110 So, the third tenet of PEM, Dynamic Dipolarity.111

On the “panentheist analogy,” cf., note 100 above. In light of the defining importance of this analogy,
Leidenhag, “Deploying,” 68, holds that the concept of panpsychism provides powerful resources to explain a
panentheistic model. Namely, she identifies a variation called “cosmospsychism,” according to which all “in” God
would mean that the cosmos of minds all “exist by virtue of being part of God’s experience.” However, in the same
volume, Pfeifer, “Naïve Panentheism,” 124, denies the cogency of a panentheist “in” in the sense of “God
experiences or ‘prehends’ the world.”
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The denial of dualism is an important presupposition of panentheism, according to Stenmark,
“Panentheism and Its Neighbors,” 27.
So, Leidenhag, “Deploying,” 80, commends panpsychism as a way to avoid identifying “all in God”
with “God in the world,” “the traditional doctrine of divine omnipresence or indwelling.”
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Ibid., 39-40.

Notice that panpsychism has also been indicated in Brierley’s explanations of Ontological Inclusion.
Brierley’s whole-part language includes the statement that “part of God can be seen and touched…, while part
nevertheless exists ‘beyond,’” Brierley, “Naming,” 6; cf., also, Brierley, “Potential,” 637.
111
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Dynamic Dipolarity highlights the salient feature of Process Theism, which models the
God-world relation in terms of complementary, distinct modes of divine existence.112 In one aspect, God as mind transcends the universe as God’s body. In the other aspect, the universe as
God’s body is the actuality of God’s experience and growth and living.113 David Ray Griffin
writes that Process Panentheism distinguishes two senses in which God has dipolarity of being.
First, “The dipolarity emphasized by [Charles] Hartshorne, says that, besides having an abstract
essence that is strictly unchanging, God also has concrete states that – contrary to the traditional
doctrine of divine immutability – involve change.”114 The second sense in which God is said to
be dipolar features Alfred North Whitehead’s “distinction between ‘primordial’ and ‘consequent’
natures, [which] emphasizes the fact that God both influences the world and is also – contrary to
the doctrine of divine impassibility – influenced by the world.” Griffin illustrates this dipolarity
by calling the reader’s attention to the mind-body analogy. He writes, “The point of the analogy…is to emphasize the intimacy and directness of the relation. My body is the part of the universe that I directly influence and that directly influences me…To call the world the body of God
is to say that God both directly influences all things and that God has the kind of sympathy with
all creatures that humans have for their bodily members.”115
Mutual Co-Inherence holds that the God-world relation is intrinsic to both the world and
God. Brierley emphasizes that this belief is especially important to panentheists when he

Leidenhag, “Deploying,” 66-67, notes that most panentheist proponents distance themselves from
process theism per se, though some of its features, such as its approval of panpsychism, are useful in demarcating
panentheism.
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Mullins, “Demarcating Panentheism,” 335.
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David Ray Griffin, “Panentheism: A Postmodern Revelation,” in In Whom We Live and Move and Have
Our Being: Panentheistic Reflections on God's Perspective in a Scientific World, ed. Philip Clayton and Arthur
Peacocke (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 2004), 43.
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includes “language of inextricable intertwining” among the tenets of his model of panentheism.
The point is that the God-cosmos complex is an irreducible unity, though panentheism holds that
the form of the universe is contingent upon God’s creative will. That there is a cosmos to function as God’s body is an intrinsic quality of God, and that the cosmos functions as a body to God
is an intrinsic quality of the cosmos. Therefore, again as Brierley writes regarding his model,
God and the cosmos cannot be separated.116 According to process panentheism, Griffin writes,
“God is essentially the soul of the universe. Although God is distinct from the universe, God’s
relation to it belongs to the divine essence.”117
Next is Symmetrical Ontological Dependence. If God and the world cannot be separated,
as Mutual Co-Inherence claims and as the Mind-Body Analogy implies, then it follows that God
and the cosmos also depend upon one another in some way for their respective ways of being.
Stenmark defines Symmetrical Ontological Dependence as the belief that “God depends on the
world (or the creation of another world) for God’s own existence.”118 He explains further that
[panentheists] believe that God could not exist without the world or without a world, just
like we—assuming that dualism is false—cannot exist without our body or a new resurrected body (as Christians might say), while still being more than our body. Thus, I suggest that panentheism essentially contains the doctrine of symmetrical ontological dependence, that is, the relation of ontological reliance goes both ways. Not just from God
to the world, which the doctrine of asymmetrical dependence says, but from the world to
God: not only no God, no world; but also no world no God.119

Brierley, “Potential,” 639-40. Cf. also, Mullins, “Demarcating Panentheism,” 338, who notes
“relational” as a defining aspect of a panentheist doctrine of God; that it is intrinsic to God’s nature to be in relation
to the universe. However, Mullins also notes that this aspect of panentheism does not demarcate it from classical
theism.
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Griffin, “Panentheism,” 42.
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Therefore, the doctrine of symmetrical ontological dependence holds that God and the universe
somehow need one another. Stenmark uses “symmetrical” just in this sense that there is an interdependent God-cosmos relation.120 Philip Clayton expresses this doctrine, writing,
It is not difficult to state the fundamental claim that the panentheistic metaphor makes:
the interdependence of God and the world. The world depends on God because God is its
necessary and eternal source; without God's creative act it would neither have come into
existence nor exist at this moment. And God depends on the world because the nature of
God's actual experience – and the occasion for the external expression of God's love – depends on interactions with finite creatures like ourselves.121
That God depends upon the cosmos and vice versa is a common view among PEM proponents.122 However, according to Brierley, not all panentheists understand God’s dependence on
the cosmos as a necessary one. Some, such as Clayton and Peacocke, hold that God’s ontological
dependence upon the universe is voluntary; that God chose to create his relation to the universe
in this way.123 Further, this choice is driven by God’s need for an object to love.

120
However, he does not intend to thus describe the qualitative aspect of the relation. That is, the way the
universe needs God is not the same as the way God needs the universe. Likewise, Brierley states, “God and mind
each being dependent on cosmos and body, but not in the same way that cosmos and body are in turn dependent on
them”; Brierley, “Naming,” 6. Note that Brierley is making the point that there is an asymmetrical relation of
dependence between God and the world. Though the terms used appear to state an opinion opposite that of
Stenmark, this is misleading. Stenmark’s concept of “symmetrical” only highlights that the relation is mutual; God
and the world need one another. Brierley’s focus is on the qualitative difference between the way God and the world
need each other.
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Clayton, “Panentheism,” 695.

Cf., also, Gregersen, “Three Varieties of Panentheism,” 20, who writes, “The idea of bilateral relations
between God and the world may even be said to be distinctive for panentheism.” His ensuing analysis of three
varieties of panentheism highlights this theme. However, the necessity of the world for God has recently been
debated by panentheism proponents Benedikt P. Göcke and Raphael Lataster. Benedikt Paul Göcke, “Panentheism
and Classical Theism,” Sophia 52, no. 1 (2013): 61, claims panentheism’s distinction vis-à-vis classical theism is
because the former holds the necessity of the world, but this necessity has yet to be established. So, for Göcke,
panentheism has not yet attained a defined status as a model. Raphael Lataster, “The Attractiveness of
Panentheism—a Reply to Benedikt Paul Göcke,” Sophia 53, no. 3 (2014): 389-93, objects that Göcke’s view is
idiosyncratic, ignoring Eastern forms of panentheism that would meet the necessity condition. The Göcke-Lataster
dialogue continued through several more articles, mostly clarifying claims and counterclaims from the initial essays.
Cf., Benedikt Paul Göcke, “Reply to Raphael Latester,” Sophia 53, no. 3 (2014): 397-400; Raphael Lataster,
“Theists Misrepresenting Panentheism—Another Reply to Benedikt Paul Göcke,” Sophia 54, no. 1 (2015): 93-98;
Benedikt Paul Göcke, “Another Reply to Raphael Lataster,” Sophia 54, no. 1 (2015): 99-102.
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Cf., Brierley, “Naming,” 9-10. Also, see Brierley, “Potential,” 637. It seems that a voluntary
“dependence” strains for coherence. If God in himself is ontologically dependent upon something it could not
logically be voluntary. Brierley notes that Clayton appeals to voluntary kenosis in Christology as a parallel.
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The final tenet of PEM, Empathy, highlights an aspect of the God-world relation that has
been touched on in the course of discussing the preceding doctrines. Like a mind and its body,
God is conscious of that body’s experiences and feelings. Therefore, PEM’s core is marked by a
denial of the classical doctrine of impassibility.124 Stated positively, this is the belief that God experiences empathy (recall “Passibility” from Brierley’s model discussed above). This is what
Stenmark calls “divine sensibility”; “the view that “God is capable of emotions, in particular is
capable of feeling sorrow or suffering as a result of the afflictions of God's creatures.” He explains:
On the other hand, and on this point Gregersen is quite correct, the affirmation that the
natures and activities of creatures do have real feedback effect on God is central to
panentheism. For panentheists, the natures and acts of creatures do after all constitute a
part of God, so a core claim of panentheism is that God could be moved by suffering in
the world.125
According to the common-sense subjective experience of one’s mind empathizing with feelings
in the body, likewise, God empathizes with the universe. This is closely related to the preceding
point about God’s dynamic nature. God experiences through the universe. Therefore, God’s empathy includes the experience of becoming and changing that the universe experiences.
Therefore, PEM presents a coherent set of beliefs several researchers agree as definitive
of panentheism. The six beliefs comprising PEM are shared by researchers seeking to resolve the
demarcation and definition problems for panentheism. That is, these six beliefs represent points
of agreement in research by Mullins and Stenmark as distinctively PEM. In correlating these

However, that is problematic on other grounds, not least that the Incarnation does not claim that Jesus is
representative of the divine nature as such (in terms of ontology).
124
This is important, because denying impassibility is arguably a “classic” feature of panentheism. Recall
the quote from Griffin above in which this denial is explicit regarding God’s dipolar being. Impassibility is often
held as a defining feature of CPT, which panentheists seek to resist. So, the denial of impassibility is at the core of
panentheism, but the affirmation of impassibility is an auxiliary view within classical philosophical theism. Cf.,
Appendix A.
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with the Brierley Model, it is now evident that five of Brierley’s eight themes are clearly represented in PEM: cosmos as God’s body, language of in and through, inextricable intertwining,
God’s dependence on the cosmos, and passibility.126 Accordingly, PEM stands as a distinctive
way of construing the God-cosmos relation according to Empathy, Symmetrical Ontological Dependence, Mutual Co-Inherence, Dynamic Dipolarity, and Ontological Inclusion as these function within the logic of the Mind-Body analogy. These represent Panentheism’s sense of how
everything is “in” God.
The Problem of Panentheism
Table 6 CT & PEM Side-By-Side Comparison

CT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Redemption Economy
Maker Analogy
Freedom of Divine Action
Absolute Ontological
Distinction
Two Orders of Being
Divine Ground of Being
Relation of Others

PEM
1
5
2

Mind-Body Analogy
Symmetrical Ontological
Dependence
Ontological Inclusion

3
4

Dynamic Dipolarity
Mutual Co-Inherence

6

Empathy

In view of these working models for CT and PEM it remains to consider in what ways
PEM is problematic according to CT. One approach simply observes the prima facie contradictions evident in a side-by-side comparison of the models (Table 6). For example, only CT includes an expressed purpose for the God-cosmos relation, the Redemption Economy.127 This
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The three not mentioned are the cosmos as sacrament, intrinsic positive value of the cosmos, and degree
Christology. In each case, these represent theological aspects of the other themes in Brierley’s model. Cosmos as
sacrament is a variant of the mind-body analogy, in that the cosmos is the means by which God acts and relates to
others. The positive value of the cosmos is a consequence of the cosmos as God’s creation, which is closely related
to symmetrical ontological dependence. Degree Christology identifies a christological implication of the set of basic
Panentheism themes. For details, cf. Brierley, “Naming.”
127

One might object that PEM includes an implied purpose in its principle of Symmetrical Ontological
Dependence. God is related to the world because God needs a cosmos through which to live God’s life. If this point
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omission by PEM might be taken as a tacit admission of an inherent naturalism.128 That is, God’s
relation to the world is simply the way things naturally are. More than that, the absence of purpose is also the absence of hope, leaving nihilism in its place.129 Consequently, the PEM claim of
divine Empathy loses its significance. Empathy unmotivated by a purpose, such as redemption,
means nothing to creatures who remain subject to the fickle forces of nature. So, the PEM “God”
loses the very personality grounding the divine love that responds redemptively to the world’s
plight.130 Another clear contradiction lies right at the heart of both models in the contrast of their
structural metaphors. A craftsman does not relate to what he makes as though making his own
body. So, the metaphors “Creator” and “Mind” are not parallel. The contrast rises to the level of
a contradiction when factoring in that the Creator makes his own material from nothing before
working with it as his project. In other words, CT operates on the principle that the Creator
makes something with his own hands that is other than those hands. PEM, in contrast, only considers the mind’s relation to those hands (along with the rest of its “body”).131 So, further,

is granted, it only serves to strengthen the inference of an inherent naturalism in PEM, making God an aspect or part
of a larger whole that also includes the cosmos; or, “God” is the whole of which the cosmos is a part.
Such naturalism is explicit in the late Arthur Peacocke’s attempt to set forth a Christian panentheism, in
Peacocke, “A Naturalistic Christian Faith,” 10-11.
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Cf., for example, a study of Jürgen Moltmann’s panentheism that finds a nihilistic lack of purpose as an
entailment of Moltmann’s panentheistic ethics, in Benjamin Blair Phillips, “The Crisis of Creation: A Critical
Analysis of Juergen Moltmann’s Panentheism” (Ph.D. diss., Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2003), 2,
156-59.
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On the forfeiture of personality in a panentheist model of God, cf., Gruenler, The Inexhaustible God, 17,
67; Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 134.
Panentheism can speak of divine love, but it must be a kind of self-love. For example, Clayton,
“Panentheism,” 695, holds that God creates because of God’s need for objects of God’s love. Murphy, “The
Emergence of Evolutionary Panentheism,” 180, writes that the world “manifest[s] its latent divinity [in part, in a]
self-surpassing love.” Either way, panentheistic love relates to the process of self-realization. So, the love
motivating, for example, the process of concretion (in terms of Whitehead’s metaphysics) is the desire for selfimprovement of a finite god, rather than the redemptive ἀγάπη of the Almighty Suitor (Isa 54:5).
131
Also criticizing panentheism for its denial of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, cf. Copan and Craig,
Creation Out of Nothing, 13-14, 147; Gruenler, The Inexhaustible God, 108; Carl F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, and
Authority, Second ed. (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 1999), loc 68943. Jürgen Moltmann attempted to construct a
Christian panentheism that maintains creation ex nihilo, Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: A New Theology of
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Ontological Inclusion explicitly denies Absolute Ontological Distinction in the God-cosmos relation. Such identification of God with the world is the defining quality of pagan idolatry that has
exercised God’s prophets and preachers through history (Exod 20:4; Jer 10:3-5; Acts 17:29; Rom
1:23).132 This could go on regarding each principle of the models. This much, therefore, suffices
to show the problem of panentheism concerning the present inquiry: a demarcated form of
panentheism strongly contradicts essential features of a traditional Christian theology of creation.
A natural theology adopting such panentheism would not be Christian.133
A direct comparison reveals PEM as problematic according to CT. Still, the purpose of
this inquiry requires looking deeper, into the broader principles behind the contrasts among the
tenets of the models. That is, neither Peirce nor a semeiotic CNT express themselves in the terms
identified in CT and PEM. Identifying the more general underlying principles involved in those

Creation and the Spirit of God (Philadelphia, MA: Fortress Press, 1984). However, his attempt is less successful
than classical theism, according to Phillips, “The Crisis of Creation,” 123.
132

Cf., the recent study on the necessity of the doctrine of the economy of redemption for a creation
theology that resists devolving into paganism, the divinization of the creature, in Bender, “Drama of Redemption,”
172.
133
This finding is consistent with Royce Gruenler’s personal testimony regarding his experience as a
process theist. He explains that process panentheism destroyed every tenet of the biblical faith he held before
adopting process thought; Gruenler, The Inexhaustible God, 15-16. More recently, Kevin Vanhoozer has discussed
how panentheism undermines the Christian gospel; cf., Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 134, 150, 154.
Oliver Crisp has recently constructed a demarcated panentheism he calls “Mereological Panentheism.” This model
borrows from Jonathan Edwards, Jürgen Moltmann, and Robert Jenson. He finds that it fails to maintain tenets basic
to a “broadly orthodox Christian theology.” Cf., Oliver D. Crisp, “Against Mereological Panentheism,” European
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11, no. 2 (2019): 23-41. Also, although Roger Olson argues in favor of orthodox
Christian panentheism, he strongly qualifies his claim, requiring that any Christian panentheism must maintain “the
gratuity of grace in creation and redemption”; cf., Olson, “Response to Panentheism,”337. However, in light of
demarcation research cited in this dissertation, Olson’s qualifying condition would keep such a view within the
scope of classical theism.

Some hold that a Christian panentheism is made possible by the trinitarian doctrine of perichoresis. Cf.,
e.g., Keith Lemna, “Trinitarian Panentheism: A Study of the God-World Relationship in the Theology of Louis
Bouyer” (Ph.D. diss., Catholic University of America, 2007); Jeong-Woo Lee, “Toward a Trinitarian Ecological
Theology: A Study in Juergen Moltmann’s Panentheism” (Ph.D. diss., University of St. Michael’s College and
Toronto School of Theology, 2007); Jan‐Olav Henriksen, “Panentheism Without the Supernatural: On a Perichoretic
Trinitarian Conception of Reality,” Philosophy, Theology and the Sciences 3, no. 1 (2016): 65-69. However,
Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 131, 149-54, argues cogently that applying perichoresis in this way commits
a category mistake fatal to claims of an orthodox Christian panentheism. Panentheism creates other problems for the
doctrine of the Trinity; on which, see ibid., 139-40; Cooper, Panentheism, 329.
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models facilitates recognizing where—if at all—Peirce or a semeiotic CNT express something
consistent with those principles. Specifically, this inquiry requires general principles pertaining
to PEM’s problematic relation to CT. In light of preceding discussions of those models, three
principles evident in that problematic relation provide the criteria for evaluating whether a CNT
appropriation of semeiotic (in chapter four) also incorporates a PEM ontology.134
First, if a semeiotic CNT speaks of the God-world relation in terms of a self-relation rather than a relation of two others, PEM would be indicated.135 That is, CNT ontology in this case
would somehow indicate that the relation of the being of God to the being of the world is continuous rather than marked by an Absolute Ontological Distinction. This would mean that CNT’s
model would formally resemble Dynamic Dipolarity rather than speaking of Two Orders of Being. God and the cosmos would be ontologically united, though manifesting qualitative and functional distinctions similar to those between a mind and its body.136 Consequently, there would be
a different sense of “transcendence” in a CNT affected by PEM. In CT, divine transcendence is
marked by notions of independence and absolute freedom with respect to the creation. PEM, on
the other hand, speaks of God in terms of a creaturely sort of transcendence. God transcends the

These three criteria also pertain to evaluating Peirce’s relation to PEM in chapter three. The following
discussion remains focused on the primary question motivating this study; i.e., how these criteria will facilitate
recognizing PEM’s influence on a semeiotic CNT, if any.
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This presumes that a semeiotic CNT would maintain some degree of God-world distinction. Otherwise,
this criterion would indicate pantheism.
On the category of “self” as implicated in panentheist ontology, cf., Cooper, Panentheism, 328-29; Beck,
“Schubert Ogden,”, 163.
136

Possibly muddying the water are recent explorations of Christian idealism. E.g., M. Wasmeier-Sailer
and Benedikt Paul Göcke, Idealismus und natürliche Theologie (Alber, 2011); Joshua Ryan Farris, S. Mark
Hamilton, and James S. Spiegel, Idealism and Christian Theology: Idealism and Christianity, vol. 1 (New York:
Bloomsbury Academic, 2016); S.B. Cowan and J.S. Spiegel, Idealism and Christian Philosophy: Idealism and
Christianity (Bloomsbury Academic, 2017); James S. Spiegel, “Berkeleyan idealism and Christian philosophy,”
Philosophy Compass 12, no. 2 (2017): n.p. However, that is beyond the scope of the present inquiry, since it is not
included in CT. It may be relevant for a subsequent project constructing a robust Peircean and traditional Christian
ontological model.

69
cosmos as a whole transcends its parts. This is a qualitative transcendence, such that “God” is
more than but not altogether other than the cosmos.137
One obtains a fuller sense of the significance of this first problem area by considering
how it manifests in a PEM-influenced christology. Both models consider the incarnation of the
Son in the person of Jesus as manifesting what is typical of the God-cosmos relation more generally. Consequently, how each understands the incarnation amplifies the fundamental contradiction between the models. CT affirms that even in the Incarnation, the principles of AOD and
TOB maintain. As the Nicene Creed confesses, Jesus is the divine Son incarnate, such that the
natures remain unmixed and consubstantial with their kinds. It is in this way that CT would affirm a sense in which the incarnation is typical of the God-cosmos relation. Yet, consistent with
DGB and RO – emphasizing the divine prerogative and initiative, in Jesus the two separate and
distinct natures are unified into one person. This hypostatic union in the case of Jesus is unique, a
sui generis historical phenomenon. It is at this point that CT would not affirm the incarnation as
typical of the God-cosmos relation. PEM christology, on the other hand, takes precisely the opposite view. For the generic PEM proponent described by Brierley, the hypostatic union in Jesus
manifests to a limited degree what is generally true of the God-cosmos relation.138 That relation,
as with Jesus, is that of a unified person – a self. This is formally represented in the PEM tenet of
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Cf., Cooper, Panentheism, 328; Henry, God, Revelation, and Authority, loc 68943. In his treatment of
panentheism vis-à-vis Christian theology, Michael Horton focuses on this point. For example, he writes that the
“qualitative” difference between God and the world “marks the chasm separating biblical faith from polytheism,
pantheism, and panentheism,” Michael Scott Horton, Pilgrim Theology: Core Doctrines for Christian Disciples
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011), 22. Cf., also Michael Scott Horton, The Christian Faith: A Systematic
Theology for Pilgrims on the Way (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2011). Horton writes that pantheism and panentheism
result from a “confusion of the Creator with creation”; similarly, “God’s aseity marks the chasm between biblical
faith and pantheism/panentheism.” Ibid., n.p.
Recall that Brierley includes “degree christology” among the eight themes describing the general
panentheist model, Brierley, “Naming,” 12. On which, cf., Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 150-51; Beck,
“Schubert Ogden,” 173; Henry, God, Revelation, and Authority, loc 68943.
138
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Dynamic Dipolarity, according to which God and the cosmos relate as two poles of some totality. Therefore, PEM christology falls into at least two classical heresies. One is the Eutychian
heresy in which the divine and human natures are mixed and therefore confused. This is the effect of the PEM tenet of Mutual Co-Inherence, and of the tenet Symmetrical Ontological Dependence. The other heresy follows the Apollinarians in denying Jesus a human mind, and so a
fully human nature. Instead, God is the mind and the body is the extent of the human aspect of
Jesus.
Second, PEM’s influence would be evident if a semeiotic CNT expresses the God-cosmos relation in terms of ontological co-inherence and interdependence rather than as a unilateral
gift of being from God to the cosmos.139 This calls attention to the contradiction between CT’s
Divine Ground of Being and PEM’s Mutual Co-Inherence. The former holds that the God-world
relation consists in God’s gracious action to constantly uphold the being of the cosmos. The latter, however, holds that the being of God requires a relation to a cosmos. Therefore, PEM entails
that God’s relation to the cosmos is an ontological necessity for God. God needs to create a cosmos in order to be God. PEM goes further. Recall that Symmetrical Ontological Dependence
holds that God needs the world for God to live the divine life. These are ways in which PEM
contradicts the sense of divine freedom affirmed by CT.140 According to CT, God creates and
sustains the cosmos as a completely voluntary action. Only God exists necessarily, and God can
live and exist as God without any cosmos, or anything else that is not God. For PEM, however,
“create” comes to have the sense of continuing creation, a process of the cosmos’ becoming.

139
Beyond the several criticisms at the ontological level, Kevin Vanhoozer links panentheism’s corruption
of the doctrine of redemption to this category, ontological interdependence; cf., Vanhoozer, Remythologizing
Theology, 150, 154. Cf., also, Gruenler, The Inexhaustible God, 108.
140
Cf., Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 134, 151, 162, 167-68; Cooper, Panentheism, 325-26;
Henry, God, Revelation, and Authority, loc 63119.
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More than that, because the cosmos enables the life of God, continuing creation is another way
of speaking of divine self-improvement. The cosmos’ process of becoming is also God’s growth
in experience and understanding.141 So, now to the last of the problem areas considered briefly
here.
Third, if “God” becomes a label for the metaphysical principles of the cosmos, then a semeiotic CNT would manifest a PEM ontology.142 That is, PEM will have influenced CNT to
have a different conception of divinity than CT has. In CT, divinity is defined in terms of the
strict ontological otherness and freedom according to which God transcends the cosmos.143 The
cosmos and its governing principles together constitute the created ontological order, and as
such, are wholly other than God. In PEM, however, divinity has a creaturely sort of transcendence. This is, again, the “transcendence” of a whole to its parts. This is truly a sense of “transcendence,” but in terms of a qualitative otherness within an ontological continuity. In this way,
according to Dynamic Dipolarity, it becomes evident that the God of PEM is a principle – albeit
a spiritual one – determining the cosmic processes and as such sharing a natural and necessary
relation to the cosmos.144 Everything about God’s life and purpose and being is related to and
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Two problems are evident here. First, if natural processes are the direct actions of the life experience of
God, then the integrity of creaturely being (cf., TOB) is violated. On which, cf., Polkinghorne, Science and
Providence, 20, 28. Second, the Creator is confused with the creature; cf., Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology,
167; Cooper, Panentheism, 328; Henry, God, Revelation, and Authority, loc 59067.
The latter problem has the further consequence that sin, evil, even hell also contribute to the divine being;
Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 155; Cooper, Panentheism, 332, 342; William J. Wainwright, “God’s
Body,” in The Concept of God, ed. Thomas V. Morris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 81-82.
142
As with the first principle, this one would indicate panentheism rather than pantheism only as long as a
semeiotic CNT maintains a sufficient degree of God-world distinction.
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This is not to ignore other attributes qualifying divinity in a CT sense, such as the omnipotence manifest
in creatio ex nihilo and the infinite wisdom manifest in the logic and order of creation.
So, writing of process panentheism, Beck, “Schubert Ogden,” 163, writes, “God’s existence is to be
conceived as strictly analogous to that of the self, because God is not the exception to metaphysical principles but
rather their eminent example.” So, panentheism is marked by the tendency to apply principles pertaining to
trinitarian doctrine to the metaphysics of the created order; Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 131, 153, writes
of the misapplication of the concepts perichoresis and kenosis.
144
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determined by cosmic events. Therefore, the one who created the cosmos, the sovereign God
confessed by CT, becomes the dependent god of PEM. The cosmos and its processes are given
dominion over God. A contemporary philosophical theology “revolution” indeed.145
The analysis in this section has highlighted panentheism’s basic tendency to naturalize
God. The theological produce of PEM thus exposes its ancient pagan roots.146 Accordingly, it is
evident that CT and PEM oppose one another at every point. Terms shared by the models (e.g.,
transcendence, God, creation, incarnation) contradict at the level of reference. Therefore, the
problem of panentheism is its antichristian force. It bears an innate influence toward pantheism,
evident in the number and range of compromises classical theists—and especially those holding
to more specifically Christian doctrines—must make to accommodate a demarcated form of
panentheism.147
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Brierley, “Naming,” 13.
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Of course, the literature on panentheism admits of these roots, but without seeing them as theologically
problematic. For example, Hartshorne and Reese, Philosophers Speak of God, 38-57. John Cooper’s important,
diachronic study of panentheism provides a helpful analysis of the ways panentheism draws from Neoplatonism in
ways that are theologically problematic vis-à-vis orthodox Christian tradition, yet others contributing to GCT (e.g.,
Augustine) utilized aspects of Neoplatonism more or less faithfully. See Cooper, Panentheism, 17-20.
147
Andrew Robinson found, in experimenting with process panentheism, “that Christian theology has to
give up too much to enable it to mesh with Whitehead’s scheme,” Robinson, God and the World of Signs, 3.
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Three: Panentheist Aspects of Semeiotic
This chapter scrutinizes the alleged relationship of Peirce’s philosophy to panentheism.
Recall from chapter one that Peirce scholars agree that Peirce’s semeiotic entails a panentheist
metaphysics, according to “panentheism” broadly conceived. If this is true for panentheism defined as PEM, then to fully appropriate semeiotic for the theoretical structure of Christian Natural Theology (CNT) would seem to entail also incorporating the contradictory beliefs of PEM. In
light of the previous chapter, then, CNT would to some extent identify the Creator with the creation. CNT would become another voice drowning out the truth of the gospel in this time. Toward
testing these consequences of a panentheist semeiotic in chapter four, the primary question of
this chapter is, How is PEM implicated by Peirce’s semeiotic? To answer this question it is necessary to understand Peirce’s semeiotic within the theoretical structure of Peirce’s philosophy. In
particular, since the question of panentheism pertains to metaphysics, one must understand how
Peirce related semeiotic and metaphysics within his philosophical system.1 The discussion of
Peirce’s views therefore works within the sophisticated interrelation of phenomenology, logic,
and metaphysics, according to Peirce’s architectonic schema of the logical relationship among
all sciences (Appendix C).2

1

Raposa, PPR, 145-46, comments on the—often neglected—importance of maintaining the metaphysical
context of Peirce’s semeiotic when appropriating semeiotic for work in other inquiries.
2

On the Kantian idea of architectonic philosophy that Peirce adapted, cf., W8:99. Also, cf., Kelly A.
Parker, The Continuity of Peirce’s Thought (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1998), 2-4. A description
of Peirce’s mature view of the architectonic relation among the various sciences is given in his “A Syllabus of
Certain Topics of Logic,” which Peirce wrote to accompany his 1903 Lowell Lectures. The relevant text is
published in EP2:258-62 and CP 1.180-202. Appendix C distills Peirce’s outline according to the EP2 text.
It is also important to note that Peirce had a broad conception of “science” as any disciplined inquiry
genuinely pursuing the truth of its object. Cf. Joshua David Black, “Peirce's conception of metaphysics” (Ph.D.
diss., University of Sheffield, 2017), 19.
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Therefore, this chapter’s inquiry proceeds through two stages. First, it describes the major
doctrines of Peirce’s philosophy as they bear on the question of the relation of semeiotic to metaphysics.3 In doing so, the inquiry pays attention to Peirce’s own theological comments made in
the context of his discussions of metaphysical questions. One will see the interdependence Peirce
conceived for semeiotic and metaphysics, such that Peirce’s metaphysics defines what he believes to be true about semeiotic. More to the point, one will see that semeiotic works with
Peirce’s conceptions of continuity, evolution, and naturalism so that his conception of God is
given in terms of a creator who is manifest in the purposeful growth of all creation. This is prima
facie consistent with PEM. So, second, this inquiry compares Peirce’s metaphysical God-talk
with the three criteria of PEM to assess the degree and manner of Peirce’s agreement with PEM.
It finds that Peirce’s theological statements in connection with synechism and the Absolute Mind
would be especially attractive to PEM proponents. However, since Peirce’s God-world model
operates according to semeiotic logic, Peirce’s apparent affinity for PEM turns out not to be
agreement with PEM. These discussions identify several aspects of Peirce’s thought that may be
taken as a bias toward panentheism while not completely agreeing with PEM. The ground is in
this way prepared for the empirical work of the next chapter, testing whether a robust appropriation of semeiotic for CNT practice causes CNT to share Peirce’s apparent panentheist bias.

3
The term metaphysics as used here indicates concepts regarding those most general features of reality. In
one place, Peirce supplied a representative list of the sorts of questions addressed by metaphysics as a scientific
discipline, “What is reality? Are necessity and contingency real modes of being? Are the laws of nature real? Can
they be assumed to be immutable or are they presumably results of evolution? Is there any real chance, or departure
from real law?” (EP2:420). So, Peirce holds that metaphysics is an ontological discipline. Accordingly, concerns to
understand what is “real,” and so “reality” as such, dominate Peirce’s representative list of questions. In this same
context, Peirce’s discussion proceeds to include time and space as important metaphysical questions, as well as “the
question of a future life and especially [the question] of One Incomprehensible but Personal God, not immanent in
but creating the universe,” (EP2:421).
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Semeiotic Metaphysics
As will be evident in the next chapter, Alister McGrath’s appropriation of semeiotic is
abstracted from the systematic setting of Peirce’s thought. This is not an illicit philosophical
move. Others have found an abstracted semeiotic to shed helpful light on questions of interpretation. For example, Jesper Tang Nielsen studies the thematic signs in the Gospel of John with the
help of Peirce’s analysis of signs as such and of the logical array of possible sign types.4 Andrew
Robinson makes fuller use of Peirce’s theoretical resources to apply semeiotic to Trinitarian theology, though he remains somewhat idiosyncratic.5 What makes McGrath’s case worth considering is that CNT proposes to appropriate semeiotic as the epistemological engine of CNT’s methodology as natural theological inquiry. For Peirce, semeiotic indeed supplies the logic of the inquiry process, as will be evident in the course of this chapter. Therefore, McGrath’s CNT proposal parallels Peirce’s purpose for his decades of developing semeiotic philosophy. To abstract
semeiotic from the systematic settings funding its efficacy, while intending for semeiotic to function according to its purpose and role within that system, risks impoverishing semeiotic and thus
creating a logical problem for CNT theory.6
In light of this, the present exposition of Peirce’s semeiotic takes a systematic approach.
That is, this discussion sets Peirce’s semeiotic within the philosophical structure Peirce envisioned. In the middle to late 1880s Peirce began to work on his own answers to questions about
metaphysics. In a chapter Peirce drafted for a planned book on metaphysics, Peirce cast his

4

Jesper Tang Nielsen, “The Secondness of the Fourth Gospel,” Studia Theologica 60, no. 2 (2006): 124.

5
Robinson, God and the World of Signs. The use of “idiosyncratic” here refers to Robinson’s direct move
from Peirce’s metaphysical categories to their application by analogy to the economic Trinity. This skips a few steps
in the route Peirce himself took in applying his universal categories theologically (W6:166-67). Whether Robinson’s
move is problematic from the standpoint of Peirce’s philosophy remains to be determined.
6
Raposa, PPR, 146, writes that one can abstract semeiotic from Peirce’s system but not without great cost
to its cogency.
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vision setting forth a new theoretical structure for philosophy (W6:168). Peirce describes this
grand scheme for philosophy in terms of architectonic (W6:440n168.1-3). This is the idea that
the various sciences (among which Peirce includes mathematics and philosophy and every area
of inquiry interested in discovering the truth of its object) relate to one another as the more specific relying upon the vaguer (cf. Appendix B).7 At the same time, the vaguer sciences draw
upon findings from the more specific ones (W8:99).8 So, Mathematics is maximally vague, being
applicable to every other field of inquiry. Philosophy also applies to all fields of inquiry but is
itself dependent upon Mathematics for the development of its ideas and principles. More specific
sciences, such as physics and biology, rely upon Philosophy in important ways.
Peirce subdivided Philosophy into three divisions: Phenomenology, Normative Science,
and Metaphysics (EP2:259). Phenomenology is the philosophical science in which Peirce works
out his analytical approach to all phenomena of experience. What Peirce called Normative Science included the subdisciplines of Aesthetics, Ethics, and Logic.9 Metaphysics, applies the epistemological doctrines gained in Normative Science as answers to metaphysical questions.10 This
is to construct ontology in the light of epistemology.11 Theoretical ideas formulated in
Though Peirce devised his own manner of arranging the sciences, the concept of “architectonic”—a
systematic organization of the sciences—is inherited from Kant; cf. Parker, Continuity, 2.
7

The parenthetical reference is to Peirce’s Monist essay, “The Architecture of Theories,” in which he
makes much of the structural metaphor implied by “architectonic.” For fuller discussions of his architectonic theory
(a.k.a., the classification of sciences), cf., e.g., Black, “Peirce’s Conception,” 26-32; Parker, Continuity, 28-58.
8

Aesthetics has to do with the quality of human perceptions. Ethics at this level in Peirce’s arrangement has
to do with being able to recognize the summum bonum, the greatest good. Peirce’s Logic is thoroughly semeiotic.
These “Normative Sciences” are dedicated to working out an understanding of how to reason well about what one
knows. Cf., Rosa Maria Perez-Teran Mayorga, From Realism to “Realicism”: The Metaphysics of Charles Sanders
Peirce (Lexington Books, 2007), 115-16, on the epistemological nature of Peirce’s categories. also,
9

On the normative sciences as epistemological ground for metaphysics, cf., esp., Black, “Peirce’s
Conception of Metaphysics,” 5, 157; Joseph L. Esposito, Evolutionary Metaphysics: The Development of Peirce’s
Theory of Categories (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1980), 2; Carl R. Hausman, Charles S. Pierce’s
Evolutionary Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010; repr., 1993), 2. Similarly, cf., Christopher
Hookway, Peirce, The Arguments of the Philosophers (New York: Routledge, 2009), 2, 219.
10

Parker, Continuity, 197, writes that semeiotic is Peirce’s starting point for metaphysics, because “the
nature of thought, as described in semeiotic, is sufficiently analogous to the nature of being that the elements of
11
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Phenomenology and Normative Science are given a form in Metaphysics that makes them easily
relatable to the more specific fields of scientific inquiry (termed by Peirce “Special Sciences,” or
“idioscopy”).12
What Peirce offers in the way of Metaphysics especially applies concepts he developed in
Logic, which is the architectonic home of semeiotic (MS 1334).13 Peirce warranted this move according to his doctrine of anthropomorphism. That is, Peirce held that the human mind imaged
the nature of the cosmos in which it evolved. In these things Peirce follows Kant in that he
agrees with Kant that the fundamental metaphysical principles of the universe are reflected in
corresponding fundamental principles of human logic, and that this conclusion follows because
such principles are already in the mind before reasoning begins.14 Peirce moves beyond this

semeiotic may be considered prototypes of the elements of being.” Further, then, semeiotic supplies four “main
hypotheses” for metaphysics: “there is a reality,” “that reality is to be conceived as a process similar to the process
of semiosis,” “modes of action or relation are fundamental to understanding modes of being,” and “the elementary
metaphysical categories describing these modes of being are variations of the three indecomposable kinds of relation
that are manifest in phenomenology and semeiotic.”
12

Including, e.g., Psychology, Biology, Physics, History, etc. (EP2:259-60).

13

Cf. the critical text in Charles S. Peirce, Prolegomena to a Science of Reasoning: Phaneroscopy,
Semeiotic, Logic, ed. Elize Bisanz (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Edition, 2016), 60.
14

Peirce was clear that in this regard he was following the tradition of Kant. Peirce writes,

How is the extraordinary prominence of these conceptions to be explained? Must it not be that they have
their origin in the nature of the mind? This is the Kantian form of inference…We find the ideas of First,
Second, Third, constant ingredients of our knowledge…it is the peculiar nature of the mind to mix them
with our thoughts…due to congenital tendencies of the mind. So far there is nothing in my argument to
distinguish it from that of many a Kantian, (W6:182-83; cf. also, W5:235).
Cf. esp., Black, “Peirce’s Conception of Metaphysics,” 163-64, discussing Peirce’s Kantian way of relating
logic to metaphysics, Black quotes Peirce on an implication of his theory of three universal categories, “‘I submit for
your consideration the following metaphysical principle which is of the nature of a retroduction: Whatever
unanalyzable element sui generis seems to be in nature, although it be not really where it seems to be, yet must
really be [in] nature somewhere, since nothing else could have produced even the false appearance of such an
element sui generis.’ (RLT, p. 161).” Black then explains, “This retroduction, allows us to move from claims about
the essential and irreducible role of a concept in cognition to claims about reality. It functions as a bridge between
logic and metaphysics. According to this principle, if the categories are irreducible to one another, and thus ‘sui
generis,’ and if they seem to be in nature, then we can take them to have some extra-cognitive reality.” Thus, Black
argues that the sui generis character of the Categories, on Peirce’s account, strongly suggests their metaphysical
reality, so that they could be in the mind at all. So, on Peirce’s view, principles of logic (i.e., Peirce’s semeiotic) are
suggestive of metaphysical realities. On Peirce’s phenomenological categores, cf., “Triad” below.
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Kantian background in offering his evolutionary explanation for the correlation of human logic
with the logic of the cosmos. Discussing Galileo’s concept of il lume naturale, Peirce writes,
“Thus, in dynamics [i.e., physics], the natural ideas of the human mind tend to approximate to
the truth of nature, because the mind has been formed under the influence of dynamical laws,”
(W8:95).15 Therefore, Peirce’s manifestly metaphysical doctrines are his semeiotic Logic read
into observed cosmic phenomena.
This discussion of Peirce’s Metaphysics follows an order according to Peirce’s philosophical doctrines pertaining to Phenomenology and Logic, which are logically prior to Metaphysics, according to Peirce’s system. As Peirce held that these doctrines are images of cosmic
realities this discussion treats them as signaling metaphysical themes, discussion of which pairs
the philosophical doctrine with its metaphysical correlate. Beginning with the theme of Meaning,
this discussion describes Peirce’s truly seminal doctrine, Pragmaticism. This influenced all of his
philosophical work and is therefore a fitting starting point for this discussion. Its metaphysical
correlate is Peirce’s doctrine of Scholastic Realism. Next comes the theme of the Triad, which
highlights his tripartite doctrine of Universal Categories. From there Interpretation includes
Peirce’s Semeiotic and its correlate in Metaphysics, Growth. Then Mind is described by the

Raposa, Theosemiotic, 88, discussing Peirce’s “anthropomorphism,” Peirce’s tendency to read nature in
light of human being, writes,
15

“every single truth of science is due to the affinity of the human soul to the soul of the universe, imperfect
as that affinity no doubt is” (CP 5.47). That such an “imperfect” affinity exists is a conjectured
presupposition that Peirce embraced as the best way to account for the otherwise inexplicable success with
which scientists have so rapidly and efficiently discovered truths about nature. While they err with
regularity, their success is vastly disproportionate to the infinite number of candidate hypotheses available
for the explanation of any given phenomenon. It is not a mysterious presupposition, but one buttressed by
an evolutionary theory explaining how our capacity for reasoning must have developed in continuous
adaptation to the natural world in which human beings live and move and have their being.
Cf. also, Raposa, PPR, 97; and ibid., 100, in light of Peirce’s evolutionary explanation, “Macrocosm mirrors
microcosm; the logic of objective mind is the same logic that ought to govern human reasoning.” Also, cf., Esposito,
Evolutionary Metaphysics, 230.
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doctrines of Synechism and Objective Idealism. This course of discussion of Peirce’s thought
shows that his Metaphysics is summarized by the statement that the universe is a great sign, “that
consists in a living inferential metaboly of symbols. In fact, ‘all this universe is perfused with
signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs.’”16 How this semeiotic metaphysics relates to
Peirce’s doctrine of God will be the final theme of this survey.
Meaning
The chief doctrine of Peirce’s philosophy, Pragmaticism, explains how to establish the
true meaning of concepts.17 He used this word for the theory that
a conception, that is, the rational purport of a word or other expression, lies exclusively in
its conceivable bearing upon the conduct of life; so that…if one can define accurately all
the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept
could imply, one will have therein a complete definition of the concept, and there is absolutely nothing more in it (EP2:332, original italics).18
In other words, Peirce’s doctrine is that the entire idea of some concept one holds is defined by
what one imagines would be the ultimate, concrete results it would produce in terms of behavioral habits.19 The would-be practical result one imagines a concept to have provides no

16

Raposa, PPR, 121, quoting CP 5.448, n1.

“Pragmaticism” is one of Peirce’s many neologisms coined in his attempt to maintain specific conceptual
references for terms used in his philosophy. In this case, Peirce invented this word to distinguish his concept of
pragmatism from the one made popular by William James and others. When later impelled to rename his original
concept, Peirce recalls that he was the first to use “pragmatism.” Peirce describes this background for
“pragmaticism” in his 1905 Monist article, “What Pragmatism Is” (EP2:331-45, 1905). The Jamesian legacy of
pragmatism continues in American pragmatist philosophers such as John Dewey, Hilary Putnam, and Richard Rorty;
though the distinction between the pragmatisms of Peirce and of James should not be overstated. Cf., Sami
Pihlström, “Peirce’s Place in the Pragmatist Tradition,” in The Cambridge Companion to Peirce, ed. Cheryl Misak
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Nevertheless, the Jamesian tradition has nominalist tendencies
(James’ “will to believe”). Nathan Houser, in his introductory essay for volume two of The Essential Peirce, notes
that Peirce named “‘pluralism’” as one of the characteristics of James’ pragmatism motivating Peirce to distinguish
his own version as “pragmaticism” (EP2:xxviii).
17

This is clearly a reiteration of Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, which, in its classical form is to “consider what
effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then,
our conception of those effects is the whole of our conception of the object,” (EP2:346, restating the form of the
maxim originally published in separate articles in 1877 and 1878. Cf., EP1:109-23, 132).
18

The maxim of pragmaticism is conveyed in terms of habit in EP2:418, “Consequently, the most perfect
account of a concept that words can convey will consist in a description of the habit which that concept is calculated
19
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guarantee that one’s belief is true. Peirce consistently advocated for scientists and philosophers
to have a measure of humility regarding beliefs about the truth of things.20 Beliefs are likely to
change over time as further experience refines what one believes about that concept. Yet, it is
also not the case that one’s belief about a concept is likely to be completely mistaken. Because
Peirce believed that the human mind evolved by and within the cosmos, he held that humans
have a natural faculty for picking out external realities. Therefore, on Pragmaticism, definitions
of concepts in terms of what one expects they would eventually produce bear some degree of
truth according to the reality independent of any one mind.21 Moreover, through further experience, Peirce theorized, there will be a tendency to increase the correspondence between belief
about the concept and its external reality. The notion that a concept has external reality brings us
to Peirce’s doctrine of Scholastic Realism.
Peirce’s studies in logic brought him to read deeply in Medieval philosophy. He became
interested in the Scholastic debates between realists and nominalists; viz., Scotus v. Ockham.
Peirce favored Scotus and the realists. However, he found that their work was nevertheless
greatly marked by nominalism, which Peirce increasingly came to recognize as the scourge of
modern thought.22 They thought that generals—broad, encompassing ideas such as Truth,
Beauty, Goodness—inhered in individuals. So, for example, the general idea of Beauty gained

to produce. But how otherwise can a habit be described than by a description of the kind of action to which it gives
rise, with the specification of the conditions and of the motive?”
On Peirce’s fallibilism, cf., e.g., Hookway, Peirce, 91; also, Black, “Peirce’s Conception of
Metaphysics,” 33; Mayorga, Realicism, 99.
20

What Hausman discusses as the “extrasemeiotic or extraepistemic condition,” Hausman, Peirce’s
Evolutionary Philosophy, 140.
21

Mayorga, Realicism, 81-84; 87-89. “Nominalist” refers to “[t]hose who deny the existence of universals,”
James K. Dew and Paul M. Gould, Philosophy: A Christian Introduction (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic,
2019), 105. That this takes the form of the belief that users assign meanings to words is evident in Hookway’s
characterization of nominalism as “‘the hypothesis that [abstract] realities…spring into existence when investigators
come to acknowledge them,’” Christopher Hookway, “Reference, Causation, and Reality,” in Semiotica (1988):
331-48, quoted in Hausman, Peirce’s Evolutionary Philosophy, 157.
22
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from an individual rose is perceived to have a form unique to that individual rose.23 For Peirce,
this left too much responsibility in the subject for the communication of general ideas in individuals.24
Still, Peirce believed that Scotus was on the right track, in that Scotus advocated for the
reality of generals (EP2:354).25 By this he meant that a general idea, such as Beauty, has characteristics and qualities that are independent of what anyone thinks about Beauty or whether anyone is thinking about Beauty.26 Beauty does not mean just whatever anyone wants it to. Something objective about it causes subjective conceptions of Beauty to share that common ground.
Real generals bear a consistency across individual cases that manifests their objectivity
(PPMRT:193-95).27
Peirce’s Scholastic Realism distinguishes between reality and existence. This distinction
parallels that between generals and individuals. For Peirce, a real general has reality but not existence, because it is indeterminate, vague.28 An individual is marked by its determinacy. It is not
necessarily determinate absolutely, in every respect. Yet, it is a single thing. It has what Scotus
called haecceity, or “thisness,” (W6:205).29 Individuals, as singular determinate things, have

23

Mayorga, Realicism, 48.

24

Ibid., 137-38.

25

On the Scotist background here, cf., Mayorga, Realicism, 83; also, Raposa, PPR, 157n29.

Peirce’s realism is consistent in this claim that something real is such because it is what it is independent
of any individual mind’s thought about it. A well-known statement in this regard is found in “The Neglected
Argument for the Reality of God,” (CP 6.453).
26

Peirce modified Scotus’ doctrine in that Peirce held that only some generals are real. Humans are able to
imaginatively create all sorts of ideas whose reality consists only as a product of their own mind. For example, one’s
dreams are not real ideas in Peirce’s sense, though ideas about one’s dreams are real (CP 6.453). The dream of
eating an ice cream cone is not real in itself. However, the idea that one dreamed about eating an ice cream cone is
real.
27

28

Mayorga, Realicism, 152.

29
Mayorga, Realicism, 84-85, 148; Parker, Continuity, 213; Raposa, PPR, 21 helpfully discusses Peirce’s
view that even individuals maintain some level of generality on Peirce’s view.
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existence but not reality, according to Peirce’s distinction. For example, a certain red rose exists.
One, therefore, can say this red rose is not that red rose. The generals used to identify them, however, do not exist. They are merely ideas. Redness and roseness are generals instantiated in both
this and that other red rose. Yet, both redness and roseness are real generals because they have
recognizable characteristics independent of anyone’s thoughts about them.
According to Peirce, therefore, generals are encountered directly when one experiences
an individual in which the general is instantiated. In the experience of an individual red rose, for
example, redness and roseness are immediately perceived, being given in that individual rose.
Peirce explained this in his 1903 Harvard Lectures when he described his theory of perceptual
judgment (PJ). The PJ is an automatically formed hypothesis of a general idea that might explain
an individual case that is surprising or unfamiliar. This hypothesis draws upon prior experience
unconsciously to fund a plausible explanation (PPMRT:242-43).30 On one’s first encounter with
a new individual, such as a red rose, the resulting PJs will tend to be vague. Perhaps one can recognize red due to prior experiences of colors, but this is the first rose so one only hypothesizes
“flower” perhaps. On further experience, such as seeing a store sign identifying that flower as a
rose, PJs gain definition.
Consequently, Peirce’s Scholastic Realism also holds that real generals are effective, as
in the preceding paragraph where the reality of generals led to the refinement of PJs. Ongoing
experience with realities of various kinds eventually leads to more accurate conceptions of those
realities. Peirce’s example par excellence is that real generals such as the Law of Gravity bear
effects upon existent individuals (PPMRT:190-93). Peirce explained that this is because real generals influence the development of behavioral habits. An example Peirce used is that a child

30

Cf. also Hausman, Peirce’s Evolutionary Philosophy, 155-56.
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quickly develops the habit of avoiding hot surfaces after only one or two experiences of the real
general, hotness (CP 6.454).31 At the level of Metaphysics, Scholastic Realism holds that the real
general, Gravity, effects existent individuals in the cosmos in a way that has become a habit of
the cosmos.
Scholastic Realism is Peirce’s doctrine that generals are real and effective in the experience of existent individuals. As a metaphysical principle this helps to account for regularities in
the cosmos, cosmic habits. As an epistemological principle this builds upon the pragmaticist conception of meaning. There are ideas that have sufficient objectivity that they are perceived similarly across manifold cases of instantiation. Accordingly, as experience of such instantiations increases, the conceptions defining those objective realities converge upon identity with the real
idea itself. In these ways, Peirce’s doctrines of Pragmaticism and Scholastic Realism participate
in the theme of meaning in Peirce’s thought.
Triad
Recall that Mathematics, in Peirce’s architectonic schema, supplies hypothetical principles for everything else. One of the most profound of these in Peirce’s hands is the principle of
adicity according to the logic of relations.32 Peirce found that three types of relations—monads,
dyads, and triads—are irreducible and distinct from each other. No number of monads constitute
a dyad, nor can a triad be composed of any combination of monads and dyads (W6:174-75).
However, he found that all other modes of relation, including monads and dyads, can be formed

31
Cf., also, Esposito, Evolutionary Metaphysics, 79-80. Esposito discusses Peirce’s use of this illustration
in MS 891 for the idea that generals are perceived in individuals; that the whole is communicated through
experience of a part, that “‘the transparency of the drop of water must actually convey a meaning to our conscious
affections as truly as the Whole Sea itself,’” (MS 891, quoted in Esposito, Evolutionary Metaphysics, 80).
32
Short, Peirce’s Theory of Signs, 71; cf., also the detailed discussion of Peirce’s existential graphs for
which adicity figures prominently via the logic of relations in Peter Ochs, Logic of Scripture, 212-27.
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from triads (EP2:364).33 Consequently, he reasoned that the triad should be the basic unit of
analysis in every field of inquiry, including the theory-constructing work of Philosophy. The
doctrines described in this section bear this out. Peirce’s doctrine of the three Universal Categories describes the triad in Phenomenology, and his doctrine of the three Cosmic Elements describes the triad in Metaphysics. Therefore, Peirce’s doctrines taken together hold that the human
mind images a cosmos in which every possible experience entails a triadic relation.34
Peirce applied his findings about triadicity to Phenomenology and discovered that the
three basic relations correspond to three fundamental elements of experience.35 The monad in experience is its qualitative aspect. Just as a monad is one object by itself, without consideration of
a relation to any other than itself, so is the quality of feeling in an experience just what it is in itself.36 This is the phenomenological category of Firstness. The dyad in experience is its brute aspect. This category has to do with reaction and resistance that manifest in the experience of otherness. With Secondness, however, there is no sense of meaning about the relation. The triad in
experience is its aspect of intelligibility. It is in the category of Thirdness that experience as such
is possible. Experience is not a brute—which is to say, meaningless—encounter with some other.

Cf. Esposito, Evolutionary Metaphysics, 178, discussing how Peirce’s logic of relations grounds his
metaphysics via the three universal categories.
33

34

Ibid., 3; so, also, the semeiotic nature of mind discussed in Parker, Continuity, 165.

35
Parker, Continuity, 128, these categories function “as fundamental conceptions in any specialized
analysis of the features of experience.”

The present discussion of Peirce’s basic conception of the categories of experience follows especially his
explanation in “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God,” (CP 6.454-55). However, that explanation is a
mature statement of Peirce’s thought on the categories since at least “One, Two, Three” (W5:242-47; 292-308).
36
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Much less is it a mere focus on an abstract quality. For experience per se there must be some perception of meaning.37 That comes when a third brings two others in relation (Figure 1).
Figure 1 Peirce's Universal Categories

Thirdness
(Mediation)

Secondness
(Otherness)

Firstness
(Quality)

The exclamation point represents the
intelligibility created by Thirdness.

Therefore, most important for phenomenology is the triad, marked by the category of
Thirdness.38 This is the category of the whole. Peirce often illustrated this with the idea of giving.
If A gives B to C, there is an irreducible relation among all three due to the nature of giving. C
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Cf. Parker, Continuity, 108. For example, the qualitative, vague feeling of a beautiful performance of a
symphony (a classic example of Firstness) is a bona fide experience by virtue of one’s consciousness of the feeling
of beauty. So, Hausman, Peirce’s Evolutionary Metaphysics, 38. Cf. also Peirce, “Neglected Argument,” (CP
6.455).
Peirce held that Firstness and Secondness are “degenerate” forms of Thirdness. Secondness is degenerate
Thirdness in the first degree, and Firstness is degenerate Thirdness in the second degree. What is important is to see
that Firstness and Secondness—monadic and dyadic relations—are abstracted from Thirdness, some triadic, true
relation. If one observes a relation of two, having Secondness, the sense of reaction and otherness, one is, in fact,
abstracting a dyadic relation from what really is a triad. For example, Peirce’s classic illustration of Secondness is
attempting to push open a door and experiencing more resistance than expected. At the level of an experience of
Secondness, this is simply a brute fact that the door will not move very easily. As Secondness, one’s attention is
directed to the relation of just two objects, oneself and the door. However, notice that the expectation that the door
should have opened is due to a triadic relation, perhaps of oneself, door, and the idea of opening or of passageway.
So, the dyadic relation of myself and the door on which the Secondness of the moment has one’s attention wholly
fixed is truly in that moment abstracted from the triad in which they properly belong. Similarly for Firstness. The
moment of some experience causes one’s attention to become fixed just on the quality of that experience, perhaps a
feeling of joy or beauty, and on nothing else. Nevertheless, that quality of feeling truly belongs within a triad in
which it is made intelligible as a part of some triadic relation. In the example of trying to open the door, one might
imagine that for some moment one’s attention is wholly fixed on the feeling of frustration. It has not occurred to one
yet why one is frustrated. On Peirce’s theory of “degenerate” categories, cf., W6:176-79.
38

86
would not have B unless A had given it. More importantly, something cannot be given unless
there is a giver, a receiver, and a gift. The very idea of “giving” logically requires all three terms
(W5:244; W6:174-75). This is the effect Thirdness has as the category by which two things are
brought into relation in the experiencing mind. Thirdness unifies a complex of three objects into
an individual whole. This is dynamic, and it is immediate whenever the relation is perceived. So,
the phenomenological category of Thirdness entails triadic action, which is the dynamic, immediate, unifying relation of two objects by a third object.
Peirce held that the three phenomenological categories are metaphysical realities, principles of the very nature of the cosmos as such (PPMRT:190-203).39 The metaphysical form of the
Categories is found in chapter seven of “A Guess at the Riddle.” This chapter describes “The
Triad in Physics.”40 Peirce concludes that “three elements are active in the world, first, chance;
second, law; and third, habit-taking. Such is our guess at the secret of the Sphynx,” (W6:208).41
Therefore, Peirce holds that Firstness as a metaphysical reality is evident in the principle of
chance. Mathematicians of Peirce’s day moved away from long-held notions of precise axioms
in geometry. They were realizing that experience yields approximations for which there remain

Cf., also John K. Sheriff, Charles Peirce’s Guess at the Riddle: Grounds for Human Significance
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 40; Parker, Continuity, 197, 200; Hausman, Peirce’s Evolutionary
Metaphysics, 127. Hoping to establish this vision publicly, Peirce drafted several versions of plans for a book first
titled One, Two, Three (a transparent allusion to the Categories) and then revised as A Guess at the Riddle. In that
book, Peirce planned to trace these Categories from their forms and functions in the work of Philosophy into their
manifestations in several salient fields of inquiry (Logic, Metaphysics, Psychology, Physiology, Biology, Physics,
Sociology, and Theology) (W6:166-67). It is important to note that the order of these chapters is not merely
determined by Peirce’s architectonic reasoning. He writes that these are the areas of inquiry into which his own
reflections actually led him and in this order (W6:175-76). Their ubiquity would imply their status as metaphysical
principles of the cosmos. Cf., Parker, Continuity, 206, on Peirce’s “‘speculative cosmology.’”
39

40
Under the heading of Physics, Peirce observes what he calls “three elements” of the cosmos, which
correspond to the three Categories. Also, Peirce begins the chapter by discussing the fact that Metaphysics in
philosophy had long been considered both possible and tracking with the state of the art in geometry (W6:208, 203).

The “Riddle” is the ancient question of Metaphysics, “What is the universe made of?” (W5:295). Cf.
editorial comments in W6:438-39. Also, on Peirce’s conception of the riddle of the Sphinx, cf., Esposito,
Evolutionary Metaphysics, 2; Sheriff, Peirce’s Guess, xvii.
41
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the possibility of infinite variations.42 The vague and approximate nature of possibility recognized by mathematicians meant to Peirce that chance must be granted as an essential element of
the metaphysics of the cosmos. Chance manifests Firstness in Peirce’s view, because in itself it is
pure possibility. There is no relation with another to determine it one way or another. Secondness
manifests in the principle of law throughout the cosmos. Peirce’s example here are the natural
laws that account for the various regularities observed in the cosmos. The concept of natural laws
just is that under certain conditions, certain actions occur, as it were, automatically. Like a deductive argument in logic, there is an aspect of necessity.43 So, the Secondness of law is seen in
its nature as a brute, automatic reaction (W6:206). Finally, habit-taking is Peirce’s metaphysical
correlate for Thirdness. Peirce held that the fact that there are such regularities in the cosmos signified that somehow the cosmos came to have certain processes or principles as cosmic habits.
Habit-taking is the dynamic aspect of becoming in the cosmos and of the cosmos itself, Peirce
noted. This is the realization of wholeness, the unification of related objects in an intelligible
manner.44
The theme of the triad makes Peirce’s anthropomorphic relation of epistemology and ontology especially evident. Both the human faculty of perception and the many kinds of natural
phenomena display similar categorial triadicity. In this way not only are humans readily able to
construct meanings discovered in engagements with those phenomena. Human inquirers also

42

For example, geometry divides a circle into three hundred sixty degrees. However, the scope of a
“degree” is problematized as deceptive regarding its specificity. That is, a “degree” is imprecise, as one may
subdivide it, subdivide the subdivisions, etc., ad infinitum (cf. “Triad in Physics,” W6:203-4).
43
44

Peirce wrote of deductive reasoning in natural processes; cf., Parker, Continuity, 199.

Cf., Parker, Continuity, 70-71, that the triad entails combination. Similarly, Esposito, Evolutionary
Metaphysics, 131-32, discusses Peirce’s theory that the thirdness of cognition combines past and future in the
present moment. Raposa discusses this at the metaphysical level of the “Absolute Mind,” as “the whole which calls
out its parts,” in PPR, 50.

88
find ubiquitous warrant to believe that those meanings are to some extent determined by the reality of things. This brings this discussion to the next theme, Interpretation.
Interpretation
At the epistemological level, Peirce’s theory of signs (Semeiotic) provides a formal analysis of Meaning in the Pragmaticist sense. In doing so, Peirce relies upon the Triadic form and its
relational dynamics. According to Semeiotic, signs include their interpretation and are dynamic
interpretative processes. Interpretation increases in the sign process until attaining to a meaning
that fully realizes the sign. So, transposed to the level of Metaphysics, Semeiotic informs
Peirce’s evolutionary theory of cosmic Growth.
Figure 2 Peirce's Triadic Sign Model

Interpretant

C
Representamen

B

Object

A
A. presentative relation; B. representative relation; C. interpretive relation.

For Peirce, a sign is anything that represents something else to someone.45 One recognizes immediately the triadic form of this sign model (Figure 2). There is a sign vehicle (a representamen in Peirce’s terms), its object, and an interpretant (the idea inferred by an interpreter)

Parker supplies a representative sample of variations on this theme of Peirce’s definition of “sign.” Cf.
Parker, Continuity, 144. Also, Parker references several of Peirce’s salient definitions of the sign: CP 2.228; CP
2.274; SS 32; SS 80-81. Cf. also Sheriff, Peirce’s Guess, 34-35.
45
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held in an irreducible relation (EP2:272-73, 1903).46 Further, Peirce theorized the three-fold internal relations of a sign which analyze the semeiotic process of the growing interpretation of a
Sign.47 These are the representamen’s dominant quality qua representamen—its presentative relation, its representative relation to its object, and its interpretive relation to its interpretant.48
For each of these, Peirce’s Universal Categories suggest a triadic analysis of types (EP2:28996).49
For example, the representative relation concerns how the representamen stands to its object as a representation of that object in some way. A representamen might be an icon of its object. In that case, its relation to the object consists solely in its quality as a representation of the
object. For example, a map is an icon of some territory that is its object. If a representamen is an
index of its object, it functions as a representamen due to some actual, causal relation between
the object and itself. A weathervane, for example, is an index of the object of wind direction. Finally, a representamen might be a symbol of its object. A symbol implies its object to an interpreter according to some set of conventional rules (EP2:291-92). A stop sign provides an example here. Much more is understood from the sign than is given in the sign itself, given that the
interpreter also understands the requisite conventions.

46
Notice Peirce’s distinction between a sign and a representamen. Sometimes Peirce used both terms to
refer to the sign vehicle, or representamen. However, his semeiotic theory manifests two distinct ideas. The
representamen is the phenomenon encountered by the interpreter by which the semeiotic idea of the object is
communicated. A sign as such just is the triadic relation of a representamen, its object, and an interpretant. See,
Parker, Continuity, 137.
47
To attempt to avoid ambiguity, “sign” with a lower-case “s” from here on indicates an individual case of
the relation of representamen, object, and interpretant. “Sign” with an upper-case “S” indicates what Peirce called
semeiosis, the interpretive process involving a series of related signs.
48
Cf., James Jakob Liszka, A General Introduction to the Semiotic of Charles Sanders Peirce (Indiana
University Press, 1996), 18-19.

Short, Peirce’s Theory of Signs, 207. Consequently, each of the three relations internal to a sign analyze
into three subtypes; such as icon, index, and symbol for the representative relation in the next paragraph. The
resulting subtypes, on Peirce’s view, translate into a taxonomy of ten possible types of sign. Any sign includes one
subtype from each of the three sign relations. See Peirce’s diagram, EP2:296.
49
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Figure 3 Semeiosis Diagram
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Peirce theorized multiple variations of the object of a Sign. This diagram simplifies the object to reflect Peirce’s doctrine that the entire Sign remains grounded in the original object
(Object1) as semeiosis occurs via a series of parallels in the representative relation (B1). Also,
this diagram simplifies the interpretant. It only indicates semeiosis in a linear way, whereas
interpretants may form in a wide array of variants consistent with the preceding sign.

One of Peirce’s earliest convictions regarding the nature of signs is that all thoughts are
signs and thinking occurs in Signs (W2:207). A Sign as such yields an interpretant, which is a
thought in the mind of one encountering the sign. Consequently, due to Thirdness, it is the nature
of signs to produce further signs. This dynamic, triadic aspect of signs Peirce called semeiosis
(CP 5.484).50 This process produces a continuum of signs carrying forward the idea of the

50

Short, Peirce’s Theory of Signs, 158; Parker, Continuity, 148-49.
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original object (Figure 3). That is, some sign began the process. As a sign, it produced an interpretant. That interpretant represents the original object in a way to some extent determined by the
representamen in that original sign. This interpretant is now the representamen of another sign
consistent with, but not identical to, the first sign. This process continues infinitely. However,
“infinitely” in Peirce’s theory of continua does not mean endlessly.51 Peirce theorized that semeiosis continues until the process has produced a habit that satisfies the original object.52 This will
be some habit of behavior rather than a thought, which would be another sign.
What must not be missed is that semeiosis is the process whereby something of the reality of the object communicates to the mind of an interpreter. At some point in the process, the reality of the object to some extent becomes embodied in the life habits of some interpreting mind.
At the risk of oversimplification, suffice it to say that Peirce explained this objective continuity
in the Sign by relating the object to an interpretant through final causation.53 This is when a desired outcome somehow bears a real causal relation to the development of the process leading to
it. In semeiosis, the convergence of interpretants with the reality of the object supplies final
causal force to the process. This expresses the heart of the pragmaticist logic of inquiry, according to which inquirers adjust beliefs closer to the truth of things according to ongoing experience.
Accordingly, semeiosis—like inquiry—proceeds in the experimental manner of trial-and-error.
Due to the generality of the objective reality grounding the Sign, various habits might conclude
the semeiotic process. The upshot of this discussion of Peirce’s theory of signs is that

51

Cf. Parker, Continuity, 147-48.

52
Notice the parallel to Peirce’s Pragmatic Maxim. The full meaning of one’s concept is evident only in
some practice they imagine would result if their concept were fully believed.

Cf., EP2:496, 499-500; where Peirce discusses the “final interpretant.” Also, cf. discussion of final
interpretant in context of Peirce’s conception of final causation in Short, Peirce’s Theory of Signs, 136-39, 183; cf.
also, Raposa, PPR, 22, discusses final causation in terms of “‘the whole call[ing] out its parts,’ (CP 1.220).”
53
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interpretation is a process involving the multiplication of cases that share a common originating
object and a general purpose directing the overall trajectory of development. Peirce found this a
powerful model for understanding relationships among “intellectual concepts” and for imagining
how the present cosmos came to be.54 Hence, Peirce’s metaphysical theory of evolutionary
Growth.
Peirce’s concept of Growth is akin to the present day notion of increasing complexity.55
Peirce hypothesized that Growth might somehow be a feature of the cosmos at the metaphysical
level, because he found it in every field of science he explored.56 Therefore, Peirce’s Metaphysics includes doctrines setting expectations for how Growth is a metaphysical principle of a cosmos marked by Pragmaticism and Semeiotic and reflected in the human mind evolved by this
growing cosmos. One of these, which Peirce called tychism (W8:135), is his doctrine that chance
is an important consideration for all of Philosophy.57
Chance, the metaphysical form of Firstness, has to do with possibility. Many things possibly could happen. By chance, certain possibilities are realized as facts of experience. Tychism is
a key to Peirce’s theory of Growth, because it is the principle whereby new cosmic habits can be

The phrase “intellectual concepts” alludes to Peirce’s definition of Pragmaticism; that it is his theory of
how to define such concepts. This trades upon his Pragmatic Maxim, which an earlier discussion noted is closely
related to his explanation of continuity in Semeiotic. Cf., CP 5.467.
54

E.g., Robert Corrington draws upon Peirce’s sign theory to explain the increasing complexity within the
framework of ecstatic naturalism in Robert S. Corrington, A Semiotic Theory of Theology and Philosophy (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Complexity also figures strongly in Philip Clayton’s theory of emergence
in Philip Clayton, Mind and Emergence: From Quantum to Consciousness (New York: Oxford University Press,
2006).
55

Recall his interdisciplinary plan for “A Guess at the Riddle” discussed earlier. Also, in “The Doctrine of
Necessity Examined,” Peirce appeals to the ubiquity of “growth” evident in any area of natural science as evidence
for the principle of evolution (W8:122). Later, in “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God,” Peirce mentions
growth as a metaphysical principle the contemplation of which eventually leads to belief in God (CP 6.465).
56

Peirce names this doctrine here, at the beginning of “The Law of Mind.” However, note that he refers the
reader to his previous essay in the early Monist series, “The Doctrine of Necessity Examined” (W8:111-25) as the
place where he discussed in detail that chance is a fundamental element of things and crucial for a modern
philosophy.
57
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formed (W8:157).58 According to Peirce, habits are formed as prior experience of chance events
makes those things more likely to happen again in the future (W8:97).59 Eventually, one of those
outcomes becomes the regular one due to its unique fitness for the character inherent in that particular process. Consider the development of bird species, for example. According to chance and
law as elemental principles of Growth, the experience of some bird species begins to include
some new feature, say, a modification of the shape of the beak. This happens, apparently accidentally, by chance, in only one or a very few individuals of that species. Peirce’s concept of the
habit-taking tendency holds that this beak change could become a regularly recurring feature of
this species, which might be enough of a change to mark a new species of that kind of bird. That
beak shape would then have become a habit.
Clearly, however, some element of these processes remains missing. What explains why
it is that certain chance facts rather than others become the habitual ones? Why would any accidental change to the shape of a bird’s beak ever become the norm for that—or now a new—species? The answer to these questions is purpose. Peirce conceived of Growth as an evolutionary
process of taking on new habits, realizing new possibilities. This process is described semeiotically as a form of the process of interpretation of a cosmos full of Signs, which is itself a Sign.
Peirce held that the Sign process involves purpose. It is teleological in nature. It is seeking its
fulfilling end. It seeks that habit which will finally and fully realize the meaning of the object
originating the Sign.60 What remains is to explain why any Sign—especially the cosmos—should

Peirce associates tychism with his theory of evolution expressly at the conclusion of “The Law of Mind,”
referenced in the text above. In a later essay, “Evolutionary Love,” Peirce writes about a form of evolution
distinguished by its Firstness according to tychism. He called this form of evolution tychasm (W8:194).
58

59

Cf. also discussion in Hookway, Peirce, 209.

This language of a Sign “seeking” its end is mainly metaphorical. Yet, Peirce identified personality as
such having the triadic form of a Sign. Cf., e.g., Raposa, PPR, 67-68, discussing CP 6.270. Likewise, as a scientist
has the personality of seeking the truth of the matter through trial-and-error, Peirce recognized an analogous
60
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have any guiding purpose, why it should have a telos. Peirce’s teleological doctrine for Metaphysics is one he called agapasm, or “Evolutionary Love.”61
Peirce reasoned that the teleological appearance of the development of the cosmos is not
merely anthropomorphic. That is, there is some reality causing the feeling of teleology one gets
from cosmic phenomena, rather than a mere projection of human psychology.62 In Peirce’s view,
there are three types of evolution occurring in the cosmic processes.63 Evolution by chance is
marked by Firstness. Evolution by causal necessity is marked by Secondness. Evolution by attraction, agapastic evolution, is marked by Thirdness. That is, the new ideas encountered in the
process of development are attractive, such that they become habits. Further, the attraction is due
to their purpose.64 That is, certain habits seem to contribute to the realization of the purpose of
being. Because of the aesthetic nature of agapastic evolution, Peirce theorized love as a driving
principle of cosmic Growth.65 Peirce explained that this love is defined by Jesus, in that the
“Gospel of Christ says that progress comes from every individual merging his individuality in

dynamic at work in cosmic evolution; cf., Ivo Assad Ibri, Kósmos Noetós: The Metaphysical Architecture of Charles
S. Peirce, vol. 131, Philosophical Studies Series (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2018), 95-96.
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Peirce had a tendency to coin terms specific to his technical philosophical meanings for them. Agapasm
is his doctrine that love affects the cosmic evolutionary processes. Agapism is his doctrine that love is an important
principle for philosophy to consider. Cf., W8:194. Similarly, we have seen that Tychism is Peirce’s doctrine that
chance is important for philosophy to include in its theorizing work. Tychasm, on the other hand, is the doctrine that
chance is a key element of the cosmic evolutionary processes.
Raposa, PPR, 100, “…Peirce's perspective…evolution is nothing other than the process of inquiry writ
large. Anthropomorphic conceptions had more than a merely metaphorical validity for Peirce. Macrocosm mirrors
microcosm; the logic of objective mind is the same logic that ought to govern human reasoning. Evolution is always,
then, a ‘thinking’ process, the development of ideas embodied in concrete fact; and human inquiry is itself
evolutionary.”
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The following comments draw upon Peirce’s essay, “Evolutionary Love,” viz., W8:194-205.
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Cf., Hausman, Peirce’s Evolutionary Philosophy, 176; Hookway, Peirce, 215.
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Peirce expressly draws upon the Gospel of John to identify this principle of his metaphysics of Growth.
See the section below on “God.”
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sympathy with his neighbors (W8:189). So, Growth proceeds via the agapistic “sympathy” of semeiotic individuals, coming together as habits of the increasingly orderly cosmos.66
If Peirce is right about agapastic (i.e., purpose-guided attraction) evolution, and that evolution per se is a process of Sign interpretation, it would follow that the cosmos and its constituent parts must somehow have the properties and nature of mind. Indeed, this idea now seems a
necessary implication of Peirce’s Kantian belief that the principles and dynamics of human
minds image similar principles and dynamics of the cosmos itself. The idealism that belief suggests is now evident in the semeiotic, purposive nature of the development of the cosmos.
Peirce’s epistemological “Law of Mind” and its metaphysical correlate, Objective Idealism, now
emerge as the capstone doctrines of Peirce’s Logic and Metaphysics.
Mind
Peirce defined the Law of Mind as the principle by which there is a continuous spread of
ideas as some ideas affect others (W8:136). This affection among ideas, according to Peirce, is
due to certain categorial properties of ideas. The Firstness of an idea is its constant quality of
feeling. Its Secondness is its energy to affect other ideas in reaction to an encounter with them.
The affect of one idea upon another is an attraction according to Thirdness. This is the tendency
in an idea to bring other ideas along with it (W8:148). In other words, Thirdness in ideas individually and among ideas collectively leads to increasing generalization as ideas become “welded”
to—or associated with—one another in complexes of ideas. Peirce explained this welding process as due to the loss of energy as more ideas are associated into a more general idea (W8:149).
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Parker, Continuity, 16, writes of Peirce’s agapasm, “Peirce proposed a theory of evolution of ideas that
regards their development as an evolution toward a harmonious state of rational order, of reality.”
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That is, generalization diminishes the initial intensity of the ideas to affect one another.67 Consequently, it is evident that Mind is marked especially by Thirdness and therefore by a growing
continuum consisting of relations of things.
Accordingly, Peirce explains how Mind works the way it does in terms of Synechism, his
doctrine that continuity is important to understanding everything (W8:136). What is important is
just that Peirce relies upon the nature of continua to understand Mind, the cosmos, and the semeiotic nature of everything. On Peirce’s understanding of continua, any individual identified within
the continuum embodies what precedes it and determines what comes after it (W8:146-47).68
Peirce held that Signs are teleological continua grounded by some general idea, an object indicated by the representamen and which determines some interpretant. In terms of Peirce’s Scholastic Realism, the individual representamen inherently communicates the general idea of its dynamic object. So, as Mind forms generalized classes of ideas—continuous relations among
Signs—Signs begin to imply one another as the entire cosmos of Signs becomes harmoniously
interrelated. The Law of Mind readily transposes to the level of Metaphysics.
Also in his 1890s series in The Monist, Peirce described his doctrine of Objective Idealism, “The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete
mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws,” (W8:106). In other words, the evolution of the
universe manifests mindlike characteristics—such as its semeiotic dynamics and categorial elements—because it is also mind. Peirce writes “effete” mind, which indicates that Mind characterizes the nature of whatever substances there are. Accordingly, ideas, real generals, are Mind in
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Cf., Raposa, PPR, 38.

Peirce’s discussion here of time as demonstrating the continuity of mind draws upon his earlier
discussion of infinitesimals and their role in continuity. Namely, infinitesimals are undetermined “parts” of a
continuum such that they hold together what comes before and after them. W8:137-46.
68

97
a vague state of great possibility. Concrete, material things are Mind in the form of Signs now
completely given to their habits. They are mind that has lost its dynamic, living quality—has become effete. They are individuals in which Thirdness has resolved to a steady state of Secondness.69
To be clear, chance remains a major factor. Peirce did not claim that the generalization
process was somehow discursive or that it is by deductive necessity.70 It is not as though the cosmos tries to organize itself. The resulting generalizations of complexes of ideas occur as a form
of habit resulting from a purposeful sifting (a la Agapasm) of many accidental Sign associations
(due to Tychasm). According to Peirce, it is the nature of Mind as such to be active and in process until those very processes result in an established habit. Mind is that which actively coordinates many such Signs, as evident in Peirce’s Law of Mind. Therefore, the cosmos as a mind (on
Objective Idealism) entails the coordination of its constituent Signs. As Peirce hypothesized, the
cosmos is comprised of Signs and is itself a Sign. Therefore, Peirce’s Metaphysics finds its voice
in his monist doctrine of Objective Idealism.
God
Abundant evidence that Peirce had a working—if largely tacit—theology is scattered
throughout his writings on the diverse array of topics on which he wrote.71 This has made it
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Cf., Parker, Continuity, 201-02; Hookway, Peirce, 211, 219.

To the contrary, Peirce writes of mental action, “There always remains a certain amount of arbitrary
spontaneity in its action, without which it would be dead,” (W8:153).
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Raposa, PPR, 3-4. Focused treatments of theology are relatively rare in Peirce’s writings. Book II:
Religion of The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce provides a convenient digest of the handful of Peirce’s
writings devoted to his theology, including, especially “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God” (CP 6.45293) and “Answers to Questions Concerning My Belief in God” (CP 6.494-521). Moreover, the first generation of
Peirce scholarship minimized theology as a theme relevant to understanding Peirce’s philosophy. Charles
Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, “Editorial Note,” in Scientific Metaphysics, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, The
Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1965), v, “The second book of the
volume, devoted to religion or ‘psychical metaphysics,’ has rather tenuous connections with the rest of the
[philosophical] system, offering, apart from scattered flashes of insight, views which have a sociological or
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possible for book-length treatments synthesizing this dappled evidence of Peirce’s religious
thought.72 Moreover, there is broad agreement that Peirce held at least to a classical theism, if not
even to trinitarian Christian theism. At times, Peirce seemed to self-consciously write from
within the tradition of Christian thought. Michael Raposa observes that Peirce
does seem for the most part to have identified himself as a Christian and to have conceived of Christianity as a highly evolved form of more “primitive” systems of belief (CP
6.442), in particular, “a higher development out of Buddhism” ([SS]78). Most importantly, the framework for the majority of Peirce’s explicitly religious writings is decisively theistic and Christian (however creatively he formulated his own ideas within that
context).73
Roger Ward has followed this theme comprehensively through key writings marking the development of Peirce’s philosophy. He finds that Peirce self-consciously ascribed to crucial aspects
of Christian belief and included them as facts upon which to develop further philosophical
views.74 Ward’s opinion seems to agree with Gérard Deledalle’s assessment. After writing that
Peirce “married Melusina in the Episcopalian Church and adopted Melusina’s triune conception
of God,” Deledalle observes that Peirce’s triadic model of signs and Peirce’s triadic metaphysical

biographical, rather than a fundamental systematic interest.” Yet, as in the case of the editors of the Collected
Papers, even critics must admit that Peirce gave theological questions a formal location within his system as the
division of metaphysics Peirce called “psychical metaphysics.” Cf., Parker, Continuity, 55.
The major expositions of this topic in Peirce studies continue to be Orange, Peirce’s Conception of God,
and Raposa, PPR. Also, Roger Ward, Peirce and Religion, should be included here because he argues for the
integral relation of Peirce’s religious beliefs for all of his thinking, though the work tends to read more like a
biography.
72

Raposa, Peirce's Philosophy of Religion, 84; Peirce writes this way in his “Neglected Argument for the
Reality of God,” ibid., 147. Christopher Hookway agrees. Cf. Christopher Hookway, Truth, Rationality, and
Pragmatism: Themes from Peirce (New York: Clarendon Press, 2000), 284. Similarly, regarding Peirce’s essay
“The Law of Mind,” Robert Corrington writes, “In this essay he still wants to see God as the JudeoChristian creator
of the world who is itself full of personality.” Corrington, Introduction, 187.
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E.g., Ward writes, “the Trinity provides a platform for [Peirce’s] developing semiotic account of
meaning that extends throughout his philosophy,” in Ward, Peirce and Religion, 150. However, Ward may
overestimate the degree of influence of particularly Christian theistic elements on Peirce’s philosophy; cf. Michael
L. Raposa, “Peirce and Religion: Knowledge, Transformation, and the Reality of God. By Roger Ward,” Journal of
the American Academy of Religion 87, no. 2 (2019):
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categories correlate in important ways with traditional views of the triune divine relations of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.75
Others find Peirce to hold forth the God of Christian theism due to Peirce’s use of the set
of divine attributes often predicated in that tradition. For example, Vincent Potter observes that
Peirce defines God in the “Neglected Argument” in the personal theistic terms of traditional
Christian thought. He writes of Peirce’s God in that essay, “that He is one, personal, transcendent, Creator of the universe of experience, omniscient, omnipotent, infallible, not subject to time,
not finite, provident.”76 David Mills corroborates Potter’s assessment, writing, “Peirce’s God
looks very much like the God of traditional theism,” according to Peirce’s “orthodox meanings
for these attributes.”77
Yet, Mills also recognizes, as Robert Corrington emphasized, Peirce held that these orthodox attributes of the Christian God must remain quite vague. The attempt to ascribe specific
definitions to these vague terms only leads to confusion.78 Notwithstanding such qualifications of
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Deledalle, Philosophy of Signs, 170, 173. Most theologians engaging Peirce also note such correlations
as discussed in the literature review in chapter one.

Vincent G. Potter and Vincent M. Colapietro, Peirce’s Philosophical Perspectives (New York: Fordham
Univ Pr, 1996), 175; cf. also ibid., 157. Similarly, Michael Slater sees Peirce not only as “a Christian theist,” but one
“who endorsed the Anselmian conception of God as a necessary being and who argued for the naturalness and
reasonableness of theistic belief,” in Michael R. Slater, Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Religion (Cambridge
University Press, 2014), 80.
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Mills, “Drama of Creation,” 114. Cf. also Shook, “Panentheism,” 12; William L. Power, “Peircean
Semiotics, Religion, and Theological Realism,” in New Essays in Religious Naturalism, ed. Creighton Peden and
Larry E Axel, Highlands Institute Series (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1993), 222.

Mills, “Drama of Creation,” 114; Corrington, Introduction, 201-02. Charles Hartshorne writes, “Peirce
held that, although it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to state in wholly definite terms the religious meaning of ‘God’
(Allah, Isvara, or whatever word is used for the all surpassing reality), there is a fundamental ‘instinct’ or intuition
that calls for some such idea.” Charles Hartshorne, “Peirce and Religion: Between Two Forms of Religious Belief,”
in Peirce and contemporary thought: philosophical inquiries, ed. Kevin L. Ketner (NY: Fordham University Press,
1995), 340. Likewise, William Power writes that Peirce “never attempted to explicate his conception of God, and
basically left it vague.” Power writes that “God” functions symbolically in Peirce’s writing so that whatever reader
with any conception relevant to the term “God” would find meaning in Peirce’s work. Cf., Power, “Peircean
Semiotics,” 221-22. Cf. also Orange, Peirce's Conception of God, 82, 85.
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Consequently, debate continues as to just what Peirce had in mind when writing the many pages in which
he engaged religious ideas. Robert Corrington pointed out that Peirce’s “conception of God is incomplete…There is
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vagueness for Peirce’s religious terminology, as Jeffrey Kasser writes, “though he continued to
remind his reader about the limitations of our language for discussing the divine nature, Peirce’s
conception of God is in many respects unabashedly traditional, both in its transcendence and in
its anthropomorphism.”79 That is, Peirce’s religious self-consciousness was ostensibly, and perhaps purposely, traditionally Christian.
The task now is to describe how Peirce thought about God as a theme in relation to Metaphysics, the culminating branch of his philosophy. The starting point for this discussion is
Peirce’s statement that truth-seekers like himself must be “materialists without flinching.” Also,
that statement provides the framework within which to understand other salient theological statements Peirce made in metaphysics contexts. “Materialists without flinching” expresses Peirce's
guiding theological principle, and his religious comments on evolutionary love, Thirdness, and
the semeiotic nature of the cosmos provide cases of Peirce practicing this principle.
In the beginning of Peirce’s earnest efforts to work out his philosophy for posterity, he
intended to write an entire chapter in “A Guess at the Riddle” on the theological implications of
his categorial Metaphysics. The only thing he wrote for that chapter was a single sentence summary in his outline for the work, “Faith requires that we be materialists without flinching,”
(W6:167). When it comes to his theology with respect to Metaphysics, Peirce provided only a
riddle. However, there may be clues supplied by Peirce in other contexts. Max Fisch, explains:

some disagreement as to the upshot of his philosophical theology; some scholars insist that his views, though cast in
his own unique language, remain fairly traditional, while other scholars see more radical things afoot in his attempts
to correlate an evolving God with an equally dynamic universe”; cf., Corrington, Introduction, 167. Note that
Corrington references Donna Orange and Michael Raposa as the exemplars of this debate. One understands Peirce’s
theology along process lines, as in the Whiteheadian process theology of Charles Hartshorne. The other disagrees. In
his most recent book, Raposa indicates that the debate remains unresolved, writing that Peirce’s thought is related to
“theism in at least one of its forms.” Cf. Raposa, Theosemiotic, 96. Cf. also Ejsing, Theology of Anticipation, 8.
79
Jeffrey L. Kasser, “Peirce on God, Reality and Personality,” in Models of God and Alternative Ultimate
Realities, ed. Jeanine Diller and Asa Kasher (Netherlands: Dordrecht Springer, 2013), 436.
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The clue is the address on “Design and Chance,” where [Peirce] chides even Epicurus for
flinching, by exempting his gods from the absolute chance that gives rise to his infinite
worlds. For he places his gods in the spaces between the worlds and rests their divinity on
the fineness of the atoms that compose them. “Thus, divineness comes from a special
cause and does not originate by chance from elements not containing it. Darwin’s view is
nearer to mine. Indeed my opinion is only Darwinism analyzed, generalized, and brought
into the realm of Ontology,” (W4:552).80
Peirce critiques Epicurus for “flinching” in his writings about the nature and origin of the gods.
Epicurus wished to have the gods subject to their own reality and not that of the cosmos humans
experience. For Peirce, this was problematic. Instead, Epicurus should have constructed his theories so that the gods are also subject to metaphysical principles such as chance. From this, it is
evident that “materialist without flinching” means that theological knowledge gained from the
cosmos must, in Peirce’s view, maintain reference to principles belonging to the cosmos, such as
the principle of chance.
Fisch goes on to commend the following statement by Peirce as a case of such an unflinching conception of God:
“I think that the existence of God, as well as we can conceive of it, consists in this, that a
tendency toward ends is so necessary a constituent of the universe that the mere action of
Chance upon innumerable atoms has an inevitable teleological result. One of the ends so
brought about is the development of intelligence and of knowledge; and therefore I
should say that God’s omniscience, humanly conceived, consists in the fact that
knowledge in its development leaves no question unanswered.”81
Here, in “American Plato,” Peirce responds to Josiah Royce’s recent work, Religious Aspects of
Philosophy (W5:221). At issue are implications of the idea of God’s omniscience upon forms of
idealism. According to Peirce, Royce’s concept entails that God exists because God thinks about
himself (W5:228). In contrast, Peirce states that cosmic teleology is the form of God’s existence,
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The Peirce Edition Project, eds., “Annotations,” W6:440n167.11-12; quoting Max H. Fisch, “Peirce’s
Arisbe,” in Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, ed. Kenneth Laine Ketner and Christian J. W. Kloesel
(Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana Univ. Press, 1986), 234.
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and the perfection of science is an individual case of the general teleology of the cosmos.82
Therefore, God’s omniscience manifests in the perfection of science, the time when there are no
unanswered questions.83
Importantly, in this essay Peirce appears to have been careful not to draw conclusions
about whether there is such a being as God who always has perfect knowledge of everything that
can be known. He allows that this is a possibility but insists on remaining vague on the precise
nature of the reality of the set of Real generals the perfection of science endeavors to discover.
Those realities, Peirce wrote, belong to “an absolute thought,” whether or not “there be a living
being whose thought coincides with this absolute thought,” (MS1369s).84 In the case of God’s
existence being in the form of cosmic teleology, and of his omniscience existing in the someday
perfection of science, one should respect Peirce’s humble natural theology. That is, it seems unlikely that Peirce would have been making any claims identifying God with those forms of his
existence. If Peirce was not willing to declare that God is the being thinking the absolute thought
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By the 1880s Peirce was arriving at his mature form of Scholastic Realism (Mayorga, Realicism, 87-89).
Recall that in this doctrine Peirce distinguished Existence from Reality. Existent things are concrete, definite, actual
individuals. Reality consists of all ideas that would be the “final opinion” of a perfected course of inquiry. Existent
things do not have Reality as an innate ontological property. Reality pertains to some generals. Yet, Real generals
are manifest in Existent things. That is, Existent things are signs of some Real generals. My cracked windshield
signifies the law of gravity that brought the rock into contact with the glass, for example. Now, also bear in mind
that Peirce understood God to be a person. As such, on Peirce’s view, God is a general, having Reality but not
Existence. (See discussion below regarding Peirce’s “vast representamen” statement. Also, this is explicit in Peirce’s
1908 essay, “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God,” CP 6.452-94). Accordingly, in stating that God’s
existence consists in the teleology of the cosmos, Peirce claims that cosmic teleology somehow constitutes a sign of
God’s Reality. In turn, therefore, the perfection of science would be a sign of God’s omniscience. Because teleology
implies conformity to some purpose, this is a more specific form of Peirce’s statement that the cosmos signifies
God’s purpose (PPMRT, 201), discussed below.
I read, “development of intelligence and knowledge” in Peirce’s statement as implying “science,”
because of the context situating Peirce’s engagement with Royce on the subject of divine knowledge. That is, Peirce
is treating the larger questions of reality and truth, claiming that both have to do with what would be known by
humans once the grand scientific project to understand and know the cosmos is complete. The relevance of God’s
omniscience is that everything science would come to discover must already be known by God. In an alternate draft
of Peirce’s response to Royce, Peirce writes that God’s knowledge is “the standard toward which human science,
with its methods of experiment and reasoning, is ultimately tending, so that it is the goal which sufficient
investigation would reach,” (MS 1369s); quoted in Orange, Conception, 33.
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of the developing cosmos, then it would be odd for him to then hold forth that God is what one
experiences as cosmic teleology.85
Instead, when Peirce wrote his “materialists without flinching” idea for a chapter on the
theological implications of his universal categories, he appears to have meant that knowledge of
God is always mediated by phenomena governed by those categories and other metaphysical
principles. It is unacceptable to pretend that humans can speak of God in terms of any metaphysics other than that which governs human minds. From this it follows that Peirce would advocate
for speaking of God in terms of the metaphysics common to human experience.86 This appears to
be the very example Peirce sets in each of the remaining theological statements discussed in this
section. Peirce spoke of God in terms of evolutionary love, categorial Thirdness, and the semeiotic continuum.
In 1892, Peirce published an essay, “Evolutionary Love.” It is in this essay that Peirce introduces his theory of cosmic teleology – of cosmic Growth – that he called Agapastic evolution.
In naming this doctrine, Peirce adapted the Greek word for profound, purposeful love—agape.
Peirce’s choice was inspired by the Johannine doctrine, “God is Love,” (W8:184).87 Peirce introduces this Johannine statement as a contribution to the long-standing philosophical tradition of
identifying love as the “evolutionary agency of the universe” (W8:184). That tradition used eros

This metaphysical “God” appears to be the direction of Donna Orange’s conclusion, cf., Orange,
Conception, 84, where she writes, “In Peirce’s mature view, God is the element of Reason or reasonableness which
both expresses itself in creating, and also is emerging in the creative process.” In contrast, Michael Raposa draws a
distinction between the Absolute Mind directing the evolution of the cosmos and the creator of that Absolute Mind,
Raposa, PPR, 59, 61; additionally, see below on Peirce’s statement about the universe as a “vast representamen.”
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So, for example, Orange, Conception, 40, “Much of what Peirce said of God in the early 1890s appears
as the direct outgrowth of his previous decade’s thought on categories, and on the related evolutionary cosmology.”
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That Peirce’s statement from this essay, “Evolutionary Love,” offers a case of “materialists without
flinching” seems evident in Raposa, PPR, 72, according to whom that essay’s “religious notions and theological
vocabulary are constitutive of that very account [of how the world develops]…What is implicit in many of Peirce’s
other writings is made explicit in this paper; his scientific metaphysics is not only shaped by but represents the
articulation of his theism”; cf., also, ibid., 144.
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as the form of love by which the cosmos evolves. This is where John distinguishes himself.88
Peirce writes, “the ontological gospeller, in whose days those views were familiar topics, made
the One Supreme Being, by whom all things have been made out of nothing, to be cherishinglove,” (W8:184).
In contrast to eros, which entailed an oppositional model, Peirce finds in John’s presentation of divine agape the definitive principle of Agapasm. Peirce notes that John identifies God
both with love and with light. He infers from this that the way light relates to its opposite parallels the way love relates to its opposite. According to Peirce, “We are to understand, then, that as
darkness is merely the defect of light, so hatred and evil are mere imperfect stages of agape and
agathon, love and loveliness,” (W8:184). Peirce grounds this model, a continuum between love
and hatred, in the gospel of Jesus Christ, “‘God sent not the Son into the world to judge the
world; but that the world should through him be saved,’” (W8:184).89 For Peirce, God’s refusal
to judge the hateful through punishment, but rather to let them “punish themselves” (W8:18485), softens the dialectic so that hatred is not wholly other than love but is only “a defect of
love,” (W8:185). Peirce writes, “the love that God is…is a love which embraces hatred as an
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The precise identity of the author of the Gospel of John has been controversial among modern biblical
scholars. For simplicity the following discussion will use the traditional appellation, “John.” Also, Andreas
Köstenberger has recently argued forcefully that internal and external evidence of authorship establishes the
traditional view; cf., Andreas J. Köstenberger, A Theology of John’s Gospel and Letters: The Word, the Christ, the
Son of God, Biblical Theology of the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2009), 72-79. This insight is a
welcome contribution from Alistair McPherson, a colleague from the Ph.D. Theology and Apologetics program at
Liberty University.

In affirming the fundamental role of Peirce’s doctrine of continuity (Synechism) for his doctrine of
evolutionary love (Agapism), Raposa tacitly describes the principle of “materialists without flinching” the present
inquiry observes in Peirce, “[Peirce’s] talk about evolution presupposed that all of reality is continuous. In each
instance, too, synechism is the key to understanding the religious dimension of Peirce’s thought. Out of this stuff of
‘melted continuity,’ he both fashioned his conception of God and defended the vagueness of that conception”;
Raposa, PPR, 41. Since knowledge of God is mediated by a universe marked by continuity, Peirce’s God-talk
endeavors to account for that continuity.
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imperfect stage of it…even needs hatred and hatefulness as its object,” (W8:185).90 Therefore,
Peirce concludes that these Johannine insights teach a circular rather than an oppositional model
of the love that powers evolutionary development. Peirce writes, “The movement of love is circular, at one and the same impulse projecting creations into independency and drawing them into
harmony,” (W8:185).91
So, Peirce’s unflinching materialist reading of John’s writing on divine agape leads
Peirce to conclude that “the statement of St. John is the formula of an evolutionary philosophy,
which teaches that growth only comes from love…the ardent impulse to fulfill another’s highest
impulse,” (W8:185). Two ideas work together here. First, Peirce holds that love alone causes
evolutionary development (“growth”).92 Second, this dynamic is understood in personal terms.
Love’s desire “to fulfill another’s highest impulse” is another way of stating the Golden Rule,
“Sacrifice your own perfection to the perfectionment of your neighbor,” (W8:185). Peirce explains that “neighbor” refers to a person, “one whom we live near, not locally perhaps, but in life
and feeling,” (W8:185).93 This does not refer only to our common sense of neighboring persons
in terms of other human beings. In fact, Peirce had long held a conception of “person” that
In saying that love “embraces” hatred, Peirce means that “the divine ‘agape’ [is] a power that harmonizes
discordant elements,” Raposa, PPR, 77.
90

Ibid., 80, points out that Peirce’s use of “creations” appears to be in a literal sense, “projected ‘into
independency’…is the moment of creation, from which all progress towards ultimate harmony or reasonableness
can be traced.” Therefore, Peirce appears to understand “creation” as it pertains to the “circular” action of
evolutionary love, “in at least two senses…causing things both to be and to be-in-relation,” ibid., 77. Further,
Raposa points out the implication of love as creative when love is the universal harmonizing principle by which
objects (whether individual or general) relate to one another. “It seems that Peirce intended to be understood quite
literally when he asserted that God is the creator of sin and ‘delights’ in the hateful. Out of nothing, God has created
everything, including that which is evil,” ibid., 89.
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Orange, Conception, 45, “Just as tending and cherishing are necessary to the life and growth of living
things, the universe as a whole grows toward reasonableness by being loved—being projected forth from God and
drawn back into harmony, a dialectic of independence and unity.”
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With the introduction of the concept of “person” Peirce continues to speak in a literal way, according to
how he defines the concept. Orange, Conception, 44-45, correctly describes the way one can relate to evolutionary
love according to one’s own social experience of love, “Growth, or evolution, according to Peirce, comes only from
love (CP 6.289), and this love is not love for an abstraction, but is directed toward those near and dear to us.”
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pertains to any semeiotic object, any general idea.94 In this way, Peirce’s philosophy of evolutionary love ties in directly to his Objective Idealism in which everything is mind and is marked
by mental action. Peirce makes this connection explicit when he writes
The philosophy we draw from John’s Gospel is that this is the way mind develops; and as
for the cosmos, only so far as it yet is mind, and so has life, is it capable of further evolution. Love, recognizing germs of loveliness in the hateful, gradually warms it into life,
and makes it lovely. That is the sort of evolution which every careful student of my essay
“The Law of Mind” must see that synechism calls for,” (W8:185-86).
Since Agapasm describes the power at work in the growth of mind, phrases such as “warms it
into life,” “perfectionment of your neighbor,” and “drawing them into harmony,” express
Peirce’s concept of metaphysical habit-formation.95 Therefore, Raposa is correct to hold that the
law of mind, that ideas affect one another unto increasing generalization, “is also…the law of
love, love constituting not only the creative origin of such ideas but also the gentle force that
welds them into harmony.”96

Raposa is careful to point out that Peirce “broadened considerably the notion of personality to embrace a
wide range of phenomena,” which notion is “cast now in an explicitly religious form.” That is, in the religious garb
of God’s cherishing-love for persons, Peirce holds that ‘a person is only a particular kind of general idea,…nothing
more than a symbol involving a general idea’ (CP 6.270),” Raposa, PPR, 76. As per ibid., 163n21, on Peirce’s
“semiotic conception of persons,” cf. also, CP 5.313ff; W1:490-504.
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Cf., Raposa, PPR, 100.

Raposa, PPR, 77. Peirce’s agapastic theology would seem to make a strong case identifying God as a
natural phenomenon. If it is true that “God is love” and that love is the power at work in mental action throughout
the cosmos, then it follows that “God” is that dynamic cosmic force. Donna Orange seems to draw this conclusion,
writing that Peirce “identif[ied] God with loving and growth-producing relationships between and among human
beings”; cf., Orange, Conception, 45. Again, “God is love, that is, God is the totality of the relationships between
and among human beings.” Ibid., 49. Michael Raposa agrees that Peirce’s view recognizes that love is “constitutive
of God’s very Being.” However, Raposa seems not to follow Orange in so strongly identifying God as the operative
force of love in the cosmos. Instead, Raposa highlights the semeiotic nature of the God-cosmos relation. If Peirce’s
Agapasm is correct, then
96

love is the creative force responsible for the development of such “personalities,” for the growth of mind. It
is the primordial and quintessential principle of generalization. Human beings, out of love for one another
and through a common devotion to specific goals and ideals, form communities, greater “selves.” The
paradigm for such behavior, the prototype for such feeble imitations, is the divine love, a love constitutive
of God’s very Being (Raposa, PPR, 77).
The semeiotic nature of the relation is manifest here in that love among human beings only represents
(“paradigm…prototype…imitations”) divine love, whereas Orange holds that the two are the same.
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Clearly, Peirce’s materialism is evident here in that he interprets John by applying Johannine ideas to Peirce’s metaphysical question of a cosmic evolutionary force. Peirce makes no
claim that his Agapastic conclusions describe what John meant to say. Rather, it seems that
Peirce’s Synechism and triadic Semeiotic illuminated for him an opportunity to correct the dualistic tradition that eros governs the evolutionary process. John’s writing that God—the agent of
creation and evolution—is understood best in terms of agape supplied powerful insights with
which Peirce could develop certain metaphysical implications of other elements of his philosophy. This seems to practice a “materialist” theology in a different way than Fisch indicated. This
is not to say that Fisch was incorrect, only that following his clue only led to an incomplete understanding. In that earlier case, this study noticed that Peirce defined his theology according to
science. He wrote that God’s existence is found in cosmic teleology, and therefore God’s omniscience would only exist when science is perfected.97 In this way Peirce speaks about God strictly
according to his scientific metaphysical convictions. In the case of Agapasm, however, the influence works the other way. That is, Peirce draws upon theology to better understand his evolutionary metaphysics. Either way, observe Peirce’s theology is unflinchingly materialistic, because whatever he says about God is cast in terms of his scientific convictions.98
The love operative in the law of mind, bringing objects into relations of increasing generality is a metaphysical form of Peirce’s category of Thirdness, the category of the dynamic of

This sense of God’s existence compares to the way Roger Olson has described Wolfhart Pannenberg’s
view of God’s existence pending full realization in the future. Olson argues that Pannenberg did not mean that God
himself does not exist. Rather, God’s existence from the perspective of human knowledge and experience awaits its
fullness in a future perfection of divine rule. Cf., Olson, “Response to Panentheism,” 335-36.
97

So, Rapsoa, PPR, 78, regarding Peirce’s theological metaphysics in “Evolutionary Love,” “In this
fashion, drawing upon theological, even biblical resources, Peirce was able to formulate his hypothesis about how
development occurs. [Likewise] the scientific method must have some bearing on the issue of how, precisely, such
notions are to be formulated. Furthermore, apart from the teachings of any ‘revelatory religion,’ something like this
theory of agapism ought to have been formulated on purely scientific principles.” Ward, Peirce and Religion, 69,
comments on Peirce’s church experience as also background for his work in “Evolutionary Love.”
98
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unification. In writing about the metaphysics of Thirdness, Peirce made a theological comment
that provides another case of his unflinching materialist theology. Drafting his proof of Pragmaticism for The Monist around 1907, Peirce appears concerned to strengthen his case for Thirdness
as an elementary metaphysical principle. In doing so, Peirce appeals to Trinitarian theology for
support. He writes, “if the metaphysicians are right in saying (those of them who do say so) that
there is but one absolutely necessary idea, which is that of the Triune God, then this idea of the
Triune God must in some way be identical with the simple idea of combination,” (EP2:364).99 A
broader insight this statement provides regarding Peirce’s materialist theology, perhaps yet a
third way in which Peirce practices his unflinching materialism, Peirce calls attention to a point
of agreement between theology and science. Unlike the statement regarding divine omniscience,
Peirce is not conforming theology to science. Unlike the argument for evolutionary love, Peirce
is not conforming science to theology. Here Peirce argues for the metaphysical reality of Thirdness by comparing the scientific idea of combination and the theological idea of the triune God.
That is, Peirce appears to hold forth that theology and science share something that is the same
idea “in some way,” though each discipline interprets the idea using different terminology.
What does Peirce mean when he says that the two ideas must be “in some way identical”
to each other? This is salient in context with Donna Orange's opinion that Peirce identified God
as, literally, the force of evolutionary development in nature. On this view, then, if the Triune
God and combination are identical, then to perceive combination just is to perceive God himself.
However, Raposa is correct to emphasize that God in himself precedes any of the categories, including Thirdness, which grounds combination. Peirce was clear about his belief that God is
“Really creator of all three Universes of Experience” (CP 6.452), which is to say the creator of
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“Combination” alludes to the nature of Thirdness to bring two others into meaningful relation.
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the cosmos in its present form. This entails that Thirdness per se is also a creation of God. It follows that God cannot also be what he has created. In this context, Raposa writes, “God creates
the world ex nihilo, but no habit, no law, no Third can cause anything to exist.”100 Therefore,
God as creator cannot be the same thing as either Thirdness or combination per se, which are
God’s creatures.
Furthermore, Peirce did not write that the Triune God himself is in some way identical
with combination as such. Peirce wrote, instead, that it is the idea of the Triune God that is in
some way identical to the idea of combination. Therefore, Peirce's claim is that the two conceptions are in some way identical. This crucial distinction suggests that Peirce's statement regards a
semeiotic relation. In fact, Raposa writes that because thoughts are necessarily Thirds, “any conception of God must be regarded…as the conception of a sign of that reality.”101 In other words,
the idea of the Triune God and the idea of combination relate to each other as a semeiotic identity rather than an ontological identity. This is therefore a parallel case to the semeiotic relation
noted in the “God is love” statement above.102 God is not ontologically identical to the love at
work in the evolutionary process and among the social relations among human beings. Rather,
God is love in a way that is semeiotically identical to those other love relations. In the case of human relationships, according to Peirce’s view, love among human persons “imitate[es]” the

Raposa, PPR, 79. Peirce’s concept of creatio ex nihilo identifies “nothing” with the formless and void
heavens and earth (Gen 1:2). For Peirce, this was an absolutely indeterminate mass of pure possibility—a something
that is “no thing” in particular (Raposa, PPR, 71). In a chance process akin to continuous creation among today’s
theistic evolutionists, Peirce held that from this “no thing” emerged the habit-forming tendency, the Universal Categories, and the cosmos as we know it; cf., W6:181, 209-10, for Peirce’s cosmology. For an example of continuing
creation among theistic evolutionists, cf., John H. Walton, “Origins in Genesis: Claims of an Ancient Text in a
Modern Scientific World,” in Knowing Creation: Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, and Science, ed. Andrew
B. Torrance and Thomas H. McCall (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2018), 120-21; also, cf., Walton, Genesis 1 as
Ancient Cosmology.
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Ibid., 67; italics added.
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Cf., n96 above.
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reality of divine love that is the being of God.103 Recall that Peirce called this sort of sign an
icon. That is, an icon in Peirce's semeiotic is a representamen that relates to its object precisely
by the quality of its resemblance of the object itself. One could substitute “imitation” for “resemblance” and have the same meaning. Therefore, one seems warranted to conclude that Peirce
claims that the idea of the Triune God and the idea of combination are identical in the sense of an
iconic relation. That is to say, they relate to each other by virtue of a shared quality that is identical.104 Given that Peirce observed the identity of “Triune God” and “combination” to demonstrate the reality of Thirdness, it is evident that the shared quality is Thirdness. So, the two ideas
bear iconic identity in that they both have to do with irreducible wholes that may nevertheless be
subdivided into parts as a matter of abstraction.105 Therefore, it appears that Peirce holds forth
that the concept of an attribute of God's being manifests Thirdness, a metaphysical category pertaining to the cosmos.106 This is Peirce's unflinching materialism on display.
Another case of Peirce's materialist theology is in his 1890s essay, “The Law of Mind.”
Peirce states that his Synechism entails a personal, directly perceivable God. That is, Peirce
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This conclusion places Peirce in the company of Augustine vis-à-vis “vestiges” of the Triune God in the
created order (Augustine, On the Trinity, 9.12.18). Andrew Robinson develops this intuition, arguing that the Trinity
is iconically represented by the Universal Categories Peirce theorized; Robinson, God and the World of Signs, 26061.
105
Ward, Peirce and Religion, 148, notes that the idea of the Triune God entails the concept of
perichoresis, which is surely marked by combination via a mutual, interdependent “participation” of discernible
members though these members are not actually parts. Cf., also, Deledalle, Philosophy of Signs, 73, for discussion
of correlations between Peirce’s triadic semeiotic and the Trinity.
106
If this is correct, then one better understands why Peirce stated that these two ideas “must” be identical
in some way. Being icons of Thirdness, their identity is a logical necessity. Recall the context of Peirce's statement.
He is arguing for the metaphysical reality of Thirdness. If Thirdness is such a reality, then it must pertain to every
phenomenon. At this point in his argument Peirce is describing the Thirdness inherent in ideas as such.
Consequently, it should be the case that any idea whatever has Thirdness, though that may not be the predominant
categorial quality in every case. (This alludes to Peirce’s understanding of Firstness and Secondness as degenerate
forms of Thirdness; cf., n38 above. This also raises the issue of Peirce's typology of signs. On which, cf., the
excellent discussions in Liszka, General Introduction; Short, Theory of Signs; and Parker, Continuity.) As cases
illustrating his point, Peirce points out that an idea from theology and an idea from philosophy clearly manifest
Thirdness.
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draws a theological conclusion as a logical consequence of his philosophical doctrines. As in the
case of the existence of God's omniscience with which this discussion began, this is a case of
theology determined by science. Of his “synechistic philosophy,” Peirce writes,
In considering personality, that philosophy is forced to accept the doctrine of a personal
God; but in considering communication, it cannot but admit that if there is a personal
God, we must have a direct perception of that person and indeed be in personal communication with him. Now, if that be the case, the question arises how it is possible that the
existence of this being should ever have been doubted by anybody. The only answer that
I can at present make is that facts that stand before our face and eyes and stare us in the
face are far from being, in all cases, the ones most easily discerned, (W8:156-57).
In this concise statement, Peirce provides several theological propositions. First, God is in a continuous relation with human beings. Second, God is personal. Third, God is communicative.
Fourth, because of the preceding three attributes it follows that God is within the scope of direct
perception by human beings. Finally, notwithstanding item four, like many things in human experience, though knowledge of God “stare[s] us in the face,” perceiving that information does
not come necessarily or in every case.
This doctrinal complex is explained by Peirce’s view that God and the cosmos are related
semeiotically, as object to Sign.107 Notice that Peirce framed this statement as a consequence of
his “synechistic philosophy.” That is, these divine attributes are evident in light of Peirce’s doctrine, Synechism, in which he holds that continuity is a crucial factor for all philosophy. Therefore, it is evident that Peirce conceived God and human beings as related by way of some continuum. Given that Peirce appealed to Synechism to explain the Law of Mind, this continuous relation, according to Peirce, must at least consist of that attribute common to everything, mind.
Since all thoughts are via Signs, semiosis just is mental action. Therefore, God is semeiotically
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related to everything that is real and everything that is existent (maintaining Peirce's terminology).
Another of his salient theological comments given in a metaphysics context makes it
clear that there can be no question that Peirce conceived the God-world relation as a semeiotic
one. In Lecture Four of his 1903 Lectures on Pragmatism at Harvard University, Peirce argues
for the reality of Firstness. That is, perceptions pick out real qualities of Firstness in objects of
experience. Peirce concludes this portion of his lecture,
Therefore, if you ask me what part Qualities can play in the economy of the universe, I
shall reply that the universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God’s purpose,
working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol, must have organically
attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these
reactions and these qualities play in an argument, that they of course play in the universe,
that universe being precisely an argument…
Now as to their function in the economy of the Universe,– the Universe as an argument is necessarily a great work of art, a great poem,– for every fine argument is a poem
and a symphony,– just as every true poem is a sound argument. But let us compare it rather with a painting,– with the impressionist seashore piece,– then every Quality in a
premiss [sic] is one of the elementary, colored particles of the painting; they are all meant
to go together to make up the intended Quality that belongs to the whole as a whole….
(PPMRT 201).
To identify the universe as a representamen is, of course, to identify it as something related to
some object in such a way that the relation is capable of determining an interpretant. Most important, Peirce identifies the universe as a type of sign that he called a symbol. The universe as a
symbol explains how it is that God must be directly perceivable by human interpreters.
Raposa writes that, according to Peirce, symbols “perform their representative function
by virtue of intending to be interpreted as a sign [according to] a particular rule or habit [that]
governs their interpretation.”108 In other words, symbols as such, according to Peirce’s schema,
are meant to reproduce further signs (interpretants) consistent with the rule that determines the
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inner logic of the symbol. Peirce’s view of the universe as a symbol is that it is governed by the
rule supplied by “God’s purpose.” Peirce describes the universe symbol as being in the form of
an “argument,” especially of “a great work of art, a great poem,” more particularly a work of art
such as an impressionist style painting.109 In terms of an argument, such as a poem, Peirce presents the universe symbol as a dynamic thing. It is somehow a complex continuum of signs representing the divine purpose. Raposa understands Peirce to imply by this the purposeful way in
which the cosmos is evolving.110
In this way one gains insight into how it is that synechism entails a personal God. Recall
that for Peirce a person is a symbol. Personality is a function of regular habits that are due to a
general rule, a purpose, determining them.111 In this respect, the cosmos has personality. The nature of symbols also explains why a personal God is an entailment of synechism. Symbols yield
further symbols. Even if an interpretant of a symbol is primarily iconic in character, it is nevertheless still a symbol.112 That is, it is a Sign functioning via the triadic action of Thirdness, which
Peirce called semeiosis. Therefore, if the universe is a symbol, it could only have been produced

“Argument” names a type of sign Peirce theorized to be strongly marked by Thirdness. That is,
Thirdness marks all three of the relations internal to the sign (EP2:296). For Peirce, this means that the sign
produces a rule-governed interpretant logically, much like a syllogism for which the conclusion follows from its
premises (EP2:435). Cf., also, Short, Peirce’s Theory of Signs, 233.
109
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Ibid., 122. Cf., n60 above. At this point this discussion overlaps with what was said about divine,
evolutionary love earlier in that love is purposeful in its creative and unifying action.
112
There is some equivocation in Peirce’s use of the term “symbol.” In his taxonomy of signs, “symbol”
pertains to a Sign marked by Thirdness in its representative relation. So, Symbols marked primarily by their iconic
character Peirce called “rhematic symbols.” Similarly, symbols marked primarily by the Secondness of their
indexical character Peirce called “dicent symbols.” Cf., e.g., Short, Peirce’s Theory of Signs, 237. On the other hand,
Peirce’s entire semeiotic theory regards Signs as symbols in a broader sense as cases of Thirdness; cf., Parker,
Continuity, 142-43. In that broader sense, symbols determine interpretants that are also symbols, because semeiosis
maintains the same kind of sign-object relation throughout its continuous process. Peirce wrote that in a genuine
sign, the representamen is related to its object so “as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to
assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object,” (EP2:272-73). Cf., Figure
3 above.
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by some prior symbol. If God is the creator of the universe, which Peirce affirmed, then God
must be personal and so able to produce another symbol, the universe.
The semeiotic process of one symbol determining further symbols manifests a personal
aspect and so can be described, like Raposa does, as “a communication event occurring between
minds in dialogue.”113 Another theological comment from the fourth of the 1903 Harvard lectures shows that Raposa is not putting words in Peirce’s mouth. Arguing for the metaphysical reality of Thirdness, Peirce’s case rests upon his doctrine of Scholastic Realism. In that regard he
appeals to natural laws as familiar examples of real generals that are effective in the world of existents, without which there would be no regularity. He traces the logical connections from this
common experience of regularity to the semeiotic nature of the underlying laws and that those
laws therefore demonstrate the effective power of thought as such. Peirce explains, “[a]nalogy
suggests that the laws of nature are ideas or resolutions in the mind of some vast consciousness,
who whether Supreme or subordinate, is a Deity relatively to us,” (PPMRT, 195). Peirce apparently reasons that the semeiotic character of the laws of nature grounds their analogy to human
thought. Thinking is the work of mind. It follows that to speak of a law-governed cosmos is as
much as saying a cosmic Mind thinks those governing laws.
Furthermore, Peirce’s comparison of the universe to a great work of art from earlier in
lecture four highlights his view that the universe communicates its purpose primarily iconically.114 Recall that the context of that earlier comparison is Peirce’s argument for the reality of
Firstness, which is the distinguishing category of signs that function as icons of their objects.
Peirce therefore describes one’s engagement with the cosmic symbol in terms of the way one
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Ibid., 117. Again, notice that this is a point of overlap with the evolutionary love discussion previously.
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would engage an impressionist painting. It’s meaning as a whole is vague but perceptible the
more of its constituent color flecks one can synthesize. Applied to perceiving God via the cosmos, Raposa writes,
…at the same time that [the universe] performs its representative function by virtue of the
law that governs its development, this universal mind also embodies a quality of purposefulness, of reasonableness, and is an index of that purpose, having been caused by it, having been projected, through a divine act of volition, into being.115
This way of reiterating the picture Peirce supplied also highlights Peirce’s view that symbols are
triadic things. That is, they are marked primarily by their Thirdness in representing an object according to a rule or purpose. At the same time, any symbol also has elements of Secondness and
Firstness, indexes and qualities functioning together in the determination of subsequent interpretants. While any symbol includes all three categorial elements, symbols vary according to the
primary manner in which the representamen represents its object. A symbol’s representative relation might be marked primarily by any of the three Categories.116 In the case of the universe, it
was Peirce’s view that its function as a symbol of God’s purpose is primarily by way of Firstness; as Raposa writes, “a quality of purposefulness, of reasonableness” is the element determining interpretants of the cosmic symbol.
This might seem to indicate an indirect perception of God rather than a direct one, as
Peirce claimed. If the universe is a symbol of God’s purpose, and if as such it represents God’s
purpose iconically to interpreters such as human minds, it appears that it is God’s purpose and
not God himself that is directly perceivable. However, in light of Peirce’s synechism, his theory
of continuity, this appearance is mistaken. Peirce held that a continuum contains its limits.

Ibid., 121. “Projected” is a key word in Peirce’s semeiotic understanding of creation. This will be treated
below vis-à-vis Peirce’s map metaphor of the cosmos’ iconic relation to the divine, creative idea.
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Cf., n112 above.
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Further, according to his conception of infinitesimals, Peirce held that a continuum as such has
no parts but has an infinite number of possibilities for construing parts of the continuum. For example, a continuous line does not have any points. Nevertheless, any number of points may be
defined for that continuous line. Finally, Peirce theorized that any infinitesimal along a continuum implies the entire continuum.117 Therefore, when Peirce claims that synechism entails a directly perceivable, personal God, he implies that there is a continuum uniting human beings with
the mind of God. This is confirmed by Peirce’s view of a semeiotic relation between God and the
cosmos. Semeiosis takes the form of a continuum, in fact of a continuum of continua. So Raposa
writes, “…the great power of a sign consists in the fact that it establishes a certain continuity between its object and its interpretant. It brings them into relation…God’s ‘poem’ achieves just
such an effect, bringing its interpreters into an active communion with the divine mind.”118 By
way of the continuity supplied by semeiosis, then, human beings directly perceive the God who
originated the semeiotic continuum in which human interpretation participates.
In view of these cases of Peirce's theology according to an unflinching materialism,
Peircean theology takes natural signs as cases of the existence of God, in Peirce’s Scholastic Realist sense. The perfection of science would be the existence of God's omniscience. God's own
existence is evident in the purposeful evolution of the cosmos, according to Peirce. This development is marked by the Thirdness of divine love. In fact, the entire cosmos is a complex, iconic
sign, displaying God's personality in the infinite array of meaningful phenomena, symbols having a sort of personality. The “law” of personality governs the action of its symbol. In each case,
Peirce's materialistic theology holds that divine attributes exist semeiotically in the cosmos.

This is especially evident in Peirce’s discussion of time as a way of thinking about continua, W8:13738. Cf., also, Parker, Continuity, 79-93.
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Hence, God is the divine personality according to which the cosmos evolves toward perfect realization, or, complete “concrete reasonableness.” To “directly” perceive God, in Peirce's view, is
not to have unmediated epistemic access to the divine being. That is, God in himself is not existent and therefore not subject to materialist ways of speaking. According to his Scholastic Realism, Peirce holds God to be the ultimate Reality, whose attributes manifest in some way symbolically throughout the cosmos. Theology speaks about divine attributes according to the way that
these are evident to inquirers. Therefore, according to Peirce, theology must be unflinchingly
materialistic, because theology must speak according to the theological significance of existent
phenomena. In other words, because knowledge of God is mediated by natural things, theology
must discipline itself according to the principles governing those things.
The Panentheism Issue
What, then, is the answer to the chief question for this chapter, “How is Peirce's Semeiotic related to PEM?”119 One response is to say that Semeiotic is not related to PEM in any direct
way. Peirce’s architectonic arrangement requires that Semeiotic cannot effectively be compared
to PEM, like the fallacy of comparing the proverbial apples and oranges. One belongs to Logic
and the other to Metaphysics. Therefore, the work of the preceding discussions has been necessary to discover how Peirce’s Semeiotic influenced his talk of God in relation to topics in Metaphysics. Consequently, this discussion of the theme of God in Peirce’s Metaphysics includes Semeiotic concepts interpreted theologically with respect to the God-world relation. Now one can
compare apples to apples. Additionally, it is evident that Peirce’s epistemological and ontological doctrines are integrally related. Therefore, evaluating the theological suitability of Semeiotic
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Recall from the last chapter the Panentheism Meta-Model (PEM). It consists of six tenets, which will
now be discussed with respect to Peirce’s God statements above: 1. Mind-Body Analogy; 2. Ontological Inclusion;
3. Dynamic (Dipolar); 4. Mutual Co-Inherence; 5. Symmetrical Ontological Dependence; and 6. Empathy.
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for CNT requires considering Semeiotic in its systematic context in Peirce’s thought. Again, the
preceding discussion of the theme “God” provides just the sort of data this evaluation requires.
Peirce’s theological commentary upon several of his concepts in metaphysics makes it possible
for those propositions to be compared to the tenets of PEM. The following paragraphs argue that
Peirce’s semeiotic Metaphysics is not yet PEM, though it is certainly quite friendly with it.120
This result does not alleviate the prospect of incorporating a theological corruption when incorporating Semeiotic into CNT. The following analysis raises awareness of the aspects of Semeiotic, and of Peirce’s thought more generally, creating the sense of a bias toward PEM. The following discussion of the evident sympathies between Peirce’s metaphysics and PEM reifies these
aspects.
The previous discussion of “God” in Peirce’s metaphysics found semeiotic at the heart of
how he related theology and science. In contrast to the supervenient metaphor of PEM, the mindbody analogy, Peirce’s thought about God and the world follows the logic of the object-sign relation. That is, PEM holds God to relate to the world somehow like human minds relate to their
bodies. Peirce holds the cosmos to be a grand symbol of God, such that God is the object for
which the cosmos is a sign. This was made explicit in Peirce’s “vast representamen” statement,
while explanations of his other statements continually returned to semeiotic theory. This discussion of Peirce’s relation to PEM therefore proceeds through three broad themes intimately

Hartshorne and Rease, Philosophers Speak of God, 269, identify several “panentheistic elements” from
samples of Peirce’s writing. These include “that the universe exists in the mind of God,” that it is God’s nature
always to create but not to create any predetermined particular, that God’s purpose develops gradually, and that God
is not necessarily omniscient. Nevertheless, “He did not put these ideas together in this manner [as panentheism per
se] or even…assert all of them with confidence.” Likewise, Robert S. Corrington, “Beyond Experience: Pragmatism
and Nature’s God,” American Journal of Theology & Philosophy 14, no. 2 (1993): 157, writes, “My growing
conviction is that Peirce worked out of an orthodox trinitarian position, but edged toward a robust panentheism
which itself pointed toward the unsaid lying at the foundation of his general perspective.” Corrington appears to
hold that Peirce would have embraced panentheism had he realized that his system virtually implied it. One reason
Peirce never said the “unsaid” in this manner, according to Corrington, is that Peirce did not go far enough beyond
experience itself to the hidden ground of that experience.
120
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related to his semeiotic way of thinking about the God-world relation: the continuum, personality, and objective idealism. These themes characteristic of Peirce’s semeiotic Metaphysics appear
to relate approximately to the three criteria distinguishing PEM.121 One may take the PEM criterion of a self-relation to correlate to the Peircean theme of symbolic personality. Also, one may
understandably infer the criterion of interdependence from a sort of dipolarity implied by
Peirce’s Objective Idealism. Finally, the criterion of “God” being used as a symbol of metaphysical principles seems evident in Peirce’s theological reading of Synechism.122 Nevertheless, further consideration shows that each case of Peirce’s apparent agreement with PEM falls apart due
to the semeiotic nature of the God-world relation in Peirce’s thought.
Peirce’s theory of continuity, his Synechism, leads the discussion here, because it is the
context of one of Peirce’s most important theological statements surveyed in the previous section. In “The Law of Mind” Peirce wrote, “In considering personality, [synechistic] philosophy is
forced to accept the doctrine of a personal God; but in considering communication, it cannot but
admit that if there is a personal God, we must have a direct perception of that person and indeed
be in personal communication with him,” (W8:156). Peirce identified Synechism as one of his
philosophical doctrines, because he found that everything is related by way of a vast continuum
consisting of many smaller continua. Peirce’s theological comment reflects his belief that God,
too, is related to everything by way of some continuum.

Both Peirce’s philosophy and the beliefs comprising PEM are integrated systems. Consequently, the
interrelations among their ideas are complex. Though the discussions here consider certain beliefs as pertaining to
particular themes (e.g., ontological inclusion and Synechism), all of the themes and beliefs potentially bear upon one
another.
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That there is such a positive relation between the Peircean themes and the PEM criteria will be evident
in the course of the following discussion. To prevent unnecessary complication, the preceding comments suffice to
indicate these connections.
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Michael Raposa holds that the continuum by which everything else is related may just be
God. On this ground, Raposa identifies Peirce’s view as panentheistic. He writes, “God’s relationship to individuals in the world might be roughly compared to that existing between a continuum and its topical singularities…Peirce…might properly be labeled a panentheist.”123 In that
light, Peirce’s synechistic theology would seem to resemble PEM’s notion of Ontological Inclusion. That is the idea that the cosmos is included in the being of God. This appearance gains
strength when Robert Corrington agrees with Raposa’s assessment, writing, “Raposa is clearly
correct when he sees an intimate connection between Peirce’s theory of continuity and the various continua (topical singularities) that enter into the world and the inner life of God.”124 However, Corrington quickly qualifies the implied identification of Peirce’s view with panentheism.
He reads Peirce’s concepts as “a radicalized panentheism, specifically, what I will call an ‘ordinal monotheism.’”125 That is, Corrington holds that God is as much a creature as anything else,
but God is the broadest and therefore most inclusive continuum of creation. If Corrington’s view
is correct, Peirce’s God is not ultimately the creator of all things. This would be inconsistent with
PEM.126 Similarly, on closer inspection, Raposa’s identification of Peirce with panentheism due
to Peirce’s Synechism breaks down according to a demarcated panentheism defined by PEM.127

Raposa, PPR, 51. “Topical singularities,” Raposa explains, are like marks drawn on a chalkboard, the
chalkboard being the grand continuum.
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Corrington, Introduction, 202.
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Ibid., 203. Corrington does not claim that this was Peirce’s view, but that Peirce’s vagueness allows
Corrington’s schema as a possible interpretation of Peirce; cf., ibid., 203-04.

However, Corrington allows that “there is a mysterious sense in which God is also a creative ground of
the world.” But he limits this to God’s evolutionary love to whatever extent it has been involved in creation. ibid.,
203.
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Raposa recognizes that Peirce’s thought can be said to be panentheistic “only in the broadest sense,”
Raposa, PPR, 160-61n22. Raposa only claims that Peirce’s view qualifies as panentheistic according to the gloss
definition for panentheism, “one who views the world as being included in but not exhaustive of the divine reality.”
ibid, 51.
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This is because Raposa describes the ontological distinction between the underlying continuum
and the topical singularities it might contain,
For even if a continuum is to be regarded as somehow ‘containing’ its limits, still, the
continuum as such ‘contains no definite parts’ (CP 6.168). Indeed, the continuum and its
singularities are not the same ‘sorts’ of things at all. They are of different dimensionalities…they occupy different ‘levels of reality.’ Once again, the ‘whole’ has properties and
a kind of reality that no mere aggregate of parts could ever have (see CP 1.220). As a system, it is essentially different from, albeit continuous with, its various subsystems.128
On Raposa’s understanding, then, Peirce’s view denies ontological inclusion in the PEM sense.
The continuum and its constituent singularities are ontologically distinct. Translated into theological language, if God is the continuum and God’s creatures are its singularities, then Peirce
affirms a strict distinction between God and God’s creatures.129 This is one of the doctrines of
classical theism that PEM expressly rejects.
Peirce’s theological statement on Synechism alleged that it not only entails that God is
personal but that human beings must be able “to have a direct perception” of God. It seems that
this claim might relate to the PEM belief in Empathy.130 On that view, God’s relation to the
world is immanent to such a degree that God feels all the feelings of the cosmos at any given
time. Though PEM discussions express Empathy only in the direction of God’s perception of
aesthetic states in the cosmos, on PEM’s mind-body logic it follows that the perception works
the other way, too. Although, since any constituent mind in the cosmos is finite, so is the degree
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In this way, this Peircean analogy indicates some form of ground-of-being theology. Further
consideration would be required to define Peirce’s view as being closer to Paul Tillich’s conception or that
explained above in CT’ belief, Divine Ground of Being.
Commenting on this statement from Peirce, Mills recognizes that it positions Peirce’s view “to be
compatible with panentheism”; cf., Mills, “Drama,” 119. However, Mills does not indicate Empathy. Further, ibid.,
123, argues that Peirce’s balance of transcendence and immanence entails an ontological continuity between God
and the world. Mills denies a “radical discontinuity” while admitting the traditional ontological language of divine
necessity and creaturely contingency. Mills concludes that Peirce’s view was an “idealist panentheism” according to
which the cosmos is “an idea in the mind of God,” ibid., 124.
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of perception of God’s feelings. Peirce’s statement seems to suggest this two-way aesthetic relation when he adds that humans must be “in communication with” this personal God.
On the other hand, in light of the more detailed consideration of this statement earlier,
Peirce’s semeiotic conception of “communication” and “direct perception” does not quite meet
the standard PEM sets for God-cosmos empathy. According to PEM, God does not just feel the
cosmos’ feelings, God experiences them from the inside. That is, God does not just perceive the
aesthetic quality of stepping on sharp rocks when a person walks barefoot in gravel. God experiences that quality as though God is that person walking barefoot. Peirce’s semeiotic conception
allows for divine sympathy with all feelings in the cosmos but not with empathy in this PEM
sense. Recall that the previous discussion of this statement from Peirce found that the communication and “direct” perception is iconic. Icons are signs that resemble their objects. Therefore,
God’s perception of cosmic feelings only resembles those feelings. Empathy as constructed in
PEM entails that God’s feeling just is what any part of the cosmos is feeling.
Peirce’s semeiotic conception of personality relates to two more PEM core beliefs. According to Peirce, a person is a sort of symbol. Symbols determine their interpretants according
to some ruling principle, just as a person’s personality determines the character of their effects.
Accordingly, if God’s relation to the cosmos is also semeiotic, then PEM’s core beliefs MindBody Analogy and Mutual Co-Inherence seem to find a place in Peirce’s Metaphysics.
Mind-Body Analogy appears to relate positively to Peirce’s Agapasm. Recall that Peirce
agreed with the Johannine identity of God with love; that God’s being is love. Peirce embraced
that and applied it to his triadic conception of cosmic evolution. A triad, in Peirce’s view, is also
a symbol, because two others are brought into meaningful relation by a third. Accordingly, one
can say that Peirce’s view entails that divine love (agape) creates the personality of the cosmos
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as a symbol. All growth in and of the cosmos itself is determined according to divine love. This
is along the lines described by Donna Orange regarding God’s creative relation to the cosmos.
Orange writes,
God and creation could be conceived as person and personality respectively. Just as in the
case of a human person, personality, as its actual expression at any time, is always only a
partial expression, so creation, (God’s ‘personality,’ as it were) is always only a partial
expression of the deity as person, that is, subject who expresses self outwardly in creation.131
This may be taken in the PEM sense of the Mind-Body Analogy. That is, just as one experiences
one’s mind expressing itself through their bodily life, so also God expresses himself through cosmic life. Further, as human minds need their bodies for such expression and life, so, too, does
God need the cosmos on a PEM reading.
Peirce’s view seems to agree with Mind-Body Analogy in another respect. Symbols, and
so personality, are marked by Thirdness, according to Peirce’s system. It is the Thirdness of the
cosmos that leads Leon Niemoczynski to identify Peirce as panentheist. In fact, Niemoczynski
appears to hold that, for Peirce, “God” just is a symbol of cosmic Thirdness; perhaps a religious
way of speaking about a metaphysical reality. Specifically, per Niemoczynski, Thirdness explains how it is that Peirce can speak of God being both “part of the world, yet also exist[ing] beyond the world.” He writes that “God represents Thirdness – generality to come, in addition to
being reflected within nature as order, rationality, and established habit.”132 Niemoczynski
strengthens his claim in a way that might suggest the Mind-Body Analogy when he writes, “the
supreme being of God includes and penetrates the whole cosmos so that all members and facts of
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Orange, Conception, 47.

Niemoczynski, “The Sacred Depths of Nature,” 112. This inquiry takes Niemoczynski to say God
“exists” in Thirdness beyond the cosmos in a more common-sense of the term existence rather than the technical
Peircean sense, since Peirce holds that nothing beyond the cosmos exists, though it might be real.
132
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the cosmos exist in God’s reality, yet God’s being is more than, and not exhausted by, those
members and their facts.” Accordingly, then, the evolving cosmos is “identified with an evolving
God.” The Thirdness transcending the cosmos, the “generality to come” as evolution progresses,
Niemoczynski identifies as the cosmic ideal, its end, which just is the “divine transcendence.”133
Like a mind to its body, for Peirce according to Niemoczynski’s assessment, “God” represents
the ideal end governing the development of the cosmos that is its expression.134
On the other hand, Mind-Body Analogy on its own is vague, such that Peirce’s apparent
agreement with this PEM belief cannot be taken as sufficient qualification of Peirce’s views as
panentheist. There are versions of the mind-body analogy open to classical theists.135 A doctrine
that clarifies the PEM sense of Mind-Body Analogy is Mutual Co-Inherence, the belief that the
being and life of God and the cosmos are so intimately intertwined that each implies the other. It
is no difficulty for an orthodox Christian view to hold that the being and life of the cosmos implies God. That is the whole point of the concept of “natural signs.”136 PEM distinguishes itself
from other theistic models in the reciprocity expressed by “mutual” co-inherence. That is, PEM
holds that God as such implies the cosmos, which contradicts the Christian doctrine of the absolute freedom of God to create or not to create anything at all. Certainly, the statements by Orange
and Niemoczynski above suggest that Peirce would agree with this PEM sense of Mutual Co-Inherence, according to the way they expressed the mind-body analogy.
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John Shook agrees with Niemoczynski that “thirdness must be an attribute of God, a crucial mode of
God’s creative activity.” Moreover, it is in terms of Thirdness that God is transcendent with respect to the cosmos.
But the divine Thirdness in and beyond the cosmos, according to Shook, is “much like the creativity and process of
an artist.” By that Shook means that God creates loosely according to a plan but largely lets the work develop as it
will. Cf., Shook, “Panentheism,” 19, 22.
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Cf., Appendix A.
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Cf., e.g., C. Stephen Evans, Natural Signs and Knowledge of God: A New Look at Theistic Arguments
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

125
Peirce’s Agapasm may also indicate his agreement with Mutual Co-Inherence. Peirce described the divine love motivating the evolution of the cosmos in terms of Thirdness. He called
attention to Johannine testimony that the divine love embraces the other and creates a unifying
relation. Therefore, in God’s love for the world, God not only created the world initially but continues to create the world ever closer to his good purpose for it, continuously bringing it into relation with himself.137 Depending on the degree to which God unifies himself with the cosmos,
Peirce’s view may indicate significant agreement with Mutual Co-Inherence. For example, Michael Raposa offers two metaphors for Peirce’s view of God’s relation to the world that could be
taken to imply a strong enough God-world unification to qualify as mutual co-inherence in the
PEM sense. In one place, Raposa writes regarding human beings who interpret the cosmos as “a
divinely authored text”; that “by interpreting we become a part of [the meaning of that text]. In
some very real sense, then, we can share in the divine life, in God’s own being.”138 If the divine
life is the love governing the symbolic evolution of the cosmos, then human interpretive activity
becomes united to this totalizing divine power at work in everything. However, this only expresses one side of the Mutual Co-Inherence equation. Raposa’s comment says that human interpretive activity implies the divine, agapic being. Does it also entail that God’s agapic being implies human interpretive activity?
While that is not evident in the context of that statement, another metaphor Raposa employs may indicate this other side of the Mutual Co-Inherence equation. He writes,
It might be more useful to conceptualize the relationship between Creator and creation in
terms of that which obtains between a law and the “cases” that it governs…While a law is
quite distinct, on realistic premises, from the collection of actual “instances” that it

Of course, “create” and “creation” as divine a divine activity is used here equivocally with respect to the
CT sense of the term. Peirce’s synechism led him to hold a form of continuing creation.
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governs, nevertheless it is intimately related to each instance, defines it, lends to it something of its own general character, indeed, its own reality.139
Recall that Peirce held real generals, such as the Law of Gravity, to be efficacious in the realm of
existents. So, a rock let go of from my hand will always fall until something interrupts its descent. That is an instance, a case, of the Law of Gravity. The Raposan analogy to the God-world
relation is that God, like the law, “governs” any and every instance that occurs. In the process,
each instance bears a resemblance to that law without any instance – or even the totality of instances – being identical to the law itself. Accordingly, the world is not God nor is God the
world, but the two are “inextricably intertwined,” to apply Brierley’s phrase.140 Further, the Law
of Gravity implies instances of itself, in the form of, “given the Law of Gravity, if a person lets
go of a rock then that rock will fall toward the earth.” Likewise, any instance implies the law.
Therefore, Raposa’s law-instance analogy agrees with Mutual Co-Inherence.
However, Raposa’s discussion of this analogy does not indicate any understanding of
how God implies a cosmos. In light of Agapasm, perhaps he could claim that agape implies a beloved. Peirce did describe the nature of this form of love as “circular.” Agape creates and brings
its creation into a relation that is also a perfecting process. Since agape marks the being and
character of God, it follows that, as “Creator,” God indeed implies a created other. This certainly
seems to agree with Mutual Co-Inherence. However, more precisely, agape pertains to an implied relation to another, a beloved. That God is “Creator” is not entailed by “God is love,” especially in view of Peirce’s sympathies with Trinitarian theology. The triune Godhead is sufficient
for a mutual relation in love. Furthermore, the law governing the development of the cosmos is
God’s purpose, of which the cosmos is a “vast representamen.” Therefore, the law-instance
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analogy Raposa suggests is more precisely translated theologically as divine purpose-cosmos.
Consequently, it seems Peirce would not concur with Mutual Co-Inherence.
Additionally, the “artist” metaphor in Peirce’s thought casts doubt on any agreement with
PEM’s Mutual Co-Inherence belief, because the artist metaphor holds to the semeiotic nature of
the God-world relation.141 Referring to Peirce’s “vast representamen” statement from the fourth
1903 Harvard Lecture, Raposa writes,
On Peirce’s view, the world as a work of art is related to God in semeiotic terms, as sign
to reality signified. It is a “vast argument” that symbolizes a divine purpose, while also
representing (as “icon”) a certain quality of purposefulness, finally, serving as an “index”
of that purpose (being related to it as effect to cause). Here the poet is distinguished from
the poem, as creator from creation….142
In that statement to which Raposa alludes, Peirce gave examples of works of art illustrating
God’s relation to the world as artist to art. He said the universe is God’s “great poem”; that the
cosmos might be also thought of as an impressionist’s painting of a seashore. In both cases, it is
evident that a mind is responsible for the existence and form of the resulting work and that the
creation is not also the creator. Therefore, contra Mind-Body Analogy, the being of the Creator is
not also the being of the creature. Admittedly, there is a sense in which Peirce agrees with Mutual Co-Inherence. The concept “artist” implies “art,” and “art” implies “artist.” However,
Peirce’s use of this imagery is not yet PEM. Peirce did not go so far as to claim that God as such
relates to some cosmos, which is the PEM view. For Peirce, the fact of the cosmos implies God,
and further reflections led him to think that God’s divine love explains the evolutionary nature of
the cosmos God is creating. But Peirce’s view remains on one side of the Mutual Co-Inherence
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equation. Peirce’s artist metaphor emphasizes a non-PEM distinction between God and the cosmos. A poet is not their poem any more than a painting is its painter. Certainly, something of the
artist is discovered in their work, but, again, as an iconic representation of the artist in some respect. Therefore, Peirce’s semeiotic conception of God’s personal relation to the cosmos does
not agree with PEM’s doctrines of Mind-Body Analogy or Mutual Co-Inherence. With respect to
the ontological aspect of the God-world relation, Peirce’s semeiotic model maintains a strict distinction consistent with classical theism.143
The remaining PEM doctrines—Dynamic Dipolarity and Symmetrical Ontological Dependence—relate to statements Peirce made regarding his Objective Idealism.144 These beliefs
pertain especially to Peirce's doctrine Objective Idealism, because that monistic doctrine holds
that everything is mind. Peirce’s doctrine therefore holds that the cosmos is a continuum of
mind, and that this continuum includes its divine source. So, there is pure mind, consisting in the
infinite possibilities available as the cosmos evolves according to God’s purpose. There is also
mind in its concrete state, often called “matter.” According to Peirce, matter just is “effete”
mind, mind that has completely realized its process of becoming according to its purpose. Just as
this is the destiny of the creator’s purpose for a rock somewhere, it is also the trajectory of the
entire cosmos as such, evolving toward the perfect realization of God’s purpose for it. This is the
metaphysical construct contextualizing Peirce’s theological statements.
Peirce’s programmatic theological statement was that scientific inquirers must be “materialists without flinching.” Peirce seems to mean that any knowledge of God comes through the
metaphysical medium in which we live. Whatever is true of God in himself, in other words, is
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absolutely beyond human ken. Theology must discipline its speech to the forms in which God is
encountered. These are the forms in which, Peirce said, God exists, in his Scholastic Realist
sense of that term. For example, Peirce said that God exists in the teleology evident in the universe, and that God’s omniscience will exist when scientific knowledge is perfected (though, recall that this is qualified as existing from the perspective of human perception).
In such comments by Peirce the basic form of the PEM belief Dynamic Dipolarity becomes evident. Recall that this is a model of God according to which the totality that is God includes the cosmos, but God is more than the cosmos. This is a more precise version of the MindBody Analogy, and so is, as Brierley states, panentheism par excellence.145 The God totality is
constantly developing in its immanent, cosmic component, and the possibilities for all development are in God's transcendence. Hence, the two poles of “dipolar.” Inherent to the dipolar
model is the PEM belief in Symmetrical Ontological Dependence. Recall that according to this
view God needs the cosmos, and the cosmos needs God. They do not necessarily need each other
in precisely the same ways, of course. The cosmos’ ontological dependence upon God is not controversial for theists in general. What demarcates PEM from Christian theism and classical theism is the belief that God is ontologically dependent upon the cosmos. God needs the cosmos to
live his life, to learn and to grow, to experience.146
Vies expressed by several scholars regarding Peirce’s relationship to panentheism would
affirm that Peirce agrees with Dynamic Dipolarity and Symmetrical Ontological Dependence.
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Brierley, “Potential,” 639, “Process theism represents the most advanced form of panentheism.”

One could easily argue that all of the core beliefs of PEM are implied by Dynamic Dipolarity. However,
that would be unnecessarily tedious. It should be evident that if God just is the totality of the actual cosmos and its
transcendent infinity of possibilities, then not only Symmetrical Ontological Dependence, but also Mutual CoInherence, Ontological Inclusion, and Empathy follow. Further, these analyze what PEM means by Mind-Body
Analogy. To avoid unnecessary complication, the following discussion takes this systematic integration for granted,
such that in discussing Peirce's relation to especially Dynamic Dipolarity one is really discussing Peirce's relation to
the heart of PEM as such.
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John Shook constructs a Peircean version of panentheism, calling it “emergent panentheism,” because he finds Peirce to advocate a “natural God that evolves right along with reality.” He claims
that, for Peirce, God is the Thirdness emergent from the “‘boundless possibility’” of the primordial “nothingness.”147 Benjamin Chicka goes as far as to identify Peirce’s panentheism as specifically having a form consistent with the dipolar model of process theism, that Peirce’s God is
“wedded to the world” and therefore “lives in all three categories.”148 Corrington agrees that it is
possible to read Peirce as a process panentheist.149 In fact, Corrington views process theism as
the essence of panentheism. The varieties of panentheism, according to Corrington, “multiply
from their progenitive wellsprings in Whitehead and Hartshorne.”150 Michael Raposa provides an
apt description of the process form of panentheism as established by Charles Hartshorne, as follows:
at the heart of Hartshorne’s metaphysical vision is the description of reality as “an ocean
of feeling”...That reality, taken as a whole, is divine on Hartshorne’s panentheistic account, as God embraces and includes, even while also emphatically transcending, what
we experience in the world. While the abstract essence of the Deity may be transcended,
however, the divine actuality (how God exists) very much depends on the existence of
finite things in the world and is aesthetically enriched by them.151
Though not claiming process theism specifically, John Cooper’s account of Peirce’s panentheism
is certainly consistent with Hartshorne. Cooper holds that all three of Peirce's metaphysical

Shook, “Panentheism,” 24, 23, 17. Shook grants that he must speculate in this, because “Peirce’s
philosophy barely admits a consideration of basic panentheism, much less anything more sophisticated,” ibid., 17.
So, he constructs two pantheist and two panentheist models arguably consistent with Peirce’s views. “Emergent
Panentheism” is deemed most satisfactory among these. On identifying God with emergent Thirdness, cf., also,
Brier, “Pragmatism, Science, Theology,” 142. So, Shook and Brier agree with Corrington to some degree that “God”
is itself emergent and creaturely.
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categories pertain just as well to God. Accordingly, writes, Cooper, “Although the universe is an
aspect of and thus ‘in’ the divine Mind, Peirce strongly distinguishes God and creatures, affirming that God is more than the material universe.” This, of course, is the signal claim of panentheists. Cooper goes farther, writing that God’s creation consists of “extensions of the divine essence,” as in pantheism. However, he recognizes that Peirce’s view is not pantheist due to the
fact that God and creatures remain distinct as “they possess their own actuality and sponteneity.”
On these grounds, Cooper judges that “Peirce’s view of God and the world is a clear case of
modern panentheism.”152
However, it is not clear that Peirce’s views truly align with the dipolar panentheist model.
It was Charles Hartshorne who introduced Peirce as a modern panentheist. Others since then
have followed his lead.153 Yet, at the same time, it was Hartshorne who suggested that Peirce
was not yet a panentheist. Introducing Peirce in the chapter “Modern Panentheism,” Hartshorne
and Reese write,
The reason that we claim him for this chapter is primarily that he is one of the chief exponents of the supporting conceptions which in other thinkers have led to an unequivocally
dipolar conception of God. These are his recognition of potentiality as a real feature of
the universe, the primacy of becoming over being, growth as a feature of the universe,
and his thesis of panpsychism.154
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Hartshorne & Reese, Philosophers, 258. Italics added. Notice that Hartshorne and Reese identify as
potentially panentheist Peirce’s tychism, law of mind, agapasm, and objective idealism. However, Peirce’s
Objective Idealism is not panpsychism in its present-day sense. The latter holds that everything has consciousness;
that all things are experiencing subjects. On which, cf., Benedikt Paul Göcke, “Panpsychism and Panentheism,” in
Panentheism and Panpsychism: Philosophy of Religion Meets Philosophy of Mind, ed. Ludwig Jaskolla, Benedikt
Paul Göcke, and Godehard Brüntrup (Paderborn: mentis Verlag, 2020), 39. Though Peirce was a monist, he
expressed his monism not in terms of substance but in terms of a common dynamic mental quality pervading
everything. That is, Peirce’s Objective Idealism holds only that everything is subject to mind-like developmental
processes.
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Further, Michael Raposa argues convincingly against the notion that Peirce’s metaphysics was
an early version of process panentheism. He writes that Hartshorne’s view is “quite different
from Charles Peirce’s announcement that the world is God’s ‘great poem.’” If Peirce shared
Hartshorne’s view then Peirce’s Poet-poem analogy for the God-world relation would entail that
“God both is the ‘never-ending poem’ and also the ‘poet as enjoying this poem.’”155 Raposa appeals to Peirce's semeiotic construction of the God-world relation to explain why Peirce in fact
would not agree with Hartshorne. According to Raposa, from Peirce’s perspective, “Hartshorne
makes the mistake of confusing a sign with the thing signified.”156 That is, Peirce would not say
that God is both poet and poem, because a sign is not at the same time its object. If Raposa is
correct, then this is devastating for any claim that Peirce’s metaphysics aligns with PEM, though
one sees ways that Peirce’s views arguably lend themselves to proponents of panentheism, such
as Hartshorne.157
One need not rely on a logical inference from Peirce's semeiotic metaphysics to determine whether he would agree with Hartshorne’s dipolar description of God. Peirce himself left
some strong suggestions that he maintained a robust distinction between God himself and the
cosmos he creates.158 Recall the earlier discussion of Peirce’s statement that the laws of nature
are ideas in the mind of some “vast consciousness.” Peirce is expressly unwilling to draw a

Raposa, “Never Ending Poem,” 214-15. Mills proposes a similar construal of Peirce’s metaphysics,
which he calls “idealist panentheism.” He formulates his view via an “author-text” analogy, “That is, the text of the
universe has its reality as an idea in the mind of God. Its reality is ‘included in but not exhaustive of the divine
reality.’” He goes on to explain that this is called for in light of Peirce’s insistence that God himself is mind. Mills
writes, “if the universe is to be within God, it must be an idea in the mind of God, or more precisely, an idea within
the mind that is God, since that is all that God is.” Mills, “Drama of Creation,” 117, 124.
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conclusion on whether this mind is God himself. Instead, Peirce avers that this mind, whatever it
is, is “a Deity relatively to us,” (PPMRT:195). That is, as far as humans are concerned, the mind
thinking the laws of this universe infinitely transcends human minds. Relative to humans, then,
this mind might as well be deity though one will never be able to know for sure.
In this, Peirce is consistent with another indication of his tendency not to identify God
with the cosmos. In his engagement with Royce that was discussed earlier, Peirce distinguished
his from Royce's understanding of The Absolute. Peirce states that he does not identify God with
anything science or philosophy can speak about. Nevertheless, Peirce does hold that there is an
“absolute thought” that contains all the realities of the evolving cosmos (MS1369s). Importantly,
a thought is a symbol, as Peirce held that ideas are symbols.159 The cosmos as a symbol has the
form of PEM's Dynamic Dipolarity and Symmetrical Ontological Dependence. The Absolute
Thought transcends its evolving realization in the cosmos like the mind transcends the body.
Also, on Peirce's synechistic Objective Idealism, the Absolute Thought contains the cosmos it
governs. Furthermore, an Absolute Thought depends ontologically on the cosmos as its form of
life and realization of self, even as the cosmos depends upon the Absolute Thought for its being
and development. This much one can reason on one’s own by applying the logic of Peirce's semeiotic to his statement about the absolute thought. These insights are confirmed in light of Michael Raposa's discussion of Peirce's conception of the “Absolute Mind.”
Raposa writes that Peirce conceived of the Absolute Mind as a sort of “all-embracing ‘supersystem,’ with its habits of thought and feeling constituting the natural laws that regulate all of

159
Raposa, PPR, 118. Also, again, Peirce called the cosmos a “vast representamen,” which is “a symbol of
God's purpose,” (PPMRT:201).
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its coordinated subsystems (see MS 289:4ff).”160 These “subsystems” include human minds.161
Peirce's conception of the Absolute Mind bears the distinct dipolar metaphysical form. It “infinitely transcends” the universe, “encompass[ing] all possibile as well as all actual states of affairs.”162 Symmetrical Ontological Dependence comes into view when considering that the transcendent Absolute Mind also “must be really continuous with” the universe.” This is according to
the principle that any singularity of a continuum receives its continuous nature from that continuum. So, the universe consists of singularities that are, “in Peirce’s religious metaphysics, the actualizations, by divine volition, of certain real possibilities...the intelligibility of any existing
thing is derived from that general idea or purpose that links it to other fragments of the system,
just as the continuity of the line ‘comes from’ that of the blackboard on which it is drawn.”163
The agreement of Peirce's conception of the Absolute Mind with PEM is evident when Raposa
writes, “Now the Absolute Mind is that one incredibly complex general idea that renders intelligible everything that exists; its reasonableness is ‘concretized’ in the actual universe even though
it continues to embody possible further determinations beyond all multitude.”164 This is Peirce’s
earlier notion of the absolute thought, and it is Orange’s view of Peirce’s conception of God as
emergent “reasonableness.”165
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Ibid., 50. Raposa also notes that this is in accordance with Peirce’s synechism. One can easily recognize
Peirce’s objective idealism manifest here.
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However, Raposa goes on to explain that the evidence from Peirce’s writings indicates
that Peirce did not identify God as the Absolute Mind as just described.166 For Raposa, this is
most likely the implication of Peirce’s statement that the “vast consciousness” is “Deity relatively to us.” Raposa speculates that Peirce may have considered the Absolute Mind as one “Platonic world” among many others.167 God, then, “must be that primordial reality” from which all
Platonic worlds “emerg[ed].” Though coming from this “creative source of all that exists,” there
remains an absolute distinction between the Platonic worlds and God.168 They are “nothing like”
God.169 The key here is that Peirce conceived the God-world relation in semeiotic terms as,
again, that of an object to a sign representing it. Raposa observes, importantly, that this is also
how “Peirce construed the relationship of the Absolute Mind to God.”170 This is because, as
Raposa explains, Peirce conceived of the Absolute Mind as that which is “projected” by God and
as that which “projects” the cosmos:
This projected reality in its entirety, this Absolute Mind, is the embodiment of a divine
purpose. It represents that purpose by developing under its law-like influence, crudely
similar to the way that a map-projection is generated through the application of certain
rules...the created universe forms a rather distorted image of the divine idea that it maps.
It is nonetheless a genuine symbol of the divine, with iconic and indexical features. That
166
For the purposes of his discussion of Peirce’s “Absolute Mind” as a religious concept, Raposa only
tentatively identified the Absolute Mind with Peirce’s doctrine of God, “for the time being, Peirce’s description of
the Absolute Mind will be loosely regarded as ‘God-talk,’” Raposa, PPR, 49.
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Ibid., 59.

If Raposa is correct that the notion of “Platonic worlds” informs Peirce’s theory of Absolute Mind, then
there is warrant to consider Peirce’s schema in relation to Plotinus’ “great chain of being.” However, against
Plotinus’ emanation model, Peirce maintains a classical theist God-world distinction with his semeiotic model. See
on “projection” below. So, contra Cooper, Panentheism, 18, 23, 139, who identifies Peirce as a Plotinian
panentheist.
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Raposa, PPR, 60. In contrast, Conway, “Metaphorical Theology,” 179, holds that Peirce’s thought
entails the identity of God and the Absolute Mind. This is due to Peirce’s semeiotic conception of “person” as a
symbol, and that “the most general idea resides in the Absolute Mind.” In fact, Conway expressly opposes Raposa
on this when Conway argues that it is more specifically God the Holy Spirit who “is the Absolute Mind of the
universe,” ibid., 179n18. However, this study has already seen that Raposa shows how Peirce’s view allows that the
“absolute thought” for this universe might be in an Absolute Mind that is one of many such “Platonic worlds,”
according to Peirce’s writings on the subject.
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is to say, at the same time that it performs its representative function by virtue of the law
that governs its development, this universal mind also embodies a quality of purpose-fulness, of reasonableness, and is an index of that purpose, having been caused by it, having
been projected, through a divine act of volition, into being.171
According to this schema, then, God creates the full idea of the cosmos and his purpose for what
it is to be and do. This idea Peirce calls the Absolute Mind. It is then the work of this Absolute
Mind to realize itself in the cosmos that it makes according to the purpose God determined for it.
Therefore, PEM quite well describes Peirce’s semeiotic conception of the relation of the Absolute Mind to the cosmos. But the Absolute Mind on Peirce’s account is not God himself, only
something like a deity when compared to human beings.172 Consequently, Peirce’s Metaphysics
can easily be related to PEM, but it is not yet itself PEM. Peirce’s unflinching materialism did
not speak of God himself when speaking of the theological gleanings available to inquirers observing phenomena of the cosmos. That is to say that Peirce appears to maintain a degree of supernaturalism in his sense of what God is in himself.
Conclusions
This chapter has pursued a careful description of the elements of Peirce’s semeiotic metaphysics. It considered several key Peircean doctrines according to the themes of meaning, triad,
interpretation, mind, and God. The purpose of this inquiry has been to identify beliefs that Peirce
held that explain why Peirce scholars largely agree that Peirce held a panentheist Metaphysics.
Several aspects of Peirce’s semeiotic Metaphysics seem somehow like a sort of panentheism, but
on closer inspection Peirce’s views fall short of a demarcated panentheism, PEM.
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Peirce related God to the Absolute Mind as “a ‘supreme’ to a ‘subordinate’ being,” Raposa, PPR, 59.
Also, since the Absolute Mind is only one of many Platonic worlds and relates to God as sign to object, ibid., 61,
concludes there is “no reason to assume that [Peirce] considered God and the Absolute to be ‘metaphysically
identifiable’ realities.”
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Peirce seems to sound panentheist (PEM) when paying theological attention to his Synechism. Peirce believed that the cosmos is a continuum of mind that includes its divine source.
As such it also, as an absolute thought, contains all of the realities and existent individuals of the
cosmos. Therefore, via a continuum God is related to everything in the cosmos. This is easily
construed as expressing the mind-body logic of PEM with its attendant beliefs. On the other
hand, what initially appears to constitute agreement between Peirce and PEM is reined in repeatedly by Peirce’s semeiotic God-world relation model. Peirce consistently held that the relation of
God to the world is best understood according to the logic of the relation of an object to its sign.
So, the love Peirce says is at work in the cosmos is something only resembling the agapic being
of God. It is not God himself. Likewise, in saying that the cosmos is God’s “great poem,” Peirce
implies that God and the cosmos are ontologically distinct. A poet is not his poem just as an object is not its own sign. In terms of the Absolute Mind, Peirce appears to have maintained this
ontological distinction. God is not the Absolute Mind creating the cosmos. This is a strong contradiction of PEM. However, Peirce is in lockstep with PEM in his belief that the Absolute Mind
realizes itself by making the cosmos according to God’s purpose. According to his Agapasm,
Peirce held that God’s love is determinate for this creative process. Not only is God’s love represented in the cosmos as a result, but this love as such constantly maintains the cosmos in relation
to God. This is why Peirce expressly believed that God’s existence per se just is in the teleology
of the cosmos. Once again, however, Peirce’s agreement with PEM dissolves on further consideration. Peirce had a technical, Scholastic Realist sense for “exist.” Also, as Peirce makes crystal
clear in the “Neglected Argument,” God is “real” and not existent. Rather than a contradiction,
Peirce’s meaning is clarified, once again, by keeping in mind his semeiotic God-world model. To
say that God exists in the cosmos at all is to identify something that is a sign of God. The
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semeiotic relation entails a fundamental distinction between God and the world, just as the artist
is fundamentally distinct from their work. So, Peirce’s Synechism seems to lean toward PEM,
until it is checked by Peirce’s semeiotic God-world model. Peirce’s theory of the Absolute Mind
as creator of the cosmos seems in fact to entail PEM in a robust way until it becomes evident that
Peirce distinguished the Absolute Mind from God semeiotically.
While it is evident that Peirce himself would not have agreed with PEM, it is also true
that Hartshorne and others have shown that Peirce’s philosophy is conducive to a spectrum of
panentheisms, including PEM.173 Accordingly, Peirce’s semeiotic metaphysics presents theological problems with respect to the conviction of CT. Three are salient in light of the preceding
analysis. Peirce’s semeiotic doctrine of God includes his concept of the Absolute Mind. Though
Peirce seems not to have identified the two, neither does Peirce indicate “creation” in its CT
sense. The creation of the Absolute Mind resembles Plotinus’ great chain of being. According to
Plotinus, God emanates a Mind that then emanates a World-Soul that then emanates the
World.174 Peirce does not express creation as emanation, but neither does Peirce express creation
in the biblical language of divine fiat. Formally, Peirce’s scheme resembles that of Plotinus, except that Peirce’s Absolute Mind mediates God and the World without a World-Soul. Peirce’s
conception of creation remains underdeveloped and therefore open to interpretation. As semeiotic in nature it resists any sense of ontological interdependence between God and the world.
However, the manner in which God effects semeiotic growth could be construed in various ways.
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See above regarding the opinions of Hartshorne, Corrington, and Shook. While Raposa identifies Peirce
as a panentheist, it is only in the “broadest sense” of the term. In light of the discussion here, then, Raposa’s Peirce
would be located with Clayton, Peacocke, and others among classical theists sympathetic to PEM but not fully
agreeing with it.
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Also, there are open questions in Peirce’s theology with respect to his Synechism. The
semeiotic God-world relation, according to Peirce, has the form of a continuum. Peirce’s thought
resists construing the metaphysical continuum including God in an ontological sense. Therefore,
Peirce’s view contradicts PEM. Peirce’s view also in this way resists emanationist views of creation. This would rule out Corrington’s speculation that God himself is emergent as among other
creatures. Still, “emergence” as such remains a live option for interpreting Peirce’s semeiotic
model. This would encourage Shook’s conclusion of “emergent panentheism” as implied by
Peirce’s metaphysics. It would also locate Peirce in the Christian panentheist camp with Philip
Clayton and Paul Tillich.175 Emergence would supply an answer to the question left open just
above, regarding the manner in which God effects semeiotic growth in the cosmos. With respect
to traditional views according to CT, however, emergence would be a problematic way to interpret Peirce’s vague ideas.176 This is evident in light of the third theological problem.
Finally, Peirce’s Objective Idealism remains problematic for CT, because Peirce’s monism pertains somehow to the God-world relation. As discussed, Peirce’s view does not hold forth
a monism in a PEM ontological sense. Also, Peirce’s monism somehow resists Plotinus’ emanationist model. Instead, Peirce’s monism is a sort of panpsychism. Unlike Hartshorne’s pan-experiential sense of panpsychism, Peirce advocated that everything shares a similar character of
mental process. This is to say that everything grows and increases interconnections until realizing its purpose in a concrete form. Accordingly, matter is substance the mental processes of
which have become frozen in habit (as Peirce says, “effete mind”). According to Synechism,
175
Clayton, Mind and Emergence, esp., ch. 5, “Emergence and Transcendence”; on these themes in
Tillich’s thought, cf., discussion of ecstatic naturalism in Tillich, in Christopher Demuth Rodkey, “Paul Tillich’s
Pantheon of Theisms: An Invitation to Think Theonomously,” in Models of God and Alternative Ultimate Realities,
ed. J. Diller and A. Kasher (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 489-90.
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For a systematic theological critique of emergence naturalism, cf., Joanna Leidenhag, “A Critique of
Emergent Theologies,” Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science 51, no. 4 (2016): 867-82.
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then, even God must be implicated somehow in this growth pertaining to all mind. Peirce wrestled with this implication (CP 6.466). Though he could not reconcile it with his theistic beliefs,
he could not deny it as a consequence of his philosophy. This is another question Peirce left open
that could be resolved philosophically by positing emergence theory. Emergence holds ontological distinction, continuity, and naturalism together coherently. However, this would be a problematic solution with respect to CT.
Therefore, semeiotic Metaphysics according to Peirce, while not itself PEM, appears to
bear a distinctive panentheist bias. In light of the consistent way Peirce scholars take Peirce as
panentheist (though not necessarily in a carefully demarcated sense such as PEM), one is justified to conclude that Peirce’s semeiotic as situated within Peirce’s system is conducive to the
panentheist zeitgeist evident in religion and science discussions today. Applied as a theoretical
structure for CNT, semeiotic might likewise open CNT to the panentheist spirit. The next chapter
explores this consequence by experimentally conforming CNT to a robustly Peircean semeiotic
and observing its theological effects.
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Four: Panentheism and a Christian Theosemiotic
With the previous chapter, this inquiry has added a detailed understanding of Peirce’s Semeiotic within its systematic philosophical context to a definition of the relevant theistic models,
CT and PEM. It is now time to consider the degree to which including Peirce’s Semeiotic in the
structure of Alister McGrath’s approach to Christian natural theology (CNT) would invite a bias
toward PEM. The present chapter answers this question empirically, seeking experiential evidence that Peirce’s susceptibility to PEM is an entailment of a thick conception of semeiotic
within theological method. This chapter, therefore, prepares for this experiment by constructing a
form of CNT embodying a robust semeiotic structure. For this, Peirce’s own dialogical interpretive process brings McGrath’s proposal into conversation with “theosemiotic,” Michael Raposa’s
term for Peirce’s method of natural theology. Finally, Robert Neville serves as an exemplar of
such a theosemiotic CNT. The three PEM criteria provide the means for testing Neville’s work
for evidence of a tendency toward PEM. The experiment demonstrates the thesis of this dissertation: that a fully Peircean Semeiotic brings with it Peirce’s relation to PEM. However, the result
is complex. Neville’s theosemiotic manifests the PEM criteria, but Neville goes far beyond
where Peirce himself likely would have led him with respect to PEM.
A Christian Theosemiotic
McGrath’s Use of Semeiotic
McGrath’s writing on CNT so far has been exploratory. He has briefly discussed various
theoretical components to set forth his vision for a direction Christian natural theology should
take. He has experimented with his own approach, in setting forth abductive arguments regarding
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“anthropic” features of the cosmos.1 This is to say that McGrath’s focus has been on casting a
vision for a renewed natural theology rather than developing the different aspects of the theory in
detail. One such aspect that has received only brief attention, disproportional to its importance
for McGrath’s vision, is Peirce’s Semeiotic and precisely how it contributes to the “structure” of
CNT (RI 96).
It is a core belief of CNT that nature is “ambiguous,” and therefore its meaning is not
self-evident but must be interpreted through the application of a conceptual framework one
brings to the experience of nature.2 Consequently, like any theory of natural theology, CNT must
be able to account for holding natural objects as signs of transcendent realities. McGrath states
that Peirce’s Semeiotic provides a “framework” precisely to this effect (RI 93-95).3 Chapter three
above has shown the powerful triadic action of Thirdness in Peirce’s theory. In this way Peirce
explains how something not identical to an invisible object nevertheless consistently communicates true ideas about that object. The discussion below shows that McGrath appreciates that Semeiotic supplies a robust, objective interpretive framework on which CNT can operate as a community-based interpretive method.

1

FT, chapters 9-15.

The metaphor of “framework” is used at a couple of different levels in McGrath’s discussions. There is
the second-order level considering the theoretical question of how the interpretation of nature’s meaning is
conceived. Peirce’s semeiotic frames CNT at this level. Then there is the first-order level of framework in the sense
of a distinct perspective from which nature is approached. In the case of CNT, the five theological beliefs considered
earlier frame the Christian perspective of nature McGrath advocates. On the latter, first-order, sense, cf., RI 35.
2

3
If not Peirce’s semeiotic theory of sign-interpretation, then McGrath would need to draw upon some other
theory of signs. Other than Peirce, the primary option in contemporary discourse is a dyadic model, most famously
according to Ferdinand de Saussure. With a dyadic model, however, one loses the grounding of the interpretation in
an object that lends consistency to a series of interpretations. Meaning becomes elusive with a dyadic model,
because interpretation is ultimately arbitrary. Context plays a role even in a dyadic account of signs, but context is a
house of cards: interpretations are interpretations of interpretations. Meaning becomes utterly conventional upon an
arbitrary foundation of significance. Cf. Winfried Nöth, Handbook of Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1990), 59. Ferdinand de Saussure focused his “semiology” on linguistic signs. His dyadic model of the sign
included a “signifier and signified.” Writes Nöth, “The distinctive feature of its bilaterality is the exclusion of the
referential object.”
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The full explanatory power of Peirce’s sign theory depends upon its integration with
other elements of Peirce’s philosophical system. Raposa writes, “Nor is it to be denied that his
semiotic can, to a great extent, be lifted from its metaphysical underpinnings and employed for
various contemporary purposes. In doing so, however, it must be admitted that this theory loses a
good deal of its original power.”4 So, though it is possible to abstract useful aspects of Peirce’s
theory for other applications, such as CNT, McGrath rightly recognizes that Semeiotic properly
functions within the context of Peirce’s philosophical system. He writes, “The theory of signs
which Peirce develops is not to be seen as some detached and independent element of his
thought, but rather interconnects his thought as a whole,” (RI 94). McGrath implies, then, that
Peirce’s sign theory provides for the sort of “further development” of “sign” as a metaphor for
human knowledge of nature upon which CNT builds (RI 3). However, McGrath’s own discussion of Semeiotic is quite abbreviated. He focuses upon Peirce’s conception of the interpretant,
especially as it is determined by mental habits interpreters bring to the experience (RI 96). Therefore, an underdeveloped explanation of how Semeiotic structures CNT epistemology opens the
door for this experiment.
A Theosemiotic Reading of CNT
The present research project raises a cautionary flag regarding the appropriation of
Peirce’s sign theory within a Christian theological framework. If McGrath intended merely to abstract the idea of habit-determined interpretants from the empowering context of Peirce’s
thought, he might thereby have mitigated to some extent the risk of incorporating Semeiotic’s
susceptibility to PEM (or, its “bias”). Instead, since McGrath tacitly confesses to an

4
Raposa, PPR, 146. In particular, Raposa mentions the loss of cogency as at risk when separating
semeiotic from Peirce’s metaphysical concepts of synechism and objective idealism; cf., ibid., 145.
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underdeveloped explanation of Peirce’s value for CNT, it seems that CNT intends a robust appropriation of semeiotic. That manner of framing CNT epistemology, were it to be developed in
detail, would draw deeply from Peirce’s thought. If Peirce’s philosophy entails a PEM bias, it is
reasonable to suppose that the incorporation of semeiotic would make CNT vulnerable to that
bias as well. If realized, a PEM bias would risk CNT coherence, given the correlation of CNT
with CT (recall from chapter two).
Introducing Theosemiotic
To assess this risk, this inquiry engages an experimental development and application of
CNT epistemology according to a robust Peircean, semeiotic framework. Michael L. Raposa
provides guidance on the elements of Peirce’s thought salient to the semeiotic structure alluded
to by McGrath. In his seminal book, Peirce’s Philosophy of Religion, Raposa coined the term
“theosemiotic” to refer to a “framework” comprised of Peirce’s concepts that function together
as a method of natural theology.5 Theosemiotic follows Peirce in conceiving of all of reality as a
great mind, sharing the general characteristics of thought, “Peirce portrayed thought as consisting
‘in the living inferential metaboly of symbols whose purport lies in conditional general resolutions to act.’”6 So, Peirce’s conception of thought is also “a useful characterization of any philosophical theology conceived as theosemiotic.”7 That is, theosemiotic method holds that theology—like any other form of thinking, of inquiring into the truth of things—results in certain
kinds of practices. Raposa writes,
From a theosemiotic perspective...theology...is to be classified as a practical science, a
mode of reflection the ultimate purpose of which is the guiding of human actions. Some
Raposa, PPR, 148, 144. Raposa, Theosemiotic, summarizes and extends his life’s work of developing his
theosemiotic theory.
5

6

Raposa, Theosemiotic, 3, quoting Peirce, CP 5.402, note 3.
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145
of these actions will be therapeutic, some liberating in a more broadly political and social
sense, once again, with no sharp line to be drawn in order to distinguish between them. In
either case, the concern is to enhance human agency...the constraints on human agency
consist primarily in constraints on attention, resulting from the fact that we are embodied
creatures, occupying a certain temporal and spatial location, enmeshed in diverse relationships, governed by laws, living in communities, affiliated with various institutions,
and so on.8
A core belief of theosemiotic is that theory and practice are related as sign and interpretation.
That is, Peirce’s theory of inquiry, pragmaticism, explains theory and practice in terms of a semeiotic continuum.9 Raposa poignantly expresses this continuum, writing, “we struggle to interpret what lies most deeply ‘hidden in the icon,’ and so to signify the mystery encountered
therein, always mostly failing, but sometimes being grasped by it, graced by it, becoming its
sign, and so embodying...a tiny fragment of its meaning.”10 What one vaguely perceives as “hidden” in the sign, one is impelled to interpret through embodying something of that quality,
though it is bound to be imperfect. Such embodiment, per theosemiotic, entails that one has
adopted as one’s own habits of thought, what is consistent with one’s perception of the object of
the sign. These habits inevitably manifest in conduct, which Peirce theorized could be feelings,
actions, or ideas.
How does pragmaticism structure the continuum between belief and behavior? The basic
semeiotic perspective of pragmaticism is evident when Raposa writes,
From the vantage point supplied by Peirce’s theosemiotic, the world is ‘perfused with
signs.’ Conceived as semiosis, our human experience of the world is always a matter of
interpretation; even the simplest perceptual judgments take the form of interpretive inferences, albeit often ones that are unconscious and not subject to immediate self-control...Finally, human beings are themselves properly to be regarded as complex symbols,
with interactions between them consisting at least partially in acts of reading.11
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The three parts of that statement imply a pragmaticist structure for theosemiotic that becomes explicit later in Raposa’s book: the world perfused with signs, experience as interpretation, and
symbolic interaction as reading. The three major movements of theosemiotic theory begin with
the basic perspective that humans live in a “world perfused with signs.” Therefore, the second
movement follows; that engagement with and within such a world often relies on interpreting
signs. Theosemiotic holds that Peirce’s sign theory explains how that works. Finally, that engagement includes the interpreting subject in a dialogic process of “reading.” Raposa conceives
this intersubjective reading in terms of praxis—according to a pragmaticist understanding of beliefs according to their practical manifestations—is truly the heartbeat of theosemiotic as Raposa
presents it. Praxis rests upon the belief that “fruits” manifest the “roots.” It is no accident that
this language brings to mind Jesus’ statement that false teachers would be known by their
“fruits” (Matt. 7:19). This teaching from Jesus was part of Peirce’s inspiration for pragmaticism.12 Accordingly, then, pragmaticism aligns with praxis—perhaps, in fact, is a form of
praxis—because of its belief that the “best interpretation” of any sign (including religious ones)
is “embodied in...disciplined conduct.”13 That is, what one believes to be the meaning of the sign
will manifest inevitably as habits of one’s behavior.
The present experiment brings this theosemiotic framework into dialogue with—indeed,
a “rereading” of—McGrath’s CNT theory.14 “Reading” is a salient term in Raposa’s

Raposa, PPR, 82, writes, “Peirce identified his theory of meaning as ‘an application of the sole principle
of logic that was recommended by Jesus; “Ye may know them by their fruits”’ (CP 5.402, note 2). But these fruits
need to be regarded in a collective sense as ‘the achievement of the whole people.’”
12
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Raposa, Theosemiotic, 149.
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Ibid., 10. The use of Raposa’s key word “rereading” indicates the asymmetrical nature of this “dialogue.”
For the purposes of this experiment—namely, the reification of potential PEM bias via the influence of semeiotic—
it is necessary to exaggerate the influence of theosemiotic upon CNT. That is where theosemiotic contacts CNT,
theosemiotic is given the defining role. This is open to the “straw man” objection; that the imbalance should favor
CNT instead, such that CNT redefines comparable aspects of theosemiotic. However, the aim is to test how a robust

147
theosemiotic to express the sense of pragmaticist interpretation. When the concept is understood
in its theoretical context, “reading” is less of a metaphor for interpretation than a description of
the process. Perhaps one’s common sense is that interpreters engage a sign, such as a written
text, through an intellectual process of deciding what the various words—distinct symbols—
mean within the context of one another. That is, “reading” in this sense names a synthetic process of making sense of a collection of signs. Or, perhaps one may say that a text one reads is a
complex sign consisting of some number of other signs whose contextual situation communicates an author’s meaning. Peirce—and so theosemiotic—would not disagree with this, except to
say that it barely scratches the surface of what is going on in the interpretive process of a textual
symbol.
Theosemiotic highlights Peirce’s semeiotic concept of personality in a theosemiotic theory of reading, of pragmaticist interpretation.15 Recall from the previous chapter that Peirce considered the common sense of a “person” as consisting of the essential properties of a symbol.
Now, “symbol” must here be taken in Peirce’s sense of a sign marked by Thirdness, whose relation between object and representamen—the manner in which the representamen represents its
object—is marked by a sort of law. The law governing a symbol is just a general idea determining the arc of a symbol’s personality, or character, some pattern of regularity relatively consistent
throughout the life of the sign.16 This receives further consideration below when working out
how Peirce’s concept of persons as symbols enriches the idea that interpretations conform to

Peircean semeiotic affects CNT with respect to PEM. By privileging theosemiotic for this experiment, this inquiry
hopes to preserve Peirce’s semeiotic theory in applying it to the interests of CNT.
15
Raposa prefers to discuss this aspect in terms of the symbolic “self” rather than “person.” This respects
the anthropomorphic nuance of Peirce’s thought without slipping into anthropocentrism. On this distinction in
Peirce, cf., Raposa, Theosemiotic, 92. On Raposa’s treatment of the “symbolic self,’” cf., e.g., ibid., 43. Keeping this
in mind, for the present this discussion will proceed using “person,” since it has established that background already.
16

Cf., ibid., 37.
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certain habits of thought. For the present, observe that a Peircean account of reading entails that
the reader is also a symbol, being a person whose manner of life manifests certain characteristic
habits of behavior.17 A theosemiotic conception of “reading,” therefore, holds that the common
sense as readers of texts may be expressed as the engagement of one symbol by another. A symbol is thus “read” by another. Moreover, the engagement is of a dialogical nature.18 While one
symbol reads the other, the first symbol is also read by the other. The point to be made here is
that theosemiotic “reading” occurs as “symbolic engagement” in which meaning is pursued by
paying attention to how one as a symbol is affected by the symbol one engages.19
Overview of Experimental Method
Peirce conceived inquiry as a process involving three modes of thought: abduction (also,
“retroduction”), deduction, and induction. Theosemiotic embraces these enthusiastically as three
“phases” of the process of inquiry, just as Peirce theorized in his own explanation of semeiotic
theological method in “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God” (EP2:440-42).20 Although, Raposa is careful to state that they are phases only in an analytical sense. One abstracts
them in turn from the inquiry process to consider that aspect of the process in more detail.21 Yet,
thought as such—and, so, inquiry as a thinking process, consists of all three modes of thinking
working together constantly. Even so, three phases of pragmaticist inquiry distinguish

17

Raposa, Theosemiotic, 37.

18

Ibid., 71. Recently, Kevin Vanhoozer has advocated for the importance of genuine dialogue in the course
of theological work, although he does not mention Peirce’s theory; Vanhoozer, Remythologizing, xvi.
The phrase “symbolic engagement” is borrowed from Robert Neville’s Peircean approach to comparative
theology without intending any allusion to that project. On which, cf., Robert Cummings Neville, On the Scope and
Truth of Theology: Theology as Symbolic Engagement (A&C Black, 2006), in which he sets forth his Peircean
methodology for his larger “Philosophical Theology” project.
19

20

Raposa, PPR, 143.

21

Raposa, Theosemiotic, 5, 113.
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themselves in their respective contributions to the process of inquiry. The abductive phase produces hypotheses to account for facts, experiences that one may not fully understand. Something
catches one’s interest and the mind naturally infers some way of explaining it. As a hypothesis it
is not the answer, but the beginning of inquiry. The deductive phase then works with that hypothesis as though it is true. Deduction explicates implications that follow from that. The inductive
phase tests the hypothesis by seeking experiential confirmation—or lack thereof—of the outcomes deduced in the previous phase. These basic phases of inquiry frame the present experiment, since the idea is to read CNT from the perspective of theosemiotic. That is, a theosemiotic
interpretation of CNT would follow its own method, so the present reading attempts to do so
here.
Since pragmaticist interpretation is conceived as symbolic engagement, it must begin
with the engagement of the relevant symbols. Generally, this is marked by the practice of “musement.” Musement is Peirce’s term for a certain sort of attention one pays to signs one seeks to
understand.22 In “A Neglected Argument,” Peirce describes musement as something one does
somewhat intentionally, but also playfully as one let’s one’s mind wander on some matter. In
Peirce’s case, the muser considers the natural order while on an evening stroll (CP 6.458). There
is a level of discipline in that one maintains thought upon the general subject, but not in a way
that seeks to control that process or direct it in any way. In terms of pragmaticist inquiry, this is a
stage marked by abductive inference as the imagination is fully and creatively engaged. Since the
present experiment concerns symbols in the form of texts McGrath has written explaining his vision for CNT, the method will be musement upon the relevant texts. A simpler way to express

22

Raposa, Theosemiotic, 115.
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this step is to use a phrase familiar to biblical exegetes, reading a text in its “plain sense.”23 Peter
Ochs, another Peirce scholar working out how to appropriate pragmaticism for theological
method, uses the concept of a “plain sense” reading precisely for the abductive work of musement on a written text that this experiment requires.24 This initial symbolic engagement with the
plain sense of McGrath’s CNT oeuvre should yield some number of responses from the theosemiotic perspective. A brief description of those responses follow that plain sense musement,
without yet trying to understand what they mean, since meaning, on pragmaticism, results from
engagement in the inquiry process.
Those abductive responses from musement on the plain sense of CNT supply the objects
for further consideration in the theosemiotic inquiry. This experiment will take each of these in
turn, thinking through them until defining a form of their idea recognizable in the later search for
experiential evidence of their meaning. The distinctive pragmaticist phases will be evident during the experiment process. Let their general description here suffice to inform the reader of their
presence in the method followed below. That is, taking one of the abductive responses the process of inquiry pursues the question, “Why is a theosemiotic mind responding to this part of
CNT?” On theosemiotic, the answer to the question will lead to a growing sense for the meaning
of a theosemiotic form of CNT, which this experiment will call “Christian theosemiotic.”25 In
terms of the inquiry process, the first step is to hypothesize what the relevant concepts or values

23
Cf., e.g.,Mordechai Z. Cohen, The Rule of Peshat: Jewish Constructions of the Plain Sense of Scripture
and Their Christian and Muslim Contexts, 900-1270 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2020).

Ochs, Logic of Scripture, 6. Ochs’ work provides an alternative to Raposa’s theosemiotic method.
However, the aims of the present project prefer Raposa whose conception of theosemiotic stays quite close to
Peirce’s methods and concepts. Ochs’ method, which he calls “pragmatic method of interpretation and repair,”
incorporates Ochs’ own interpretation of Peirce within the primary structure of his methodology. However, Ochs
provides the method of choice for the project to follow this one, the task of which will be to repair CNT
epistemology according to a version of Peirce’s pragmaticism for which the PEM bias has been removed.
24

25

Raposa, PPR, 144; ibid., Theosemiotic, 236.
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would be if fully conformed to theosemiotic. This requires first clarifying the CNT and theosemiotic ideas (a deductive move).26 Then, in an imaginative use of deductive reasoning (therefore nearly as abductive as deductive) the next step describes that hypothesis of the resulting idea
of a Christian theosemiotic. This process repeats for each of the theosemiotic responses to the
plain sense reading of CNT.
Since deductive conclusions are imagined as if the hypothesis is true, to gain a better
sense for authenticity requires the inductive phase. That is, are these hypotheses true to Peirce’s
theosemiotic? If so, then those deductions should lead to the conception of outcomes that bear a
real resemblance to what one will find in the experience of putting Peirce’s theories into practice.
The inductive phase of pragmaticist inquiry requires testing the hypothesis in lived, experimental
experience. Normally, that would involve designing experiments for the purpose of testing the
hypothesis, that is, to see whether the practice of the hypothesis yields the sorts of results described in the deductive step. However, since Robert Neville has spent his theological career experimentally bringing Peirce’s ideas to bear on questions in Christian theology, his experience
documented in his many writings serves that inductive purpose of this inquiry.27 Locating instances of the ideas of a hypothetical Christian theosemiotic in Neville’s prolific work in pragmatic philosophical theology will demonstrate his relevance to this inquiry.28 Then, evidence that

This mimics Peter Ochs’ move to “deeper plain sense reading” in his distinct method; cf., Ochs, Logic of
Scripture, 165.
26

27
Lisanne Winslow has recently published a work holding forth a theology of nature according to
McGrath’s CNT vision. She brings together McGrath’s insights with those of Emil Brunner and Jonathan Edwards
in Lisanne Winslow, A Trinitarian Theology of Nature (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2020). Winslow’s
work participates in the general orbit of theosemiotic. Edwards provides a way for her to speak of the semiotics of
nature in its function as divine communication. She does not discuss Peirce, however. Recall that Raposa identifies
Edwards as among several American thinkers contributing to a larger theosemiotic tradition that includes Peirce but
does not depend upon his ideas. Cf., Raposa’s chapter “A Brief History of Theosemiotic,” in Raposa, Theosemiotic,
15-42.

Neville’s entire career provides relevant material regarding Christian theosemiotic. Since he has recently
published a magnum opus embodying a mature statement of his life’s work, the present inquiry draws primarily
28
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the three PEM criteria are present in Neville’s case of a Christian theosemiotic answers the question motivating this dissertation. The experiment now begins with a plain sense reading of
McGrath’s CNT theory.
Plain Sense Reading of CNT
McGrath’s CNT writings aim to retrieve a “thick” conception of natural theology, which
takes orthodox Christian doctrine as its starting point (RI 24, 22; OS 246). He holds that a critical-realist epistemology warrants beginning with the Christian framework as a hypothetical
means of interpreting natural phenomena (OS 327; FT 27). That is, while there is an objective
reality grounding one’s perception in the experience of some thing, the larger significance of the
thing is ambiguous. There is a need for some subjective “key” to interpret the meaning of nature.
McGrath writes, “Nature does not coerce us evidentially into any specific ‘clear and distinct
ideas’ (Descartes) concerning its meaning or significance. It can be argued to be consistent with
atheism, agnosticism, and theism—but entails none of them. The meaning of nature must be unlocked using a key which nature itself does not supply,” (RI 33). Therefore, those who would understand the meaning of natural phenomena must bring some interpreting framework to the experience (RI 71-74; OS 298; FT 27). An interpreter’s framework, according to McGrath, is some
“habitus” by which one makes sense of the world. A habitus, formed by the influence of one’s
social context, produces a schema representing the world as one sees it (RI 28-30, 70). These
schemas vary in explanatory cogency. Within the conventions of arguing by inference to the best
explanation (IBE), McGrath holds that CNT explanations of natural signs will be more cogent
than non-Christian alternatives (RI 98, 178; OS 442). This method turns, of course, upon an

from the four volumes of that “Philosophical Theology” project. For bibliographical information on these works, see
the section discussing Neville’s work below.
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authentic Christian way of seeing the natural world. McGrath calls such a definitive Christian
schema the “Christian imaginarium.” In this way McGrath refers to an imagination transformed
by the Holy Spirit in accordance with the core beliefs of the great Christian tradition (RI 43, 51,
52; 35, 36).29 He holds that this Christian perspective—being defined by the self-revelation of
the Creator—is grounded in the root of all truth, beauty, and goodness in nature (RI 154; FT 28).
Therefore, IBE arguments constructed according to this perspective will be compelling even to
non-Christians, given that human nature has proven to have an attraction to these values wherever they might be found (OS 478, 5469).
While a critical realist epistemology is taken as justification for CNT’s adoption of IBE
methodology for natural theology arguments, McGrath looks to Peirce’s semeiotic for help to explain how the Christian imaginarium determines Christian interpretations of nature.30 McGrath
writes that semeiotic supplies a “framework” by which cultural and natural signs are correlated.
This is because semeiotic explains “the creative and constructive role of the individual thinker in
creating patterns of associations” between certain phenomena and certain responses to them (RI
96). This explanation dovetails with critical realism in the concept of habitus. That is, semeiotic
shares the belief that one’s interpretation of some experience forms to a great degree according
to the influence of habits already inherent in one’s imagination. At the same time, semeiotic
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On which, cf., Appendix B.

In The Open Secret, McGrath defines critical realism as a view “which affirms both the existence of an
extra-mental reality and the active, constructive role of the observer in representing and interpreting it...critical
realism insists that human thought is constrained and informed by an engagement with an external reality.” Applied
to CNT, McGrath (OS 370-79) writes, “our approach insists that the human attempt to make sense of things is
shaped by the way things actually are.” Though it appears from McGrath’s account that critical realism generally
does not explain how perception and experiment have access to the fact and structures of the objective reality being
studied, critical realism emphasizes that this is the case. Further, McGrath highlights that his preferred form of
critical realism advocates that reality is “stratified,” such that various scientific disciplines conform their methods to
their distinctive objects; cf., Alister E. McGrath, The Science of God: An Introduction to Scientific Theology (A&C
Black, 2004), 141, 147. For McGrath’s more detailed discussions of critical realism theories, cf., McGrath, Reality,
195-244.
30
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explains that interpretations also depend upon a grounding relation to the reality of their object
(RI 95). This objective grounding of the sign occurs due to triadic action, which sets semeiotic
apart from the semiology of Saussure.31 This entire critical realist dynamic occurs in the function
of the interpretant in semiosis. So, McGrath’s discussion of semeiotic focuses on Peirce’s conception of the interpretant.
Because they are triadically related to the originating object of the sign, McGrath writes
that interpretants can be conceived as “translations” of the original sign, in that they “develop”
the understanding of the object to which the sign is related (RI 95). This development and translation occur because of the influence of the interpreter’s habits of imagination—i.e., their habitus—upon interpretant formation. In semeiotic terms, then, the Christian imaginarium constitutes
the set of interpretive habits distinctive to Christians as such. The result is that Christian interpretations of natural signs are marked by characteristically Christian qualities, such as love, mercy,
and hope. Additionally, Peirce theorized that interpretants can take three basic forms: emotional,
energetic, and logical. Therefore, CNT interpreters of nature may represent a Christian perspective on the world aesthetically or through their actions as well as through conceptual propositions
(RI 95).
That is where McGrath moves on from Peirce as a resource for CNT theory. McGrath’s
greater interest for semeiotic is its application to the way communities function in training
individuals in their interpretive habits. For this McGrath looks to Josiah Royce, who developed
Peirce’s pragmaticist conception of the inquiry community into a theology of the Christian
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Cf., n3 above.
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“community of interpretation,” (RI 96).32 McGrath understands Royce to have theorized the
interpretive community as being defined by shared interpretive habits, which McGrath calls the
Christian imaginarium. So, McGrath understands Royce’s concept of community “loyalty” as
community members maintaining common “interpretive traditions,” (RI 96-97). For the purposes
of CNT, McGrath proposes that the Christian community of interpretation should seek to
conform its imaginarium to the signum crucis. McGrath holds that this sign pertains to the
vagueness of the natural world at the same time that it defines the self-revelation of God. It just
is a definitive sign of the revelatory utility of the natural world, notwithstanding the world’s
ambiguity, even its evils. McGrath holds that Christian communities can do this because the
habitus forms according to that on which the community constantly attends in its practices.
Consequently, McGrath argues that the Church’s sacramental practices, for example, train the
community in the Christian imaginarium defined by the signum crucis (RI 97-100). Bringing
these things together, then, it is evident that McGrath holds forth semeiotic as the explanatory
framework justifying the strategic development of the Christian imaginarium through attention
to the signum crucis. That semeiotic framework consists of Peirce’s theory of interpretantformation according to habits of thinking, which are themselves formed according to the
interpreter’s developmental context.
A mind whose habits of thought are determined according to theosemiotic would respond
to this plain text representation of CNT at six points. From a theosemiotic perspective,
strategically using the Christian framework as the interpretive lens as though nature in itself is
absolutely ambiguous calls for interpretive dialogue. Also, theosemiotic would respond that
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Recall that a salient aspect of pragmaticism is the notion that meaning is discovered in the long-run
experience of a community of inquirers who are such because of their common interest in getting to the truth of the
matter.
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abductive argumentation in the form of musement has greater cogency than constructed IBE
arguments. A theosemiotic mind would notice that Peirce’s semeiotic theory not only explains
the subjective, constructive aspect of perception. It also explains how that subjectivity is yet
influenced and formed over time by the objective reality inherent in the sign. Similarly,
theosemiotic would object to the strategy of conceiving the interpretive habitus in static,
determinate terms, such as the Christian imaginarium, notwithstanding the relative vagueness
McGrath ascribes to the signum crucis. Further, the CNT conception of “community of
interpretation” would require adjustment, according to a theosemiotic perspective, in that
“loyalty” and community definition are to an undetermined Truth to be discovered rather than to
a prescribed habitus already defined. Finally, theosemiotic would have significant contributions
to make regarding the formation of the imaginarium via careful, constant, practical attention to
the signum crucis. These points of response serve this experiment as signs pointing the way
toward a theosemiotic interpretation of CNT. That path will emerge in the course of working out
a theosemiotic interpretation of each of these signs.
Theosemiotic Responses
CNT Starting Point. This first sign is McGrath’s claim that CNT is warranted to start
from the Christian imaginarium when offering interpretations of natural signs due to the great
ambiguity of nature.33 That is, “The meaning of nature must be unlocked using a key which nature itself does not supply,” (RI 33). Consequently, some sort of “framework” is necessary for
subjects to discern ways in which natural phenomena are meaningful.34 Therefore, for CNT,

In this respect, CNT’s approach appears to accord well with Reformed Epistemology’s concept of
warranted “basic beliefs”; cf., Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press,
2000).
33

34

RI 71-72, 74, McGrath explains that the ambiguity of nature results from its great complexity, bearing
both “good” and “evil” aspects simultaneously. Interpreters of nature must choose a way of “seeing [nature] as”
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“Natural theology is understood to be the action of ‘seeing’ nature from a specifically Christian
perspective.”35 McGrath describes CNT’s use of the Christian schema as an interpretive framework reifying nature’s profound meaning as follows:
The grand themes of the Christian faith provide an interpretive framework by which nature may be seen in profound and significant ways. The web of Christian theology is the
elixir, the philosopher’s stone, which turns the mundane into the epiphanic, the world of
nature into the realm of God’s creation. Like a lens bringing a vast landscape into sharp
focus, or a map helping us grasp the features of the terrain around us, the Christian vision
of reality offers a new way of understanding, imagining, and behaving. It invites us to see
the natural order, and ourselves within it, in a special way—a way that might be hinted at,
but cannot be confirmed by, the natural order itself (RI 35-36).
The CNT claim taken as a sign for theosemiotic engagement here is, more specifically, since nature does not supply its own framework, its own interpretive key, “we are free to choose the
manner in which we see nature, forcing us to identify the best way of beholding the natural
world,” (FT 27).36 In sum, then, the CNT sign is that nature’s ambiguity leaves interpreters “free
to choose” the framework by which to construct hypotheses of nature’s meaning.
Peirce’s theosemiotic way of speaking of nature’s ambiguity, on the other hand, emphasizes the concept of vagueness. Recall that this is the idea that there is a degree of definition that
nevertheless remains underdetermined. Regarding the theosemiotic starting point vagueness has
the form of the underdetermined sense that the cosmos is God’s “great poem,” that all of nature

consistent with some schema. This is especially true for perceiving theological meaning in nature. According to
McGrath, nature is “theologically opaque,” a problem which might be resolved “using the device of framing,” (RI
77). For example, judging some aspect of nature as evil is “not an empirical notion; it represents the interpretation of
empirical observations from the standpoint of a theory,” (RI 74).
This is to set forth a plausible view of nature according to Christianity’s “distinct notions of God, nature,
and human agency, (FT 27; refers to Open Secret, 1-7, 12-14, 171-216 [pages not Kindle location]). Here the
theoretical structure of CNT draws upon the five core theological beliefs discussed earlier. That is, those five
diagram the “specifically Christian perspective.”
35
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McGrath cites McGrath, Open Secret, 7-10, 147-56 (these refer to pages rather than to Kindle location).
This way of putting it seems to stand in tension with McGrath’s core theoretical belief that CNT holds to a “‘critical
realist’ epistemology,” according to which, “the human attempt to make sense of things is shaped by the way things
actually are,” even as human minds are also actively involved to structure their “vision of reality,” (OS 372).
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is a sort of “book” of divine authorship.37 Importantly, the concept of the divine author of that
book is vague, too, in stark contrast to CNT’s desire to define “God” with Christian specificity.38
Instead, for theosemiotic, the sense of divine authorship is recognized as a metaphor for the experience of beauty in encounters with natural phenomena.39 On theosemiotic, this experience of
beauty represents a vague sense for the entire teleology of the cosmos. That is, there is an indefinite perception of the summum bonum to which all of reality is somehow destined.40 Moreover,
that end is grounded in the originating “No-thing,” the theoretical state of absolute potentiality.41
In other words, theosemiotic sees the cosmos in semeiotic terms as a “living inferential
metaboly of symbols” whose results are found in “conditional general resolutions to act.” Recall
from Peirce’s semeiotic that signs are vague, such that semiosis is a continuous process of defining their meaning.42 As a continuous process, then, Peirce’s fallibilism also comes into view.
That is, interpretations of signs always to some degree fall short of the objective reality they represent.43 This process of definition is the process of interpretation, in which subjective and objective elements work together to explore a range of possibilities grounded in the object of the sign.
As a grand sign of the divine Mind, then, the cosmos and its many levels of interacting semeioses are related like topological continua grounded ultimately in the divine Mind.44

Raposa, Theosemiotic, ix, 16; also, ibid., PPR, 144, “This is the essence of a theosemiotic. The universe
is God's great poem, a living inferential metaboly of symbols.”
37

Raposa, Theosemiotic, 87; recalls Peirce’s “claim that there cannot be ‘a more adequate way’ of
understanding the cause or creator of the universe ‘than as vaguely like a man’ (CP 5.536).”
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Raposa, Theosemiotic, 15.
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Ibid., 21, 172.
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Raposa, PPR, 150; ibid., Theosemiotic, 25, 39.
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Raposa, Theosemiotic, 39.
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Ibid., 93-94. Consequently, the common sense of the world as “God’s great poem” may—on
theosemiotic—turn out to be false. Cf., ibid., PPR, 148.
44
Raposa, PPR, 144. Recall from the previous chapter, discussion of Peirce’s blackboard illustration of
synechism and objective idealism.
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Therefore, a “religious naturalism” is manifest in Peirce’s theosemiotic.45 This brings together salient theories pertaining to Peirce’s semeiotic metaphysics. First of all, the vast continuum of signs grounded in the divine Mind is familiar from Peirce’s objective idealism. A multitude of interrelated orders of ideas constitute all of reality, from mere general qualities such as
beauty to the generality of material facts, such as mountain ranges.46 Accordingly, then, Peirce’s
“extreme realism” is implicated in the reality of ideas and, indeed, of semiotic relations. This indicates, further, Peirce’s Agapism, according to which cosmic semeiosis is determined ultimately
by divine purposes of Love. Given the reality of such ideas, then, the facts of the cosmos embody
these purposes, constituting signs of those purposes.47 Hence, Peirce’s anthropomorphism.48 As
it relates to the vagueness of nature and the role of the subject in interpreting nature, Peirce held
that human minds are able to perceive—albeit vaguely—the purposes embodied in the realities
encountered in experience. Religious experiences of natural phenomena result from perceiving
the beauty of the purposes pertaining the nature’s divine teleology. Hence, the theoretical starting
point of the cosmos as a “great poem” of “God.” The theosemiotic idea, then, is that the vagueness of Signs invites interpretive engagement with them. In the process of that engagement, interpreters perceive divine ideas embodied in natural facts. This leads to the growth of religious
significance of natural Signs and the growth of religious meaning as interpreters begin to also
embody those ideas.
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Raposa, Theosemiotic, 120-21, 146.
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Recall that matter itself is, per Peirce, “effete mind.”

47

Raposa, Theosemiotic, 236.

Ibid., 88-89, that “the whole of nature can be read as religiously meaningful...is possible at all only given
the premises supplied by Peirce’s semiotic realism; and it is against this same background that his anthropomorphism should be conceived and understood.” Also, ibid., 189, describes Peirce’s anthropomorphism, “as humans we
have evolved within the womb and at the bosom of the universe as it really is. We are subtly but decisively attuned
to it as a result of his natural evolutionary process.”
48
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How would the theosemiotic complex of ideas regarding nature’s religiously significant
vagueness redefine (“reread”) the CNT conception that nature is ambiguous in such a way that
interpreters rightly choose their own frame, such as the Christian imaginarium? A Christian theosemiotic would view nature as not so strongly ambiguous as CNT holds. Also, Christian theosemiotic would temper McGrath’s language of choosing one’s starting point, since one is not
free at all to choose one’s interpretive habits (except in a Peircean sense of the “self-controlled”
development of such habits, on which see below). Consequently, Christian theosemiotic would
take seriously the Christian imaginarium from which Christian interpreters of nature must rightly
begin. That habitus would be granted status as a semeiotic complex nested within the fabric of
semeiotic continua comprising all of reality. That is, the Christian habitus stands, according to
theosemiotic, as a sign somehow representing the much more vague reality. Further, notwithstanding Christianity’s specific claims about how to define the “somehow” of this representation
(e.g., CT’s definition of “Creator”), a Christian theosemiotic would insist that this definition of
the nature of its representation is also only vaguely a sign of the underlying objective reality of
the sign. In terms of a “book” or a “great poem,” Christian natural theology constitutes a chapter
or a stanza playings its part for the beauty and meaning of the whole. The meaning of the whole
depends upon its end result. A Christian theosemiotic claims no warrant to assert its definitive
priority over alternative views. Such a claim can only be established from the perspective of the
end.
A general effect of theosemiotic upon CNT is the transposition of CNT’s conception of
meaning to one of increasing vagueness. Rather than CNT’s vision of arguing for its views as definitive of the truth, a Christian theosemiotic would hold its own Christian definitions of natural
signs as vague representations of an even more vague reality. This is to deny the plain sense
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claims of the Christian signs, since as signs they claim to define the self-revelation of the “SelfRevealing God.”49 In other words, theosemiotic would relativize the theological significance of
Christianity’s signs. As Raposa observes, theosemiotic tends to generalize theology. He shows
that the theosemiotic tradition manifests this even among those treating natural signs from a
Christian perspective.50 Christianity somehow discloses something of the ultimate reality behind
religious experiences of nature, but a Christian theosemiotic grants the same status to all such experience. The limit of theological generalization, per theosemiotic, is that it must maintain a
vague theism, in that “God” somehow represents some personality marked by beauty, goodness,
and truth.51 A Christian theosemiotic, then, must confront the challenge of how to understand its
own signs within the context of the complex of all religious signs.
From the Raposan theosemiotic perspective adopted for this project it is striking that
McGrath justifies the Christian imaginarium framework for natural theology on the ground that
nature’s theological opacity leaves interpreters free to postulate their starting point. Where CNT
speaks of the “ambiguity” of nature, theosemiotic speaks of its vagueness. Semeiotic vagueness
nevertheless entails that interpreters learn the habits for interpreting the Sign from engagement
with the Sign. For a Christian theosemiotic, this means that the Christian imaginarium is a starting point determined by the Christian theologian’s experiences of nature prior to CNT inquiry.

49

Recall this core theological belief of CNT.

Raposa, Theosemiotic, 38-39, on the “radical monotheism” evident in some exemplars included in the
theosemiotic tradition; viz., Jonathan Edwards, Josiah Royce, Peirce, and H. Richard Niebuhr. Note that Raposa
does not claim that Jonathan Edwards is directly linked somehow to Peirce, or vice versa. Raposa’s point is that the
history of American theology bears a theosemiotic element in some of its thinkers. Royce, of course, intentionally
worked from Peirce’s ideas, and Niebuhr was influenced by Peirce through Royce, but also by theosemiotic more
generally through Edwards, according to Raposa’s account.
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Raposa, Theosemiotic, 89-90.
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IBE as Abductive Strategy. Theosemiotic also responds to the form of abductive argumentation McGrath envisions for natural theology. CNT makes the modest claim that “this approach to natural theology holds that nature reinforces an existing belief in God through the resonance between observation and theory,” (OS 459). That is, “The specific cognitive aspects of
natural theology are affirmed, [namely,] as showing the capacity of the Christian faith to make
sense of what is observed…em-phasiz[ing] resonance…not set[ting] out to prove any core element of that faith from an appeal to nature,” (FT 28; refers to OS 15-18, 232-60).52 Yet, CNT
seeks more than to demonstrate resonance in its desire to engage in its dialogue with science by
arguing according to inference to the best explanation (IBE). That McGrath advocates an IBE
approach is clear when discussing his vision for the apologetics potential of CNT. In that mode,
CNT asks, “‘does the Christian theoria … “a way of seeing things” – make the best sense of
what we experience within us, and observe in the natural world around us?’” Also in this context,
McGrath appeals to Peirce’s concept of abduction, Peirce’s theory of hypothesis-formation. That
is, McGrath claims warrant to posit Christian theology as an explanatory hypothesis for various
natural phenomena, since if such a God exists it would explain many things (RI 178).53 This retrieves an older approach to natural theology in the history of Christian theology, which shows
“that ‘naturalist’ accounts of the natural world and the achievements of the natural sciences are
intrinsically deficient, and that a theological approach is required to give a comprehensive and
coherent interpretation of the natural order,” (RI 20).

The fourth of McGrath’s six natural theology models aims to demonstrate “analogy or intellectual
resonance between the human experience of nature on the one hand, and of the Christian gospel on the other,” (RI
20). It “affirm(s) the rationality of an existing faith” rather than proposing that faith’s necessity due to the given
facts of nature.
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When describing the cogency of CNT claims, McGrath (OS 442) appeals to IBE criteria (economy,
scope, elegance, and fruitfulness) discussed by John C. Polkinghorne, Science and the Trinity: the Christian
Encounter with Reality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). For a more detailed treatment of this topic by
McGrath, see his recent work, McGrath, Territories of Human Reason.
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Given the divine self-revelation contained in the Christian imaginarium, especially in the
signum crucis, McGrath holds that CNT’s abductive argumentation would prove far superior to
alternative views. He writes, “nature is here interpreted as an ‘open secret’—a publicly accessible entity, whose true meaning is known only from the standpoint of the Christian faith,” (OS
442).54 Christian natural theology works from the basic belief that in Jesus the divine creator was
incarnate to redeem the natural order from the corruption of sin (OS 408). Just as “the figure of
Jesus of Nazareth can be argued to be both the foundation and criterion of Christian theology”
generally, Jesus is also the key to a Christian natural theology (OS 4896). It is in the light of Jesus that the theological significance of nature becomes evident to one’s perception. So, CNT
holds that “the Christian imaginarium [is] an intellectual and imaginative framework which both
reaffirms the rational transparency and the inherent beauty of nature, and grounds these in the
deeper reality of a Trinitarian vision of God,” which is defined in light of Jesus of Nazareth (RI
154). This strategy has immediate cogency for human minds, whose nature it is to seek these values (truth, beauty, and goodness) in the world (OS 478; FT 28).55 Therefore, the basic CNT idea
here is that the strategy of abductive argument (IBE) according to the Christian imaginarium will
prove itself as a compelling perspective, since it will naturally bring to light the truth, beauty,
and goodness in nature to which human minds are drawn.

54

For example, a problem is how to reconcile the order and disorder present together in nature. In light of
the economy of salvation, “a Trinitarian engagement with nature is already marked with the sign of the cross and is
thus especially attentive to the problem of suffering in nature,” (FT 80). Therefore, CNT well accounts for disorder
as well as order. Expanded into a full abductive (IBE) argument, McGrath would say, the CNT view would present a
superior explanation of suffering in nature compared to scientific or other views, because the Christian hypothesis of
nature’s meaning in fact accords with the Creator’s revelation of nature’s religious meaning. On the signum crucis
as the locus of CNT’s cogency, RI 98.
55
McGrath envisions CNT as seeking to highlight where “truth, beauty, and goodness [are] evident in
nature in the light of Jesus Christ”; also, cf., OS 221-31.
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Abductive argumentation in the IBE sense does have a place in Peirce’s philosophical
system.56 However, IBE is not the most powerful form of abductive argument that Peirce theorized. In fact, theosemiotic rests upon the sort of abductive argument that Peirce himself applied
to the practice of natural theology. That is, musement is Peirce’s prescribed practice of abductive
meditation upon natural phenomena, and it is the beating heart of theosemiotic.57
Theosemiotic values musement, as did Peirce, as a powerful method of argument. Peirce
supplied a technical sense for the term “argument” as referring to the natural operation of the
mind in reasoning. In this sense, argument is synonymous with inference. One does not try to
make an argument in this sense, an argument simply happens as the mind responds naturally to
ideas. Peirce contrasts this with argumentation. An argumentation in Peirce’s sense is an effort to
communicate an idea from one mind to another. It is a complex strategy involving some number
of arguments. The classic form is syllogism: major premise, minor premise, conclusion. An argumentation proceeds, because its internal arguments draw the mind toward the conclusion. The
relevance to the present inquiry is that Peirce conceived of musement as a practice of abductive

Cf., K. T. Fann, Peirce’s Theory of Abduction (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1970), 41. Though
Peirce is best known for his careful attention to abduction in the sense of a perceptual inference, Fann discusses that
Peirce also theorized a sense of abduction as a mode of a posteriori inquiry. This accords with IBE in that abduction
in this inquiry form attempts to provide reasons why one hypothesis seems better than alternatives.
56

Peirce, “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God,” CP 6.458-65. Though much of what follows in
this clarification of the theosemiotic idea relates directly to what Peirce himself gives in that essay, this discussion
references Raposa. This is to establish that theosemiotic, according to Raposa, indeed follows Peirce’s strategic
appeal to the practice of musement in a way similar to McGrath’s strategic use of IBE.
57

Though musement does not factor in McGrath’s discussions of abductive reasoning in Re-Imagining
Nature, his earlier work shows that he is aware of this form of abductive argument. In FT 42-45, McGrath discusses
Peirce’s conception of musement in “A Neglected Argument” as Peirce’s abductive account of the natural human
tendency to infer God from natural signs. McGrath’s purpose for this discussion is to prepare the ground for the role
that “surprising facts” will play in his IBE approach later in the same work (on which, cf., FT 83-94). That is,
following Peirce, McGrath holds that CNT should direct its attention to scientific phenomena that are interesting due
to their “counterfactual” quality. The case-in-point in that work are the various cosmic features that appear to
suggest an “anthropic principle” operative somehow in the universe.
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argument.58 Musement, in other words, constitutes an aesthetic form of inquiry, which is no less
able to perceive truth than more familiar, discursive strategies.
Musement is a “playful” manner of meditating upon natural phenomena that catch one’s
attention.59 It is “disciplined” to an extent, because it maintains a general sort of focus. Also,
Peirce holds that its practice requires a mind having scientific habits. Not that one seeks to follow any path of inquiry or pursue any prescribed result, but that such a mind will naturally reason in an orderly and logical manner without interrupting the attitude particular to musement (CP
6.461). That attitude is a “childlike” openness to wonder. Raposa writes that musement entails
and restores, “A childlike freedom from bias, from well-entrenched, habitual modes of thought
and perception, a certain playfulness, and capacity for wonder even in the encounter with seemingly ordinary things—these are the qualities that make possible an appreciation of nature’s
beauty.”60 It requires the phenomenological skill of “discernment” (of seeing what is there).61
This requires that one maintain a degree of “detachment” from the object of one’s attention.62
This is accomplished in musement’s playfulness not to pursue any particular objective. Musement, as mentioned above, is a form of aesthetic thinking, because musement is drawn forward
through encounters with beauty.63 Therefore, musement proceeds according to the logic of

58
On Peirce’s distinction between argument and argumentation as terms, and Peirce’s identification of
musement as a form of argument, cf., CP 6.456, 465, 467.
59

Raposa, PPR, 151-52.

Raposa, Theosemiotic, 20. Freedom from “habitual modes of thought and perception,” in this context
refers to beliefs that normally act as leading principles of thought. Musement still involves the basic forms of
thinking, so a well trained mind will conduct its play experimentally entertaining beliefs not normally held by
moving through the mind’s customary logical manner. Peirce understood that normal, logical manner as the modes
of mind described in pragmaticism: abduction, deduction, induction.
60

“Phaneroscopy” is Peirce’s name for phenomenology. Peirce conceived of this as the practice of
perceiving the “phaneron,” which is all that is present to the mind at that moment. So, the discernment of musement
attends especially to what is in one’s mind, ibid., 192.
61

62

Raposa, Theosemiotic, 11.

63

Raposa, PPR, 144; ibid., Theosemiotic, 11, 17.
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abductive inference. Abductions are explanatory hypotheses arising instinctively in the moment
one encounters something one wants better to understand.64 That is, abductive inferences begin
the process of interpreting signs.65
As “argument” in this way, musement opens itself to be led by the nature of things to discover their truth. Musement is, therefore, a mode of natural theological inquiry that entrusts itself
to the inherent theological significance of natural facts. Again, Peirce’s anthropomorphism
claims that human minds are formed in such a way as to pick out “fragments” of meaning embodied in natural facts. Raposa offers as an example, that the laws of nature embody divine purposes.66 So, abductive inference perceives, vaguely, those divine thoughts. Musement leads one
to discover not just the explanatory hypothesis of a personal, immanent Creator. It also leads one
to discover that one believes this hypothesis; not as a result of discursive analysis, but as a matter
of discovering that one’s conduct begins to conform to such belief in God (CP 6.467).67 This is
because as musement picks out patterns of the divine mind embodied in natural facts, the inference of a divine personality becomes irresistable, according to Peirce.68 This is consistent with
the way one perceives any person. Furthermore, theosemiotic holds that abductive inference is
the way one perceives their own personality from patterns of behavior that embody that set of
mental habits unique to oneself.69
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Raposa, Theosemiotic, 116; ibid., PPR, 144.
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Raposa, PPR, 152.
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Raposa, Theosemiotic, 236; ibid., PPR, 144.
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Raposa, Theosemiotic, 66-67.

68
This was certainly Peirce’s claim in the NA, but Raposa does not wish to follow Peirce on that point. One
of the ways Raposa’s theosemiotic moves beyond Peirce is in its openness to non-theistic interpretations of natural
religious signs; cf., Raposa, Theosemiotic, 12, 76.
69

Ibid., 32.
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A Christian theosemiotic would still rest on Peirce’s theory of abductive inference for its
strategy of engaging the interpretation of nature. Rather than abductive inference in the form of
IBE argumentation, however, a Christian theosemiotic would prefer abductive inference as a
form of argument in the aesthetic practice of musement. Rather than constructing argumentations
to show the Christian imaginarium as a plausible explanatory hypothesis, Christian theosemioticians would practice the play of meditative musement upon some interesting natural phenomenon. Accordingly, there would be no prescribed program. There would be nothing prescribed at
all, except the general “rules” of the play of musement and the parameters that come naturally to
the phenemenon in question. But those parameters are only the starting point for musement,
which is allowed to follow whatever reasonable paths of thought accord with a scientifically
trained (i.e., logically ordered) mind. Importantly, the parameters of musement include the Christian imaginarium, which Christians naturally bring with them to the task. However, musement
entails bracketing that set of Christian beliefs, holding them “as though one does not hold them.”
The Christian theosemiotician allows the play of musement to follow the perception of beauty
beyond—or perhaps behind—the Christian Sign to the deeper levels of the signified reality; a
movement into increasing degrees of vagueness of meaning.70 A Christian theosemiotician
would trust the embodied divine purposes to eventually make themselves known through the
musement process of exploring the field of possibilities. In this experimental course of musement, the Christian theosemiotician would begin to perceive patterns in the things whose beauty
continues to draw them forward. These patterns would begin to have the feel of personality, familiar to the muser from their own experience in perceiving their own personality according to

70
The muser would indeed be drawn along by the sense of the beauty of the vague, divine ideas latent
somewhere in the phenomenon—indeed, “hidden in the icon.” Raposa, Theosemiotic, 5.

168
patterns manifest in their behavioral habits. The meaning of these patterns emerges as musement
translates them into behavioral habits in the muser’s own life. In this way the Christian theosemiotician embodies the divine beauty discovered in natural Signs, becoming likewise a natural
symbol of that divine beauty. The Christian theosemiotician in this way becomes conformed to
the personal image of God.
The abductive theory funding Christian theosemiotic method comes very close to manifesting a PEM ontology, arguably implying that nature embodies God. Without the definition
provided by Christian theology, “God” is necessarily quite vague. Even the sense of God’s personality can only be accounted for in the sense of the personality of any sign as a “self.”71 This
leaves theosemiotic religiously wide open. Only a strict atheism would be unavailable to the
muser as an interpretation of their sense of “God” in nature.72 Therefore, a Christian theosemiotic
interpretation of this CNT sign results in a powerful validation of the religious experience of nature. It affirms one’s sense of a grand unity and purpose for all things. However, a Christian theosemiotic would not insist on any particular definition of the reality causing the religious experience, such as the Christian imaginarium of CNT would offer.73 A Christian theosemiotic would
have to deny its own definitions of God to speak instead of a vague divine being, divine

71

Raposa, Theosemiotic, 36-37.
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Ibid., 76, 89-90.
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Theosemiotic includes musement as the primary mode of the process of inquiry that continues seeking a
more definite conception of the vague sense of “God” in nature. Such a process of definition develops through the
gradual addition of qualities as patterns of God’s identity emerge over time. However, theosemiotic holds that God
is not definitely known until the end, in the perfection of “reasonablness.” Even so, this vision of the process of
definition likely holds the key to a positive theosemiotic CNT. That is, there is here somehow a clue for a CNT
theosemiotic strategy that is able to affirm the Christian definition of “God.” This will be explored in a subsequent
project aimed at rereading theosemiotic according to CNT.
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principle, or “ultimate reality.”74 A Christian theosemiotic interpretation of this CNT sign, therefore, would only deliver belief in a vague religious naturalism.
Inference to the best explanation (IBE) is a method commonly used when trying to decide
among a range of plausible alternative hypotheses. Accordingly, there is great latitude granted
for positing prospective hypotheses, such as McGrath envisions doing with the Christian imaginarium. His hope is only to demonstrate the plausibility of the Christian hypothesis of the meaning of nature. In contrast, theosemiotic holds that musement is a more powerful form of abductive argument. Rather than merely inviting interlocutors to deliberately consider the Christian
perspective, Christian theosemiotic aims to lead Christians and all communities to a discovery of
the truth of nature’s religious significance through a disciplined practice of musement and community praxis.
Subjective Focus of Semeiotic Structure. A theosemiotic perspective also responds to
McGrath’s emphasis on the subjectivity of a semeiotic account of religious perception. From
McGrath’s comments on critical realist epistemology with respect to CNT, it is clear that he affirms the objective, “realist” aspect of that philosophy.75 There is no question that McGrath affirms the scientific common sense that the objects of scientific—i.e., empirical—inquiry are realities external to and independent of ourselves as perceiving subjects. Accordingly, one’s perceptions are about something other than one’s own ideas of it. Also, somehow those external, independent realities affect how one perceives them. This is why various sciences differ in their
methods. Their respective objects require different perceptual models and experimental

74
Religious naturalism in a Peircean form does not necessarily deny a supernatural definition of “God,”
such as Christianity holds. As discussed in the previous chapter, Peirce would only speak to the definition of “God”
to the extent that it was available in natural signs via scientific reasoning. Cf., the chapter “Scientific Theism,” in
Raposa, PPR, 7-34.
75

See n30 above.
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techniques. In McGrath’s CNT writings, comments on critical realism consistently state only the
basic definition, usually as he moves to discuss the subject’s constructive role in perception. Yet,
McGrath’s primary interest for CNT purposes clearly is the “critical” aspect of this realism. That
is, one’s perceptions of those real, external, independent objects are necessarily formed according to one’s own ideas accompanying one to the experience. One’s preconceptions, previous experiences, and the multitude of influences from one’s community context contribute to the form
of one’s perceptions. More than this, McGrath’s interest is on the active role imagination takes in
constructing perceptions. McGrath writes of the natural human desire “to make sense of things.”
This implies that often one’s initial sense is a question. One’s imagination immediately engages
the question, bringing to bear whatever resources are available in the storehouse of one’s experience and one’s contextual influences. Drawing upon theoretical resources supplied by Peirce’s
semeiotic, McGrath finds a ready structure to account for this subjective moment in perception.
Perception is a form of interpretation, and Peirce theorized that the interpretive movement of Signs belongs with the formation of the interpretant. McGrath introduces the concept of
the interpretant in the context of a brief discussion of Peirce’s triadic sign model. Though
McGrath does not elaborate, he mentions that interpretants relate to the object through the representamen. Consequently, interpretants develop and translate one’s understanding of the object
(RI 95). McGrath’s discussion emphasizes the subjectivity of interpretant formation, for example, when he writes, “The role of the interpretant highlights the creative and constructive role of
the individual thinker in creating patterns of association between stimuli and outcomes,” (RI 9596, emphasis added). Further, McGrath holds that CNT’s interest in Semeiotic “really lies primarily in [Peirce’s] proposal that we should think of signs in terms of ‘habit’ rather than
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convention,” (RI 96). Those habits operate through the imagination. Applied to CNT, the imaginarium is that set of interpretive habits determining a Christian interpretation of signs.76
Like CNT, theosemiotic takes an empirical approach.77 That is, claims about religious
knowledge are hypotheses grounded in external realities experienced as religious signs.78 Further, experience as defined by Peirce is an abductive event. A perceptual judgment—an instinctive explanatory hypothesis—results from an encounter with some thing or idea.79 Importantly,
Signs are given in experience.80 They are not selected or sought as much as they are discovered.
One finds that one has had a religious experience. Then a process of reflection and inquiry begins so that one might understand it. So, theosemiotic holds that perceptions of religious experience are abductive inferences responding to Signs given in experience. Interpretations of Signs
are therefore to a great degree discovered. Due to the important role granted to the objective reality, the creative and constructive aspect of interpretation is not so much a repetition of one’s habits of thought as much as it is an event in which those habits creatively apply themselves to what
is given in the Sign via abductive inference to discover a new form of interpretation of the object.
A theosmiotic treatment of the sign model emphasizes the objectivity of semiosis. The
triadic action of signs means they act to form their interpretants. Two minds unite in the Sign so
that something of the idea of the object communicates to a sufficient degree to determine an interpretant of that same object in the other mind. A salient structural element in Peirce’s sign
model is the object, which has this determining power due to the force of the interpretive relation

76

Recall that McGrath describes the imaginarium in terms of mental habits (RI 70).

77

Raposa, Theosemiotic, 5.
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Raposa, PPR, 148.
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Raposa, Theosemiotic, 94.
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Raposa, PPR, 148.
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as a final cause. The Sign as such naturally has the purpose of realizing itself eventually in an Ultimate Interpretant.81 Semiosis in this way forms a continuum of interpretation until the Ultimate
Interpretant—some habit of conduct—finally manifests the idea of the object motivating the
Sign.
A final element should be brought under consideration here to clarify the theosemiotic
idea. Notwithstanding the objectivity of semiosis, interpretation varies greatly and admits of subtle nuance, according to Peirce’s taxonomy of signs. He was able successfully to work out a tenfold taxonomy, though his system is theoretically infinite. Beyond the ten types, the subtleties
become too difficult to maintain for any practical benefit.82 The upshot is that theosemiotic values the fact that the various sign types indicate different types of information communicated
through such signs.83 So, in a continuum of interpretants through the life of a Sign there can be
varying amounts and types of information communicated. Not all interpretants will be of equal
value with respect to the Sign’s purpose to realize an Ultimate Interpretant. Consequently, the
habits of mind operating in semeiotic abductions prove more or less useful to this purpose.
The theosemiotic idea, then, is that interpretants form abductively as one encounters
Signs given in experience. One’s habits of mind are used creatively by the imagination to make
sense of the object perceived in the Sign. Such Signs along a continuum will be of varying types
and qualities of information, such that knowledge of the truth of the Sign is hoped for in the long
run when at last some Ultimate Interpretant in the form of behavioral habit manifests the
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Cf., Short, Peirce’s Theory of Signs, 57-58.
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Short, Theory of Signs, 260.
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Raposa, PPR, 149-50. Yet, Raposa also cautions that the types are to be treated as heuristic devices rather
than as keys to decoding specific meanings hidden in the form of any sign; cf., ibid., Theosemiotic, 57, 61.
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meaning of the Sign. Nevertheless, the entire process continues to be determined largely by its
originating object.
From a theosemiotic perspective, the sign here focuses on McGrath’s use of Semeiotic
primarily to explain the subjective aspect of perception. McGrath attends mostly to the role that
the subject’s habits play in the interpretation of natural signs.84 In contrast, Peirce emphasizes the
objectivity of semeiosis, such that a Christian theosemiotic would hold that nature provides objective assistance in its own interpretation. It would hold that some religious natural signs truly
manifest some truth about God. The cosmos really is to some extent a “book” from which true
knowledge of God can be gained. On the understanding of Peirce gained in chapter three, a
Christian theosemiotic would resist claiming that God in himself is the object of any natural sign.
Rather, vague information somehow relating to God objectively grounds whatever signs represent theological truth. One way to understand this, perhaps, is to think of the Absolute Mind as
the created “wisdom” of the cosmos (Prov 8:22-31).85 Therefore, further, religious experiences
of nature would be taken as Signs given by nature itself that something of some religious value
has been experienced. This would open wide the field of interreligious dialogue, because no subject’s religious experience is meaningless.
Therefore, a Christian theosemiotic would trust the Sign to reveal itself somehow through
the continuation of the interpretive process. A Christian theosemiotic would read natural signs in
accordance with the Christian habitus, but the imagination also would seek to find a fit between
that habitus and the objective sense given in the Sign. It would, again, pursue a strategy of
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McGrath’s emphasis on the determining role of subjective habits in the interpretation of signs extends
through his discussion of the role community’s play in forming, maintainin, and deploying those habits (RI 96-100).
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Some, such as Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine, advocated for a two-stage creation, such that the
conception of the total divine plan for creation is distinguished from the gradual enactment of that plan. Cf.,
Blowers, Drama, 11.
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musement and would expect “the answer” to be sometime in the future. In the meantime, a
Christian theosemiotic would encourage playful experimentation with a range of possible interpretations of the Sign in question. A Christian theosemiotic would tolerate widely divergent alternatives as experimental objects, trusting that the truth of God is thereby making itself known.
McGrath holds that Semeiotic provides a suitable “framework” according to which interpreters creatively correlate cultural and natural signs. This specifically calls attention to the role
of interpretive habits described by semeiotic. Theosemiotic would agree, of course, that the subject’s interpretive habits play a creative role in the formation of the interpretant. However, theosemiotic also emphasizes that the object of the sign, vaguely sensed by interpreters via their experience of the representamen, plays a determining role in the subject’s creative interpretation;
that the interpreting subject is learning from signs how better to interpret them. A Christian theosemiotic interpretation of the CNT idea would trust the self-revealing nature of the Sign to interpret the Christian perspective as meaningful broadly across religious perspectives.
The Determinate Habitus. Theosemiotic would also respond to McGrath’s sketch of the
habitus as having a rather stable, determinate character. If the sense of a static habitus is not expressed in CNT literature, it is a reasonable inference from McGrath’s indication that a symbolic
core is necessary to maintain authentic Christian identity. CNT defines itself as “Christian” according to several specific theological beliefs and a powerful symbol of the heart of Christian
faith (i.e., the Christian imaginarium). These are the five theological beliefs discussed earlier in
the section comparing them to CT, and the signum crucis (RI 64-65).86 These together inform the
Christian habitus or habitual perspective on the world. It should be noted that the five beliefs are
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McGrath writes of the “‘normative centering’” role of the signum crucis.
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not exclusive for McGrath but representative (OS 4438).87 Perhaps, then, it would be fair to say
that the habitus implies the set of beliefs pertaining to the great tradition of the Christian faith.
The ecumenical creeds—especially the Nicene Creed—supply a basic framework from which a
hypothetical set might be constructed, but that would no doubt quickly bog down in controversy.
So, McGrath wisely names a minimal set of doctrinal parameters, like a symbol representing an
undefined larger whole. So, the claim here is not that only these five doctrines frame the CNT
imaginarium. A complete list would surely include more. Nevertheless, even a representative list
implies a desire for definition. To say “this” and “not that” in certain respects. This is the intent
of the use of the term “static” or “determinate.”
Also contributing to that sense of establishment and unchanging commitment is
McGrath’s emphasis on the role of the Christian community within CNT precisely to preserve
and continue this habitus to serve CNT into the future (RI 96). However, the Christian imaginarium is not merely a result of holding a certain set of traditional doctrines. It is not simply the effect of consistently holding up the sign of the cross in the center of various sacraments and practices in the life of the Church. These aims and activities are necessary, but their formation as the
Christian imaginarium is the divine work of the Holy Spirit illuminating and transforming the
mind of the community and its members (RI 52). The CNT idea, then, is that the habitus remains
consistent over time and useful to CNT’s expressed purposes, because the Holy Spirit works
through core Christian doctrines and cruciform practices of the Church to train the Church’s imagination in the Christian imaginarium. The Church conducts itself in such a way as to allow the
Spirit to maintain the Christian imaginarium in them, and to train new believers therein.

87
McGrath writes of the five theological beliefs, “These themes illustrate, but do not exhaust, the
distinctively Christian framework through which the natural world is seen.”
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McGrath’s concern in this sign regarding the habitus may be expressed as a concern to
maintain the Christian identity. Consequently, the “self” as a symbol is the relevant theosemiotic
category here.88 Any symbol as theorized in Peirce’s taxonomy is a set of “general ideas [that
have] become embodied concretely in habits.”89 In other words a symbol is significant because it
operates according to some set of general ideas that function like laws or conventional norms
governing the Sign.90 So, a set of beliefs such as the Christian imaginarium constitutes a symbolic character.91 They are organized and held together by a certain spirit, a purpose for their being as a whole. Whether as a “self” or in terms of “personality,” the upshot is that a symbol’s
identity is defined by what remains consistent over time and in experience. This is why theosemiotic emphasizes that selves entail relations of love. The continuity of identity is a function of
the symbol’s desire to realize that meaning, its love of its purpose. Theosemiotic speaks of this
love as a certain “quality of attention” that facilitates the process of realizing the meaning of the
Sign.92 So, theosemiotic holds that the attention directs the meaning of the self. Writes Raposa,
“Now every person considered at any given point in time is a symbol, analogous to a word, so
that a ‘man denotes whatever is the object of his attention at the moment; he connotes whatever
he knows or feels of this object, and is the incarnation of this form or intelligible species’ (CP
7.591; W1: 498).”93 Moreover, importantly for theosemiotic, semeiotic attention is not effective

Cf., e.g., Rapoas, Theosemiotic, 48; also, cf., ibid., 53-54, where Raposa writes of the “continuity” of the
self over time.
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So, Raposa writes that selves are “living legisigns.” Ibid., 46. “Legisign” is a term from Peirce’s sign
taxonomy. It refers to a “presentative condition” marked by Thirdness. That is, a sign grounded by “any
conventional, dispositional, or lawlike feature it may have acquired,” Liszka, General Introduction, 36.
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only in one direction. Symbolic selves “read” other selves, which affects both.94 Consequently, a
symbol is complex. There is not just one sign, but a continuum of Signs organized by the purpose of the symbol. Raposa writes, “the self consists in what Peirce might portray metaphorically
as a living, moving train or stream of thought-signs.” More accurately, the semeiotic continuum
is more like a network of streams, or, as Peirce said, a cable.95
Therefore, communities are “corporate” selves.96 A community as such is marked by
some set of characteristic habits, beliefs constituting its identity and enduring character. Recall,
then, that any Sign is a Sign because some purpose gives it life and governs its semeiotic development. Therefore, any individual self has the set of habits that they do, because their personality
is a spirit unifying all of those elements into a coherent whole (so, the action of love within a
self).97 Theosemiotic understands communities in this same way. A genuine community of inquiry has the distinctive set of habits that it does, because its personality, a spirit, determines and
maintains its distinctive set of beliefs.
CNT holds that its habitus is maintained by the Holy Spirit. A Christian theosemiotic
would take that in terms of the symbolic self of the Christian community of interpretation. That
is, the Church is a symbol whose habits embody the general ideas of the faith maintained across
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Raposa, PPR, 54, “Moreover, within the context of theosemiotic, individuals are signs [among whom]
reciprocal acts of interpretation...a kind of living intertextuality...complex system of meaning”; ibid., Theosemiotic,
x, ““Finally, human beings are themselves properly to be regarded as complex symbols, with interactions between
them consisting at least partially in acts of reading.” Cf., also, ibid., 68.
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Ibid., 50, writes, “The ideals and purposes to which any individual is devoted will also act as final causes
to which certain aspects of that person’s life will be essentially ordered. A person’s life as a whole will be more or
less unified in this fashion to the extent that the selving process involves real growth in meaning...Insofar as it can
be accomplished, however, the unity of the self will be ‘the unity of symbolization—the unity of consistency.’...such
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the great Christian tradition. The Church is a communal self, constituted by many selves holding
together by their love to do so as this communal self, and as this is accomplished through symbolic engagement. Unifying all of these dynamics, providing the overarching, governing purpose
of the communal Sign is the Spirit of the Christian community. A Christian theosemiotic therefore explains the Spirit-led Church as a semeiotic interpretant. That is, the Spirit illuminates believers regarding the beliefs of the habitus. These become embodied in the habits of individual
selves, an interpretive move. As a collective, the individual interpretations variously manifest the
distinctive set of habits maintained by the Spirit for the whole. So, a theosemiotic CNT also expects the vagueness of the habitus and the variety endemic to semeiotic process to result in a
community that at a certain level is a unified whole, while at a microscopic level any individual
or subset of individuals might at that moment be out of sync with the habitus and therefore its
Spirit. Indeed, given the developmental and experimental semeiotic process, a theosemiotic CNT
would even suggest that any particular individual at the moment out of sync with the Spirit might
yet be somehow in accord with the Spirit’s developmental purpose for the symbol overall.
According to CNT, the well defined Christian imaginarium is learned from and maintained by the community. This defined perspective, or set of habits, is meant in CNT to supply a
determining influence on the interpreter’s intuitive construction of religious meaning. According
to theosemiotic, in contrast, the habitus is also affected through the act of interpretation. The
work of symbolic engagement changes the subject’s interpretive habits to some degree, as the
subject is motivated to know the truth of the matter. A Christian theosemiotic would therefore
speak of the Christian habitus and its community context in terms of Peirce’s conception of the
symbolic “self.”
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Community Definition. Another theosemiotic response to the plain sense description of
CNT would come at the point regarding the way the community of interpretation relates to the
interpretive habits of its members. McGrath defines “community”—or writes that communities
of interpretation are defined, are formed—as a number of people faithfully hold to a common set
of interpretive traditions. The value of the Christian imaginarium determined by the signum crucis is as a symbol that can hold together such a community though there are some variations
among ideas concerning that tradition.98 So, for CNT the Christian community of interpretation
just is the set of people “loyal” to that imaginarium and therefore marked by that habitus. Perhaps the essential idea here is McGrath’s sense that community identity and therefore the integrity of the Christian habitus must be strategically, intentionally preserved by choosing the definitive symbol for that purpose. Recall McGrath’s statement regarding the ambiguity of nature as
warrant for adopting the Christian frame as starting point, “we are free to choose the manner in
which we see nature, forcing us to identify the best way of beholding the natural world,” (FT
27).99 Though, ultimately, the formation of the Christian imaginarium itself in the minds of
Christians, McGrath is clear, is the transformative work of the Holy Spirit.100The strategic function of the community seems indicated also in its role in cultivating that Christian identity
through practices designed for the purpose. This function for the community is mentioned in a
discussion of the value of the signum crucis for maintaining the requisite Christian character of
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The context of McGrath’s discussion of the signum crucis implies that this is the vague symbol McGrath
seeks for CNT, “for the purposes of the present study the most important outcome is the establishment of a
communal interpretation of a sign which is open to multiple readings, none of which is self-evidently authoritative,”
(RI 97).
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Although, McGrath seems to hold that the Christian perspective is not as much chosen by CNT as it is
received as the frame given for Christians as such. Consider, “Natural theology is here interpreted, not as a general
search for divinity on terms of our own choosing, but as an engagement with nature that is conducted in the light of
a Christian vision of reality, resting on a trinitarian, incarnational ontology,” (OS 282).
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McGrath writes that the imaginarium is established through the Spirit’s work of metanoia, (RI 51-52).
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the imaginarium. McGrath writes that the signum crucis “can be accommodated in the notion of
the church as a ‘community of interpretation,’ safeguarding, unfolding, and using the Christian
imaginarium to grasp the significance of the world,” (RI 100). The Christian community functions to develop its members’ understanding of the sign of the cross in both “safeguarding” and
then “unfolding” the cruciform imaginarium. That is, McGrath’s idea seems to be that community members control their status as a community according to their commitment to preserving
and cultivating a defined set of beliefs.
Peirce’s idea was different as to the dynamics of community identity and loyalty. A community of inquiry is defined by a shared objective; namely, by a commitment to discover the
truth of some matter on which all are interested.101 This is the defining purpose of a community
as a self. The search for the truth of the matter gives the community integrity and identity as it
unifies all efforts, though they may appear to be disparate. Rapoasa writes, “The ideals and purposes to which any individual is devoted will also act as final causes to which certain aspects of
that person’s life will be essentially ordered. A person’s life as a whole will be more or less unified in this fashion to the extent that the selving process involves real growth in meaning.”102
Habits of thought certainly contribute to the constitution of the community, but that is not due to
loyalty to those habits. Rather, loyalty and love are to the community itself as the symbol of the
purpose that unites them.103 So, this sign, like the previous, has to do with the theosemiotic doctrine of the symbolic self. The basic theosemiotic correlate to the CNT idea is that the loyalty and

Peirce’s concept is grounded by a scientific model of communities of inquiry. Cf., Parker, Continuity,
191-92. So, cf., also, Raposa, PPR, 154.
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interpretive habits of community members are the produce of their love for the purpose that defines and forms the community; namely, the quest for the truth of some matter.104
A Christian theosemiotic would affirm McGrath’s claim that the Christian community of
interpretation is marked by a shared habitus, and that that habitus can be analyzed into a representative set of beliefs framing the Christian imaginarium. Further, it would affirm McGrath’s
effort to identify the symbol giving definition to the entire community and its habits as the signum crucis. A Christian theosemiotic would nuance such claims as descriptive, as observing
what are the “fruit” of the community symbol, of its governing purpose. So, it would express
community identity, constitution, and loyalty in this case as: the Christian community of interpretation consists of all those who love the purpose that is represented in the cruciform habitus.
This defining, governing purpose has been here associated with the Holy Spirit who forms these
habits in the community.
If a theosemiotic idea of community turns on a shared commitment to discovery of the
truth of some matter, how would that interpret the Holy Spirit as governing principle of the
Christian community? A shared conviction of this community is that religious truth has been revealed in and through Jesus in a definitive and final manner. Perhaps a Christian theosemiotic
would say that the loyalty of the Christian community is due to their shared love for the truth revealed in Jesus. This community is enamored by the beauty of Jesus, a sense of the profound divine glory he represents and most of all a vague sense of the infinite meaning of Jesus as the
symbol of religious truth.105 The Christian community is therefore organized by the Holy Spirit
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So, ibid., 34, 91, writes of the idea that beliefs, which are habits of interpretation, manifest in “fruits of
life,” habitual patterns of behavior and thought.
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Recall that inquiry is drawn forward by the perception of beauty, as in the practice of musement; cf.,
Raposa, PPR, 144. Similarly, on the motivating beauty of God, cf., idem., Theosemiotic, 17.
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in the sense that it is the work of the Spirit to reveal and to glorify the Son in the name of the Father (John 16:14, 15). The Spirit maintains the purpose of the community’s love: to discover the
meaning of Jesus. To that end, the beliefs comprising the imaginarium and producing the Christian habitus are sustained, developed, deepened as the Spirit determines the interpretive life of
the community.106 The essence of this matter is that these habits are a result of what constitutes
the Christian community of interpretation: loyalty due to love for the hope of knowing the full
meaning of Jesus. So, a Christian theosemiotic shifts the focus of attention from dogmatics to
personality. A Christian theosemiotic looks for conformity to the symbol of Jesus rather than
merely conformity to doctrinal formulae. This continues to manifest the movement toward
vagueness. A Christian theosemiotic would therefore recognize its own community as loyal to
the symbol of Jesus, but Jesus is a symbol of something more vague and therefore more general
in its appeal and application. A Christian theosemiotic would recognize its community as those
loyal to that more general idea.
CNT holds that communities are, first of all, defined by the habits of interpretation to
which its members are “loyal.” McGrath describes these as “interpretive traditions.” Theosemiotic holds that communities of interpretation are indeed defined by their common interest, for example, the recent community bound by its interest in discovering an effective vaccine for
COVID-19. In contrast to the CNT conception is that the community is defined not by a set of
traditional ideas to which it is loyal, but by a common hope for a discovery of the truth on some
matter in question. A Christian theosemiotic community is therefore defined by the hope of discovering the full meaning of Jesus.
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The present study uses “determines” here in a soft sense of influence, as through the work of
illumination and sanctification.
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Community Habitus Construction. Finally, the CNT idea of the Christian community
of interpretation cultivating its own habitus by paying close and constant attention to the signum
crucis would raise a response from theosemiotic. The CNT idea here has two parts. One is
McGrath’s concept of habitus as a habitual way of seeing the world—of representing it in schemas—due to the training of the habits of the mind and imagination in and by one’s social context
(i.e., the imaginarium) (RI 28-30, 70). The second is that this training is accomplished by constant attention to the signum crucis; for example, through the practice of the sacraments (RI 9799).107 There seems to be a sense here, once again, that humans are the controlling agents of their
imagination formation. It seems to be the idea that one can decide how one wants one’s mind to
function, then create that result by applying the proper techniques. This is not to ignore
McGrath’s attention to the Holy Spirit as the agent of transformative metanoia. Nor is it to ignore McGrath’s aim as faithfulness to what is received as a given and authoritative tradition of
faith. Rather, it is to focus attention on the prescriptive, intentional aspect of CNT’s methodological decision to start with the Christian imaginarium. This is a decision to maintain a predefined
perspective by establishing a defining symbol, the signum crucis, for that purpose. Therefore,
McGrath’s CNT notion of the self-controlled development of interpretive habits is to maintain
constant attention to the signum crucis, trusting the Holy Spirit to work out the formation of the
Christian imaginarium in the process. Thus established in that mental frame, CNT practitioners
will naturally interpret natural signs in Christian ways.
The theosemiotic conception of the self-controlled development of habits of interpretation is a natural process of conforming one’s habits to the purpose of the symbol. The
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interpreting mind is drawn to the Sign by a vague sense of its beauty.108 Interpretation is a process by which the mind seeks the meaning of the beauty perceived in the Sign. One’s habits of
interpretation are imperfectly suited to the task, and their reformation is an experimental process
of developing those habits that prove useful in working out the meaning of the Sign. This, too, is
a function of the objectivity of the Sign. Its ground in the object provides a constant pressure resisting subjectivity in interpretation—that is, resisting subjective arbitrariness. Theosemiotic
holds that this self-controlled process occurs through the practice of musement. Raposa writes
that musement effectively develops an interpreter’s “reading skills.”109 The aim of this process is
an interpretive embodiment of the beauty of the Sign. This just is that one’s habits of mind represent the habits implied by the beauty of the Sign, such that one’s actions manifest those habits.110
Here theosemiotic affirms William James’ phrase describing behavioral habits as “fruits for
life.”111 They represent the “roots” of habits of interpretation trained by the objective purpose of
the Sign.
An important point is that this behavioral fruit interprets the Sign according to mental
habits learned from engaging the Sign.112 As such, the resulting fruit is not merely an imitation or
reproduction of the object. There is difference even as there is consistency. In other words there
is a development of the Sign. This is understood as the “growth” of symbols. Indeed, it is the
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For Peirce, beauty was a functional aesthetic, in that anything is beautiful if it is able to effect an
interpretant. The purpose of any Sign is to represent itself in additional signs (interpretants). Therefore, effective
function according to this purpose defines semeiotic beauty. In Peirce’s architectonic arrangement of Philosophy,
aesthetics comes before ethics and logic (which is semeiotic). Consequently, neither goodness (ethics) nor truth
(semeiotic logic) factor in Peirce’s understanding of beauty. Cf., Parker, Continuity, 50.
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growth of meaning as interpretive habits are embodied in the fruit of disciplined practices.113
These are disciplined in that they continue the habits pertaining to the beauty of the Sign that
formed them, because of the continuation of love for that Sign.114 Therefore, theosemiotic speaks
of the “gift of meaning.”115 Interpretations are discovered through this process of musing upon
and so learning the mental habits of the Sign’s beauty. No one can predict the fruit these habits
will yield in the life of any interpreter. Yet, these fruit of meaning are the reason for engaging the
process at all, “This is part of the raison d’etre of any theosemiotic inquiry: we struggle to interpret what lies most deeply ‘hidden in the icon,’ and so to signify the mystery encountered
therein, always mostly failing, but sometimes being grasped by it, graced by it, becoming its
sign, and so embodying (at best, I think, in conduct shaped by love and in communities rather
than alone) a tiny fragment of its meaning.”116 The basic theosemiotic idea, then, is that habits of
interpretation are trained naturally by the Sign as it is engaged through musement. This process
works by waiting for “fruits of life” to finally align with the beauty of the Sign. At that point,
that beauty has become embodied in the interpreter who has developed the requisite habits of
mind.
In light of theosemiotic there is a double sense for “self” in the concept of self-controlled
habit formation. Interpretation is a process of symbolic engagement. There are two “selves” engaged in the work of interpretation. Interpretation is therefore the endeavor to realize meaning
that is consistent with the objective reality of both selves as symbols. In the present case, a Christian theosemiotic would recognize the signum crucis as the Sign embodying the beauty that
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every member of the community loves and wants to discover its full meaning. To that end, the
community attends constantly to the signum crucis through the practice of musement. In this
case, certain meaningful practices can facilitate musement on the sign of the cross, such as the
sacraments. Since musement itself has an experimental aspect, “reading skills” are developed
even as one engages in the playful exploration of possible meaning. However, interpretive habits
gained in musement are imperfect. A Christian theosemiotic would also look to the inductive
process of testing hypotheses in experience as crucial to the development of the requisite habits.
This involves attempts at putting beliefs into practice and observing the results. When the results
embody to some extent the beauty of the Sign, they are confirmed as fruits for life and the habits
that produced them become established. Other outcomes will prove dissonant with the beauty of
the signum crucis and their underlying habits are marked for reform.
In this Christian theosemiotic account, the beauty of the Sign correlates to McGrath’s role
of the Holy Spirit in habit-formation for the Christian community of interpretation. The requisite
habits of mind develop through experience as the objective purpose of the Sign constantly affects
its interpreters through the beauty of the Sign. In other words, the Christian community of interpretation is formed by the purpose of the Holy Spirit as each member is drawn into union due to
shared love for the meaning of the signum crucis. The Spirit’s purpose—and so that of the “self”
or symbol that is the Christian community of interpretation—is to realize the full meaning of the
signum crucis. This is grounded in a perception of the beauty of that Sign—a beauty grounded in
the objectivity of the signum crucis. Accordingly, in CNT terms, the Spirit works to develop the
minds of the community to conform them to the beauty of the sign of the cross producing embodiments of meaning in practice.
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The formation of interpretive habits internal to the Christian community of interpretation
through continuous musement and praxis regarding the signum crucis develops the conception of
the fourth CNT sign regarding the determinate habitus. The present interest here goes further.
The Christian community as a self engages intra-community practices to cultivate the habitus for
the purpose of engaging other symbols external to the community in an authentic Christian way.
A Christian theosemiotic pursues this through the abductive strategy of musement upon natural
signs. As a symbol whose purpose is the realization of the full meaning of Jesus, these engagements with external Signs are also governed by the Spirit of the Christian interpretive community. Therefore, not only are the objects of those natural Signs self-revealing, the Spirit of the
Christian community works through that process of interpretation to develop the meaning of Jesus. That is, in engaging the selves of the natural Signs, Christian theosemioticians perceive
ways that they themselves are being “read” by those Signs. The beauty of the spiritual purpose of
the Christian interpretive community leads Christian theosemioticians to perceive the different
senses for the meaning of Jesus in the engagements with those other Signs. Consequently, their
own interpretive habits grow, and those that are coherent with respect to the cruciform imaginarium become part of the repertoire of the Christian theosemiotician. As Christian theosemiotic engages other Signs more broadly—natural and religious—the more their habitus embodies the full
generality of the meaning of Jesus.
A Christian theosemiotic would be therefore a fairly robust natural theology, in that it implies that humans learn to embody the divine beauty of God through disciplined, enduring engagement with natural signs. Further, a Christian theosemiotic would understand the beauty of
the signum crucis as an index of the divine beauty discovered in many different forms and
sources of religious signs. Therefore, a Christian theosemiotic would have its own sense for
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CNT’s desire to preserve and cultivate its distinctive habitus according to the cruciform imaginarium. Remaining grounded in the Christian imaginarium, the Christian theosemiotic community is able collectively in the course of time to develop the full meaning of Jesus through Christian engagement with many different religious symbols of ever greater degrees of vagueness.
This process of engaging other symbolic selves not only develops the meaning of Jesus as it is
embodied in Christian interpreters. As these engage selves embodying habits of other religions,
the engagement with cruciform symbols of the meaning of Jesus will “read” them to themselves,
and their habits will grow under the influence of the Spirit. In this way a Christian theosemiotic
might increase the community who loves the hope of the full meaning of Jesus as the beauty of
that hope catches on through symbolic engagement with those whose habits are primarily formed
through a certain quality of attention to the signum crucis.
Whereas CNT wants to situate the Christian imaginarium in a defined way according to
the sign of the cross, a Christian theosemiotic would treat the signum crucis as a sign marking
the starting point of the development of the Church’s imaginarium. The difference is subtle but
real. CNT holds the cruciform imaginarium as a pattern to be cultivated and applied to nature in
such a way that it reifies nature’s truth, beauty, and goodness. This is hoped to result in great explanatory cogency and power in CNT IBE arguments in natural theological engagements with
science. A Christian theosemiotic, in contrast, expects that the cruciform engagement with nature
will result in the growth of meaning of the symbol of the signum crucis as that symbol also contributes to the growth of meaning gained regarding the religious significance of the natural
world.
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Summary of A Christian Theosemiotic
From this interpretive exercise engaging CNT at certain points according to theosemiotic
a Christian theosemiotic has emerged. The interpretation set forth here has favored theosemiotic
conceptions when these have contrasted with those of CNT. The resulting model approaches natural theology in a way that intends to be Christian in its identity while also being global, universal in its relevance and meaning. That is to say that a Christian theosemiotic develops its theological meaning in successive levels of increasing vagueness, such that its religious truth appears to
identify with truth manifest in other religious Signs. Accordingly, a Christian theosemiotic starts
with the idea that the vagueness of natural Signs provides opportunities for symbolic engagement
with the Christian imaginarium, such that the religious meaning of both grows according to the
logic of vagueness. A Christian theosemiotic practices Peirce’s abductive strategy of musement
for this process of the growth of meaning. This is possible according to the semeiotic structure of
Signs with respect to the self-revealing power of their objects. However, the growth of meaning
through musement is not a straightforward process. The habitus of the Christian theosemiotic
community remains consistent and coherent with its core symbol, the signum crucis, even as its
collective musement manifests a dynamic experimental ebb and flow as community members
learn the requisite interpretive habits. Binding all of this together and motivating its progress is
the theosemiotic community’s love for the hope of realizing the full meaning of Jesus. This love
keeps them grounded in the sign of the cross as their experiments in musement on many natural
religious signs and on many other religions results in the growth of the community of those who
love the hope of the meaning of Jesus. Christian theosemioticians increasingly embody those
habits realizing Jesus’ meaning along with others who are drawn by Jesus’ beauty into that semeiotic continuum. The final stage of the present experiment will identify a practicing
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theosemiotician whose work manifests most or all of these qualities, and supplies experiential
cases to illustrate whether Peirce’s theosemiotic brings with it a tendency toward PEM ontology.
Christian Theosemiotic Outcomes
This part of the present experiment looks to theosemiotic experience for evidence of the
interpretive deductions made in the engagement of theosemiotic with CNT. These yielded a hypothesis for several beliefs pertaining to a Christian theosemiotic, which may be outlined as follows:117
1. The Christian imaginarium is the vague starting point from which Christian inquiry
discovers the vaguer religious meaning of Signs.
2. The logic of vagueness operative in the aesthetic practice of musement produces the
growth of the religious meaning of Signs.
3. The objectivity and final causation of semeiosis grounds confidence in the true religious meaning of nature to reveal itself through the process of symbolic engagement.
4. Religious interpretive communities, such as the Christian community, are unified by
their love for a common purpose, which governs the development of their interpretive
habits.
5. The symbol of Jesus, whose Christian community unites in the love of the hope of
someday knowing Jesus’ full meaning, represents a vaguer religious idea in loyalty to
which a much broader community is united.
6. Symbolic engagement yields mutual self-revelation, such that the beauty of the
growth of the meaning of Jesus, by engaging many other Signs with increasing vague
significance while grounded always in the signum crucis, increasingly brings to light
the full religious meaning of both.
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While there is an evident interrelation among these beliefs, this outline is not to imply an orderly,
systematic philosophical argument for these as constituting a coherent Christian theosemiotic theory. These are the
gleanings of an interpretive engagement with CNT. Their order and form have been determined by that engagement,
such that there is an ad hoc aspect to this collection of beliefs. Consequently, this writer takes the prima facie
coherence of this set of ideas as promising the potential for a more developed Christian theosemiotic theory. That
must wait for another project. Their use for the present inquiry is to provide a set of signs by which to qualify Robert
Neville as an exemplar of something like a Christian theosemiotic.
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A further result of this sketch of a Christian theosemiotic is the hypothesis that Robert
Neville might serve as an exemplar for the purposes of the empirical work of this chapter. It is
germane to this empirical strategy that Neville was not in view at the beginning of the theosemiotic inquiry above. The suggestion of the Neville hypothesis came in the course of interpreting
CNT according to theosemiotic. First, the language of “symbolic engagement” arose as though
naturally within that discussion, yet without any intention of appealing to Neville’s sense for that
phrase. Then each of the conclusions revealing a rough form for a Christian theosemiotic in different ways suggested the idea that Neville might just provide a case for further study.
Qualifying Robert Neville
Consequently, the first task, as this study enters the inductive phase of the experiment, is
to establish that Neville qualifies as an exemplar for a Christian theosemiotic. Obviously, the
correspondence of Neville’s work with this Christian theosemiotic model can only be approximate. Still, it should be evident whether there is sufficient likeness to consider Neville as a Christian interpreter of theosemiotic. Neville confesses to be a Christian, and therefore to have a
Christian “bias,” though he strives methodologically to neutralize this.118 Neville also describes
his work as a form of Christian theology, though he emphasizes that he intentionally avoids a
confessional approach to that task.119 In Raposa’s estimation, Neville is a successful interpreter
of Peirce in a manner akin to theosemiotic. He includes Neville’s work “among the very few attempts to adapt Peirce’s philosophy for theological purposes.”120 Further, Raposa commends
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Neville as an example of the sort of “religious naturalism, capacious rather than narrow in its
scope and methods,” that theosemiotic must also be.121
Neville makes no secret of his indebtedness to Peirce’s thought. Though the discussions
carried out in the body of Neville’s philosophical theology project are not usually transparent
about Peirce’s influence, where Neville explains his methodology he regularly highlights ways
that Peirce’s philosophy funds his own. The Peircean heart of Neville’s project, of course, is
Peirce’s Semeiotic. Neville’s work is a “theology of symbolic engagement,” so he understandably takes advantage of the robust sign theory Peirce provides. Neville mentions that the semeiotic concepts of “[r]eference, meaning, and interpretation in context are the three main elements
in a theory of signs that has learned from the semiotics of Charles Peirce.”122 Neville also incorporates Peirce’s theory of the triadic action of Signs as such.123 Also, Neville’s work receives
value from its reliance upon semeiotic due to the breadth of scope of Peirce’s theory. In particular, Peirce’s comprehensive sign theory includes an analysis of semeiotic dynamics and a taxonomy of sign types that enables coherent analysis of religious signs and their effects in a wide array of forms and contexts.124 A major aspect of Neville’s theology reflects Peirce’s fallibilism.
This belongs to the overall empirical approach to theology that Neville adopts, receiving theological claims as hypotheses that must be tested.125 Neville’s method also manifests the basic rationale of pragmaticist inquiry. In an unusually transparent passage regarding Peirce’s influence
on the process of Neville’s work, Neville explains how his entire four-volume Philosophical
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Theology project moves according to the pragmaticist rhythm of abduction, deduction, and induction.126 On the other hand, as Raposa noted, Neville does not ape Peirce’s work. For example,
Neville maintains a broader sense of the term “symbol” than it has in Peirce’s system.127
From these things, one could “do the math” and posit that Neville comes within a reasonable approximation of Christian theosemiotic to illustrate the sorts of outcomes Christian theosemiotic is likely to have under the influence of a full-throated appropriation of Peirce’s philosophy. However, correlating Neville’s views with the six ideas in the outline above will strengthen
this conclusion. It happens that evidence for several of the Christian theosemiotic ideas presents
itself in Neville’s discussion of four “principal points [that] distinguish this Philosophical Theology from more common approaches to theology in the contemporary world.”128 Evidence for the
other ideas is also available in Neville’s work.
There is no question that Neville’s project manifests the Christian theosemiotic idea that
the Christian imaginarium constitutes the starting point for—but not the final say in—theological
understanding. Regarding the distinguishing mark of “engagement,” Neville writes that this has
the result “that the boundaries of religious communities that might be defined by doctrinal affiliation are blurred, if not wholly relativized.”129 That is, the process of a theology of symbolic engagement such as Neville advocates holds that tradition-specific doctrines—their religious
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identities—are valid expressions of religious experiences and convictions pertaining to that tradition. However, they are not sufficient understandings of the vague, “ultimate reality” that they
ultimately imply as symbols.130 Consequently, “the project involves deliberate efforts to make
theology vulnerable to correction, requiring theology in each tradition to be open to learning
from other traditions and from the arts, sciences, and practical disciplines.”131 Discussing the distinctive concept of religion Neville’s project advocates, the idea of the vague starting point manifests in his call to “recontextualize” the “theologies of traditions for which historical narratives
are central” to accord with the “larger natural context.” Christianity, of course, is among these.132
So, “Philosophical Theology respects and interprets the revelatory claims of the religions it studies without treating them as unchallengeable premises. Thus Philosophical Theology speaks to
and for the religious locations it studies but not from any of them in the sense of presupposing
their truth.”133 For Neville’s project, then, even a generic theistic conception of “God” is only
one of many possible symbols supplying a coherent “rhetorical center” from which to begin theological inquiry as he conceives it.134
Neville’s discussion of the four “points” marking Philosophical Theology vis-a-vis other
theological approaches does not appear to indicate the second idea of a Christian theosemiotic.
Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that Neville’s project entails that the logic of vagueness
operates through the process of musement to reveal religious meaning.135 Neville explains that
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his project endeavors to “exhibit its subject matter,” namely, the ultimate meaning of religious
symbols. This follows Peirce’s logic of abduction, in that theological reflection has the form of
musement as it explores explanatory possibilities.136 Neville describes that this “process begins
wildly and vaguely” and is refined “through stages of clarification and precision [abstraction].”137 Indeed, he aims to engage “with as many domains of reality that might correct” his theology.138 This reflects Neville’s long-held belief that theological symbols just are vague representations of the underlying reality. That is, that reality is such that it is somehow “symbolizable” in terms of determinate realities (including general ideas) without being reducible to any of
them.139
Philosophical Theology’s distinguishing mark of “metaphysical pragmatism” entails the
Christian theosemiotic idea that Signs can be trusted to reveal the truth of their ultimate objects
through the process of interpretation. Neville writes that the work of inquiry provides a sort of
“feedback” due to “the realities referred to in the engagement, resisting attempts to evaluate them

(Bloomsbury, 2016; reprint, 2004), 167, writes, “This Peircean theory that all of our theories can be ranked in a
hierarchy of vagueness, goes to the heart of Neville’s comparative methodology.”
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wrongly.”140 Such symbolic engagement with reality is therefore “vulnerable to correction by the
realities they engage.”141 An illustration Neville raises utilizes the symbols of heaven and of personal gods. The semeiotic feedback takes the form of a sense of the “broken” status of such
Signs. By this Neville means that an interpreter’s context helps them perceive that such “symbols...obviously are not literally true.” They are “broken.” Yet, in other interpretive contexts—
presumably vaguer ones, moving in the direction of ultimacy rather than particularity—they may
be “taken to be true in broken innocence.” That is, one gains a perception of their value for truth
that is not determined by their literal sense.142
The fourth idea of a Christian theosemiotic is that religious interpretive communities are
unified by their love for a common purpose, which is inherent in their identity and manifest in
their habits of interpretation. Neville would not advocate any particular religious perspective as
definitive of the whole of the truth to be discovered by Philosophical Theology. Still, Neville’s
project values the particular identities of religious communities for the purpose of discovering
that truth. So, he advocates the importance of community-specific theological work, in which

Neville, Ultimates, 15. Neville credits this to the three-fold categorial schema of Peirce’s
phenomenology, according to which Thirdness provides the conception of the process of “actualizing form,” of the
becoming of the general idea.
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Bloomsbury Academic, 2016; reprint, 2004), 6.
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communities seek to better understand their own symbols. He writes, “This is kataphatic theology, and is essential both to the vitality and ordering of religious communities and to the continuity of traditions in changing circumstances.” This establishes, maintains, and develops the “sacred canopy” necessary to religious practice as such.143
As in a Christian theosemiotic, Neville’s Philosophical Theology also manifests the idea
that the particularity of a religious symbol represents a religious idea pertaining to a much
broader community of inquiry. This manifests in Neville’s discussion of the mark of engagement
among the four distinguishing points of his theological approach. He writes that engagement
“shifts the locus of theological truth from doctrines to interpretive engagement.” This much is
already in the earlier ideas of the symbolic starting point and the logic of vagueness. Like Christian theosemiotic, Neville also builds on those earlier ideas regarding the implication for defining
communities of interpretation. Just as the symbol represents vaguer meanings, its interpretation
leads one to identify with broader interpretive communities. Neville writes, “it also shifts the
public for theology from the theologian’s own religious community to a public consisting of anyone with an interest in the outcome of the inquiry.”144 For this reason, Neville advocates that theology “must be global and ‘omni-disciplinary’ in its public.”145 In other words, the “public for
the philosophy as developed here for theological issues includes thinkers who come from any religious or secular tradition with ideas to contribute to the first-order issues or to the second and
higher order issues of analysis and methodology.”146 In this way, “This project should serve the
theological interests of Buddhists, Christians, Confucians, Daoists, Hindus, Jews, and Muslims
143
Neville, Ultimates, 19-20. Neville uses “sacred canopies” as a transparent reference to Peter Berger, The
Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (New York: Anchor Books, 1990; repr., 1967).
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just as much as the work of their own confessional theologians, and with an openness to comparison and correction that provides a broad and somewhat tested context.”147 Though not stating
the Christian theosemiotic idea in so many words, nevertheless, Neville’s idea is clearly parallel.
His own project is to start from one’s own theological perspective in a process of inquiry that
opens out onto vaguer theological symbols, such that the litany of disparate traditions can somehow find common theological ground.
Finally, the sixth Christian theosemiotic idea adds emphasis to the particularity of one’s
home theological tradition as necessary for the successful inquiry into the ultimate vagueness of
the reality behind all religious Signs. Neville’s project manifests something very close to this.
This is the reason Neville prefers to consider religious symbols in their indexical aspect rather
than their iconic aspect. Clarifying his take on Peirce’s concept of symbols, Neville writes,
“Most deep religious symbols are indexical as well as perhaps iconic, and they have to be lived
with for individuals and communities to be transformed so that they actually function to carry
across something true.”148 It is therefore the “iconic” particularity of such religious symbols
within their respective communities that facilitates the community’s enduring experience of the
“indexical” level of engagement. The consequence is that religious communities develop their
understanding of the breadth of scope of a symbol’s meaning. Part of this process includes symbols becoming “broken” for a religious community. Discussing the concept of broken symbols as
a distinguishing mark of Philosophical Theology, Neville writes that when symbols break down,
inquiry continues.
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Most theologies...have apophatic moments when they recognize the limitations, falsehoods, failures to address realities, and the spiritual bondage of manifest sacred canopies.
In this recognition they attempt to articulate more nearly ultimate sacred canopies that address the implosion of the manifest canopies, although these too are limited by the powers of symbolization.149
Such is the process of this sort of theological inquiry. Moving into ever more ultimate forms of
the symbols, converging toward a perception of the ultimate reality. Though, strictly speaking,
this point can never be reached, by virtue of its ultimate vagueness. So, the particularity of the
confessional religious community is valued as necessary, “understanding that the tradition itself
is aimed to develop and test the best hypotheses.”150 That testing occurs in the engagement from
the omni-disciplinary community mentioned earlier, “Those claims that are most vulnerable, and
yet are sustained and steadied through as many critical tests as can be devised, including criticism from all sides of a global public, have the greatest rational warrant.”151
The Question of Panentheism
Having established Neville’s credentials as a Christian theosemiotician, this inquiry arrives at its final step. The problem has been the evident probability that CNT’s appeal to Semeiotic would entail an unwitting incorporation of Peirce’s PEM bias. The six points outlining a
Christian theosemiotic hypothesize some of the basic features such a CNT would have. It remains to answer the question of whether such a theological project has proven in experience to
manifest one or more of the criteria of PEM. PEM would be indicated in a theology whose conception of the God-world relation (A) speaks of divine transcendence in terms of a self-relation;
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(B) is presented in terms of interdependence as necessary for growth of the divinity; or, (C) represents “God” as a reference to metaphysical principles. An initial foray into Neville’s extensive
work finds (C) strongly represented in Neville’s writings, while (A) and (B) are implicated when
considering the significance of Neville’s method of engagement as symbolic.
Because Neville does not presuppose theism in even its simplest form, it makes sense to
begin with the third criterion, that “God” is a symbol of metaphysical principles. According to
Neville, any given religious symbol refers to the maximally vague “ultimate reality.”152 Consistent with the treatment of “God” as a metaphysical category, Neville’s definition of his conception of ultimate reality is given as his overarching metaphysical hypothesis for Philosophical
Theology. He writes, “The complex metaphysical hypothesis to be elaborated throughout the volumes of Philosophical Theology is that the ultimate reality of the world consists in its being created in all its spatiotemporal complexity by an ontological act of creation. Everything determinate in any way is part of the world so created.”153 This certainly seems to manifest something of
the dipolarity of the PEM mind-body model of the God-world relation. PEM thus holds that
God’s being includes every determinate, created thing in the cosmos, while God’s being as such
is somehow more than what has become and is becoming created in the world. Specifically, regarding Neville’s conception, “ultimate reality” refers to a metaphysical quality of the totality of
determinate, created things. That is the “ontological act of creation,” which is causally responsible for everything. Neville holds that “the ultimate is a singular act of creation, not in time or
space but creative of time and space.”154 That moment of creative action is Neville’s

Recall, e.g., discussion of the concept of broken symbols as a mark of Neville’s project. The move
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understanding of the meaning of “God.”155 Neville’s likeness to PEM intensifies in light of the
fact that he conceives of the act of creation as “eternal,” as ongoing. Therefore, the determinate
world always constitutes the work of “God,” of that ongoing creative act.156 In PEM terms, then,
the world is always the self-expression of its ultimate reality as the process of creation from
nothing.157
Speaking of ultimate reality expressing its “self” leads to a consideration of whether Neville’s theology manifests the PEM criterion of the God-world relation conceived as a self-relation. Begin by noting that Neville denies any notion of a unifying self, or intelligibility, or purpose, characterizing the ultimate reality of things. He writes, “because the ultimate has no nature
apart from creation, it cannot be a person apart from creation, who creates as a personal act. But
neither can the ultimate create itself to be a person in any sense deeply analogous to finite creative people as persons.”158 On the other hand, Neville also describes ultimate reality in a way that
seems parallel to Peirce’s conception of the nested continua of all of reality. Notice in the following quote that the ultimate reality (the ontological creative act) is related through various contextual levels in which determinate things relate to each other. Neville writes,
The ontological creative act is the source of possibility and value through the form in all
things, allowing for temporal change to actualize possibilities with values...is the source
of the components that harmonies harmonize in their time, and thus of the groundedness
155
Neville, Ultimates, 260, “the dialectical, metaphysical theory of the ontological act of creation is as
much a name for God as a description.”
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of those harmonies...is the source of the existential location of each harmony in a field
whereby it can be connected and mutually determined by other harmonies...is the source
and context of the ultimate identity or value attained by each harmony, and of the harmonies together.159
So, although Neville certainly denies an overarching logic or teleology of things such as Peirce
hypothesized, he nevertheless conceives of the totality of things in terms of an ordered series determined by their origin in the ontological act of creation.160 While not precise, there is a sense in
which Neville thus expresses a version of the mind-body analogy. As the body’s form and actions are determined by its mind, so the ultimate reality—that ontological creative act—eternally
determines the forms and actions of all determinate things.161
Two of the three PEM criteria are recognizable even in the cursory considerations of Neville made here. The remaining criterion regards the notion that God depends upon the world for
his own growth, for God’s own experience and becoming. Strictly speaking, this criterion should
perhaps be denied as applying to Neville’s work. Since the ultimate reality is simply an ongoing
arbitrary creative act, that reality would not be in any sense a consciousness or a mind—which
requires a sense of purpose at some level—that could experience being or becoming. On the
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other hand, Neville holds that attributes predicated of “God” depend upon what is manifest in the
created order. He writes, “We cannot say that God (or Brahman, or Shiva, or non-being, or the
Dao, or Heaven, etc.) apart from identification with the many is good, true, unified, or beautiful...Much less can we say that God has intentional properties as a person.”162 This is consistent
with Neville’s doctrine that it is in the act of creating from nothing that the ultimate reality determines the creation and determines “God” to thereby become the creator.163 Nevertheless, given
Neville’s defining logic of symbolic engagement, it is not necessary for the ultimate reality actually to be theorized by Neville as a cosmic purpose in a constant process of becoming. It is
enough that Neville’s conception stands as a vaguer—that is, more ultimate—level of such a
conception. That is, one might say that PEM’s concept of God as the mind that grows and experiences by way of its cosmic body is a less-than-ultimate conception of the ultimate reality. Yet,
it is more ultimate—and, so, closer to the truth of things—than other theistic models, such as
CT.164 Therefore, in light of Neville’s work, the trajectory of a Christian theosemiotic not only
leads to the tell-tale PEM criteria. It also leads beyond PEM to a more radical form of religious
naturalism, in which the basic theistic notion of a personal God is only a symbol of the maximally vague ontological act of creation from nothing.
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Wildman, “Neville’s Systematic Theology,” 11, writes, “Specifically, for Neville, creation is a singular
act in which both the world's nature and the divine nature are determined. Equivalently, being-itself has no
determinate nature.”
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Accordingly, Neville discusses a way that the persons of the Christian Trinity correlate to salient
features of ultimate reality and its determinate creation according to Neville’s hypothesis. The Father corresponds to
ultimate reality as such, the arbitrary ontological act of creation. The Son, or “Logos,” correlates to the “set of
transcendentals that constitute the characters of harmony” inherent in all determinate things. The Spirit “is the force
of temporal process that continually builds up harmonies and tears them down.” Neville adds that the Logos and the
Spirit “constitute the way by which the eternal act of creation proceeds within time from date to date.” Neville,
Ultimates, 261-62. Neville does not claim that the Trinitarian Persons are merely these metaphysical correlates.
Neville wishes always to respect the specific theological content native to religious symbols in their home traditions.
Still, it is the case that he claims that the Christian Trinity is, in truth, a too-determinate symbol of what are
metaphysical qualities or principles.
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Regarding all three PEM criteria, then, Neville follows the naturalist trajectory beyond
Peirce’s own conclusions. PEM holds that God and the world depend upon one another for
growth and the experience of becoming. While Peirce’s synechism can lend to such notions,
Peirce conceived of the God-cosmos continuum as semeiotic in nature. The growth of meaning
in the cosmos, on Peirce’s account, was not God’s own growth. Like Peirce, Neville denies that
the growth of the cosmos is the growth of God, but that is because Neville denies any reality to
“God” beyond one of many symbols for the act of creation. PEM holds that the God-cosmos relation is similar to that of a mind and body. It is, in other words, a self-relation. Peirce approaches this idea in his conception of the Absolute Mind. In the end, however, the Absolute
Mind is the first creature of the cosmos, the first symbol of God’s reality, on Peirce’s reckoning.
Neville surpasses PEM’s claim of the God-cosmos totality as a self. Denying any sense of self or
personality to God, Neville holds that the ultimate reality relates arbitrarily to the cosmos. Nevertheless, it is a totality due to the continuum resulting from the act of creation. Finally, PEM holds
that “God” in fact represents certain metaphysical features and principles of the bipolar totality.
Peirce approaches this idea, too, but stops short. Peirce holds that those principles—such as natural laws—are symbols of God’s will and purposes in the cosmos, embodying information about
God but are not God himself in the PEM sense. Neville, in contrast to Peirce, embraces the PEM
idea in the strongest of terms. Yet, whereas PEM intends to remain a form of theism, Neville expressly denies any sense of theism for his view.165 Rather than, as Peirce did, hold the creation of
the cosmos and its ensuing developmental process as a “vast representamen,” “a symbol of
God’s purpose,” Neville turns that relation on its head. For Neville, it is “God”—even as conceived by PEM—that is a symbol of the self-creating cosmos.
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This is a surprising conclusion that begs for explanation. Why does Neville go so far beyond Peirce and PEM? Is that somehow the logical outcome of Peirce’s ideas? In other words, if
it is correct to hold Neville as an exemplar of a Christian theosemiotic, does this result mean that
Peirce’s ideas entail Neville’s radical form of theological naturalism? This might appear to be the
case, since those who so far have taken Peirce most seriously for theology sympathize with one
another on just this point: that Peirce’s thought lends to a naturalistic religious paradigm in natural theology.166 The common factor in Neville’s post-Peircean relation to the PEM criteria is Neville’s strict denial of even a vague sort of theism as an ultimate way of talking about the religious significance of the world. Neville strongly and consistently denies any objective reality to
notions of personality in conceptions of the religious ultimate. This is evident in his emphasis on
the indexical nature of natural symbols of ultimate reality, in that the created order of things represents the eternal creative act indexically, as effect represents cause.167 It is thus evident that
Neville’s view is marked by its secondness. This is in contrast to Peirce’s view that natural signs
of God are purposeful and communicative like elements of a poem or painting. That is, for Peirce
a symbol is a relation marked by its thirdness. Neville expressly did not use “symbol” in Peirce’s
more specific sense.168 Therefore, Neville rejects Peirce’s confident conclusion that Synechism
entails a personal God, directly perceivable through natural signs. Recall that Peirce’s doctrine of
directly perceiving a personal God stands with his anthropomorphism and objective idealism. It
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is evident, then, that Neville’s departure from Peirce results at least from a rejection of these key
ideas which Peirce held very closely: vague theism, anthropomorphism, objective idealism.169
Neville’s prioritization of his ontology seems to account for the marked ways he departs
from Peirce’s Semeiotic and surpasses Peirce’s naturalism even beyond PEM. Regarding the
third PEM criterion—“God” as symbol of metaphysical principles—this study found that Neville’s symbolic engagement project “elaborate[s]” his “complex metaphysical hypothesis” about
the being of the ultimate reality.170 Notice that he characterized the ultimate reality in an ontological manner: “the ontological reality of the world consists in its being created in all its spatiotemporal complexity by an ontological act of creation.”171 Also, according to Neville, notwithstanding Peirce’s metaphysical extension of the three Universal Categories, Peirce did not work out an
ontology.172 For Neville, then, Peirce’s Semeiotic holds epistemological but not ontological
value. Consequently, Neville adapts Semeiotic to his ontology in the ways noted above. Regarding the question governing this experimental engagement with Neville, it is evident that Neville’s
PEM-transcending religious naturalism is a consequence of his ontology and not of his use of
Peirce. Therefore, it seems to be the case that Peirce’s views are susceptible to PEM—perhaps,
even in terms of a PEM bias—but do not necessarily entail such an ontology.
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Conclusion
This chapter tested for Peircean PEM bias. That is, it inquired into whether incorporating
Semeiotic into Christian natural theology would entail incorporating Peirce’s bias toward PEM
ontology. The inquiry began by constructing a form of CNT that factors Semeiotic according to
Peirce’s full systematic sense. With assistance from Raposa’s theosemiotic, this study interpreted
CNT as a Christian theosemiotic. In another step in the process, Neville’s theology as symbolic
engagement fit the Christian theosemiotic parameters. This experimental inquiry looked to Neville’s long experience with Peirce and theology and found that Neville’s case of a Christian theosemiotic shows evidence of PEM. In discussing the evidence of PEM criteria in Neville, it became evident that his Christian theosemiotic concludes in a radical religious naturalism far surpassing Peirce’s bias toward PEM. Further reflection on this result concluded that Neville’s positive relation to PEM, in contrast to Peirce, seems to result from Neville’s ontological priorities.
Accordingly, Neville’s case seems to show that a Christian theosemiotic is susceptible to interpretation according to PEM or more radical religious naturalist ontologies. What might this mean
for Semeiotic and the problem of panentheism? The study in chapter two found that CNT shares
CT’s antithetical relation to PEM. Therefore, the evidence suggests that a Christian theosemiotic
bears Peirce’s PEM bias as a result of a robust appropriation of Semeiotic.
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Five: Conclusion
This dissertation has engaged a suggestion from Alister McGrath that Charles Peirce’s
theory of signs supplies a fitting and powerful resource to structure the epistemology of a renewed vision for Christian theology of nature. McGrath’s suggestion sympathizes with several
other Christian theologians whose work aims to continue along the trajectory of the mainstream
of the great Christian tradition; for example, Andrew Robinson, Hermann Deuser, and Amos
Yong. These represent a growing community of researchers who find Peirce’s ideas fruitful for
theological interpretation, developing understanding of a wide range of religious ideas. On the
other hand, Peirce scholars, including Michael Raposa and Robert Corrington, agree that Peirce’s
philosophy entails a panentheist ontology. Further, though it is possible to abstract Peirce’s sign
theory from its systematic context in Peirce’s thought, Raposa holds that such a move sacrifices
much of the power of Peirce’s sign theory. All of this suggests, first, that theologians appropriating Peirce for their work have likely invited philosophical problems, wishing to claim powers of
Semeiotic that are muted or lost due to abstraction from their Peircean roots. Second, these theologians invite theological problems (vis-à-vis a catholic-evangelical view), since a recovery of a
robust, Peircean sign theory would involve those aspects of Peirce’s thought that experts find to
entail panentheism. This dissertation has taken McGrath’s suggestion as an opportunity to test
this problem. The guiding hypothesis has been that developing Peirce’s sign theory within
McGrath’s proposed Christian natural theology (CNT) will also incorporate Peirce’s bias toward
panentheist ontology, which would then risk incoherence in CNT’s theoretical structure. The ensuing inquiry found that CNT interpreted by a robust account of Semeiotic does skew theologically toward panentheism from its traditional Christian starting point. However, it does not appear that Peirce’s ideas themselves entail a properly demarcated panentheism.
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A key to that result is the “properly demarcated panentheism.” Research found that the
identity of panentheism is a current problem for the panentheism community. There is broad
sympathy with the basic idea that “the world is in God, but God is more than the world.” So far
intractable problems arise when trying to grasp a clear concept of what “in” is meant to say in
that vague definition. Philip Clayton, perhaps the most prolific proponent of panentheism today,
is content to let the definition—and panentheism’s identity—remain vague. He is happy to recognize highly disparate theologies as bona fide members of a panentheist community (theisms
such as Christianity, but also naturalisms such as Daoists). Others, among them Michael Brierley, recognize a “demarcation problem.” That is, such a broad conception of panentheism risks
becoming meaningless. In other words, if everything is panentheist then nothing is. Working
with recent studies engaging the demarcation problem, this dissertation constructed a model of a
panentheism (PEM) that neither blends into classical theism nor pantheism. Six core beliefs mark
PEM: the mind-body analogy, ontological inclusion, dynamic dipolarity, mutual coinherence,
symmetrical ontological dependence, and empathy. PEM takes these as an interdependent whole,
for which the mind-body analogy provides the unifying logic.
The fact that PEM can be clearly distinguished from classical theism suggests that theologies sympathetic to classical theism—such as CNT—would begin to contradict themselves if Semeiotic brings with it a panentheist ontology. On the other hand, the present inquiry does not approach panentheism as problematic from the broad philosophical perspective of classical theism.
Rather, the theological perspective of this dissertation is, more specifically, that of a “catholicevangelical” theological tradition. It differs from classical theism in its openly confessional claim
that the incarnation of the Son in Jesus supplies the defining pattern for theological truth. This
distinction is not meant as a critique of classical theism. Rather, it recognizes that classical
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theism is proper to a philosophical approach to theology, whereas the approach taken here starts
from openly Christian beliefs. Consequently, it was necessary to define that approach. Analysis
of recent historical theologies of creation yielded a Christian theism model (CT). In light of traditional creation theology, whose ontological claims model the God-world relation according to
the Incarnation, seven core beliefs emerged for CT: redemption economy, maker analogy, freedom of divine action, absolute ontological distinction, two orders of being, divine ground of being, and relation of others. The CT model made it possible then to define just why PEM would
be problematic for any theology that intends to maintain a CT perspective. For the purposes of
this project, the three points of this problematic served as the criteria by which to recognize a
PEM influence upon a more fully semeiotic CNT. Those criteria are distinctive, PEM ways of
speaking of the God-world relation: as a self-relation, as an interdependent relation, and as a
symbolic relation indicating natural metaphysical principles.
Just as it was important to define the relationship of CT to PEM, it was also necessary to
define Peirce’s relationship to PEM. Chapter three engaged a critical inquiry in response to
Peirce scholars’ claims that Peirce’s philosophy entails a panentheist ontology. It was not so
much with the expectation of contradicting those claims. Rather, it was driven by a need to understand which of Peirce’s ideas lend to a panentheist view and whether Peirce himself would
have sympathized with panentheism. This kind of information would inform later analysis of the
experimental semeiotic interpretation of CNT. Also, since the power of semeiotic lies in its various roots in Peirce’s philosophy, to make sense of a semeiotic interpretation of CNT required a
comprehensive view of that system and the place of semeiotic within it. That discussion of
Peirce’s thought highlighted the importance of his anthropomorphic epistemology. Peirce conceived of the human mind as having been formed in the image of the cosmic processes and
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regularities under the influence of which the human mind evolved. Chapter three analyzed
Peirce’s thought in five themes: meaning, the triad, interpretation, mind, and God. Discussion of
these themes centered on interpretation, in which semeiotic is a salient element. Also, the movement through these themes moved interpretively, consistent with Peirce’s architectonic arrangement of sciences, such that semeiotic becomes an interpretive lens by which the triadic processes
of the cosmos are recognized as a great mind, and the meaning of the cosmos is recognized as
somehow defining the common term “God.” The first four themes paired a major element of
Peirce’s epistemology with its correlate concept in Peirce’s metaphysics. For example, in the
theme Interpretation, Peirce’s semeiotic epistemology corresponds to his concept of growth as a
metaphysical principle. The theme of God in Peirce’s thought required a different approach.
Peirce did not develop a systematic explanation of his theology. Rather, his writings include numerous discussions of his theological ideas as bearing upon other philosophical matters. Consideration of several of Peirce’s clearly theological statements provided a sense for his ideas about
God’s relation to the cosmos. This yielded the insight that Peirce consistently speaks of God’s
relation to the cosmos as semeiotic in nature and a metaphysical parallel to the relation of an artisan to their artifact. Therefore, Peirce’s metaphysics was not yet panentheism, though it is evident why someone might see him as pointing in that direction.
These considerations prepared the way for the empirical, that is, experimental, investigation in chapter four. The method of inquiry of this dissertation sought evidence of PEM’s influence in a version of CNT built upon a robust semeiotic theory. This experiment involved several
steps. First, a closer look at McGrath’s treatment of Semeiotic highlighted the function he believes it should have within CNT overall. McGrath’s interest in Semeiotic is for the way Peirce
accounted for the interpretive habits of the imagination that bear upon the subjective side of a
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critical realist perception model. Then, this study introduced Michael Raposa’s work on “theosemiotic” as an appropriate model of a robust Peircean account of Semeiotic as it bears on perception in religious experience. Accordingly, the experiment of chapter four next followed the
theosemiotic method of inquiry to discover an authentic Peircean interpretation of CNT: abductive formation of a hypothesis, deductive clarification of the implications of that hypothesis, and
inductive testing for those implications in experience. In the abductive phase, musement involved a theosemiotic engagement with a plain sense representation of McGrath’s CNT proposal. This discovered that theosemiotic would likely respond to CNT in six ways. The deductive
phase defined how theosemiotic would alter the CNT idea, producing the six ideas pertaining to
a Christian theosemiotic. These steps positioned this inquiry for the inductive phase of the experiment. That involved observing the theological results, relevant to the God-cosmos relation, of an
actual case of something like Christian theosemiotic. Robert Neville’s theology of symbolic engagement qualified as the Christian theosemiotic exemplar, according to the six defining ideas of
that model.
A brief look into Neville’s mature work found evidence of all three of the PEM criteria.
On the other hand, it was also evident that Neville has a distinctive sense for a PEM God-cosmos
relation. That is, Neville’s metaphysics grants all three PEM criteria at a symbolic level. God’s
relation to the world can be considered a self-relation, as long as one understands it as a symbol
of a much vaguer reality. Likewise for the second criterion: there is a sense in which the ultimate
reality—the eternal creative act—grows interdependently with what is being created. Again,
however, that is in a merely semiotic sense. In determining continuous developments of the creation, the ultimate reality also determines further developments of itself. Regarding the third PEM
criterion, that “God” represents metaphysical principles, Neville’s theory agrees fully. Therefore,

213
Neville’s Christian theosemiotic both embraces a robust Peircean Semeiotic and far surpasses
Peirce’s relation to PEM. Whereas Peirce himself was not yet PEM in his metaphysics, Neville
has moved beyond PEM in his radical form of religious naturalism. For Neville, not just “God”
but any theism—even PEM and pantheism—must only stand as symbols of the maximally vague
ultimate reality.
However, though Neville’s religious ontology affirms PEM as a true, though imperfect,
symbol of ultimate reality, Neville’s case shows that Semeiotic as such does not entail a PEM
ontology. Apparently due to his own ontological priorities, Neville amended Peirce’s Semeiotic
in definitive ways for use in Neville’s symbolic engagement theory. Still, CNT—like CT—is not
open to anything approaching PEM. Neville’s case appears to show, therefore, that Semeiotic is
a determining factor in the susceptibility to PEM of the Christian theosemiotic hypothesized
above.
This outcome may give the reader the impression of a strong PEM risk with Semeiotic.
However, let the reader keep two points in mind. First, the experiment in the previous chapter
intentionally prioritized theosemiotic over CNT as the primary interpretive “reader.” This likely
exaggerated whatever PEM bias Peirce’s ideas have, denying CNT the opportunity to modify
that influence in light of broader considerations. So, as a hypothesis for another project, a more
balanced dialogue conceived as a CNT interpretation of theosemiotic would be both robustly
Christian and semeiotic. The crucial factor in such a result would be to ground Christian theosemiotic in an authentic Christian ontology according to parameters like those set forth in CT.
Second, the conclusion for this project must attend to Peirce’s side of Neville’s religious naturalism. Neville goes far beyond Peirce’s own ideas. It is evident that Peirce’s Semeiotic, as Peirce
understood it within his own philosophical system, does not entail a PEM model of the God-
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cosmos relation. Though Peirce’s underdeveloped semeiotic metaphysics is susceptible to PEM
ontology, it is also the case that the semeiotic aspect of Peirce’s metaphysics consistently resists
PEM. Therefore, Peirce’s philosophy might offer resources by which Christian theosemioticians
might take full advantage of the explanatory scope and power of Semeiotic while avoiding the
pitfalls of PEM or more radical religious naturalisms.1 Further research regarding Christian theosemiotic will pursue the discovery of those resources.
This affirms the great promise Peirce’s thought holds for the new natural theology emerging in the field of science and religion, as Alister McGrath has suggested. One might consider
this dissertation as a case study in an experimental pragmaticist method of cultural engagement.
The possibility of incorporating panentheist bias via Semeiotic within CNT represents to some
degree the larger tendency within religion and science to adopt a panentheist metaphysics. The
unexpected result of this study, that Semeiotic provides PEM-resistant resources for natural theology, might indicate a way to accomplish the ends of the new natural theology without compromising so much of traditional Christian faith. Further experience and experimentation with the
Christian theological appropriation of Peirce’s views will tell.

Ochs, Logic of Scripture, will prove to be helpful in this regard. His work finds that Peirce’s own
philosophy requires that the Judeo-Christian scriptures supply true “leading principles” (defining beliefs) for any
inquiry pursuing the truth of religious signs; cf., ibid., 288.
1
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Appendix A: Demarcating Panentheism
The Panentheism Meta-Model (PEM)
Table 7 The Panentheism Meta-Model (PEM) Detail

A

Belief or Doctrine
Ontological Distinction (S1) Essential

CPT
S, M, B

PE
M

[S], [M]

S

P

properties per Creator, creatures (M); God
Separate from Cosmos (B1)

B

Divine Impassibility (S9, M)

C

Asymmetrical Ontological Dependence (S3),

S, [M]

Divine Independence (M)
D

Creation (S2), Contingent Creature Exist-

S, M

S

M, B

B

S, M

S

S, M
S, M, B

S
S, M, B

ence (M)

E

Omnipresence (M), God is present to the
cosmos (B3), God penetrates the cosmos (B8)

F

Divine Goodness (S12), Omnibenevolent
(M)

G
H

Divine Power (S11), Omnipotent (M)

Conservation (S5), God Sustains the Uni-

[M]
M

verse (M), God is the ground of the cosmos
(B9)

I

Divine Sensibility (S10), Empathy w/selfcontrol (M), God is affected by the cosmos
(B5)

[M], B

S, B

J

Ontological Inclusion (S6), All-in-God (M),

[M], B

S, M, B

[M], [B]

M, B

[M]

M, B

God contains the universe (B4)

K

Mind-Body analogy (M), The cosmos is

[M]

God's body (B10), God includes the cosmos,
as whole includes part (B11)

L

Relational (M), God and cosmos inextricably
intertwined (B12), Mutual Co-Inherence

(B)
M

Dynamic (M), God is dipolar (B14)

[M]

M, B

N

Symmetrical Ontological Dependence

[M]

S, [M], B

S

M

S, M, B

(S7), God needs the world ontologically (M),
God is dependent on the cosmos (B13)

O

Ontological Identity (S8), God-World Identity (M), God is totally dependent on, or coterminus with, the cosmos (B15)
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The Panentheism Meta-Model (Table 7 The Panentheism Meta-Model (PEM) DetailTable 7 above) synthesizes the data from three important studies regarding a demarcated identity
for panentheism. Beliefs pertaining to classical philosophical theism (CPT), panentheism (PE),
and pantheism (P) are compared. The studies, Brierley (B), Mullins (M) and Stenmark (S), are
discussed in more detail below. Those initials in the PEM table above mark the important beliefs
of each model according to the different studies. Also note that PEM represents the views of
these panentheism advocates who wish to demarcate their view from others. There is no critique
as to the accuracy of their representation of either classical theism or pantheism. Focus remains
on how leading panentheists conceive of the defining beliefs of their view.
A plain initial (e.g., S) indicates a core belief of the respective model, whereas a bracketed initial (e.g, [S]) indicates an auxiliary belief. In the table above, a strikethrough (e.g., M) indicates that a core belief is the denial of that belief (e.g., line A, Mullins writes that the denial of
a God-world ontological distinction is a core belief of panentheism). The primary structure of
this table is from Stenmark, whose study ordered the core beliefs of the three models on a continuum (S1-S8). S9 and following are located according to Brierley’s model.
Notice that item I, “Empathy,” is the logical correlate of panentheism’s core belief denying “Divine Impassibility,” item B. Likewise, item J, Ontological Inclusion,” is the logical correlate of panentheism’s core belief denying “Ontological Distinction,” item A. Item L, “Mutual
Co-Inherence,” is the logical correlate of panentheism’s core belief denying “Ontological Identity,” item O.
Finally, various shading patterns are used to identify the range of core beliefs respective
to each model and the ranges of beliefs outside of that core. For example, panentheism’s core as
demarcated from CPT and P includes items J through N. Item I is also included in PEM in the
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text of chapter two, because S and B agree it is a core belief of PE, and M holds that the corresponding denial of “Divine Impassibility” is a core belief of PE. Only B suggests that “Empathy”
might be a core belief of CPT as well. Similarly, item N, “Symmetrical Ontological Dependence,” is counted with PEM, because all three studies associate it with PE, and only S holds that
it is also a core belief of P.
The Logic of “In”
In a 2006 essay, Michael Brierley engages the problem of demarcating Panentheism from
Classical Theism and Pantheism. He lists fifteen propositions constituting a continuum of denials
or affirmations of the “in” of panentheism (all-in-god-ism).1 The continuum consists of degrees
of relation between denying that the world is in God and identifying God with the world. That is,
each proposition states a logically possible way of describing the “in” of panentheism. Therefore,
the continuum moves from classical philosophical theism (CPT) to pantheism (P), with Panentheism (PE) falling along a range somewhere between these.2 Thus, for example, if one’s version
of theism would affirm that “the cosmos is God’s body” (#10 below), then one’s view is probably panentheist (PE). CPT’s definitive hypothesis is #1, PE ranges between #4 and #14, and P’s
only relevant hypothesis is #15. Demarcating PE vis-à-vis P is not difficult since P has a strong
form of God-world relation, such that the world is God without remainder. PE’s distinction here
resists identifying the two and maintains a form of divine transcendence. The difficulty comes in
trying to demarcate PE from CPT. PE as such, according to Brierley, includes propositions #4-

1

This paragraph discusses Brierley, “Potential,” 636-41.

Cf., Table 8 “Brierley’s ‘In’ Propositions” below. Though Brierley’s discussion mentions “Eschatological
panentheism,” the discussion here does not consider it. The table reflects it since it is part of Brierley’s discussion,
but it receives very little attention in that discussion. Brierley describes it as a future-oriented perspective among
some classical theists. “Classical philosophical theism” is borrowed from Philip Clayton to clarify this dissertation’s
distinction between classical and Christian theism. (Although, that distinction is to clarify a certain species within a
genus.) Cf., Clayton, “Panentheism,” 699. Arthur Peacocke also uses this phrase in Peacocke, “Introduction,” xviii.
2
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14. However, Brierley also grants that CPT includes propositions #1-8. Further, Brierley holds
that #9 and #10 are available to CPT if kept consistent with #1. Therefore, Brierley’s account implies that only #11-14 are distinctly panentheistic. This is interesting, because #11-14 is the subrange of PE Brierley calls “advanced” PE.3 It follows, then, that “basic” PE (#4-10) is a panentheist way of construing certain CPT beliefs.
Table 8 Brierley's “In” Propositions

CPT
Classical
Theism

PE

Eschatological
(Pan)Theism
Y (for now)

Basic
PE

Y (for now)

Y

1. God is separate from the cosmos.

Y

2. The cosmos will be in God.

Y

3. God is present to the cosmos.

Y

4. God contains the cosmos. (external
relation implied)

Y

5. God is affected by the cosmos (e.g.,
God suffers).
6. God acts in and through the cosmos.

Y

Y

Y

Y

7. The cosmos is a sacrament, or sacramental.

Y

Y

8. God penetrates the cosmos.

Y

Y

9. God is the ground of the cosmos.

Y (if w/#1)

Y

10. The cosmos is God's body.

Y (if w/#1)

P

Advanced PE

Y

11. God includes the cosmos, as the
whole includes the part.

Y

12. God and the cosmos are inextricably
intertwined.

Y

13. God is dependent on the cosmos.

Y

14. God is dipolar.

Y

15. God is totally dependent on, or coterminus with, the cosmos.

Y

“Y” marks a proposition as being consistent within the respective model. Modifying conditions are indicated in parentheses. CPT can affirm propositions #1-#10. PE can affirm propositions #4-#14.

3

Brierley, “Potential,” 638, identifies “advanced” PE as expressed in a mature way in process theism.
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The Logic of “Core” Beliefs
Some recent studies explore the demarcation problem through the framework of Imre
Lakatos’ seminal work in philosophy of science.4 Lakatos theorized a Research Program (RP) as
constituted by “core” hypotheses and by “auxiliary” ones. It is the core hypotheses that define
and direct the RP. So, possibly, PE can be demarcated by its core tenets vis-à-vis the core tenets
of CPT and P. This discussion considers two recent studies utilizing this framework for demarcation analysis. One study is by R. Mullins.5 The other is by Michael Stenmark.6
Mullins Demarcation Model
R. Mullins’ study seeks to demarcate PE vis-à-vis three subtypes of Western theism (classical theism [CPT], neo-classical theism [NCT], open theism [OT]) and pantheism (P) (Table 9
below). Mullins’ method is to consider the range of beliefs held by these models. So, a comprehensive set of beliefs in classical theism are considered, then a few that are common among pantheists, then a moderate number that are held by panentheists to be definitive of their view. Then
he considers how they compare on select beliefs.7 Ultimately, Mullins finds that PE as currently
described in the literature is not sufficiently distinct from the other models.
CPT’s core beliefs include a se, strong immutability, omniscience, and sustaining the universe, among others. Alternate versions of CPT—NCT and OT—ascribe to the same range of
core beliefs, though with qualifications in some instances, or alternative formulations in others.

Clayton, “Prospects,” 1-18; cf., Lakatos, “Falsification and Methodology of Scientific Research
Programmes,” 91-196.
4

5

Mullins, “Difficulty.”

6
Stenmark, “Panentheism and Its Neighbors.” Though Stenmark does not expressly appeal to Lakatos, his
terminology implicitly invokes the research program framework; cf., Clayton, “Prospects,” 8.

The table reflects Mullins’ discussion. Where Mullins did not speak to a model’s position on some belief,
the table leaves it blank. For example, there was no comment regarding PE’s position on several CPT beliefs,
including a se, timeless, and strong immutability. Although, one could reason how PE would respond to those.
7
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NCT, for example, holds timelessness as a core belief but qualifies it as being with succession.
God is infinite with respect to time but does experience movement from one state to another.
CNT and OT qualify the core belief of immutability as a “weak” rather than strong form. By this,
according to Mullins, these hold that God does not change in his essence but he does change in
his relationships. Other views are represented among CPT, NCT, and OT, but they are auxiliary
rather than core beliefs. That is, they do not qualify a view as CPT, NCT, or OT. For example,
all three views have some who hold to the eternality of truth, but this can be denied without causing one’s view to depart from the tradition. Similarly, the core of P is that the world is one substance, and God and the world are ontologically identical. Therefore, they have a strong sense in
which God is manifest in individuals and events. Mullins notes that several core beliefs of CPT
are auxiliary beliefs for P. For example, surprisingly, P can include the belief that God is a se,
timeless, immutable, and simple.
PE’s core beliefs include several from Charles Hartshorne’s classic definition, that God is
eternal, conscious, omniscient (“knows the world”), changing (“temporal”), and all-in-God
(“world-inclusive”).8 Another, closely related core belief is that God is relational. PE also includes two negative core beliefs. One is the denial of a God-world identity (against P). The other
is the denial of a God-world distinction, in the sense that CPT holds. The latter denial entails
negative views of several of CPT’s core beliefs (that God and creatures have essential properties
distinctive to themselves and that God is independent). Most of PE’s auxiliary beliefs, according
to Mullins’ discussion, have to do with various ways of interpreting the sense of the world “in”

8

In an influential essay, Hartshorne defined Panentheism as the form of theism simultaneously affirming
all five theistic categories that Hartshorne finds to be at issue throughout the history of Western theology,
represented by the initials ETCKW: eternal, temporal, conscious, knowing the universe, world-inclusive. Cf.,
Charles Hartshorne, “Introduction: The Standpoint of Panentheism,” in Hartshorne and Reese, eds., Philosophers
Speak of God, 1-25.
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God. These are also auxiliary beliefs available to CPT. Surprisingly, God’s dependence upon the
world is considered by Mullins to be auxiliary to PE. This is because some major proponents of
PE hesitate to affirm that God needs the world. For example, Clayton holds that God freely
chooses to need the world somehow like a mind needs its body.9 Stronger forms of PE, such as
Hartshorne’s process view, hold that God truly and always needs a universe, but God can choose
the kind that embodies him.10
As with Brierley’s analysis, PE is clearly demarcated from P by resisting the pull toward
identifying God and the world.11 This denial is a core tenet of PE. Also, like Brierley, Mullins’
work shows that PE has much more in common doctrinally with Classical Theism than with P.
Although, the shared beliefs with CPT are primarily auxiliaries. The upshot of Mullins’ work is
that PE holds no core beliefs as distinctly its own. Every core and auxiliary belief marked for PE
already pertains to either CPT or P. From this it looks more as though PE is a modified form of
CPT, such as NCT and OT.

9

Mullins, “Demarcating Panentheism,” 341.

10

Hartshorne, “Standpoint of Panentheism,” 22.

“Resisting” is appropriate, because Philip Clayton describes PE as a movement that aims to make God as
immanent to the world as possible without slipping into a pantheistic mode marked by identifying God and the
cosmos. Cf., e.g., Clayton, “Prospects,” 9; idem., “Panentheism” (2015), 692.
11
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Table 9 Mullins Demarcation Model

Beliefs

Theism

Panentheism
(PE)

Pantheism
(P)

Classical
Theism
(CPT)
Y

Neoclassical
Theism
(NCT)
Y

Open Theism
(OT)
Y

[Y]

Timeless

Y

Y w/succession

Y

[Y]

Strong Immutability

Y

Y weak*

Y weak

[Y]

Simple
Impassible

Y
Y

(cf. unity)
(cf. empathy)

(cf. unity)
(cf. empathy)

[Y]

Omnibenevolent

Y

Y

Y

Omniscient

Y

Y

Y, limited foreknowledge

Omnipotent

Y

Y

Y

Omnipresent

Y

Y

Y

Necessary divine existence

Y

Y

Y

Creatures Contingent

Y

Y

Y

God essential properties

Y

Y

Y

N (re: G-W
distinction)

Creatures essential properties

Y

Y

Y

N (re: C-W
distinction)

World is Plurality of Substances

Y

Y

Y

Sustains the Universe

Y

Y

Y

Eternality of truth

[Y]

[Y]

[Y]

Temporal Ontology

[Y]

[Y]

Creation Necessary or Contingent

[Y]

[Y]

Infinite

[Y]

[Y]

a se

[Y]
(cf. body)

Y

Y

Empathy w/Self-Control

Y

Y

Human Freedom

[Y]

Y libertarian

Presentist

[Y]

Y

Endurantist

[Y]

Y
Y

N (re: G-W
distinction)

World is One Substance

Y
N

Individuals & Events Manifest
God
Personal
Conscious

Y

[Y]

Y

God-World Identity

[Y]

Y contingent

Unity of distinct & coextensive
attributes

Divine independence

Y

Y
Y
[Y]

Y

[Y]
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Beliefs

All-In-God
God More Than World
Transcendent/Immanent
Mind-Body Analogy

Theism
Classical
Theism
(CPT)
(cf. “In”)
(cf.
“body”)
Y

Neoclassical
Theism
(NCT)
(cf. “In”)

Panentheism
(PE)
Open Theism
(OT)
(cf. “In”)

Y
Y

Y

Y

[Y] but
“body”

Y

Y

Y

[Y]

“In” = God energizes the world

[Y]

[Y]

[Y]

[Y]

“In” = God experiences the
world

[Y]

[Y]

[Y]

[Y]

“In” = God ensouls the world

[Y]

[Y]

[Y]

[Y]

“In” = God plays with the world

[Y]

[Y]

[Y]

[Y]

“In” = God gives space to the
world

[Y]

[Y]

[Y]

[Y]

“In” = God provides the ground
of emergence in the world

[Y]

[Y]

[Y]

[Y]

“In” = God befriends the world

[Y]

[Y]

[Y]

[Y]

(cf. Timeless)

(cf. Timeless)

(cf. Timeless)

Y

Dynamic

[Y]

[Y]

Y

Relational

[Y]

[Y]

Y

Changing

[Y]

[Y]

Y

Eternal

God Needs the World Ontologically

Pantheism
(P)

[Y]

[Y]

Y/N = core; [Y] = auxiliary; * “weak” = unchanging essence, changing relationships

Stenmark Demarcation Model
Mikael Stenmark’s recent essay, similarly, finds very little distinguishing PE from the array of theistic models (Table 10 below). Like Brierley, Stenmark considers a list of beliefs ranging along a continuum moving from CPT to P. However, Stenmark also includes Deism, which
constitutes the extreme opposite of P. Like both Brierley and Mullins, Stenmark finds the extreme on the Pantheism end of the continuum clearly demarcated from PE by its belief in the
God-world identity. Stenmark also agrees that there is a substantial degree of correlation in the
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beliefs of CPT and PE. However, he notes that several beliefs commonly held to be definitive for
each of these models are in fact incidental to them. For example, a motivation driving panentheism in contemporary theology is a rejection of divine impassibility, held to be a core belief of
CPT.12 Stenmark finds, to the contrary, that this is an auxiliary belief. Simlarly, process theism is
often closely identified with PE.13 However, Stenmark finds that it is a logical possibility for
CPT, too. Being at the core of neither CP, nor PE, then, it is an auxiliary belief. Consequently, on
according to Stenmark, PE demarcates itself primarily by its relatively strong sense in which
God includes the cosmos within God’s own being.14
On Stenmark’s analysis, of the fourteen beliefs considered, only two properly belong to
the PE core without also being found in the others: “divine sensibility” (the view that “God is capable of emotions, in particular is capable of feeling sorrow or suffering as a result of the afflictions of God's creatures”) and “ontological inclusion” (that “the world is a part of God but not
identical to God”).15 However, we recall that Mullins’ analysis showed that two variations of
CPT (NCT and OT) hold that God has an empathetic relation to the cosmos. Taking that into account, then, PE really has only one distinctive core belief, ontological inclusion. Yet, that is
merely the vague affirmation of the term “panentheism” (all-in-God). As we have seen both from
Brierley and Mullins, the sense of “in” can vary widely even within CPT. Yet, Stenmark’s demarcation of PE may nevertheless hold, because he defines “ontological inclusion” as entailing a

12

Cf., e.g., Peacocke, “Introduction,” xviii.

13

As with Brierley above, “advanced” PE.

Since Stenmark’s analysis conformed to a continuum across the models themselves, rather than an
element related to the models, the Meta-Model generally holds to his structure. (In contrast to Brierley’s
demarcation study, which considers the three models relative to meanings of the world being “in” God that are
logically available to them.) Brierley and Mullins, where not correlated directly with Stenmark, are included where
they fit logically in the D-P continuum, relative to similar topics, and where the emphasis of the respective models
seems to lie (in that descending order of priority).
14

15

Stenmark, “Panentheism and Its Neighbors,” 31, 27.

225
whole-part relation. CPT will not use whole-part language to explain possible ways the cosmos
can be said to be “in” God, P will not agree to the whole-part language, because God-world identity entails coextension.
Therefore, for Stenmark, PE demarcates itself merely by its relatively strong sense in
which God includes the cosmos within God’s own being. This is consistent with Brierley’s analysis. Brierley found PE to be distinctive especially in “advanced” ways of construing the “in” of
all-in-God. Stenmark differs only in not further analyzing what the core belief of ontological inclusion may mean. In that way, perhaps Brierley’s work complements that of Stenmark. Though
Mullins concluded negatively regarding PE as a demarcated RP, in fact it seems his analysis concurs with Stenmark. Though Mullins – like Brierley – shows that CPT can have a sense of all
“in” God, these are auxiliary to CPT proper. Also, CPT will not affirm “in” in a way truly comparable to the core of PE (recall Brierley here). They find, then, that PE can be demarcated from
CPT by the particular sense in which PE construes the meaning of its identifying term “panentheism” (all-in-God-ism).16 This underscores the cogency of The Brierley Model, which is corroborated in the PE Meta-Model.

16
Two other studies corroborate this conclusion. Cf., Gregersen, “Three Varieties of Panentheism,”, and
Cooper, Panentheism.
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Table 10 Stenmark Demarcation Model

Doctrine

Deism

Classical Theism

(4) World Self-Sufficiency

Y

(1) Ontological Distinction

Y

Y

Y

Y

(3) Asymmetrical Ontological Dependence

Panentheism

[Y]

(9) Divine Impassibility

Y

Y

(5) Conservation

Y

Y

(11) Divine Power

Y

Y

(12) Divine Goodness

Y

Y

[Y]

[Y]

(2) Creation

(14) Process Theism

Pantheism

Y

(10) Divine Sensibility

Y

(6) Ontological Inclusion

Y

(13) Pure (Divine) Persuasive Power

[Y]

Panpsychism
(7) Symmetrical Ontological Dependence
(8) Ontological Identity

[Y]
Y

Y
Y

Doctrines indicated as "Y" are core doctrines of the indicated research program. If indicated with brackets "[Y]"
then the doctrine is not core but is an auxiliary option held by some. Stenmark's primary numerical order includes
#1-#8. #1-#4 have been rearranged here to reflect their relation to the primary logic of Stenmark's continuum moving from Deism (extreme God-world separation) to Pantheism (extreme God-world identity).
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Appendix B: CNT & CT Parity
In Re-Imagining Nature, McGrath writes that the “foundations” for the CNT project
therein described were laid in the course of three previous works, The Open Secret, A FineTuned Universe, and Darwinism and the Divine.1 The first two of those expressly address
McGrath’s Christian theological schema that distinguishes his natural theology project from
other natural theologies.2 These foundational works in relation to Re-Imagining set forth five
basic Christian doctrines identified for CNT that this dissertation refers to as theological beliefs:
the Self-Revealing God, the Analogia Entis, the Imago Dei, the Economy of Salvation, and the
Incarnation.3 The following discussion briefly explain CNT's theological beliefs and how they
relate to the principles of CT.
First, CNT affirms the God of Christianity as the “Self-Revealing God.” This is “the idea
of a transcendent God who chooses to self-disclose in history and nature,” (OS 4423; FT 71). So,
McGrath adds that the illumination of the Holy Spirit informs this view. God is personally involved in the human process of interpreting both nature and scripture (FT 72). Though this belief

1

McGrath, Re-Imagining, 4.

2

McGrath writes that Christian natural theology is a form of the more general human quest to discover and
relate to what transcends ourselves. The history of religion manifests such a tendency across all times and places.
That is, natural theology per se “can be broadly understood as a process of reflection on the religious entailments of
the natural world, rather than a specific set of doctrines,” (RI 7). Within such practices among those of Christian
faith, some tenets set forth in this section distinguish McGrath’s project as a subset. For example, McGrath’s
Christian natural theology contrasts with the process theology of Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, Based on the
Thought of Alfred North Whitehead. Also, CNT distinguishes itself from the modern classical approach to theistic
proofs promoted by Christian philosophers, such as William Lane Craig and James Porter Moreland, eds., The
Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009); cf., also, E. Feser, Five Proofs
for the Existence of God (Ignatius Press, 2017). Cf., section “Resonance, Not Proof,” OS 433-70.
3

There are two similar lists of traditional Christian doctrines. In The Open Secret McGrath discusses five
“leading themes of the Christian faith,” (OS 4423). Four of these are listed again in A Fine-Tuned Universe as the
important “points” of “a Trinitarian vision of reality,” (FT 70-71). The list in Fine-Tuned omits the incarnation as a
distinct item in the list. However, it appears to include the incarnation within its discussion of the imago Dei, in that
christology is expressly a definitive topic for the concept of “the image of God.” Given the determinative force of
the doctrine of the incarnation for Christian theology in general, it is maintained in this dissertation as a distinct
structural element according to the original list given in Open Secret.
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does not directly align with any of the CT principles, one might argue that it fits within the CT
principle of the Relation of Others (RO). Recall that this principle holds that it is God who has
the prerogative to initiate and sustain the redemptive relation with the creation. Structured in the
person of Christ and accomplished by the constant activity of the Holy Spirit, in love God brings
humans and the created order into relation to himself in perfecting the creation according to the
Redemption Economy. The revelation of this plan to humans certainly belongs among the sorts
of activities by which God brings humans into sanctifying relation to himself (e.g., Eph 1:9, 10;
17-19; 3:9-12).
Second, CNT affirms the analogia Entis. This is “the belief that there is an analogous relationship between God and nature, grounded in the created character of the natural order,” (OS
4423). The concept of analogia entis rests especially on Augustine’s thought, “that there exists,
on the one hand, a perceptible correspondence and, on the other, an ontological difference, between the creator and the creation,” (OS 4551). Both this difference and the correspondence follow from creatio ex nihilo, the crucial doctrine that divine creation is absolute, not a mere ordering of existent matter. Also, the creation that results is wholly dependent upon the mind and
power of its creator (FT 73-74). In that dependence, “the created order is capable of rendering
the character of God, especially God’s wisdom, goodness, and beauty,” (FT 74).4

McGrath notes G. M. Hopkins’ concepts of nature’s “‘inscape’” and “‘instress.’” Also, Emil Brunner’s
notion of nature’s “‘permanent capacity for revelation,’” informs this view (FT 74).
4

Furthermore, with this belief it becomes evident how CNT brings together the most important elements of
the orthodox tradition. That is, in Re-Imagining Nature, McGrath’s list of six types of natural theological practice in
history of Christian theology appears to correlate with several structural beliefs of CNT. McGrath writes that each
type manifests “a broader and richer underlying concept, reflecting the needs or opportunities of the particular
context within which it is embedded,” (RI 18). That is, these types emerged in the times and places that they did,
because a more comprehensive, tacit Christian natural theology determined such responses to the challenges
particular to their context. In other words, these six types, according to McGrath, constitute a “thick description” of
a more basic model of natural theology governed by beliefs basic to Christian theology. “Each can be seen as an
enactment of an aspect of natural theology, rather than as defining in itself what natural theology actually is,” (RI
23). The analogia entis represents the second such historical model incorporated into CNT as a sort of metamodel.
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The analogy of being figures expressly in CT, though not for all the same reasons as here
in CNT. CT focuses on the ontological disparity figured by analogia entis. In the Divine Ground
of Being (DGB), the creaturely being is gifted by God, “suspended” from God’s being as its
manner of participation in divine being. This affirms CNT on the constant dependence of the created order upon God. Such participation “in” the being of God is guarded against panentheism by
the central doctrines of CT emphasizing that the relation of Creator to creation is one of noncontinuous others. The CT principles of the Freedom of Divine Action, Absolute Ontological Distinction, and Two Orders of Being focus on the “ontological difference” CNT affirms from Augustine. So, CT majors on just one aspect of analogia entis, whereas CNT holds two complementary aspects (resemblance and ontological difference) together. That is, because the creation
is created by God from nothing, its otherness from God is no obstacle to God’s use of the creation to represent himself to human interpreters.
Third, CNT holds the Imago Dei as a core theological belief. For CNT, this is “the principle that humanity is created in the image of God and thus endowed with some capacity to discern
traces of God within or through nature,” (OS 4423).5 McGrath affirms the model offered by Athanasius, that the imago Dei “designates the human capacity to reason—or, more accurately, to
conform mentally to the patterns established by the divine Logos within creation—and hence to

That second model “[proceeds] from engagement with the world of nature,” (RI 20). This is an a posteriori
“affirmation of the existence of God on the basis of the regularity and complexity of the natural world,” (RI 19).
5
This belief incorporates the first natural theology model from McGrath’s list of six. (Cf., note 4 above)
This is the model that corresponds to classical modern natural theology, “‘which investigates what human reason
unaided by revelation can tell us about God.’” It holds forth the basic concept that certain a priori principles have
“theistic entailments” (RI 18-19). (Quoting George Hayward Joyce, Principles of Natural Theology (New York:
Routledge, 2017; repr., 1922), 1.) This emphasizes that the basic equipment of the human mind is somehow
naturally attuned to orderly, logical reasoning, and to discern subtle clues left by the creator upon the work of
creation. Therefore, also the third model of natural theology is evident here. This model emphasizes “the intellectual
outcome of the natural tendency of the human mind to desire or be inclined toward God,” (RI 20). There is a sense
in which belief in God is natural.
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discern God, albeit partially and imperfectly,” (OS 4587; cf. also FT 76).6 Augustine developed
this further, drawing a comparison between the triune being of God and a tripartite analysis of
the human mind. That is, the human image of God manifests in part in the very structure of the
human mind (FT 76).7 So, the fact that humans are able to make sense of nature “is to be explained by the rationality of God as creator of both the fundamental ordering of nature and the
human observer of nature,” (FT 77). Part of God’s ordering of the human observer’s mind is to
grant the human mind its own agency, comparable to God’s creative agency, to construct its perception of significance in nature (OS 4683). That is, the imagination works with the God-given
rationality. McGrath writes, “the human imagination is part of our endowment as those who bear
the ‘image of God,’ enabling us to ‘see’ the fundamental interconnectedness of the world, no
matter how difficult this may be to express in words,” (RI 48-49). However, CNT also holds that
this divine image in the mind of humankind is marred by sin. The healing of the faculty of perception comes not from the proper selection of natural facts to interpret, but “by the enhancement
of the human capacity to discern,” (OS 4700).8 It is not just the data that his mind is working
with that is problematic. The human mind itself needs healing, a recalibration by the true
knowledge of the creator. Therefore, without some way to correct the sin-biased faculty of

However, Gunton, Triune Creator, 12, “The traditional tendency to locate the image of God in reason or
some other human endowment or quality is now much disputed in favour of a conception of the whole of human
being as existing in relation to God, other human beings and the rest of the created order. The latter relation is
described in Genesis as ‘dominion’, which means...a calling to be and to act in such a way as to enable the created
order to be itself as a response of praise to its maker.”
6

McGrath cites Augustine, On the Trinity, 9.12.18, regarding the concept of “vestiges of the Trinity,” or
“footprints.” Specifically, Augustine describes what Peirce would call a triadic relation constituting a mind as such
among the mind’s self, its knowledge of itself, and its love of itself. Also, McGrath cites Augustine, On the Trinity,
16.4.6, regarding the rational or intellectual soul. Presumably book 16 is a typographical error, since this work goes
only to fifteen books. At 15.4.6, Augustine argues that natural signs can yield knowledge of God’s attributes due to
the rational nature given by God.
7

McGrath compares this problem to “visual agnosia,” a disease in which one sees every detail as normal
but has no ability to make sense of the whole, to conceive of the meaning of what one sees (OS 4719). This lends to
the programmatic claim of CNT as such, that Christian natural theology will be persuasive through the ability to see
nature according to its creator, as informed by basic Christian theology.
8
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perception, human observers cannot have great confidence in their ability to know God truly
through nature (OS 4790).
This third theological belief of CNT clearly pertains to epistemology. As such, it lies beyond the scope of CT’s ontological focus. Even so, correlations to CT principles are evident.
This belief bears an implied correlation to the belief that God is self-revealing, which, in turn,
arguably relates to the CT principle of the Relation of Others. More immediately evident, however, the concept of the image of God in humankind relates theologically and conceptually to the
CT principle of the Maker Analogy. The doctrine of the imago Dei is grounded in the biblical
testimony that God chose to “make man in our image,” (Gen 1:26). This is one way that the Creator imprinted the work of his hands with his own signature style, as it were. In humankind, at
least, God purposely imparted something of his own personality into his work. Again, this continues to attest to the thoroughgoing otherness of the creature from the Creator. Humankind does
not bear the image of God as the result of ontological continuity with God, but precisely because
the Creator, in his freedom, granted such image to humankind. Finally, since the CNT belief includes the problem of sin, marring the endowed image, there is a theological connection to the
CT principle of the Redemption Economy. “Redemption” has to do, of course, with overcoming
the imperfection of the creation, especially in its bondage to sin. This common ground between
CNT and CT becomes explicit rather than implied in the next CNT belief.
The fourth core theological belief of CNT is The Economy of Salvation. This refers to the
narrative schema in which the natural world is currently subject to the “fall,” but its restoration is
anticipated according to God’s plan: the narrative structure of “creation, fall, redemption, and
consummation,” (OS 4423, 4772). As created, the cosmos was perfectly ordered, but in its fallen
state is now marked by disorder and chaos in spite of a fundamental orderedness that remains
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(OS 4824). Therefore, natural theology necessarily occurs within the unfolding of this plot (FT
78). Regarding the fall, the apostle Paul wrote that “creation [is] the basis of a knowledge of
God,” even as creation is now “‘groaning,’” (OS 4772, in reference to Rom. 1:20; 8:22). That is,
creation itself does not yet manifest God’s full intention for what it will be in its perfect goodness. This bears directly on the possibility of a natural theology. McGrath writes, “it cannot be
assumed that the ‘nature’ which is observed directly corresponds to the state of nature which
might be thought to bear the imprint of its creator,” (OS 4790). In light of the effects of sin on the
image of God, then, “a fallen humanity reflects on a fallen nature,” (FT 78). This means that natural theology constantly faces the hazard that “[T]heological reflection on fallen nature “may
lead to idolatry, heterodoxy, or some form of paganism,” (FT 79). Regarding restoration, the
cross of Jesus is obviously the central element of this economy, relating to both the fallen state of
things and to their restoration through the redeeming work of God in Jesus Christ (FT 80). Yet,
CNT holds also that beyond the cross there is other redemptive work being done. There is the
continuing, providential work of the Spirit sanctifying and perfecting according to the plan of redemption. Accordingly, “there is a profoundly eschatological dimension to an authentically
Christian natural theology, in that it is to be interpreted in the light of its goal, not merely of its
origin,” (OS 4860). That is, “nature is thus to be seen as a continual reminder and symbol of a
renewed creation, a world which we do not yet know but believe to lie over the horizons of our
human existence,” (OS 4879).
The CNT parallel with CT is obvious in this fourth theological belief. The first ontological principle of CT is the Redemption Economy. The basic claims are the same: the creation is an
ages long project that God had always planned to redeem through the person of Jesus Christ. CT
is not as specific about the reason there is sin and evil in the cosmos. The language of “fall” is
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not inconsistent with CT, but CT shies away from claiming that the creation was initially perfect
in the sense of God’s ultimate purpose. It is a project, the beginning of which was perfect with
respect to what needed to be done for that stage of the entire plan of redemption. There is no
doubt that CT and CNT agree that redemption has specifically to do with overcoming the effects
of sin and evil in the world, and that this is done by God’s “two hands,” as Irenaeus taught. This
aspect of CT is made especially clear in its final principle, Relation of Others.
Fifth, CNT holds The Incarnation as a core theological belief. This belief states that God
entered the natural order by entering a certain “place” in history. By the use of the term “place,”
McGrath means the cultural location of being a Jewish male from Nazareth in Galilee in the first
century (OS 4950). McGrath associates the incarnation expressly with the Economy of Salvation,
writing “that God entered into the natural order in Christ, in order to transform and redeem it,”
(OS 4423). As a distinct theological belief comprising CNT, then, it supplies the interpretive key
by which the others are to be understood. Specifically, belief in the incarnation points directly to
the cross of Jesus Christ. That cross entails the redemptive aspect, by which nature is seen according to the promise of eschatological perfection (RI 99). Also, the cross entails the redemption of the fallen human mind, and its healing to see nature and God correctly (RI 100). Therefore, the cross is a poignant symbol in Christian theology called the signum crucis. “The signum
crucis affirms that the one ‘through whom all things were made’ is also the one who suffered and
died on the cross.” The cross is thus God’s definitive self-revelation, and therefore provides the
definitive framework that is able to bring forth theological insight even from the darkness of evil
and suffering in the world (RI 98). As God’s definitive self-revelation, the incarnation also answers the modern question of metaphysical dualism, “how [can] a transcendent God...be known”
through the natural order[?]” (OS 4443; cf., OS 1848). In light of the incarnation, McGrath
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“affirms the capacity of the natural to disclose the divine, both on account of its status as the divine creation, and as the object of God’s habitation,” (OS 424, 1869; also, 4498). Therefore,
“Implicit within a Christian natural theology is a semiotics of nature, in which nature is understood as a system of natural signs—such as a sense of wonder—intimating the existence of some
transcendent reality,” (RI 112).
For CNT, the belief in the Incarnation is central to and definitive of the other theological
beliefs. This is similar to claims regarding the ontological principles of CT. Whereas, CNT focuses on the way the Incarnation informs God’s work of redemption and revelation with and
within the creation, CT focuses more on the way the Incarnation demonstrates how the infinite
God relates to the finite order of his creation. Of course, redemption is a distinct element of CT
with respect to God’s purpose in creating and sustaining the creation. CT’s ontological interest
complements the epistemological interest of CNT. That is, CNT (Analogia Entis) understands
from the Incarnation that the creation has the “capacity” as a medium of divine communication.
CT understands this in terms of the Freedom of Divine Action evident in the incarnation of the
Son. God is able to use the creation in whatever ways and for whatever purposes he wants to.
Further, the Incarnation affirms the ontological dualism of the Two Orders of Being. So,
McGrath and CT agree that the Incarnation demonstrates God’s power and will to reveal himself
through that which is not himself.
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Appendix C: Peirce’s Architectonic
The Classification of Sciences of Charles Peirce1
I.

Sciences of Discovery
A. Mathematics
“what is and what is not logically possible,” whether or not it actually exists (259).
1. Mathematics of Logic
2. Mathematics of Discrete Series
3. Mathematics of Continua and Pseudo-continua
B. Philosophy
“positive science…discovering what really is true; but it limits itself to so much of truth
as can be inferred from common experience (259).
1. Phenomenology
“the kinds of elements universally present in…whatever is present at any time to the
mind in any way” (259).
2. Normative Science
“distinguishes what ought to be from what ought not to be,” (259).
a. Esthetics
“the science of ideals…that which is objectively admirable without any ulterior
reason,” (260).
b. Ethics
“the science of right and wrong,” as per “the summum bonum. It is the theory of
self-controlled, or deliberate, conduct,” (260).
c. Logic
“the theory of self-controlled, or deliberate thought…All thought being performed
by means of signs, Logic may be regarded as the science of the general laws of
signs,” (260).
i.

Speculative Grammar
“the general theory of the nature and meaning of signs,” (260).

ii.

Critic
“classifies arguments and determines the validity and degree of force of each
kind,” (260).

From the syllabus to the Lowell Lectures, 1903; cf. the text in EP2:258-62. Peirce orders the “sciences in
their present condition,” (258). Also, “one science depends upon another for fundamental principles,” in ascending
(Z – A) order, (258). Also, “in most cases the divisions are trichotomic,” (258). “Trichotomic” is a word Pierce uses
of tripartite analysis according to the Universal Categories (EP2:162). All terms are taken from Peirce’s text. Bold
text is used to indicate areas mentioned in the discussion of Peirce’s metaphysics in chapter three above.
1
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iii.

Methodeutic
“the methods that ought to be pursued in the investigation, in the exposition,
and in the application of truth,” (260).

3. Metaphysics
“to give an account of the universe of mind and matter,” (259).
a. General Metaphysics/Ontology
b. Psychical/Religious Metaphysics
i.

God

ii.

Freedom

iii.

Immortality

c. Physical Metaphysics
“the real nature of Time, Space, Laws of Nature, Matter, etc.”
C. Idioscopy
“all the special sciences…occupied with the accumulation of new facts,” (259).
1. Physical Sciences
a. Nomological/General Physics
“discovers ubiquitous phenomena of the physical universe, formulates their laws,
and measures their constants,” (259).
i.

Molar Physics (260) (Dynamics and Graviatation)

ii.

Molecular Physics (Elaterics [“theory of elasticity,” EP2:335n5] and Thermodynamics)

iii.

Ethereal Physics (Optics and Electrics)

b. Classificatory Physics
“describes and classifies physical forms and seeks to explain them by the laws of
nomological Physics,” (259).
i.

Crystallography (260)

ii.

Chemistry
One.

Physical Chemistry

Two.

Organic Chemistry

Three.
iii.

Inorganic Chemistry

Biology
One.

Physiology

Two.

Anatomy

c. Descriptive Phyiscs
“describes individual objects…endeavors to explain their phenomena” in accordance with nomological and classificatory physics, (259).
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i.

Geognosy

ii.

Astronomy

2. Psychical/Human Sciences
a. Nomological Psychics/Psychology
“general elements and laws of mental phenomena,” (259).
i.

Introspective Psychology (261)

ii.

Experimental Psychology

iii.

Physiological Psychology

iv.

Child Psychology

b. Classificatory Psychics/Ethnology
“classifies products of mind and endeavors to explain them,” (259).
i.

Special Psychology
One.

Individual Psychology (261)

Two.

Psychical Heredity

Three.
Four.

Mob Psychology

Five.

Race Psychology

Six.
ii.

iii.

Abnormal Psychology

Animal Psychology

Linguistics
One.

Word Linguistics

Two.

Grammar

Ethnology
One.

Social Developments (customs, laws, religion, and traditions)

Two.

Technology

c. Descriptive Psychics/History
“describes individual manifestations of mind,” (259).
i.

ii.

History proper (261)
One.

Monumental

Two.

Ancient

Three.

Modern

Four.

First cross-division (Political, Science, Social Developments)

Five.

Second cross-division (per geography and ethnicity)

Biography
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iii.

Criticism
One.

Literary (262)

Two.

Art

II.

Sciences of Review
“arranging the results of discovery, beginning with digests and going on to endeavor to form
a philosophy of science,” (258-59). E.g., Peirce’s own classification of sciences. As of 1903,
Peirce had not developed a classification of these sciences (262).

III.

Practical Sciences
As per EP2:535n6, see MS 1343 “Of the Classification of the Sciences. Second Paper. Of the
Practical Sciences” (1902). This manuscript may be found on the web at
https://www.fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-1343-1902-of-the-classification-of-the-sciences?page=1 (accessed 3/4/21)

239
Bibliography
Allan, George. “Thinking Axiologically.” In Interpreting Neville, edited by J. Harley Chapman
and Nancy Frankenberry, 3-26. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999.
Anderson, Douglas R., and Charles S. Peirce. Strands of System: the Philosophy of Charles
Peirce. Purdue University Press Series in the History of Philosophy. West Lafayette, Ind.:
Purdue University Press, 1995.
Anderson, Gary A. Creation Ex Nihilo: Origins, Development, Contemporary Challenges. Notre
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2018.
Archer, Kenneth J. “Pentecostal Hermeneutics: Retrospect and Prospect.” Journal of Pentecostal
Theology 4, no. 8 (1996): 63-81.
———. A Pentecostal Hermeneutic for the Twenty First Century: Spirit, Scripture and
Community. Vol. 28. Journal of Pentecostal Theology Supplement Series. New York:
T&T Clark International, 2004.
Arnold, Bill T. Genesis. New Cambridge Bible Commentary, edited by Ben Witherington III.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Asbill, Brian D. The Freedom of God for Us: Karl Barth’s Doctrine of Divine Aseity. Vol. 25. T
& T Clark Studies in Systematic Theology. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015.
Barrett, Peter. “The New Natural Theology: A Bridging and Integrating Mode of Inquiry.”
Scriptura 89 (2005): 495-509.
Beck, W. David. “Schubert Ogden on the Relationship between Theology and Philosophy.”
Ph.D. diss., Boston University, 1980.
Bender, Kimlyn J. “Christ, Creation and the Drama of Redemption: ‘The Play's the Thing . . .’.”
Scottish Journal of Theology 62, no. 2 (2009): 149-174.
Berger, Peter. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. New York:
Anchor Books, 1990. Reprint, 1967.
Bignon, Guillame, and Paul Helm. Excusing Sinners and Blaming God: A Calvinist Assessment
of Determinism, Moral Responsibility, and Divine Involvement in Evil. Eugene, Oregon:
Pickwick Publications, 2018.
Black, Joshua David. “Peirce's conception of metaphysics.” Ph.D. diss., University of Sheffield,
2017.
Blowers, Paul M. Drama of the Divine Economy: Creator and Creation in Early Christian
Theology and Piety. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

240

Bracken, Joseph A. “Trinitarian Spirit Christology: In Need of a New Metaphysics?”
Theological Studies 72, no. 4 (2011): 750-67.
Brier, Søren. “Can Peircean Pragmaticism Help Theology to Understand the World?” Chinese
Semiotic Studies 12, no. 3 (2016): 473-79.
———. “Pragmaticism, Science, and Theology or How to Answer the Riddle of the Sphinx?”
The American Journal of Semiotics 34, no. 1-2 (2018): 131-161.
Brierley, Michael W. “Naming a Quiet Revolution: The Panentheistic Turn in Modern
Theology.” In In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being: Panentheistic
Reflections on God’s Presence in a Scientific World, edited by Philip Clayton and Arthur
Peacocke, 1-15. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 2004.
———. “The Potential of Panentheism for Dialogue Between Science and Religion.” In The
Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, edited by Philip Clayton, 635-51. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2006.
Bryant, Hershel Odell. “Spirit Christology in the Christian Tradition: From the Patristic Period to
the Rise of Pentecostalism in the Twentieth-Century.” Ph.D. diss., Bangor University,
2013.
Campbell, Ronnie P. “Mere Christian Theism and the Problem of Evil: Toward A Trinitarian
Perichoretic Theodicy.” Ph.D. diss., Liberty University, 2015.
———. Worldviews and the Problem of Evil: A Comparative Approach. Bellingham, WA:
Lexham Press, 2019.
Case-Winters, Anna. Reconstructing a Christian Theology of Nature: Down to Earth. Ashgate
Science and Religion Series. New York: Routledge, 2016.
Chicka, Benjamin J. “God the Created: Philosophy, Science, and Pragmatic Constructive
Realism.” Ph.D. The Claremont Graduate University, 2017.
Clark, David K. To Know and Love God: Method for Theology. Foundations of Evangelical
Theology, edited by John S. Feinberg. Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway Books, 2003.
Clayton, Philip. The Problem of God in Modern Thought. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B.
Eerdmans, 2000.
———. “Panentheism in Metaphysical and Scientific Perspective.” In In Whom We Live and
Move and Have Our Being: Panentheistic Reflections on God's Presence in a Scientific
World, edited by Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke, 73-91. Grand Rapids, Mich.:
William B. Eerdmans, 2004.

241
———. “Panentheism Today: A Constructive and Systematic Evaluation.” In In Whom We Live
and Have Our Being: Panentheistic Reflections on God’s Presence in a Scientific World,
edited by Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke, 249-64. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B.
Eerdmans, 2004.
———. Mind and Emergence: From Quantum to Consciousness. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2006.
———. “Panentheism.” In The Routledge Companion to Modern Christian Thought, edited by
Chad Meister and James K. Beilby, 690-702. New York: Routledge, 2013.
———. “How Radically Can God be Reconceived Before Ceasing to Be God? The Four Faces
of Panentheism.” Zygon 52, no. 4 (2017): 1044-1059.
———. “Prospects for Panentheism as Research Program.” European Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 11, no. 1 (2019): 1-18.
Cobb, John B. A Christian Natural Theology, Based on the Thought of Alfred North Whitehead.
Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965.
Cohen, Mordechai Z. The Rule of Peshat: Jewish Constructions of the Plain Sense of Scripture
and Their Christian and Muslim Contexts, 900-1270. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2020.
Colle, Ralph Del. Christ and the Spirit: Spirit Christology in Trinitarian Perspective. New York
& Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Conway, Charles Gerald. “A study in the metaphysics of metaphorical theology: C. S. Peirce's
conception of the ‘continuum’ as a model for the ‘spiritual presence’ of Paul Tillich.”
Ph.D. diss., Graduate Theological Union, 2005.
Cooper, John W. Panentheism—The Other God of the Philosophers: From Plato to the Present.
Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2013.
Copan, Paul, and William Lane Craig. Creation Out of Nothing: A Biblical, Philosophical, and
Scientific Exploration. Baker Publishing Group, 2004.
Corrington, Robert S. “Beyond Experience: Pragmatism and Nature’s God.” American Journal
of Theology & Philosophy 14, no. 2 (1993): 147-160.
———. Introduction to C. S. Peirce: Philosopher, Semiotician, and Ecstatic Naturalist.
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1993.
———. A Semiotic Theory of Theology and Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2000.

242
———. “My Passage from Panentheism to Pantheism.” American Journal of Theology &
Philosophy 23, no. 2 (2002): 129-153.
Cotter, David W. Genesis. Berit Olam: Studies in Hebrew Narrative & Poetry, edited by David
Cotter, W. Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 2003.
Cowan, S.B., and J.S. Spiegel. Idealism and Christian Philosophy: Idealism and Christianity.
Bloomsbury Academic, 2017.
Craig, William Lane. God, Time, and Eternity. Vol. II. The Coherence of Theism: Eternity.
Dordrecht: Springer, 2001.
———. “Pantheists in Spite of Themselves: God and Infinity in Contemporary Theology.” In
For Faith and Clarity: Philosophical Contributions to Christian Theology, edited by
James K. Beilby, 135-56. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006.
Craig, William Lane, and James Porter Moreland, eds. The Blackwell Companion to Natural
Theology. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.
Crisp, Oliver D. “Against Mereological Panentheism.” European Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 11, no. 2 (2019): 23-41.
Cross, Terry L. “The Divine-Human Encounter Towards a Pentecostal Theology of Experience.”
Pneuma 31, no. 1 (2009): 3-34.
Deledalle, Gérard. Charles S. Peirce’s Philosophy of Signs: Essays in Comparative Semiotics.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000.
Deng, Natalja. God and Time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
Deuser, Hermann. Gott: Geist und Natur: theologische Konsequenzen aus Charles S. Peirce’
Religionsphilosophie. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1993.
———. Gottesinstinkt: semiotische Religionstheorie und Pragmatismus. Tübingen: Mohr
Siebeck, 2004.
———. Religion: Kosmologie und Evolution: sieben religionsphilosophische Essays. Tübingen:
Mohr Siebeck, 2014.
Dew, James K., and Paul M. Gould. Philosophy: A Christian Introduction. Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Baker Academic, 2019.
Dodds, Michael J. The Unchanging God of Love: Thomas Aquinas and Contemporary Theology
on Divine Immutability. Second ed. Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America
Press, 2008.

243
Downing, Crystal. Changing Signs of Truth: A Christian Introduction to the Semiotics of
Communication. Downers Grove, Ill.: IVP Academic, 2012.
Draper, Paul, ed. Current Controversies in Philosophy of Religion. New York: Routledge, 2019.
Dulles, Avery. Models of revelation. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1983.
Ejsing, Anette. Theology of Anticipation: A Constructive Study of C. S. Peirce. Princeton
Theological Monograph Series. Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2007.
Erickson, Millard J. Christian theology. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1998.
Esposito, Joseph L. Evolutionary Metaphysics: The Development of Peirce’s Theory of
Categories. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1980.
Evans, C. Stephen. Natural Signs and Knowledge of God: A New Look at Theistic Arguments.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Fann, K. T. Peirce’s Theory of Abduction. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1970.
Farris, Joshua Ryan, S. Mark Hamilton, and James S. Spiegel. Idealism and Christian Theology:
Idealism and Christianity. Vol. 1. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016.
Ferguson, Sinclair B. The Holy Spirit. Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity Press, 1996.
Feser, E. Five Proofs for the Existence of God. Ignatius Press, 2017.
Fisch, Max H. “Peirce's General Theory of Signs.” In Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, edited
by Kenneth Laine Ketner and Christian J. W. Kloesel, 321-55. Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1986.
———. “Peirce’s Arisbe.” In Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, edited by Kenneth Laine
Ketner and Christian J. W. Kloesel, 227-48. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana Univ. Press,
1986.
Frame, John M. The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God. Vol. 1. A Theology of Lordship.
Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Publishing, 1987.
Frisinia, Warren G. “Pragmatism, Logical Vagueness, and the Art of Comparative Engagement.”
In Theology in Global Context: Essays in Honor of Robert Cummings Neville, edited by
Amos Yong and Peter G. Heltzel, 161-74: Bloomsbury, 2016. Reprint, 2004.
Furlong, Peter. The Challenges of Divine Determinism: A Philosophical Analysis. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2019.

244
Ganssle, Gregory E., and Paul Helm. God & Time: Four Views. Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity
Press, 2001.
Ganssle, Gregory E., and David M. Woodruff. God and Time: Essays on the Divine Nature.
edited by Gregory E. Ganssle and David M. Woodruff. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002.
Gasser, Georg. “God’s Omnipresence in the World: On Possible Meanings of ‘En’ in
Panentheism.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 85, no. 1 (2019): 43.
Geisler, Norman L. Christian Apologetics. 2nd ed. Grand Rapids, Mich: Baker Academic, 2013.
Geisler, Norman L., and William D. Watkins. Worlds Apart: A Handbook on World Views.
second ed. Eugene, Or: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2003.
Gelpi, Donald L. Experiencing God: A Theology of Human Emergence. University Press of
America, 1987.
———. “The Authentication of Doctrines: Hints from C. S. Peirce.” Theological studies. 60, no.
2 (1999): 261.
Gibbs, John G. Creation and Redemption: A Study in Pauline Theology. Vol. 26. Novum
Testamentum Supplements. Leiden: Brill, 1971.
Giles, Kevin. Jesus and the Father: Modern Evangelicals Reinvent the Doctrine of the Trinity.
Grand Rapids, Mich: Zondervan, 2006.
Göcke, Benedikt Paul. “Panentheism and Classical Theism.” Sophia 52, no. 1 (2013): 61-75.
———. “Reply to Raphael Latester.” Sophia 53, no. 3 (2014): 397-400.
———. “Another Reply to Raphael Lataster.” Sophia 54, no. 1 (2015): 99-102.
———. “There is No Panentheistic Paradigm.” The Heythrop Journal (2015): 1-8.
———. “Panpsychism and Panentheism.” In Panentheism and Panpsychism: Philosophy of
Religion Meets Philosophy of Mind, edited by Ludwig Jaskolla, Benedikt Paul Göcke,
and Godehard Brüntrup, vol 2, 37-64. Paderborn: mentis Verlag, 2020.
Gregersen, Niels Henrik. “Three Varieties of Panentheism.” In In Whom We Live and Move and
Have Our Being: Panentheistic Reflections on God’s Presence in a Scientific World,
edited by Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke, 19-35. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B.
Eerdmans, 2004.

245
Grenz, Stanley J. “Articulating the Christian Belief-Mosaic.” In Evangelical Futures: A
Conversation on Theological Method, edited by John G. Stackhouse, 107-36. Grand
Rapids: Baker, 2000.
———. Rediscovering the Triune God: The Trinity in Contemporary Theology. Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 2004.
Griffin, David Ray. Reenchantment Without Supernaturalism: A Process Philosophy of Religion.
Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2001.
———. “Panentheism: A Postmodern Revelation.” In In Whom We Live and Move and Have
Our Being: Panentheistic Reflections on God's Perspective in a Scientific World, edited
by Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke, 36-47. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B.
Eerdmans, 2004.
Grudem, Wayne. “Biblical and Theological Introduction: The Incompatibility of Theistic
Evolution with the Biblical Account of Creation and with Important Christian Doctrines.”
In Theistic Evolution: A Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Critique, edited by J.
P. Moreland, Stephen C. Meyer, Christopher Shaw, Ann K. Gauger, and Wayne Grudem,
61-77. Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 2017.
———. “Theistic Evolution Undermines Twelve Creation Events and Several Crucial Christian
Doctrines.” In Theistic Evolution: A Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Critique,
edited by J. P. Moreland, Stephen C. Meyer, Christopher Shaw, Ann K. Gauger, and
Wayne Grudem, 783-837. Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 2017.
Gruenler, R.G. The Inexhaustible God: Biblical Faith and the Challenge of Process Theism.
Baker Book House, 1983.
Gunton, Colin E. “Historical and Systematic Theology.” In The Cambridge Companion to
Christian Doctrine, edited by Colin E. Gunton, Cambridge Companions to Religion, 320. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
———. The Triune Creator: A Historical and Systematic Study. Alban Books Limited, 1998.
Habermas, Jürgen. An Awareness of What is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular Age.
Cambridge: Polity, 2010.
Habets, Myk. The Anointed Son: A Trinitarian Spirit Christology. Vol. 129. Princeton
Theological Monograph Series. Eugene, Or: Pickwick Publications, 2010.
Haight, Roger. “The Case for Spirit Christology.” Theological Studies 53, no. 2 (1992): 257-87.
Han, Sang Min. “Constructing a New Approach for Contemporary Pentecostal Theology: A
Study of Ecstasy and Spiritual Presence as a Divine–Human Encounter.” Ph.D. diss.,
Drew University, 2011.

246

Hartshorne, Charles. The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God. New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 1964. Reprint, 1948.
———. A Natural Theology for Our Time. La Salle, Il.: Open Court, 1967.
———. “Peirce and Religion: Between Two Forms of Religious Belief.” In Peirce and
contemporary thought: philosophical inquiries, edited by Kevin L. Ketner, 339-55. NY:
Fordham University Press, 1995.
Hartshorne, Charles, and William L. Reese. Philosophers speak of God. Amherst, N.Y.:
Humanity Books, 2000. Reprint, 1953.
Hartshorne, Charles, and Paul Weiss. “Editorial Note.” In Scientific Metaphysics, edited by
Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, vol 6, The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders
Peirce. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1965.
Hauerwas, Stanley. With the Grain of the Universe: the Church’s Witness and Natural Theology:
Being the Gifford Lectures Delivered at the University of St. Andrews in 2001. Grand
Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2013.
Hausman, Carl R. Charles S. Pierce’s Evolutionary Philosophy. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2010. Reprint, 1993.
Helm, Paul. Eternal God: A Study of God Without Time. second ed. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2010.
Hendry, George S. “The Freedom of God in the Theology of Karl Barth.” Scottish Journal of
Theology 31, no. 3 (1978): 229-244.
Henriksen, Jan‐Olav. “Panentheism Without the Supernatural: On a Perichoretic Trinitarian
Conception of Reality.” Philosophy, Theology and the Sciences 3, no. 1 (2016): 51.
———. “The Experience of God and the World: Christianity’s Reasons for Considering
Panentheism a Viable Option.” Zygon 52, no. 4 (2017): 1080-1097.
Henry, Carl F. H. God, Revelation, and Authority. Second ed. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 1999.
Hockenberry, Jennifer. “Graceful Reality: A Foundation for the Future of Philosophical
Theology.” In Theology in Global Context: Essays in Honor of Robert Cummings
Neville, edited by Amos Yong and Peter G. Heltzel, 277-88. New York: Bloomsbury
Academic, 2016. Reprint, 2004.
Hollingsworth, Andrew. “‘Ecos’ in the Labyrinth: Systematic Theology as Semiotic
Phenomenon.” Ph.D. diss., New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, 2018.

247
Hookway, Christopher. “Reference, Causation, and Reality.” In Semiotica, vol 69, 331-48, 1988.
———. Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism: Themes from Peirce. New York: Clarendon Press,
2000.
———. Peirce. The Arguments of the Philosophers, edited by Ted Honderich. New York:
Routledge, 2009.
Horton, Michael Scott. The Christian Faith: A Systematic Theology for Pilgrims on the Way.
Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2011.
———. Pilgrim Theology: Core Doctrines for Christian Disciples. Grand Rapids, MI:
Zondervan, 2011.
———. Rediscovering the Holy Spirit: God’s Perfecting Presence in Creation, Redemption, and
Everyday Life. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 2017.
Ibri, Ivo Assad. Kósmos Noetós: The Metaphysical Architecture of Charles S. Peirce. Vol. 131.
Philosophical Studies Series, edited by Luciano Floridi and Mariarosaria Taddeo. Cham,
Switzerland: Springer, 2018.
Johnson, Keith L. Karl Barth and the Analogia Entis. Vol. 6. T & T Clark Studies in Systematic
Theology, edited by John Webster, Ian A. McFarland, and Ivor Davidson. New York;:
T&T Clark, 2010.
Johnson Leese, J. J. Christ, Creation, and the Cosmic Goal of Redemption: A Study of Pauline
Creation Theology as Read by Irenaeus and Applied to Ecotheology. Vol. 580. Library of
New Testament Studies. New York, NY: T & T Clark, 2018.
Joyce, George Hayward. Principles of Natural Theology. New York: Routledge, 2017. Reprint,
1922.
Kärkkäinen, Veli-Matti. Christ and Reconciliation. Vol. 1. A Constructive Christian Theology
for the Pluralistic World. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company,
2013.
———. Trinity and Revelation. Vol. 2. A Constructive Christian Theology for the Pluralistic
World. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2014.
———. Creation and Humanity. Vol. 3. A Constructive Christian Theology for the Pluralistic
World. Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2015.
Kasser, Jeffrey L. “Peirce on God, Reality and Personality.” In Models of God and Alternative
Ultimate Realities, edited by Jeanine Diller and Asa Kasher, 431-440. Netherlands:
Dordrecht Springer, 2013.

248
Keel, Othmar, Silvia Schroer, and Peter T. Daniels. Creation: Biblical Theologies in the Context
of the Ancient Near East. Winona Lake, Indiana: Eisenbrauns, 2015.
Ketner, Kenneth Laine. “Semeiotic.” In Das Bild zwischen Kognition und Kreativität:
Interdisziplinäre Zugänge zum bildhaften Denken, edited by Elize Bisanz, 375-401.
Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2011.
Köstenberger, Andreas J. A Theology of John’s Gospel and Letters: The Word, the Christ, the
Son of God. Biblical Theology of the New Testament. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2009.
Lakatos, Imre. “Falsification and Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes.” In Criticism
and the Growth of Knowledge, edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, 91-196.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
Lataster, Raphael. “The Attractiveness of Panentheism—a Reply to Benedikt Paul Göcke.”
Sophia 53, no. 3 (2014): 389-395.
———. “Theists Misrepresenting Panentheism—Another Reply to Benedikt Paul Göcke.”
Sophia 54, no. 1 (2015): 93-98.
Lee, Jeong-Woo. “Toward a Trinitarian Ecological Theology: A Study in Juergen Moltmann’s
Panentheism.” Ph.D. diss., University of St. Michael’s College and Toronto School of
Theology, 2007.
Leidenhag, Joanna. “A Critique of Emergent Theologies.” Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science
51, no. 4 (2016): 867-882.
———. “Deploying Panpsychism for the Demarcation of Panentheism.” In Panentheism and
Panpsychism: Philosophy of Religion Meets Philosophy of Mind, edited by Godehard
Brüntrup, Benedikt Paul Göcke, and Ludwig Jaskolla, vol 2, Innsbruck Studies in
Philosophy of Religion, ed. Christian Tapp and Bruno Niederbacher SJ, 65-90. Boston,
MA: mentis Verlag, 2020.
Lemna, Keith. “Trinitarian Panentheism: A Study of the God-World Relationship in the
Theology of Louis Bouyer.” Ph.D. diss., Catholic University of America, 2007.
Levering, Matthew. Engaging the Doctrine of Creation: Cosmos, Creatures, and the Wise and
Good Creator. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2017.
Levine, Michael. “Non-Theistic Conceptions of God.” In Routledge Companion to Philosophy of
Religion, edited by Chad Meister and Paul Copan, 259-270: Routledge, 2012.
Lewis, Paul W. “Towards a Pentecostal Epistemology: The Role of Experience in Pentecostal
Hermeneutics.” The Spirit & Church 2, no. 1 (2000): 95-125.

249
Liston, Greg. “A ‘Chalcedonian’ Spirit Christology.” Irish Theological Quarterly 81, no. 1
(2016): 74-93.
Liszka, James Jakob. A General Introduction to the Semiotic of Charles Sanders Peirce. Indiana
University Press, 1996.
Long, Steven A. Analogia Entis: On the Analogy of Being, Metaphysics, and the Act of Faith.
Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011.
May, Gerhard. Creatio Ex Nihilo: The Doctrine of “Creation Out of Nothing” in Early Christian
Thought. New York;: T & T Clark International, 2004.
Mayorga, Rosa Maria Perez-Teran. From Realism to “Realicism”: The Metaphysics of Charles
Sanders Peirce. Lexington Books, 2007.
McFarland, I.A. From Nothing: A Theology of Creation. Westminster John Knox Press, 2014.
McGrath, Alister E. “Engaging the Great Tradition: Evangelical Theology and the Role of
Tradition.” In Evangelical Futures: A Conversation on Theological Method, edited by
John G. Stackhouse, 139-58. Grand Rapids, Mich., Leicester, UK, and Vancouver, BC:
Baker Books, Inter-Varsity Press, and Regent College Publishing, 2000.
———. A Scientific Theology. Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans Pub., 2001-2003.
———. The Science of God: An Introduction to Scientific Theology. A&C Black, 2004.
———. Reality. Vol. 2. A Scientific Theology. New York: T & T Clark, 2006.
———. T. F. Torrance: An Intellectual Biography. Bloomsbury Academic, 2006.
———. The Open Secret: A New Vision for Natural Theology. Kindle ed. Malden, MA:
Blackwell Publishing, 2008.
———. A Fine-Tuned Universe: The Quest for God in Science and Theology. Louisville, KY:
Westminster John Knox Press, 2009.
———. Darwinism and the Divine: Evolutionary Thought and Natural Theology. Malden, MA:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.
———. Emil Brunner: A Reappraisal. Malden, MA: Wiley, 2013.
———. Science and Religion A New Introduction. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 2013.
———. “The Rationality of Faith: How Does Christianity Make Sense of Things?” Philosophia
Christi 18, no. 2 (2016): 395-409.

250
———. Re-Imagining Nature: The Promise of a Christian Natural Theology. Malden, MA:
Wiley, 2016.
———. The Territories of Human Reason: Science and Theology in an Age of Multiple
Rationalities. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2018.
Meixner, Uwe. “Orthodox Panentheism: Sergius Bulgakov's Sophiology.” In Panentheism and
Panpsychism: Philosophy of Religion Meets Philosophy of Mind, edited by Ludwig
Jaskolla, Benedikt Paul Göcke, and Godehard Brüntrup, vol 2, 205-29. Boston, MA:
mentis Verlag, 2020.
Mills, David Matthew. “The Drama of Creation: Charles Sanders Peirce on the Universe as
God’s Work of Art.” Ph.D. diss., Pennsylvania State University, 2000.
Molnar, Paul D. Faith, Freedom, and the Spirit: The Economic Trinity in Barth, Torrance and
Contemporary Theology. Downers Grove, Illinois: IVP Academic, 2015.
Moltmann, Jürgen. God in Creation: A New Theology of Creation and the Spirit of God.
Philadelphia, MA: Fortress Press, 1984.
Moore, Andrew. “Theological Critiques of Natural Theology.” In The Oxford Handbook of
Natural Theology, edited by Russell Re Manning, 227-44. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2013.
Mullins, R. T. “The Difficulty with Demarcating Panentheism.” Sophia 55, no. 3 (2016): 325346.
Murphy, Michael. “The Emergence of Evolutionary Panentheism.” In Panentheism Across the
World's Traditions, edited by Loriliai Biernacki and Philip Clayton, 177-99. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2013.
Neville, Robert Cummings. God the Creator: On the Transcendence and Presence of God.
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992. Reprint, 1968.
———. On the Scope and Truth of Theology: Theology as Symbolic Engagement. A&C Black,
2006.
———. Ultimates. Vol. 1. Philosophical Theology. Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press, 2013.
———. Existence. Vol. 2. Philosophical Theology. Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press, 2015.
———. Religion. Vol. 3. Philosophical Theology, . Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press, 2016.

251
———. “Thanks and Conversation: Responding to My Theological Colleagues.” In Theology in
Global Context: Essays in Honor of Robert Cummings Neville, edited by Amos Yong and
Peter G. Heltzel, 357-86: Bloomsbury 2016. Reprint, 2004.
Niemoczynski, Leon J. “The Sacred Depths of Nature: An Ontology of the Possible in the
Philosophy of Peirce and Heidegger.” Ph.D. diss., Southern Illinois University
Carbondale, 2009.
Nöth, Winfried. Handbook of Semiotics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990.
Ochs, Peter. Peirce, Pragmatism, and the Logic of Scripture. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1998.
Oliver, Simon. “Every Good and Perfect Gift is From Above: Creation Ex Nihilo Before Nature
and Culture.” In Knowing Creation, edited by A.B. Torrance and T.H. McCall, vol 1, 2745. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2018.
Olson, Roger E. “A Postconservative Evangelical Response to Panentheism.” The Evangelical
Quarterly 85, no. 4 (2013): 328-337.
Orange, Donna M. Peirce’s Conception of God: A Developmental Study. Lubbock, Tex., USA:
Institute for Studies in Pragmaticism, 1984.
Orji, Cyril. A Science-Theology Rapprochement: Pannenberg, Peirce, and Lonergan in
Conversation. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2018.
Pannenberg, Wolfhart. Systematic Theology. Vol. 2. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans,
1994.
Parker, Kelly A. The Continuity of Peirce’s Thought. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University
Press, 1998.
Peacocke, Arthur. “Introduction: ‘In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being?’.” In In
Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being: Panentheistic Reflections on God's
Presence in a Scientific World, edited by Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke, xviii-xxii.
Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 2004.
———. “A Naturalistic Christian Faith for the Twenty-First Century: An Essay in
Interpretation.” In All That Is: A Naturalistic Faith for the Twenty-First Century, edited
by Philip Clayton, 1-56. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007.
Peirce, Charles S. The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Edited by C. Hartshorne, P.
Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1935, 1958.
———. The Charles S. Peirce papers. Houghton Library.

252
———. The Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition. edited by Nathan Houser.
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982-2010.
———. Reasoning and the Logic of Things: The Cambridge Conferences Lectures of 1898.
Edited by Kenneth Laine Ketner. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.
———. Prolegomena to a Science of Reasoning: Phaneroscopy, Semeiotic, Logic. Edited by
Elize Bisanz. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Edition, 2016.
Peirce, Charles S., and Patricia A. Turrisi. Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right
Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism. Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press, 1997.
Peirce, Charles S., and Victoria Welby. Semiotic and Significs: The Correspondence Between
Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby. Elsah, IL: Arisbe Associates, 2001.
Peters, Ted. “Models of God.” Philosophia 35, no. 3 (2007): 273-288.
———. God—The World’s Future: Systematic Theology for a New Era. Minneapolis, MN:
Fortress Press, 2015.
Peterson, Gregory. Minding God: Theology and the Cognitive Sciences. Minneapolis: Fortress,
2003.
Peterson, Gregory R. “Whither Panentheism?” Zygon 36, no. 3 (2001): 395-405.
Pfeifer, Karl. “Naïve Panentheism.” In Panentheism and Panspsychism: Philosophy of Religion
Meets Philosophy of Mind, edited by Godehard Brüntrup, Benedikt Paul Göcke, and
Ludwig Jaskolla, vol 2, Innsbruck Studies in Philosophy of Religion, ed. Christian Tapp
and Bruno Niederbacher SJ, 123-38. Boston, MA: mentis Verlag, 2020.
Phillips, Benjamin Blair. “The Crisis of Creation: A Critical Analysis of Juergen Moltmann’s
Panentheism.” Ph.D. diss., Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2003.
Pihlström, Sami. “Peirce’s Place in the Pragmatist Tradition.” In The Cambridge Companion to
Peirce, edited by Cheryl Misak, 27-57. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Pinnock, Clark H. Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness. Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Paternoster Press, 2001.
Plantinga, Alvin. Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Polkinghorne, John C. Science and the Trinity: the Christian Encounter with Reality. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.

253
———. Science and Providence: God’s Interaction with the World. Templeton Foundation
Press ed. Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press, 2005.
———. “Christianity and Science.” In Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, edited by
Philip Clayton, 57-70. New York: Oxford Univ Press, 2006.
———. “Where is Natural Theology Today?” Science and Christian Belief 18, no. 2 (2006):
169-179.
Potter, Vincent G., and Vincent M. Colapietro. Peirce’s Philosophical Perspectives. New York:
Fordham Univ Pr, 1996.
Power, William L. “Peircean Semiotics, Religion, and Theological Realism.” In New Essays in
Religious Naturalism, edited by Creighton Peden and Larry E Axel, Highlands Institute
Series, 211-24. Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1993.
Quash, Ben. Found Theology: History, Imagination and the Holy Spirit. A&C Black, 2013.
Rae, Murray. “Jesus Christ, the Order of Creation.” In Christ and the Created Order, edited by
Andrew B. Torrance and Thomas H. McCall, vol 2, Perspectives from Theology,
Philosophy, and Science, 23-34. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2018.
Rahner, Karl. The Trinity. Translated by Joseph Donceel. London: Bloomsbury Publishing,
2001. Reprint, 1970.
Raposa, Michael L. Peirce’s Philosophy of Religion. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
1989.
———. “In the Presence of the Universe: Peirce, Royce, and Theology as Theosemiotic.” The
Harvard Theological Review 103, no. 2 (2010): 237-247.
———. “The ‘Never Ending Poem’: Some Remarks on Dombrowski’s Divine Beauty.”
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy 31, no. 3 (2010): 207-24.
———. “Peirce and Religion: Knowledge, Transformation, and the Reality of God. By Roger
Ward.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 87, no. 2 (2019): 565-568.
———. Theosemiotic: Religion, Reading, and the Gift of Meaning New York: Fordham
University Press, 2020.
Richards, Jay Wesley. The Untamed God: A Philosophical Exploration of Divine Perfection,
Immutability, and Simplicity. Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity Press, 2003.
Riches, Aaron. Ecce Homo: on the Divine Unity of Christ. Interventions. Grand Rapids, Mich.:
William B. Eerdmans, 2016.

254
Robinson, Andrew. God and the World of Signs Trinity, Evolution, and the Metaphysical
Semiotics of C. S. Peirce. Boston: Brill, 2010.
Robinson, Andrew, and Christopher Southgate. “Semiotics As a Metaphysical Framework for
Christian Theology.” Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 45, no. 3 (2010): 689-712.
Rodkey, Christopher Demuth. “Paul Tillich’s Pantheon of Theisms: An Invitation to Think
Theonomously.” In Models of God and Alternative Ultimate Realities, edited by J. Diller
and A. Kasher, 483-95. Dordrecht: Springer, 2013.
Rowe, William. “Does Panentheism Reduce to Pantheism? A Response to Craig.” International
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 61, no. 2 (2007): 65-67.
Sheriff, John K. Charles Peirce’s Guess at the Riddle: Grounds for Human Significance.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.
Shook, John R. “Panentheism and Peirce's God: Theology Guided by Philosophy and
Cosmology.” Philosophy, Theology and the Sciences 3, no. 1 (2016): 8-31.
Short, T. L. Peirce’s Theory of Signs. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Slater, Michael R. Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Religion. Cambridge University Press,
2014.
Smith, James K. A. Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-Secular Theology. Grand
Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2004.
Spiegel, James S. “Berkeleyan idealism and Christian philosophy.” Philosophy Compass 12, no.
2 (2017): np.
Stackhouse, John G. “Evangelical Theology Should Be Evangelical.” In Evangelical Futures: A
Conversation on Theological Method, edited by John G. Stackhouse, 39-58. Grand
Rapids: Baker, 2000.
Stenmark, Mikael. “Panentheism and Its Neighbors.” International Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 85, no. 1 (2019): 23-41.
Tang Nielsen, Jesper. “The Secondness of the Fourth Gospel.” Studia Theologica 60, no. 2
(2006): 123-144.
Thomas, Owen C. “Problems in Panentheism.” In The Oxford Handbook of Religion and
Science, edited by Philip Clayton, 652-64. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Ticciati, Susannah. “Anachronism or Illumination? Genesis 1 and Creation ex nihilo.” Anglican
Theological Review 99, no. 4 (2017): 691-712.

255
Tillich, Paul. Existence and the Christ. Vol. 2. Systematic Theology. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1957.
Torrance, Andrew B., and Thomas H. McCall. “Introduction.” In Christ and the Created Order,
edited by Andrew B. Torrance and Thomas H. McCall, vol 2, 15-22. Grand Rapids,
Mich.: Zondervan, 2018.
Towne, Edgar A. “The Variety of Panentheisms.” Zygon 40, no. 3 (2005): 779-786.
Vanhoozer, Kevin J. The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical Linguistic Approach to Christian
Theology. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2005.
———. Remythologizing Theology: Divine Action, Passion, and Authorship. Vol. 18.
Cambridge Studies in Christian Doctrine, edited by Daniel W. Hardy. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2010.
von Rad, Gerhard. Genesis: A Commentary. Revised ed. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973.
Wainwright, William J. “God’s Body.” In The Concept of God, edited by Thomas V. Morris, 7287. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.
Walton, John H. Genesis 1 as Ancient Cosmology. Winona Lake, Ind: Eisenbrauns, 2011.
———. “Origins in Genesis: Claims of an Ancient Text in a Modern Scientific World.” In
Knowing Creation: Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, and Science, edited by
Andrew B. Torrance and Thomas H. McCall, vol 1, 107-21. Grand Rapids: Zondervan,
2018.
Ward, Roger A. Peirce and Religion: Knowledge, Transformation, and the Reality of God.
American Philosophy Series, edited by John J. Kaag. London; Lanham, MD: Lexington
Books, 2018.
Wasmeier-Sailer, M., and Benedikt Paul Göcke. Idealismus und natürliche Theologie. Alber,
2011.
Wildman, Wesley J. “Neville’s Systematic Theology of Symbolic Engagement.” In Theology in
Global Context: Essays in Honor of Robert Cummings Neville, edited by Amos Yong and
Peter G. Heltzel, 3-28. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016. Reprint, 2004.
Williams, Thomas. “Introduction to Classical Theism.” In Models of God and Alternative
Ultimate Realities, edited by Jeanine Diller and Asa Kasher, 95-100. Dordrecht: Springer
Netherlands, 2013.
Wilson, Jonathan R. God’s Good World: Reclaiming the Doctrine of Creation. Grand Rapids:
Baker Academic, 2013.

256
Winslow, Lisanne. A Trinitarian Theology of Nature. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers,
2020.
Wittman, Tyler. God and Creation in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
Yong, Amos. Spirit-Word-Community: Theological Hermeneutics in Trinitarian Perspective.
Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2006. Reprint, Ashgate 2002.
———. Dialogical Spirit: Christian Reason and Theological Method in the Third Millennium.
Cambridge, United Kingdom: James Clarke & Co., 2015.

